Bill Text: CA SB1052 | 2015-2016 | Regular Session | Amended

NOTE: There are more recent revisions of this legislation. Read Latest Draft

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Bill Title: Custodial interrogation: juveniles.

Spectrum: Partisan Bill (Democrat 3-0)

Status: (Vetoed) 2016-11-30 - Last day to consider Governor's veto pursuant to Joint Rule 58.5. [SB1052 Detail]

Download: California-2015-SB1052-Amended.html

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BILL NUMBER: SB 1052	AMENDED
	BILL TEXT

	AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY  AUGUST 18, 2016
	AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY  AUGUST 1, 2016
	AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY  JUNE 16, 2016
	AMENDED IN SENATE  MAY 31, 2016
	AMENDED IN SENATE  MARCH 28, 2016

INTRODUCED BY   Senators Lara and Mitchell
   (Principal coauthor: Senator Leno)

                        FEBRUARY 16, 2016

   An act to add Section 625.6 to the Welfare and Institutions Code,
relating to juveniles.


	LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST


   SB 1052, as amended, Lara. Custodial interrogation: juveniles.
   Existing law authorizes a peace officer to take a minor into
temporary custody when that officer has reasonable cause to believe
that the minor has committed a crime or violated an order of the
juvenile court. In these circumstances, existing law requires the
peace officer to advise the minor that anything he or she says can be
used against him or her, that he or she has the right to remain
silent, that he or she has a right to have counsel present during any
interrogation, and that he or she has a right to have counsel
appointed if he or she is unable to afford counsel.
   This bill would require that a youth under 18 years of age consult
with  legal  counsel  in person, by telephone, or by
video conference  prior to a custodial interrogation and before
waiving any of the above-specified rights. The bill would provide
that consultation with legal counsel cannot be waived.  If a
custodial interrogation takes place before the youth has consulted
with legal counsel, the   The  bill would require
the court to consider the effect of the failure to comply with the
above-specified  requirement and to consider the
circumstances surrounding statements made without the assistance of
legal counsel. The bill would make a failure to comply with its
provisions admissible in support of claims that the youth's statement
was obtained in violation of his or her rights, was involuntary, or
is unreliable.   requirement in adjudicating the
admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age made
during or after a custodial interrogation.  The bill also
clarifies that these provisions do not apply to the admissibility of
statements of a youth under 18 years of age if certain criteria are
met.
   Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no.
State-mandated local program: no.


THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

  SECTION 1.  The Legislature finds and declares all of the
following:
   (a) Developmental and neurological science concludes that the
process of cognitive brain development continues into adulthood, and
that the human brain undergoes "dynamic changes throughout
adolescence and well into young adulthood." (See Richard J. Bonnie,
et al., Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental Approach,
National Academies of Science (2012), page 96, and Chapter 4.) As
recognized by the United States Supreme Court, children and youth "'
generally are less mature and responsible than adults,'" (J.D.B. v.
North Carolina (2011) 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2397, quoting Eddings v.
Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 115); "they 'often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could
be detrimental to them,'" (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting
Bellotti v. Baird (1979) 443 U.S. 622, 635); "they 'are more
vulnerable or susceptible to...  outside pressures' than adults"
(J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S.
551, 569); they "have limited understandings of the criminal justice
system and the roles of the institutional actors within it" (Graham
v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 78); and "children characteristically
lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an
incomplete ability to understand the world around them" (J.D.B., 131
S.Ct. at 2397).
   (b) Custodial interrogation of an individual by the state requires
that the individual be advised of his or her rights and make a
knowing, intelligent, and voluntarily waiver of those rights before
the interrogation proceeds. People under 18 years of age have a
lesser ability as compared to adults to comprehend the meaning of
their rights and the consequences of waiver. Additionally, a large
body of research has established that adolescent thinking tends to
either ignore or discount future outcomes and implications, and
disregard long-term consequences of important decisions. (See, e.g.,
Steinberg et al., "Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay
Discounting"; William Gardner and Janna Herman, "Adolescent's AIDS
Risk Taking: A Rational Choice Perspective," in Adolescents in the
AIDS Epidemic, ed. William Gardner et al. (San Francisco: Jossey
Bass, 1990), pp. 17, 25-26; Marty Beyer, "Recognizing the Child in
the Delinquent," Kentucky Child Rights Journal, vol. 7 (Summer 1999),
pp. 16-17; National Juvenile Justice Network, "Using Adolescent
Brain Research to Inform Policy: A Guide for Juvenile Justice
Advocates," September 2012, pp. 1-2; Catherine C. Lewis, "How
Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes over Grades Seven to Twelve
and Policy Implications," Child Development, vol. 52 (1981), pp. 538,
541-42). Addressing the specific context of police interrogation,
the United States Supreme Court observed that events that "would
leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in
his early teens" (Haley v. Ohio, (1948) 332 U.S. 596 (plurality
opinion)), and noted that "'no matter how sophisticated,' a juvenile
subject of police interrogation 'cannot be compared' to an adult
subject" (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2394, quoting Gallegos v. Colorado
(1962) 370 U.S. 49, 54). The law enforcement community now widely
accepts what science and the courts have recognized: Children and
adolescents are much more vulnerable to psychologically coercive
interrogations and in other dealings with the police than resilient
adults experienced with the criminal justice system.
   (c) For these reasons,  in situations of custodial
interrogation and prior to making a waiver of rights under Miranda v.
Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436,  youth under 18 years of age
should consult with legal  counsel prior to making a waiver
of rights. In the determination of whether a child or youth has
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her rights
under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, a court must take into
account the special concerns that are present when a young person is
involved, including a child or youth's limited experience, education
and immature judgment (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 725).
These concerns must also take into consideration whether a child's or
youth's age or experience indicates that his or her request for a
probation officer, parent, or other adult is in fact an invocation of
his or her right to remain silent (Fare, 442 U.S. at 725). 
 counsel to assist in their understanding of their rights and
the consequences of waiving those rights. 
  SEC. 2.  Section 625.6 is added to the Welfare and Institutions
Code, to read:
   625.6.  (a) Prior to a custodial interrogation, and before the
waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth under 18 years of age shall
consult with legal  counsel.   counsel in
person, by telephone, or by video conference.  The consultation
may not be waived. 
   (b) If a custodial interrogation of a minor under 18 years of age
occurs prior to the youth consulting with legal counsel, both of the
following remedies shall be granted as relief for noncompliance with
subdivision (a):  
   (1) 
    (b)  The court shall, in adjudicating the admissibility
of statements of a youth under 18 years of age made during or after a
custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply
with subdivision  (a) and the factors specified in
subdivision (c).  (a).  
   (2) Provided the evidence is otherwise admissible, the failure to
comply with subdivision (a) shall be admissible in support of claims
that the youth's statement was obtained in violation of his or her
Miranda rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable.  

   (c) In determining whether an admission, statement, or confession
made by a youth under 18 years of age was voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently made, the court shall consider all the circumstances
surrounding the statements, including, but not limited to, all of the
following: 
   (1) The youth's age, maturity, intellectual capacity, education
level, and physical, mental, and emotional health.  

   (2) The capacity of the youth to understand Miranda rights,
including the nature of the privilege against self-incrimination
under the United States and California Constitutions, the
consequences of waiving those rights and privileges, whether the
youth perceived the adversarial nature of the situation, and whether
the youth was aware of how legal counsel could assist the youth
during interrogation.  
   (3) The manner in which the youth was advised of his or her
rights, and whether the rights specified in the Miranda rule were
minimized by law enforcement.  
   (4) The youth's reading and comprehension level and his or her
understanding of the Miranda rights given by law enforcement.
 
   (5) Whether there was an express or implied waiver of Miranda
rights.  
   (6) Whether the youth asked to speak with a parent or other adult
at any time while in law enforcement custody.  
   (7) Whether law enforcement offered to allow the youth to consult
with a parent or guardian prior to the interrogation, or whether law
enforcement took steps to prevent a parent or guardian from speaking
to the youth prior to interrogation.  
   (8) Whether the youth had been interrogated previously by law
enforcement and whether the youth invoked his or her Miranda rights
previously.  
   (9) Whether the youth requested to leave.  
   (10) Whether law enforcement either by express or implied conduct
intimated that the youth could leave after speaking, or if any other
promises of leniency were made.  
   (11) The manner in which the interrogation occurred, including
length of time, method of interrogation, location, number of
individuals present, the treatment of the youth by law enforcement,
the tone and manner of questioning during interrogation, whether law
enforcement personnel were in uniform, if ruses were used, if express
or implied threats were made, and if applicable, the failure to
comply with Section 627.  
   (12) Whether the youth consulted with legal counsel prior to
waiver.  
   (13) Any other relevant evidence.  
   (d) 
    (c)  This section does not apply to the admissibility of
statements of a youth under 18 years of age if both of the following
criteria are met:
   (1) The officer who questioned the suspect reasonably believed the
information he or she sought was necessary to protect life or
property from a substantial threat.
   (2) The officer's questions were limited to those questions that
were reasonably necessary to obtain this information. 
   (e) For purposes of this section, "Miranda rights" refers to the
rights specified in subdivision (c) of Section 625.  
   (d) This section does not require a probation officer to comply
with subdivision (a) in the normal performance of his or her duties
under Sections 625, 627.5, or 628.