Bill Text: CA AB2542 | 2019-2020 | Regular Session | Amended

NOTE: There are more recent revisions of this legislation. Read Latest Draft

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Bill Title: Criminal procedure: discrimination.

Spectrum: Partisan Bill (Democrat 18-0)

Status: (Passed) 2020-09-30 - Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 317, Statutes of 2020. [AB2542 Detail]

Download: California-2019-AB2542-Amended.html

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Amended  IN  Senate  July 01, 2020

CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE— 2019–2020 REGULAR SESSION

Assembly Bill

No. 2542

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Introduced by Assembly Member Kalra
(Principal coauthors: Senators Bradford, Lena Gonzalez, and Mitchell)
(Coauthors: Assembly Members Bonta, Chu, Friedman, Kamlager, Levine, McCarty, Mark Stone, Robert Rivas, Ting, and Weber)
(Coauthors: Senators Durazo and Wiener)

February 19, 2020

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An act to amend Sections 99243 and 99243.5 of the Public Utilities Code, relating to transportation. An act to amend Section 1473 of, and to add Section 745 to, the Penal Code, relating to criminal procedure.

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 2542, as amended, Kalra. Local transportation funds: State Transit Assistance Program: reports. Criminal procedure: discrimination.

Existing law generally prescribes the procedure for the prosecution of persons arrested for committing a crime, including pleadings, bail, pretrial proceedings, trial, judgment, sentencing, and appeals. Existing law allows a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of their imprisonment or restraint. Existing law allows a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted for, among other things, relief based on the use of false evidence that is substantially material or probative to the issue of guilt or punishment that was introduced at trial.

This bill would prohibit the state from seeking a criminal conviction or sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin, as specified. The bill would allow a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted on the basis of that prohibition. The bill would require the prosecution to disclose, pursuant to a written request, all evidence relevant to a potential violation of that prohibition. By expanding the duties of local prosecutors, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program. The bill would require a court that finds a violation of that prohibition to dispose of the case against the defendant as specified. The bill would apply its provisions to adjudications and dispositions in the juvenile justice system.

The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.

This bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.

Existing law, for purposes of the State Transit Assistance Program, requires local transportation agencies to report to the Controller by June 15 of each year the public transportation operators within its jurisdiction that are eligible to claim specified local transportation funds.

This bill would instead require local transportation agencies to report this information within 7 months after the end of each fiscal year.

Existing law requires the Controller to submit an annual report to the Legislature on the revenues available and expenditures made with regard to local transportation funds available for public transportation and other purposes in each county within 3 months of receiving specified annual reports regarding the expenditure of those funds for public transit purposes and specified information regarding the expenditure of those funds for streets and highways purposes.

This bill would no longer require the Controller to submit this annual report to the Legislature and would instead require the Controller to compile, publish, and make publicly available on the Controller’s internet website this data and information on or before November 1 of each year.

Digest Key

Vote: MAJORITY   Appropriation: NO   Fiscal Committee: YES   Local Program: NOYES  

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Bill Text

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

SECTION 1.

 This act shall be known and may be cited as the California Racial Justice Act of 2020.

SEC. 2.

 The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:

(a) Discrimination in our criminal justice system based on race, ethnicity, or national origin (hereafter “race” or “racial bias”) has a deleterious effect not only on individual criminal defendants but on our system of justice as a whole. The United States Supreme Court has said: “Discrimination on the basis of race, odious in all respects, is especially pernicious in the administration of justice.” (Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979) (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946))). The United States Supreme Court has also recognized “the impact of … evidence [of racial bias] cannot be measured simply by how much air time it received at trial or how many pages it occupies in the record. Some toxins can be deadly in small doses.” (Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 777 (2017)). Discrimination undermines public confidence in the fairness of the state’s system of justice and deprives Californians of equal justice under law.

(b) A United States Supreme Court Justice has observed, “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination.” (Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary, 572 U.S. 291, 380-81 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)). We cannot simply accept the stark reality that race pervades our system of justice. Rather, we must acknowledge and seek to remedy that reality and create a fair system of justice that upholds our democratic ideals.

(c) Even though racial bias is widely acknowledged as intolerable in our criminal justice system, it nevertheless persists because courts generally only address racial bias in its most extreme and blatant forms. More and more judges in California and across the country are recognizing that current law, as interpreted by the high courts, is insufficient to address discrimination in our justice system. (State v. Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d 34, 35 (2013); Ellis v. Harrison, 891 F.3rd 1160, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2018) (Nguyen, J., concurring), reh’g en banc granted Jan. 30, 2019; Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986); People v. Bryant, 40 Cal.App.5th 525 (2019) (Humes, J., concurring)). Even when racism clearly infects a criminal proceeding, under current legal precedent, proof of purposeful discrimination is often required, but nearly impossible to establish. For example, one justice on the California Court of Appeals recently observed the legal standards for preventing racial bias in jury selection are ineffective, observing that “requiring a showing of purposeful discrimination sets a high standard that is difficult to prove in any context.” (Bryant, 40 Cal.App.5th 525 (Humes, J., concurring)).

(d) Current legal precedent often results in courts sanctioning racism in criminal trials. Existing precedent countenances racially biased testimony, including expert testimony, and arguments in criminal trials. A court upheld a conviction based in part on an expert’s racist testimony that people of Indian descent are predisposed to commit bribery. (United States v. Shah, 768 Fed. Appx. 637, 640 (9th Cir. 2019)). Existing precedent has provided no recourse for a defendant whose own attorney harbors racial animus towards the defendant’s racial group, or toward the defendant, even where the attorney routinely used racist language and “harbor[ed] deep and utter contempt” for the defendant’s racial group (Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 924-25 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); id. at 939-40 (Graber, J., dissenting)). Existing precedent holds that appellate courts must defer to the rulings of judges who make racially biased comments during jury selection. (People v. Williams, 56 Cal. 4th 630, 652 (2013); see also id. at 700 (Liu, J., concurring)).

(e) Existing precedent tolerates the use of racially incendiary or racially coded language, images, and racial stereotypes in criminal trials. For example, courts have upheld convictions in cases where prosecutors have compared defendants who are people of color to Bengal tigers and other animals, even while acknowledging that such statements are “highly offensive and inappropriate” (Duncan v. Ornoski, 286 Fed. Appx. 361, 363 (9th Cir. 2008); see also People v. Powell, 6 Cal.5th 136, 182-83 (2018)). Because use of animal imagery is historically associated with racism, use of animal imagery in reference to a defendant is racially discriminatory and should not be permitted in our court system (Phillip Atiba Goff, Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Melissa J. Williams, and Matthew Christian Jackson, Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (2008) Vol. 94, No. 2, 292-293; Praatika Prasad, Implicit Racial Biases in Prosecutorial Summations: Proposing an Integrated Response, 86 Fordham Law Review, Volume 86, Issue 6, Article 24 3091, 3105-06 (2018)).

(f) Existing precedent also accepts racial disparities in our criminal justice system as inevitable. Most famously, in 1987, the United States Supreme Court found that there was “a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race” in death penalty cases in Georgia, but the court would not intervene without proof of a discriminatory purpose, concluding that we must simply accept these disparities as “an inevitable part of our criminal justice system” (McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 295-99, 312 (1987)). In dissent, one Justice described this as “a fear of too much justice” (Id. at p. 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).

(g) Current law, as interpreted by the courts, stands in sharp contrast to this Legislature’s commitment to “ameliorate bias-based injustice in the courtroom” subdivision (b) of Section 1 of Chapter 418 of the Statutes of 2019 (Assembly Bill 242). The Legislature has acknowledged that all persons possess implicit biases (Id. at Section 1(a)(1)), that these biases impact the criminal justice system (Id. at Section (1)(a)(5)), and that negative implicit biases tend to disfavor people of color (Id. at Section (1)(a)(3)-(4)). In California in 2020, we can no longer accept racial discrimination and racial disparities as inevitable in our criminal justice system and we must act to make clear that this discrimination and these disparities are illegal and will not be tolerated in California, both prospectively and retroactively.

(h) There is growing awareness that no degree or amount of racial bias is tolerable in a fair and just criminal justice system, that racial bias is often insidious, and that purposeful discrimination is often masked and racial animus disguised. The examples described here are but a few select instances of intolerable racism infecting decisionmaking in the criminal justice system. Examples of the racism that pervades the criminal justice system are too numerous to list.

(i) It is the intent of the Legislature to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system because racism in any form or amount, at any stage of a criminal trial, is intolerable, inimical to a fair criminal justice system, and violates the laws and Constitution of the State of California. It is the intent of the Legislature to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing. It is the intent of the Legislature to reject the conclusion that racial disparities within our criminal justice are inevitable, and to actively work to eradicate them.

(j) It is the further intent of the Legislature to provide remedies that will eliminate racially discriminatory practices in the criminal justice system, in addition to intentional discrimination. It is the further intent of the Legislature to ensure that individuals have access to all relevant evidence, including statistical evidence, regarding potential discrimination in seeking or obtaining convictions or imposing sentences.

SEC. 3.

 Section 745 is added to the Penal Code, immediately following Section 740, to read:

745.

 (a) The state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.

(b) A violation of subdivision (a) is established if the defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, any of the following:

(1) The judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.

(2) In court and during the criminal proceedings, the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror, used racially discriminatory language or otherwise demonstrated bias or animus based on race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful or directed at a defendant.

(3) Race, ethnicity, or national origin was a factor in the exercise of peremptory challenges. The defendant need not show that purposeful discrimination occurred in the exercise of peremptory challenges to demonstrate a violation of subdivision (a).

(4) The prosecution sought or obtained a conviction for an offense for which convictions are more frequently sought or obtained against people who share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin than for defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained.

(5) (A) A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for that offense on people that share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin than on defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where sentencing occurred.

(B) A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for the same offense on defendants in cases with victims of one race, ethnicity, or national origin than in cases with victims of other races, ethnicities, or national origins, in the county where the sentence was imposed.

(c) Based on evidence of a violation of subdivision (a), a defendant may file a motion in the trial court or, if judgment has been imposed, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion under Section 1473.7 in a court of competent jurisdiction.

(d) If a motion is filed in trial court, the court shall hold a hearing and make findings on the record. Evidence may be presented in the form of statistical evidence, aggregate data, the sworn testimony of attorneys, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, jurors, or other members of the criminal justice system, or in any other form the court deems relevant and appropriate, consistent with the rules of evidence. The prosecution may offer evidence in rebuttal of the defendant’s evidence, including statistical evidence or evidence of training and policies to address explicit or implicit bias. The court may appoint an independent expert. The defendant shall have the burden of proving a violation of subdivision (a) by a preponderance of the evidence.

(e) Pursuant to a written request, the prosecution shall disclose to the defense all evidence relevant to a potential violation of subdivision (a). If the prosecution has reason to believe that relevant evidence is in the possession of another law enforcement agency, the prosecution shall request that information and disclose it to the defense. Upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit the prosecution to redact information prior to disclosure.

(f) Notwithstanding any other law, if the court finds, by a preponderance of evidence, a violation of subdivision (a), the following remedies shall be imposed:

(1) Before a judgment has been entered, the court may reseat a juror removed by use of a peremptory challenge, declare a mistrial, discharge the jury panel and empanel a new jury, or dismiss or reduce one or more charges. Monetary sanctions and training alone are not sufficient as a remedy.

(2) (A) When a judgment has been entered, if the court finds that a conviction was sought or obtained in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with subdivision (a).

(B) When a judgment has been entered, if the court finds that only the sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall vacate the sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and impose a new sentence. On resentencing, the court shall not impose a new sentence greater than that previously imposed.

(3) When the court finds there has been a violation of subdivision (a), the defendant shall not be eligible for the death penalty.

(g) This section also applies to adjudications and dispositions in the juvenile justice system.

(h) This section shall not prevent the prosecution of hate crimes pursuant to Sections 422.6 to 422.865, inclusive.

(i) As used in this section, the following definitions apply:

(1) “More frequently sought or obtained” or “more frequently imposed” means that statistical evidence or aggregate data demonstrate a significant difference in seeking or obtaining convictions or in imposing sentences comparing individuals who have committed similar offenses and the prosecution cannot establish race-neutral reasons for the disparity.

(2) “Racially discriminatory language” means language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, racially charged or racially coded language, language that compares the defendant to an animal, or language that references the defendant’s physical appearance, culture, ethnicity, or national origin. Evidence that particular words or images are used exclusively or disproportionately in cases where the defendant is of a specific race, ethnicity, or national origin is relevant to determining whether language is discriminatory.

(3) “State” includes the Attorney General, a district attorney, a city prosecutor, or a superior court judge.

(j) A defendant may share a race, ethnicity, or national origin with more than one group. A defendant may aggregate data among groups to demonstrate a violation of subdivision (a).

SEC. 3.5.

 Section 745 is added to the Penal Code, immediately following Section 740, to read:

745.

 (a) The state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.

(b) A violation of subdivision (a) is established if the defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, any of the following:

(1) The judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.

(2) In court and during the criminal proceedings, the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror, used racially discriminatory language or otherwise demonstrated bias or animus based on race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful or directed at a defendant.

(3) If jury selection was completed prior to January 1, 2021, race, ethnicity, or national origin was a factor in the exercise of peremptory challenges. The defendant need not show that purposeful discrimination occurred in the exercise of peremptory challenges to demonstrate a violation of subdivision (a).

(4) The prosecution sought or obtained a conviction for an offense for which convictions are more frequently sought or obtained against people who share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin than for defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained.

(5) (A) A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for that offense on people that share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin than on defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where sentencing occurred.

(B) A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for the same offense on defendants in cases with victims of one race, ethnicity, or national origin than in cases with victims of other races, ethnicities, or national origins, in the county where the sentence was imposed.

(c) Based on evidence of a violation of subdivision (a), a defendant may file a motion in the trial court or, if judgment has been imposed, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion under Section 1473.7 in a court of competent jurisdiction.

(d) If a motion is filed in trial court, the court shall hold a hearing and make findings on the record. Evidence may be presented in the form of statistical evidence, aggregate data, the sworn testimony of attorneys, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, jurors, or other members of the criminal justice system, or in any other form the court deems relevant and appropriate, consistent with the rules of evidence. The prosecution may offer evidence in rebuttal of the defendant’s evidence, including statistical evidence or evidence of training and policies to address explicit or implicit bias. The court may appoint an independent expert. The defendant shall have the burden of proving a violation of subdivision (a) by a preponderance of the evidence.

(e) Pursuant to a written request, the prosecution shall disclose to the defense all evidence relevant to a potential violation of subdivision (a). If the prosecution has reason to believe that relevant evidence is in the possession of another law enforcement agency, the prosecution shall request that information and disclose it to the defense. Upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit the prosecution to redact information prior to disclosure.

(f) Notwithstanding any other law, if the court finds, by a preponderance of evidence, a violation of subdivision (a), the following remedies shall be imposed:

(1) Before a judgment has been entered, the court may reseat a juror removed by use of a peremptory challenge, declare a mistrial, discharge the jury panel and empanel a new jury, or dismiss or reduce one or more charges. Monetary sanctions and training alone are not sufficient as a remedy.

(2) (A) When a judgment has been entered, if the court finds that a conviction was sought or obtained in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with subdivision (a).

(B) When a judgment has been entered, if the court finds that only the sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall vacate the sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and impose a new sentence. On resentencing, the court shall not impose a new sentence greater than that previously imposed.

(3) When the court finds there has been a violation of subdivision (a), the defendant shall not be eligible for the death penalty.

(g) This section also applies to adjudications and dispositions in the juvenile justice system.

(h) This section shall not prevent the prosecution of hate crimes pursuant to Sections 422.6 to 422.865, inclusive.

(i) As used in this section, the following definitions apply:

(1) “More frequently sought or obtained” or “more frequently imposed” means that statistical evidence or aggregate data demonstrate a significant difference in seeking or obtaining convictions or in imposing sentences comparing individuals who have committed similar offenses and the prosecution cannot establish race-neutral reasons for the disparity.

(2) “Racially discriminatory language” means language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, racially charged or racially coded language, language that compares the defendant to an animal, or language that references the defendant’s physical appearance, culture, ethnicity, or national origin. Evidence that particular words or images are used exclusively or disproportionately in cases where the defendant is of a specific race, ethnicity, or national origin is relevant to determining whether language is discriminatory.

(3) “State” includes the Attorney General, a district attorney, a city prosecutor, or a superior court judge.

(j) A defendant may share a race, ethnicity, or national origin with more than one group. A defendant may aggregate data among groups to demonstrate a violation of subdivision (a).

SEC. 4.

 Section 1473 of the Penal Code is amended to read:

1473.

 (a) A person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, restrained, under any pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of his or her the imprisonment or restraint.

(b) A writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:

(1) False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to his or her the person’s incarceration.

(2) False physical evidence, believed by a person to be factual, probative, or material on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty, which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person.

(3) (A) New evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.

(B) For purposes of this section, “new evidence” means evidence that has been discovered after trial, that could not have been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence, and is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching.

(c) Any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (b) is immaterial to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b).

(d) This section does not limit the grounds for which a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted or preclude the use of any other remedies.

(e) (1) For purposes of this section, “false evidence” includes opinions of experts that have either been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that have been undermined by later scientific research or technological advances.

(2) This section does not create additional liabilities, beyond those already recognized, for an expert who repudiates his or her the original opinion provided at a hearing or trial or whose opinion has been undermined by later scientific research or technological advancements.

(f) Notwithstanding any other law, a writ of habeas corpus may also be prosecuted based on evidence that a criminal conviction or sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 745. A petition raising a claim of this nature for the first time, or on the basis of new discovery provided by the state or other new evidence that could not have been previously known by the petitioner with due diligence, shall not be deemed successive. If the petitioner already has a habeas corpus petition on file in state court, but it has not yet been decided, the petitioner may amend the existing petition with a claim that the petitioner’s conviction or sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 745. The petition shall state if the petitioner requests appointment of counsel and the court shall appoint counsel if requested. Newly appointed counsel may amend a petition filed before their appointment. The court shall review a petition raising a claim pursuant to Section 745 and shall determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause why relief shall not be granted and hold an evidentiary hearing, unless the state declines to show cause. If the court determines that the petitioner has not established a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court shall state the factual and legal basis for its conclusion on the record or issue a written order detailing the factual and legal basis for its conclusion.

SEC. 5.

 Section 3.5 of this bill shall only become operative if Assembly Bill 3070 is enacted and becomes effective on or before January 1, 2021, in which case Section 3 of this bill shall not become operative.

SEC. 6.

 If the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.

SECTION 1.Section 99243 of the Public Utilities Code is amended to read:

99243.

(a)The Controller, in cooperation with the department and the operators, shall design and adopt a uniform system of accounts and records, from which the operators shall prepare and submit annual reports of their operation to transportation planning agencies, county transportation commissions, or the San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Board having jurisdiction over them and to the Controller within seven months after the end of the fiscal year. The report shall contain underlying data from audited financial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, if this data is available. The report shall specify (1) the amount of revenue generated from each source and its application for the prior fiscal year, and (2) the data necessary to determine which section, with respect to Sections 99268.1, 99268.2, 99268.3, 99268.4, 99268.5, and 99268.9, the operator is required to be in compliance in order to be eligible for funds under this article.

(b)(1)For the purposes of the State Transit Assistance Program, which is governed by Sections 99312 to 99314.9, inclusive, the Controller shall provide a mechanism for each transportation planning agency, county transportation commission, and the San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Board to report to the Controller those operators within its jurisdiction that are STA-eligible operators, as defined in paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) of Section 99312.2.

(2)The mechanism shall require each transportation planning agency, county transportation commission, and the San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Board to report to the Controller those STA-eligible operators within its jurisdiction that are both:

(A)Eligible to claim local transportation funds under either Article 4 (commencing with Section 99260) or Article 8 (commencing with Section 99400), or under both articles.

(B)A public transportation operator, as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 99312.2.

(3)The Controller shall rely upon that verification to determine whether or not an operator is an STA-eligible operator pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) of Section 99312.2. The transportation planning agency, county transportation commission, and the San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Board shall provide this information to the Controller within seven months after the end of each fiscal year.

(c)As a supplement to the annual report prepared pursuant to subdivision (a), each operator shall include an estimate of the amount of revenues to be generated from each source and its proposed application for the next fiscal year, and a report on the extent to which it has contracted with the Prison Industry Authority, including the nature and dollar amounts of all contracts entered into during the reporting period and proposed for the next reporting period.

(d)The Controller shall instruct the county auditor to withhold payments from the fund to an operator that has not submitted its annual report to the Controller within the time specified by subdivision (a).

(e)In establishing the uniform system of accounts and records, the Controller shall include the data required by the United States Department of Transportation and the department.

(f)Notwithstanding any other law or any regulation, including any California Code of Regulations provision, the City of El Segundo, the City of Huntington Beach, the City of Inglewood, the City of Long Beach, or the City of South Lake Tahoe may select, for purposes of this chapter, on a one-time basis, a fiscal year that does not end on June 30. After the city has sent a written notice to the Secretary of Transportation and the Controller that the city has selected a fiscal year other than one ending on June 30, the fiscal year selected by the city shall be its fiscal year for all reports required by the state under this chapter.

SEC. 2.Section 99243.5 of the Public Utilities Code is amended to read:

99243.5.

(a)On the basis of data in the annual reports submitted pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 99243 and the information submitted pursuant to Section 99406 to the Controller, the Controller shall compile, publish, and make publicly available on the Controller’s internet website the submitted data and information on or before November 1 of each year.

(b)The Controller shall take steps as the Controller deems necessary to ensure that the data and information submitted are adequate and accurate.