Bill Text: MO HR3102 | 2011 | Regular Session | Introduced
Bill Title: Issues articles of impeachment for Judge John A. Ross, Twenty-First Judicial Circuit, and orders him to stand trial before the Missouri Supreme Court for violations of the Missouri Constitution
Spectrum: Partisan Bill (Democrat 1-0)
Status: (Introduced - Dead) 2011-05-26 - Referred: Judiciary (H) [HR3102 Detail]
Download: Missouri-2011-HR3102-Introduced.html
FIRST REGULAR SESSION
96TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY
ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT
WHEREAS, John A. Ross is a circuit judge in the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit of Missouri, wholly situated in the County of St. Louis, Missouri; and
WHEREAS, Judge Ross had presided over the case of Buchek v. Washington, et.al., Cause No. 09SL-CC04530, pending in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, for well over a period of one year; and
WHEREAS, Article VII, Section 1, Missouri Constitution provides:
"All elective executive officials of the state, and judges of the supreme court, courts of appeals and circuit courts shall be liable to impeachment for crimes, misconduct, habitual drunkenness, willful neglect of duty, corruption in office, incompetency, or any offense involving moral turpitude or oppression in office."; and
WHEREAS, a court decision which is clearly in opposition to the plain meaning of the constitution and statutes of this state and made in favor of personal opinion or in deference to political allies is "corruption in office"; and
WHEREAS, a decision like that is also in violation of the judge's oath to defend the constitution and strikes at the seminal principles of "separation of powers"; and
WHEREAS, even if the judge's motives are not malicious, but he simply misunderstands the clear dictates of the constitution, statutes, and decided case law, then he is guilty of "incompetency"; and
WHEREAS, Supreme Court Rule 2.03 and Canon 3 provides that "A Judge Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently"; and
WHEREAS, in presiding over said Buchek case, Judge Ross, in violation of Article VII, Section 1 of the Missouri Constitution and of Supreme Court Rule 2, engaged in misconduct, willful neglect of duty, incompetency, and oppression in office, partiality and dilatory tactics, the facts in support of which are more specifically set forth hereinafter; and
WHEREAS, Judge Ross unreasonably delayed and refused to expeditiously and speedily set the Buchek case for trial but instead willfully, deliberately, and purposefully refused to set the case for trial in order to unlawfully hold the Northeast Ambulance and Fire Protection District hostage to his judicial activism and racially and sexually discriminatory interlocutory orders and rulings; and
WHEREAS, Judge Ross in presiding over said case engaged in judicial activism such that he not only deprived the persons who had been either elected or appointed to serve as Directors of the Northeast Ambulance and Fire Protection District of their right to manage the district, but effectively disenfranchised the voters of the district by usurping the powers of the individuals that the voters elected to manage the district; and
WHEREAS, Judge Ross, by his judicial activism, unlawfully substituted his judgment for that of the duly elected and appointed officials of the district; and
WHEREAS, there is no constitutional, statutory, or case law precedence in the State of Missouri providing that a state court has the power to supervise duly elected public officials in the performance of their day-to-day statutory duties; and
WHEREAS, Judge Ross' judicial activism was directed against a duly elected board of directors of black elected officials, with a racially discriminatory effect; and
WHEREAS, with the only elected body in the State of Missouri that has been placed under the supervision of a state court judge being a board of black elected officials, Judge Ross effectively engaged in a racially discriminatory practice as well; and
WHEREAS, Judge Ross incompetently and oppressively granted a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to a resident of the district, despite the fact that said resident was without standing to sue; and
WHEREAS, the Plaintiff claimed that there was a need for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent the expenditure of funds by district officials pending the filling of a vacancy on the board of directors of the district; and
WHEREAS, Subsection 2 of section 321.200, RSMo, provides for the circuit court to fill that particular vacancy; and
WHEREAS, Judge Ross incompetently and oppressively usurped the power of the court en banc to fill the vacancy on the board of directors by personally making the appointment to the board himself in order to seek political favor and gain from the Firefighters Union Local 2665, and to seek their help, aid, and influence so that he might be appointed as a United States District Court Judge; and
WHEREAS, Judge Ross corruptly appointed Bridget Dailey Quinlisk to the fire district's board due to the fact that she was endorsed and supported by the firefighter's union, despite the fact that she had been ousted from the Normandy City Council and despite the fact that her brother had been ousted from the Board of the Northeast Ambulance and Fire Protection District; and
WHEREAS, the vacancy on the board of directors was filled on November 19, 2009; and
WHEREAS, once the vacancy was filled, the claim of the Plaintiff in the Buchek case was moot and thus Judge Ross should have immediately dismissed the case or issued a final judgment in the case; and
WHEREAS, instead of dismissing the case or conducting a speedy trial on the merits and entering a final judgment in the case, Judge Ross has actively continued to exercise jurisdiction over the board of directors and actively supervised the expenditure of funds by the district, totally contrary to the law of Missouri for well over a year after the filling of said vacancy; and
WHEREAS, the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction as interlocutory orders are not subject to being appealed to the appellate courts, but instead, the Defendants have to await a final judgment in the case before seeking appellate review; and
WHEREAS, Judge Ross used that procedural barrier to retain jurisdiction over the case for well over one year after the filling of the vacancy on the district's board of directors; and
WHEREAS, Judge Ross usurped the statutory powers granted to the board of directors of the fire district by directing the district directors as to whom they can hire, how much they can pay, and what they can buy; and
WHEREAS, Judge Ross effectively ordered the board to sexually discriminate against the district's female fire chief by ordering the duly constituted fire district board to reduce the pay of a female fire chief to an amount less than that paid to her male predecessor as fire chief in violation of the federal Equal Pay Act, and thereby Judge Ross has by his judicial activism effectively engaged in sexual discrimination against the female fire chief; and
WHEREAS, Judge Ross under the facts set forth above, without any statutory or constitutional authority at all, deprived duly elected and appointed executive and legislative officials from performing duties and exercising powers granted to those officials by Missouri law; and
WHEREAS, in the case of Harkey v. Mobley, 552 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. App. 1977), the court held:
"Sans express statutory authority and absent, as here, allegations of fraud, courts of equity have no jurisdiction to remove directors or officers of a private corporation on the ground of mismanagement of the affairs of the corporation, neglect or other causes. The only power of amotion is in the corporation itself. Neither do courts have authority, absent statutory power, to grant injunctions restraining officers from performing their corporate duties since this would have the same effect as their removal. Griffin v. St. Louis Vine & Fruit Growers' Association, 4 Mo.App. 595, 596(1) (1877); Feldman v. Pennroad Corporation, 60 F.Supp. 716, 719(9) (D.C.Del. 1945), aff'd, 155 F.2d 773 (3rd Cir. 1946); 2 Fletcher Encyclopedia Coporations (Perm.Ed.) Section 358, pp. 170-174; 10 C.J.S. corporations Section 738 b., pp. 74-75; 10 Am.Jur.2d, Corporations, Section 1111, pp. 550-551; Annot., 124 A.L.R. 364-373." (Emphasis ours); and
WHEREAS, incompetently or corruptly Judge Ross failed to follow the precedence of the Harkey case; and
WHEREAS, the case of Massey v. Howard, et.al., 240 S.W.2d 743, held:
"In Depew v. Venice Drainage District, 158 La. 1099, 105 So. 78, the trial court, upon petition of a holder of improvement bonds issued by the drainage district, appointed a receiver to hold, manage and dispose of all the property and income of the corporation and to receive the taxes levied by it, and to distribute it under the supervision of the court to the persons entitled to the same. On appeal the court held that neither the provisions of the constitution of that state authorizing drainage districts and declaring them to be political subdivisions of the state, nor the statutes giving district courts 'unlimited' jurisdiction in matters of receiverships of corporations, vested any power in such courts to appoint a receiver of a public corporation. The court said, 105 So. page 19: 'If this court should hold that the judiciary may take over and control the agencies of government and substitute its judgment for the discretion vested in legally constituted authorities, the legislative and executive branches of government might as well cease to function. The contemplation of such a monstrosity is repugnant to common sense.'
Whatever legal or other remedies may be available to appellant, if any, it appears to us certain that the remedy he seeks in the present proceedings, namely the appointment of a receiver to take over a part of the statutory functions of the members of the Board of Supervisors of the Drainage District, such as to determine the amount of a necessary levy, to make the same, and to take steps to collect and disburse it, is not authorized by law." (Emphasis ours); and
WHEREAS, oppressively, incompetently, or corruptly, Judge Ross has failed to follow the precedence of the Harkey case; and
WHEREAS, Judge Ross issued an order prohibiting the board of directors from paying two of the Defendants in the Buchek case, Joseph Washington, a black fire chief, and Robert Edwards, a black board member, attorneys' fees and out-of-pocket expenses out of district funds; and
WHEREAS, said order prevented Washington's and Edwards' attorneys from being able to fully litigate the matter, to defend Washington and Edwards, and to challenge Judge Ross' judicial activism, corruption, and incompetency, and thus deprived said Defendants of due process of law; and
WHEREAS, despite the fact that Judge Ross ordered the district to not pay the attorneys' fees of Washington and Edwards, whose attorneys were under contract with the district to provide legal services in defense of Washington and Edwards as district officials, Judge Ross, without any contractual nor statutory authority has incompetently, corruptly, and oppressively ordered the fire district to pay the attorneys' fees of various litigants and nonlitigants in the Buchek case, despite the fact that said litigants had neither statutory nor contractual basis for payment of their attorneys' fees and despite the clear precedence in Missouri law that no attorneys' fees may be awarded to anyone in a case except where it is authorized by contract or by statute; and
WHEREAS, Judge Ross corruptly, incompetently, oppressively, and willfully in order to evade the holding of the Harkey case appointed a Special Master to effectively act as a receiver over the fire district's directors and funds, and ordered the duly constituted board of directors to make no expenditure of district funds except upon approval of the Special Master and Judge Ross; and
WHEREAS, Judge Ross issued an order barring defendants Washington's and Edwards' attorneys from presenting evidence in support of their defense to said Special Master, while concurrently granting the white plaintiff's attorneys the power to present evidence in support of their claim to said Special Master, thus effectively racially discriminating against said Defendants and violating said Defendants rights to due process of law; and
WHEREAS, Judge Ross refused for over a year to hold a speedy trial on the merits of the case so that a final appealable judgment could be entered in the case, in violation of Supreme Court Administrative Rules, and in the end, dismissed the case without prejudice as the case was without merit and the dismissal prevented the case from being reviewed by an appellate court:
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that it is the Order and Judgment of the Missouri House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth General Assembly, that Judge John A. Ross shall stand trial before the Missouri Supreme Court for violation of Article VII, Section 1 of the Missouri Constitution due to misconduct, willful neglect of duty, corruption in office, incompetency, and oppression in office; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Chief Clerk of the Missouri House of Representatives be instructed to prepare properly inscribed copies of this resolution for Judge John A. Ross and the Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme Court.
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