Bill Text: TX SB330 | 2023-2024 | 88th Legislature | Comm Sub
Bill Title: Relating to the resilience of the electric grid and certain municipalities.
Sponsorship: Broadly Bipartisan Bill
Status: (Engrossed - Dead) 2023-05-23 - Placed on General State Calendar [SB330 Detail]
Download: Texas-2023-SB330-Comm_Sub.html
| By: Hall, et al. | S.B. No. 330 | |
| (Schaefer, Spiller, Anderson) | ||
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| relating to the resilience of the electric grid and certain | ||
| municipalities. | ||
| BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: | ||
| SECTION 1. The legislature finds that: | ||
| (1) electric grid outages threaten the lives of the | ||
| citizens of this state and pose a disproportionately large risk to: | ||
| (A) the elderly, vulnerable, and underprivileged | ||
| within this state; and | ||
| (B) communities facing disproportionate | ||
| environmental health burdens and population vulnerabilities | ||
| relating to facilities such as chemical plants and refineries that | ||
| can become environmental disaster areas when taken off-line due to | ||
| loss of electricity; | ||
| (2) the 16 critical infrastructures identified in | ||
| President Barack Obama's Presidential Policy Directive "Critical | ||
| Infrastructure Security and Resilience" (PPD-21) including water | ||
| and wastewater systems, food and agriculture, communications | ||
| systems, the energy sector including refineries and fuel | ||
| distribution systems, chemical plants, the financial sector, | ||
| hospitals and health care facilities, law enforcement and | ||
| government facilities, nuclear reactors, and other critical | ||
| functions depend on the electric grid in this state and make the | ||
| grid's protection vital to the economy of this nation and homeland | ||
| security; | ||
| (3) the power outage that occurred in this state in | ||
| February 2021 caused: | ||
| (A) death and suffering in this state; | ||
| (B) economic loss to this state's economy; | ||
| (C) impacts to all critical infrastructures in | ||
| this state; | ||
| (D) the dispatch of generation units that likely | ||
| exceeded limits established by the Environmental Protection Agency | ||
| for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, mercury, and carbon monoxide | ||
| emissions and wastewater release limits; | ||
| (E) radically increased pricing of electricity | ||
| that resulted in making electric power bills unaffordable to many | ||
| customers across this state; and | ||
| (F) the exacerbation of the COVID-19 pandemic | ||
| risk by forcing many of the state's citizens to consolidate at | ||
| warming centers and in other small spaces where warmth for survival | ||
| superseded social distancing protocols; | ||
| (4) a previous large-scale power outage occurred in | ||
| this state in February 2011 during which 4.4 million customers were | ||
| affected; | ||
| (5) this state is uniquely positioned to prevent power | ||
| outages because this state is a net exporter of energy and is the | ||
| only state with an electric grid almost exclusively within its | ||
| territorial boundaries; | ||
| (6) the 2011 and 2021 power outages call into | ||
| question: | ||
| (A) whether too much risk has been accepted | ||
| regarding weatherization of electric generation infrastructure; | ||
| (B) whether this state lacks the internal | ||
| distribution structure and control systems to manage rolling | ||
| outages; and | ||
| (C) whether sufficient resources have been | ||
| allocated toward overall grid resilience; | ||
| (7) public confidence in the resilience of the | ||
| electric grid in this state is essential to ensuring economic | ||
| prosperity, domestic tranquility, continuity of government, and | ||
| life-sustaining systems; | ||
| (8) a resilient electric grid that offers businesses | ||
| in this state continuity of operations in the event of a natural or | ||
| man-made disaster will be an unrivaled attraction for businesses to | ||
| expand or move their operations to this state and for protecting | ||
| what is important to this state, including its military | ||
| installations and its environment; | ||
| (9) current market incentives and regulations are not | ||
| sufficient for electric utilities to: | ||
| (A) prioritize grid security and resilience; and | ||
| (B) protect the grid against hazards; | ||
| (10) protection of the electric grid in this state | ||
| against hazards would assure businesses and the citizens of this | ||
| state that the "lights will be back on first in Texas" in the event | ||
| of a nationwide catastrophe affecting electric infrastructure, | ||
| sparing catastrophic societal and environmental consequences for | ||
| this state; and | ||
| (11) when this state begins implementation of the plan | ||
| for all hazards resilience described by Section 44.006, Utilities | ||
| Code, as added by this Act, to protect the electric grid in this | ||
| state, short-term and long-term economic benefit will far exceed | ||
| even the most optimistic estimates of the conventional economic | ||
| incentives provided by tax abatements to attract businesses to this | ||
| state. | ||
| SECTION 2. Subtitle B, Title 2, Utilities Code, is amended | ||
| by adding Chapter 44 to read as follows: | ||
| CHAPTER 44. GRID RESILIENCE | ||
| Sec. 44.001. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter: | ||
| (1) "All hazards" means: | ||
| (A) terrestrial weather including wind, | ||
| hurricanes, tornadoes, flooding, ice storms, extended cold weather | ||
| events, heat waves, and wildfires; | ||
| (B) seismic events including earthquakes and | ||
| tsunamis; | ||
| (C) physical threats including terrorist attacks | ||
| with direct fire, drones, explosives, and other methods of physical | ||
| sabotage; | ||
| (D) cyber attacks including malware attacks and | ||
| hacking of unprotected or compromised information technology | ||
| networks; | ||
| (E) manipulation of operational technology | ||
| devices including sensors, actuators, and drives; | ||
| (F) electromagnetic threats through man-made | ||
| radio frequency weapons, high-altitude nuclear electromagnetic | ||
| pulse, and naturally occurring geomagnetic disturbances; | ||
| (G) electric generation supply chain | ||
| vulnerabilities including insecure or inadequate fuel | ||
| transportation or storage; and | ||
| (H) insider threats caused by compromised or | ||
| hostile personnel working within government or the utility | ||
| industry. | ||
| (2) "Micro-grid" means a group of interconnected loads | ||
| and distributed energy resources inside clearly defined electrical | ||
| boundaries. | ||
| (3) "Security commission" means the Texas Grid | ||
| Security Commission. | ||
| Sec. 44.002. TEXAS GRID SECURITY COMMISSION. (a) The Texas | ||
| Grid Security Commission is composed of the following members: | ||
| (1) a representative of the Texas Division of | ||
| Emergency Management appointed by the chief of that division; | ||
| (2) a representative of the commission appointed by | ||
| that commission; | ||
| (3) a representative of the Railroad Commission of | ||
| Texas appointed by that commission; | ||
| (4) a representative of the independent organization | ||
| certified under Section 39.151 for the ERCOT power region appointed | ||
| by the chief executive officer of that organization; | ||
| (5) a representative of power generation companies | ||
| appointed by the chief of the Texas Division of Emergency | ||
| Management; and | ||
| (6) a representative of transmission and distribution | ||
| utilities appointed by the chief of the Texas Division of Emergency | ||
| Management. | ||
| (b) The chief of the Texas Division of Emergency Management | ||
| may invite members or former members of the United States Air | ||
| Force's Electromagnetic Defense Task Force to advise the security | ||
| commission. | ||
| (c) The Texas Division of Emergency Management shall | ||
| designate a member of the security commission to serve as presiding | ||
| officer. | ||
| (d) The presiding officer may invite to advise the security | ||
| commission any person whose expertise the security commission | ||
| considers necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter. | ||
| (e) The security commission shall convene at the call of the | ||
| presiding officer. | ||
| (f) The security commission shall report to the chief of the | ||
| Texas Division of Emergency Management. | ||
| (g) A vacancy on the security commission is filled by | ||
| appointment for the unexpired term in the same manner as the | ||
| original appointment. | ||
| (h) To the extent possible, individuals appointed to the | ||
| security commission must be residents of this state. | ||
| (i) The presiding officer of the security commission or the | ||
| chief of the Texas Division of Emergency Management may invite | ||
| subject matter experts to advise the security commission, including | ||
| individuals recognized as experts in the fields of law enforcement, | ||
| emergency services, communications, water and sewer services, | ||
| health care, financial services, agriculture, transportation, | ||
| electricity markets, cybersecurity of grid control systems, | ||
| electromagnetic pulse mitigation, terrestrial and solar weather, | ||
| and micro-grids. The presiding officer may invite an individual | ||
| for this purpose regardless of whether the individual is a resident | ||
| of this state. | ||
| Sec. 44.003. GRID RESILIENCE INFORMATION. (a) Each of the | ||
| following members of the security commission shall apply for a | ||
| secret security clearance or an interim secret security clearance | ||
| to be granted by the federal government: | ||
| (1) the representative of the independent | ||
| organization certified under Section 39.151 for the ERCOT power | ||
| region; | ||
| (2) the representative of the Texas Division of | ||
| Emergency Management; and | ||
| (3) the representative of the commission. | ||
| (b) A member of the security commission listed under | ||
| Subsection (a) who is granted an applicable security clearance | ||
| under that subsection is a member of the information security | ||
| working group. | ||
| (c) The information security working group shall determine: | ||
| (1) which information created or obtained by the | ||
| security commission is confidential; | ||
| (2) which members of the security commission may | ||
| access which types of information received by the security | ||
| commission; and | ||
| (3) which members, other than members of the working | ||
| group, should apply for a secret security clearance or interim | ||
| clearance granted by the federal government. | ||
| (d) Information that the information security working group | ||
| determines is confidential under Subsection (c) shall be stored and | ||
| maintained by the independent organization certified under Section | ||
| 39.151 for the ERCOT power region. | ||
| (e) The security commission must maintain a reasonable | ||
| balance between public transparency and security for information | ||
| determined to be confidential under Subsection (c). | ||
| (f) Confidential information created or obtained by the | ||
| security commission is not subject to disclosure under Chapter 552, | ||
| Government Code. | ||
| (g) A meeting of the security commission that involves the | ||
| discussion of confidential information is not subject to Chapter | ||
| 551, Government Code. | ||
| Sec. 44.004. GRID RESILIENCE EVALUATION. (a) The security | ||
| commission shall evaluate, using available information on past | ||
| power outages in ERCOT, all hazards to the ERCOT electric grid, | ||
| including threats that can cause future outages. The security | ||
| commission shall evaluate the resilience of municipalities in this | ||
| state in the following essential areas: | ||
| (1) emergency services; | ||
| (2) communications systems; | ||
| (3) water and sewer services; | ||
| (4) health care systems; | ||
| (5) financial services; | ||
| (6) energy systems, including an evaluation of whether | ||
| energy, electric power, and fuel supplies are protected and | ||
| available for recovery in the event of a catastrophic power outage; | ||
| and | ||
| (7) transportation systems. | ||
| (b) The security commission may create groups or teams to | ||
| identify and address each hazard as necessary. The security | ||
| commission must assess each hazard both on the likelihood of | ||
| occurrence of the hazard and the potential consequences of the | ||
| hazard. | ||
| (c) The security commission shall identify methods by which | ||
| this state can support an overall national deterrence policy as | ||
| proposed by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, including by: | ||
| (1) identifying means to ensure that all hazards | ||
| resilience for electric utilities supports critical national | ||
| security functions in this state; and | ||
| (2) engaging the Texas National Guard to be trained as | ||
| first responders to cybersecurity threats to the ERCOT electric | ||
| grid and other critical infrastructure. | ||
| (d) The security commission shall evaluate nuclear | ||
| generation sites in this state, the resilience of each nuclear | ||
| reactor to all hazards, and the resilience to all hazards of | ||
| off-site power for critical safety systems that support the reactor | ||
| and spent fuel. The security commission may communicate with the | ||
| Nuclear Regulatory Commission to accomplish the evaluation. | ||
| (e) The security commission shall evaluate current Critical | ||
| Infrastructure Protection standards established by the North | ||
| American Electric Reliability Corporation and standards set by the | ||
| National Institute of Standards and Technology to determine the | ||
| most appropriate standards for protecting grid infrastructure in | ||
| this state. | ||
| (f) The security commission shall investigate the steps | ||
| that local communities and other states have taken to address grid | ||
| resilience. The security commission may request funding from the | ||
| Texas Division of Emergency Management to conduct site visits to | ||
| these locations as required. | ||
| (g) The security commission shall identify universities | ||
| based in this state that have expertise in cybersecurity and other | ||
| matters that can contribute to the security commission's goal of | ||
| mitigating all hazards to the grid in this state. | ||
| (h) In carrying out the security commission's duties under | ||
| this section, the security commission may solicit information from: | ||
| (1) defense contractors with experience protecting | ||
| defense systems from electromagnetic pulse; | ||
| (2) electric utilities that have developed | ||
| electromagnetic pulse protections for the utilities' grid assets; | ||
| (3) the United States Department of Homeland Security; | ||
| and | ||
| (4) the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United | ||
| States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack. | ||
| Sec. 44.005. RESILIENCE STANDARDS. (a) Based on the | ||
| findings of the evaluations and investigations conducted under | ||
| Section 44.004, the security commission shall consider and | ||
| recommend resilience standards for municipalities and critical | ||
| components of the ERCOT electric grid. | ||
| (b) Standards considered and recommended for energy systems | ||
| of municipalities should include provisions to ensure that energy, | ||
| electric power, and fuel supplies are protected and available for | ||
| recovery in the event of a catastrophic power outage. | ||
| (c) Not later than October 1, 2024, the security commission | ||
| shall prepare and deliver a report to the legislature on the | ||
| recommended resilience standards as required under this section and | ||
| an anticipated timeline for implementation of the standards. | ||
| Sec. 44.006. PLAN FOR ALL HAZARDS RESILIENCE. (a) Not | ||
| later than October 1, 2024, the security commission shall prepare | ||
| and deliver to the legislature a plan for protecting the ERCOT | ||
| electric grid from all hazards, including a catastrophic loss of | ||
| power in the state. | ||
| (b) The plan must include: | ||
| (1) weatherizing requirements to prevent power | ||
| outages from extreme cold weather events, an analysis of whether | ||
| these requirements would induce cyber vulnerabilities, and an | ||
| analysis of the associated costs for these requirements; | ||
| (2) provisions for installing, replacing, or | ||
| upgrading industrial control systems and associated networks, or | ||
| the use of compensating controls or procedures, in critical | ||
| facilities to address cyber vulnerabilities; | ||
| (3) provisions for installing, replacing, or | ||
| upgrading extra high-voltage power transformers and supervisory | ||
| control and data acquisition systems to withstand 100 | ||
| kilovolts/meter E1 electromagnetic pulses and 85 volts/kilometer | ||
| E3 electromagnetic pulses; | ||
| (4) a timeline for making improvements to remaining | ||
| infrastructure to meet resilience standards adopted by the security | ||
| commission under Section 44.005; | ||
| (5) long-term resilience provisions for supporting | ||
| industries including: | ||
| (A) nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; | ||
| (B) fuel supply; | ||
| (C) health care; | ||
| (D) communications; | ||
| (E) water and sewer services; | ||
| (F) food supply; and | ||
| (G) transportation; and | ||
| (6) any additional provisions considered necessary by | ||
| the security commission. | ||
| (c) The security commission may consult with the Private | ||
| Sector Advisory Council in developing the plan. | ||
| Sec. 44.007. GRID RESILIENCE REPORT. (a) Not later than | ||
| January 1 of each year, the security commission shall prepare and | ||
| deliver a nonclassified report to the legislature, the governor, | ||
| and the commission assessing natural and man-made threats to the | ||
| electric grid and efforts to mitigate the threats. | ||
| (b) The security commission shall make the report available | ||
| to the public. | ||
| (c) In preparing the report, the security commission may | ||
| hold confidential or classified briefings with federal, state, and | ||
| local officials as necessary. | ||
| Sec. 44.008. MICRO-GRIDS. The security commission shall | ||
| recommend resilience standards for micro-grids. The standards must | ||
| be developed for both alternating current and direct current. | ||
| SECTION 3. This Act takes effect immediately if it receives | ||
| a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, as | ||
| provided by Section 39, Article III, Texas Constitution. If this | ||
| Act does not receive the vote necessary for immediate effect, this | ||
| Act takes effect September 1, 2023. | ||
