Bill Text: CT SB01062 | 2013 | General Assembly | Comm Sub


Bill Title: An Act Concerning The Recommendations Of The Connecticut Sentencing Commission Regarding The Sentencing Of A Child Convicted Of A Felony Offense.

Spectrum: Moderate Partisan Bill (Democrat 9-1)

Status: (Introduced - Dead) 2013-05-02 - File Number 681 [SB01062 Detail]

Download: Connecticut-2013-SB01062-Comm_Sub.html

General Assembly

 

Substitute Bill No. 1062

    January Session, 2013

 

*_____SB01062JUD___041713____*

AN ACT CONCERNING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CONNECTICUT SENTENCING COMMISSION REGARDING THE SENTENCING OF A CHILD CONVICTED OF A FELONY OFFENSE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened:

Section 1. (NEW) (Effective October 1, 2013) (a) If the case of a child, as defined in section 46b-120 of the general statutes, charged with the commission of a felony is transferred to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court pursuant to section 46b-127 of the general statutes, as amended by this act, and the child is convicted pursuant to such transfer, the court shall consider mitigating factors at the time of sentencing, including, but not limited to, the following:

(1) The age and maturity of the child at the time of the offense;

(2) The child's history of trauma, abuse or neglect;

(3) The child's history of mental illness or substance abuse;

(4) The intellectual capacity and educational history of the child;

(5) The child's family and community environment, including the child's ability to extricate himself or herself from such environment;

(6) The child's level of participation in the offense;

(7) The degree of peer or familial influence or pressure on the child;

(8) The impetuosity of the child;

(9) The ability of the child to appreciate the risks and consequences of the child's conduct;

(10) The ability of the child to navigate the criminal justice system and participate meaningfully in his or her defense;

(11) The capacity for rehabilitation of such child and the opportunities for rehabilitation of such child in the community and in an adult prison environment; and

(12) Any scientific and psychological evidence showing the differences between a child's brain development and an adult's brain development.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 54-91a of the general statutes, no presentence investigation or report may be waived with respect to a child convicted of a class A or B felony. With respect to a child convicted of a class C or D felony or an unclassified felony, the presentence investigation and report may be waived by the child only upon approval by the court. Any presentence report prepared with respect to a child shall address the factors set forth in subdivisions (1) to (12), inclusive, of subsection (a) of this section.

(c) The Court Support Services Division of the Judicial Branch shall establish reference materials relating to adolescent psychological and brain development to assist courts in sentencing children pursuant to this section.

Sec. 2. Subsection (c) of section 46b-127 of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective October 1, 2013):

(c) Upon the effectuation of the transfer, such child shall stand trial and be sentenced, if convicted, as if such child were eighteen years of age, subject to the requirements of section 1 of this act. Such child shall receive credit against any sentence imposed for time served in a juvenile facility prior to the effectuation of the transfer. A child who has been transferred may enter a guilty plea to a lesser offense if the court finds that such plea is made knowingly and voluntarily. Any child transferred to the regular criminal docket who pleads guilty to a lesser offense shall not resume such child's status as a juvenile regarding such offense. If the action is dismissed or nolled or if such child is found not guilty of the charge for which such child was transferred or of any lesser included offenses, the child shall resume such child's status as a juvenile until such child attains the age of eighteen years.

Sec. 3. Subsection (f) of section 46b-133c of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective October 1, 2013):

(f) Whenever a proceeding has been designated a serious juvenile repeat offender prosecution pursuant to subsection (b) of this section and the child does not waive such child's right to a trial by jury, the court shall transfer the case from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court. Upon transfer, such child shall stand trial and be sentenced, if convicted, as if such child were eighteen years of age, subject to the requirements of section 1 of this act, except that no such child shall be placed in a correctional facility but shall be maintained in a facility for children and youths until such child attains eighteen years of age or until such child is sentenced, whichever occurs first. Such child shall receive credit against any sentence imposed for time served in a juvenile facility prior to the effectuation of the transfer. A child who has been transferred may enter a guilty plea to a lesser offense if the court finds that such plea is made knowingly and voluntarily. Any child transferred to the regular criminal docket who pleads guilty to a lesser offense shall not resume such child's status as a juvenile regarding such offense. If the action is dismissed or nolled or if such child is found not guilty of the charge for which such child was transferred, the child shall resume such child's status as a juvenile until such child attains eighteen years of age.

Sec. 4. Subsection (f) of section 46b-133d of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective October 1, 2013):

(f) When a proceeding has been designated a serious sexual offender prosecution pursuant to subsection (c) of this section and the child does not waive the right to a trial by jury, the court shall transfer the case from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court. Upon transfer, such child shall stand trial and be sentenced, if convicted, as if such child were eighteen years of age, subject to the requirements of section 1 of this act, except that no such child shall be placed in a correctional facility but shall be maintained in a facility for children and youths until such child attains eighteen years of age or until such child is sentenced, whichever occurs first. Such child shall receive credit against any sentence imposed for time served in a juvenile facility prior to the effectuation of the transfer. A child who has been transferred may enter a guilty plea to a lesser offense if the court finds that such plea is made knowingly and voluntarily. Any child transferred to the regular criminal docket who pleads guilty to a lesser offense shall not resume such child's status as a juvenile regarding such offense. If the action is dismissed or nolled or if such child is found not guilty of the charge for which such child was transferred, the child shall resume such child's status as a juvenile until such child attains eighteen years of age.

Sec. 5. Section 53a-46a of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective October 1, 2013, and applicable to any person convicted prior to, on or after said date):

(a) A person shall be subjected to the penalty of death for a capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012, under the provisions of section 53a-54b, as amended by this act, in effect prior to April 25, 2012, only if (1) a hearing is held in accordance with the provisions of this section, and (2) such person was eighteen years of age or older at the time the offense was committed.

(b) For the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed when a defendant is convicted of or pleads guilty to a capital felony, the judge or judges who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered shall conduct a separate hearing to determine the existence of any mitigating factor concerning the defendant's character, background and history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, and any aggravating factor set forth in subsection (i) of this section. Such hearing shall not be held if the state stipulates that none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section exists or that any factor set forth in subsection (h) of this section exists. Such hearing shall be conducted (1) before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt, or (2) before a jury impaneled for the purpose of such hearing if (A) the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty; (B) the defendant was convicted after a trial before three judges as provided in subsection (b) of section 53a-45; or (C) if the jury which determined the defendant's guilt has been discharged by the court for good cause, or (3) before the court, on motion of the defendant and with the approval of the court and the consent of the state.

(c) In such hearing the court shall disclose to the defendant or his counsel all material contained in any presentence report which may have been prepared. No presentence information withheld from the defendant shall be considered in determining the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. Any information relevant to any mitigating factor may be presented by either the state or the defendant, regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence in trials of criminal matters, but the admissibility of information relevant to any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section shall be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence in such trials. The state and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any information received at the hearing and shall be given fair opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of the information to establish the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. The burden of establishing any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section shall be on the state. The burden of establishing any mitigating factor shall be on the defendant.

(d) In determining whether a mitigating factor exists concerning the defendant's character, background or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall first determine whether a particular factor concerning the defendant's character, background or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, has been established by the evidence, and shall determine further whether that factor is mitigating in nature, considering all the facts and circumstances of the case. Mitigating factors are such as do not constitute a defense or excuse for the capital felony of which the defendant has been convicted, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as tending either to extenuate or reduce the degree of his culpability or blame for the offense or to otherwise constitute a basis for a sentence less than death.

(e) The jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall return a special verdict setting forth its findings as to the existence of any factor set forth in subsection (h) of this section, the existence of any aggravating factor or factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section and whether any aggravating factor or factors outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist pursuant to subsection (d) of this section.

(f) If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds that (1) none of the factors set forth in subsection (h) of this section exist, (2) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section exist and (3) (A) no mitigating factor exists or (B) one or more mitigating factors exist but are outweighed by one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section, the court shall sentence the defendant to death.

(g) If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds that (1) any of the factors set forth in subsection (h) of this section exist, or (2) none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section exists, or (3) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section exist and one or more mitigating factors exist, but the one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section do not outweigh the one or more mitigating factors, the court shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.

(h) The court shall not impose the sentence of death on the defendant if the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds by a special verdict, as provided in subsection (e) of this section, that at the time of the offense (1) the defendant was [under the age of eighteen years, or (2) the defendant was] a person with intellectual disability, as defined in section 1-1g, or [(3)] (2) the defendant's mental capacity was significantly impaired or the defendant's ability to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired but not so impaired in either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or [(4)] (3) the defendant was criminally liable under sections 53a-8, 53a-9 and 53a-10 for the offense, which was committed by another, but the defendant's participation in such offense was relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or [(5)] (4) the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that the defendant's conduct in the course of commission of the offense of which the defendant was convicted would cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death to another person.

(i) The aggravating factors to be considered shall be limited to the following: (1) The defendant committed the offense during the commission or attempted commission of, or during the immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of, a felony and the defendant had previously been convicted of the same felony; or (2) the defendant committed the offense after having been convicted of two or more state offenses or two or more federal offenses or of one or more state offenses and one or more federal offenses for each of which a penalty of more than one year imprisonment may be imposed, which offenses were committed on different occasions and which involved the infliction of serious bodily injury upon another person; or (3) the defendant committed the offense and in such commission knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense; or (4) the defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner; or (5) the defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value; or (6) the defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value; or (7) the defendant committed the offense with an assault weapon, as defined in section 53-202a; or (8) the defendant committed the offense set forth in subdivision (1) of section 53a-54b, as amended by this act, to avoid arrest for a criminal act or prevent detection of a criminal act or to hamper or prevent the victim from carrying out any act within the scope of the victim's official duties or to retaliate against the victim for the performance of the victim's official duties.

Sec. 6. Section 53a-54b of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective October 1, 2013, and applicable to any person convicted prior to, on or after said date):

A person is guilty of murder with special circumstances who is convicted of any of the following and was eighteen years of age or older when such person committed the murder: (1) Murder of a member of the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or of any local police department, a chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice, a state marshal who is exercising authority granted under any provision of the general statutes, a judicial marshal in performance of the duties of a judicial marshal, a constable who performs criminal law enforcement duties, a special policeman appointed under section 29-18, a conservation officer or special conservation officer appointed by the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection under the provisions of section 26-5, an employee of the Department of Correction or a person providing services on behalf of said department when such employee or person is acting within the scope of such employee's or person's employment or duties in a correctional institution or facility and the actor is confined in such institution or facility, or any firefighter, while such victim was acting within the scope of such victim's duties; (2) murder committed by a defendant who is hired to commit the same for pecuniary gain or murder committed by one who is hired by the defendant to commit the same for pecuniary gain; (3) murder committed by one who has previously been convicted of intentional murder or of murder committed in the course of commission of a felony; (4) murder committed by one who was, at the time of commission of the murder, under sentence of life imprisonment; (5) murder by a kidnapper of a kidnapped person during the course of the kidnapping or before such person is able to return or be returned to safety; (6) murder committed in the course of the commission of sexual assault in the first degree; (7) murder of two or more persons at the same time or in the course of a single transaction; or (8) murder of a person under sixteen years of age.

Sec. 7. Section 53a-54d of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective October 1, 2013, and applicable to any person convicted prior to, on or after said date):

A person is guilty of murder when, acting either alone or with one or more persons, he commits arson and, in the course of such arson, causes the death of a person. Notwithstanding any other provision of the general statutes, any person convicted of murder under this section who was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the offense shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall not be eligible for parole.

Sec. 8. Subsection (c) of section 53a-54a of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective October 1, 2013, and applicable to any person convicted prior to, on or after said date):

(c) Murder is punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subdivision (2) of section 53a-35a unless it is (1) a capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012, by a person who was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the offense, punishable in accordance with subparagraph (A) of subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a, (2) murder with special circumstances committed on or after April 25, 2012, by a person who was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the offense, punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subparagraph (B) of subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a, or (3) murder under section 53a-54d, as amended by this act, committed by a person who was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the offense.

This act shall take effect as follows and shall amend the following sections:

Section 1

October 1, 2013

New section

Sec. 2

October 1, 2013

46b-127(c)

Sec. 3

October 1, 2013

46b-133c(f)

Sec. 4

October 1, 2013

46b-133d(f)

Sec. 5

October 1, 2013, and applicable to any person convicted prior to, on or after said date

53a-46a

Sec. 6

October 1, 2013, and applicable to any person convicted prior to, on or after said date

53a-54b

Sec. 7

October 1, 2013, and applicable to any person convicted prior to, on or after said date

53a-54d

Sec. 8

October 1, 2013, and applicable to any person convicted prior to, on or after said date

53a-54a(c)

JUD

Joint Favorable Subst.

 
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