

118TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# S. 4433

To enhance United States cooperation with European countries to improve the security of Taiwan, and for other purposes.

---

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 23, 2024

Mr. RICKETTS (for himself and Mrs. SHAHEEN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

## A BILL

To enhance United States cooperation with European countries to improve the security of Taiwan, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Building Options for  
5 the Lasting Security of Taiwan through European Resolve  
6 Act” or the “BOLSTER Act”.

7 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

8 Congress finds the following:

9 (1) In an October 2022 speech before the 20th  
10 National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party,

1 General Secretary Xi Jinping declared that the Peo-  
2 ple’s Republic of China (referred to in this Act as  
3 the “PRC”) has not ruled out the use of force re-  
4 garding Taiwan.

5 (2) The Office of the Director of National  
6 Intelligence’s Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S.  
7 Intelligence Community, published on February 6,  
8 2023, noted that “Beijing is working to meet its  
9 goal of fielding a military by 2027 designed to deter  
10 U.S. intervention in a future cross-Strait crisis.”.

11 (3) The risk of economic disruption following a  
12 conflict in the Taiwan Strait could amount to ap-  
13 proximately \$2,000,000,000,000 in a blockade sce-  
14 nario, which would immediately, and potentially irre-  
15 versibly impact global trade and investment, key  
16 supply chains for semiconductors, and other trade  
17 and national security priorities.

18 (4) The European Union’s foreign and security  
19 policy service, the European External Action Service,  
20 recognizes that the European Union may use sanc-  
21 tions to promote the objectives of its Common For-  
22 eign and Security Policy, all of which have potential  
23 relevance in the event of military action or coercion  
24 against Taiwan.

1           (5) The European Union has imposed sanctions  
2 on—

3           (A) PRC officials and entities responsible  
4 for human rights abuses in Xinjiang; and

5           (B) PRC entities for their support of Rus-  
6 sia’s illegal and unprovoked war in Ukraine.

7           (6) In July 2022, Jorge Toledo Albinana, Am-  
8 bassador of the European Union to the People’s Re-  
9 public of China, said, “In the event of a military in-  
10 vasion [of Taiwan], we have made it very clear that  
11 the European Union, with the United States and its  
12 allies, will impose similar or even greater measures  
13 than those we have now taken against Russia.”.

14           (7) On January 18, 2023, the European Par-  
15 liament passed a resolution calling upon “all com-  
16 petent European Union institutions to urgently draw  
17 up a scenario-based strategy for tackling security  
18 challenges in Taiwan.”.

19           (8) In an April 18, 2023, speech to the Euro-  
20 pean Parliament, European Commission President  
21 Ursula von der Leyen emphasized that the European  
22 Union “stand[s] strongly against any unilateral  
23 change of the status quo [in the Taiwan Strait], in  
24 particular by the use of force.”.

1           (9) The PRC has supported Russia’s illegal,  
2 full-scale invasion of Ukraine by resupplying Rus-  
3 sia’s defense industrial base.

4           (10) Taiwan has—

5                 (A) aligned itself with European Union  
6 sanctions against Russia in response to the full-  
7 scale invasion of Ukraine; and

8                 (B) provided Ukraine more than  
9 \$113,000,000 in financial support and more  
10 than 950 metric tons of humanitarian supplies.

11 **SEC. 3. CONSULTATIONS, PLANS, REPORTS, AND BRIEF-**  
12 **INGS.**

13           (a) CONSULTATIONS WITH EUROPEAN GOVERN-  
14 MENTS REGARDING SANCTIONS AGAINST THE PRC  
15 UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.—

16                 (1) IN GENERAL.—The head of the Office of  
17 Sanctions Coordination at the Department of State,  
18 in consultation with the Director of the Office of  
19 Foreign Assets Control at the Department of the  
20 Treasury, shall engage in regular consultations with  
21 the International Special Envoy for the Implementa-  
22 tion of European Union Sanctions and appropriate  
23 government officials of European countries, includ-  
24 ing the United Kingdom, to develop coordinated  
25 plans and share information on independent plans to

1 impose sanctions and other economic measures  
2 against the PRC, as appropriate, if the PRC is  
3 found to be involved in—

4 (A) overthrowing or dismantling the gov-  
5 erning institutions in Taiwan, including engag-  
6 ing in disinformation campaigns in Taiwan that  
7 promote the strategic interests of the PRC;

8 (B) occupying any territory controlled or  
9 administered by Taiwan as of the date of the  
10 enactment of this Act;

11 (C) violating the territorial integrity of  
12 Taiwan;

13 (D) taking significant action against Tai-  
14 wan, including—

15 (i) creating a naval blockade or other  
16 quarantine of Taiwan;

17 (ii) seizing the outer lying islands of  
18 Taiwan; or

19 (iii) initiating a cyberattack that  
20 threatens civilian or military infrastructure  
21 in Taiwan; or

22 (E) providing assistance that helps the se-  
23 curity forces of the Russian Federation in exe-  
24 cuting Russia's unprovoked, illegal war against  
25 Ukraine.

1           (2) SEMIANNUAL CONGRESSIONAL BRIEF-  
2           INGS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the  
3           enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter  
4           for the following 5 years, the head of the Office of  
5           Sanctions Coordination shall provide a briefing re-  
6           garding the progress of the consultations required  
7           under paragraph (1) to—

8                   (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of  
9                   the Senate;

10                   (B) the Committee on Banking, Housing,  
11                   and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

12                   (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of  
13                   the House of Representatives; and

14                   (D) the Committee on Financial Services  
15                   of the House of Representatives.

16           (b) COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT IN  
17           A TAIWAN CONTINGENCY.—

18                   (1) PLAN.—Not later than 1 year after the date  
19                   of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of  
20                   the United States Agency for International Develop-  
21                   ment (referred to in this section as the “Adminis-  
22                   trator”), in coordination with the Secretary of State,  
23                   shall develop a plan to deliver humanitarian aid to  
24                   Taiwan in the event of a blockade, quarantine, or

1 military invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Libera-  
2 tion Army (referred to in this Act as the “PLA”).

3 (2) CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT.—In devel-  
4 oping the plan required under paragraph (1), the  
5 Administrator shall consult with the European Com-  
6 mission’s Emergency Response Coordination Centre  
7 and appropriate government officials of European  
8 countries regarding cooperation to provide aid to  
9 Indo-Pacific countries as the result of a blockade,  
10 quarantine, or military invasion of Taiwan by the  
11 PLA, including the extent to which European coun-  
12 tries could backfill United States humanitarian aid  
13 to other parts of the world.

14 (3) CONGRESSIONAL ENGAGEMENT.—Upon  
15 completion of the plan required under paragraph  
16 (1), the Administrator shall provide a briefing re-  
17 garding the details of such plan and the consulta-  
18 tions required under paragraph (2) to the Com-  
19 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the  
20 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-  
21 resentatives.

22 (c) REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF PRC  
23 MILITARY ACTION AGAINST TAIWAN.—

24 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after  
25 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President

1 shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign  
2 Relations of the Senate and the Committee on For-  
3 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives that  
4 contains an independent assessment of the expected  
5 economic impact of—

6 (A) a 30-day blockade or quarantine of  
7 Taiwan by the PLA; and

8 (B) a 180-day blockade or quarantine of  
9 Taiwan by the PLA.

10 (2) ASSESSMENT ELEMENTS.—The assessment  
11 required under paragraph (1) shall contain a de-  
12 scription of—

13 (A) the impact of the blockade or quar-  
14 antine of Taiwan on global trade and output;

15 (B) the 10 economic sectors that would be  
16 most disrupted by a sustained blockade of Tai-  
17 wan by the PLA; and

18 (C) the expected economic impact of a sus-  
19 tained blockade of Taiwan by the PLA on the  
20 domestic economies of European countries that  
21 are members of NATO or the European Union.

22 (3) INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT.—

23 (A) IN GENERAL.—The assessment re-  
24 quired under paragraph (1) shall be conducted  
25 by a federally-funded research and development



1 center or another appropriate independent enti-  
2 ty with expertise in economic analysis.

3 (B) USE OF DATA FROM PREVIOUS STUD-  
4 IES.—The entity conducting the assessment re-  
5 quired under paragraph (1) may use and incor-  
6 porate information contained in previous stud-  
7 ies on matters relevant to the elements of the  
8 assessment.

9 **SEC. 4. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION AND**  
10 **EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS REGARDING IN-**  
11 **CREASING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELA-**  
12 **TIONS WITH TAIWAN.**

13 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

14 (1) Representative offices in Taiwan have been  
15 established by—

16 (A) 16 of the 27 European Union member  
17 states;

18 (B) the European Union;

19 (C) the United Kingdom; and

20 (D) Switzerland.

21 (2) Taiwan has representative offices in—

22 (A) 19 of the 27 European Union coun-  
23 tries;

24 (B) the United Kingdom; and

25 (C) Switzerland.

1           (3) The PRC has used its economic power to  
2           pressure Taiwan’s diplomatic allies to cut ties and  
3           switch diplomatic recognition to the PRC, which has  
4           reduced Taiwan’s diplomatic allies to just 12, includ-  
5           ing The Holy See.

6           (4) On November 18, 2021, Taiwan formally  
7           opened the Taiwanese Representative Office in Lith-  
8           uania, which is the first such office in Europe that  
9           uses Taiwan in its title rather than the PRC-pre-  
10          ferred title, “Taipei”, despite actions of economic co-  
11          ercion imposed on Lithuania by the PRC.

12          (5) Since 2020, legislative bodies in Poland,  
13          Lithuania, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the  
14          Czech Republic, Italy, Switzerland, Ireland, Bel-  
15          gium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark, and Slovakia  
16          have passed legislation or resolutions that call for—

17                 (A) deepening ties and exchanges with Tai-  
18                 wan;

19                 (B) supporting Taiwan’s participation in  
20                 international organizations; or

21                 (C) maintaining the status quo in the Tai-  
22                 wan Strait.

23          (6) Since 2020, parliamentary delegations from  
24          Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania,  
25          Germany, Spain, France, Finland, Romania, Por-

1 tugal, Belgium, Sweden, Ireland, Italy, Estonia, Lat-  
2 via, and the European Union have visited Taiwan.

3 (7) In May 2023, representatives from the  
4 United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Czech  
5 Republic joined the United States, Australia, and  
6 Japan in a joint statement calling for Taiwan’s in-  
7 clusion in the 76th World Health Assembly.

8 (8) The November 2023 Group of 7 Japan  
9 2023 Foreign Ministers’ Statement expressed “sup-  
10 port for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in inter-  
11 national organizations, including in the World  
12 Health Assembly and WHO technical meetings.”.

13 (9) As of 2022, Taiwan was the European  
14 Union’s 13th largest trading partner overall and its  
15 5th largest Asian trading partner.

16 (10) Taiwan is a leading investor in the Czech  
17 Republic, which currently hosts more than  
18 \$1,000,000,000 in foreign direct investment from  
19 Taiwan, resulting in thousands of jobs for Czech  
20 citizens.

21 (11) From 2021 to 2022, trade between Lith-  
22 uania and Taiwan increased by 50 percent. Taiwan  
23 has invested in Lithuania’s emerging chip sector,  
24 laser companies, and other high-tech industries.

1           (12) In June 2022, the European Commission,  
2           for the first time, upgraded its trade and investment  
3           dialogues with Taiwan, which had been ongoing at  
4           the technical level for more than 20 years, to the  
5           ministerial and director-general level for the first  
6           time in recognition of the benefit from higher-level  
7           coordination.

8           (13) In August 2023, Taiwan Semiconductor  
9           Manufacturing Company Limited announced part-  
10          nerships with various European technology firms  
11          and investments of \$3,500,000,000 to build its first  
12          semiconductor plant in Europe in Germany.

13          (14) On November 8, 2023, the Government of  
14          the United Kingdom signed an Enhanced Trade  
15          Partnership agreement with Taiwan. This is the  
16          first such agreement between Taiwan and a Euro-  
17          pean country.

18          (15) On December 13, 2023 the European Par-  
19          liament passed a resolution that—

20                  (A) urges the European Union to pursue a  
21                  resilient supply chain agreement with Taiwan;  
22                  and

23                  (B) calls for a bilateral investment agree-  
24                  ment between Taiwan and the European Union

1 to enhance a 2-way partnership in digital trade  
2 and cyber resilience.

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
4 gress that—

5 (1) the United States, Europe, and Taiwan are  
6 like-minded partners that—

7 (A) share common values, such as democ-  
8 cracy, the rule of law and human rights; and

9 (B) enjoy a close trade and economic part-  
10 nership;

11 (2) bolstering political, economic, and people-to-  
12 people relations with Taiwan would benefit the Eu-  
13 ropean Union, individual European countries, and  
14 the United States;

15 (3) the European Union can play an important  
16 role in helping Taiwan resist the economic coercion  
17 of the PRC by negotiating with Taiwan regarding  
18 new economic, commercial, and investment agree-  
19 ments;

20 (4) the United States and European countries  
21 should coordinate and increase diplomatic efforts to  
22 facilitate Taiwan’s meaningful participation in inter-  
23 national organizations;

24 (5) the United States and European countries  
25 should—

1 (A) publicly and repeatedly emphasize the  
2 differences between their respective “One  
3 China” policies and the PRC’s “One China”  
4 principle; and

5 (B) counter the PRC’s propaganda and  
6 false narratives about United Nations General  
7 Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI), which claim  
8 the resolution recognizes PRC territorial claims  
9 to Taiwan; and

10 (6) Taiwan’s inclusion in the U.S.-EU Trade  
11 and Technology Council’s Secure Supply Chain  
12 working group would bring valuable expertise and  
13 enhance transatlantic cooperation in the semicon-  
14 ductor sector.

15 (c) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.—Not later than 180  
16 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and semi-  
17 annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary  
18 of State shall provide a briefing to the Committee on For-  
19 eign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on For-  
20 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives regarding the  
21 Department of State’s engagements with the European  
22 Union and the governments of European countries to in-  
23 crease political and economic relations with Taiwan, in-  
24 cluding—

1           (1) public statements of support for Taiwan’s  
2           democracy and its meaningful participation in inter-  
3           national organizations;

4           (2) unofficial diplomatic visits to and from Tai-  
5           wan by high-ranking government officials and parlia-  
6           mentarians;

7           (3) the establishment of parliamentary caucuses  
8           or groups that promote strong relations with Tai-  
9           wan;

10          (4) strengthening subnational diplomacy, in-  
11          cluding diplomatic and trade-related visits to and  
12          from Taiwan by local government officials;

13          (5) strengthening coordination between United  
14          States and European business chambers, univer-  
15          sities, think tanks, and other civil society groups  
16          with similar groups in Taiwan;

17          (6) establishing new representative, economic,  
18          or cultural offices in a European country or in Tai-  
19          wan;

20          (7) promoting direct flights to and from Tai-  
21          wan;

22          (8) facilitating visits by religious leaders to Tai-  
23          wan; and

24          (9) increasing economic engagement and trade  
25          relations.

1 **SEC. 5. CONSULTATIONS WITH EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS**  
2 **ON SUPPORTING TAIWAN'S SELF-DEFENSE.**

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

4 (1) In September 2021, the European Commis-  
5 sion released the European Union Strategy for Co-  
6 operation in the Indo-Pacific, which acknowledges  
7 that increased tensions between the PRC and Tai-  
8 wan could impact European security and economic  
9 prosperity.

10 (2) In 2019, 2021, and 2023, the French Navy  
11 sent warships to transit the Taiwan Strait and in  
12 2021, the British Navy frigate HMS Richmond  
13 transited the Taiwan Strait.

14 (3) In November 2021, the German Navy com-  
15 mitted to sending vessels to the Indo-Pacific every 2  
16 years to expand cooperation with like-minded states  
17 advocating for freedom of navigation and a rules-  
18 based international order.

19 (4) European deterrence efforts in the Taiwan  
20 Strait support the United States' strategic interests,  
21 as the United States also sends warships through  
22 the Taiwan Strait to promote deterrence and re-  
23 spond to aggressive behavior by the PRC towards  
24 Taiwan.

25 (5) In April 2023, European Commission Vice-  
26 President Josep Borrell Fontelles called on Euro-



1       pean navies to patrol the Taiwan Strait to show Eu-  
2       rope’s commitment to freedom of navigation.

3               (6) In August 2023, French President Emman-  
4       uel Macron signed into law legislation emphasizing  
5       that France would defend freedom of navigation in  
6       the Indo-Pacific region, including the South China  
7       Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

8               (7) European countries, including France, Ger-  
9       many, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the  
10      Czech Republic, and Lithuania, have developed Indo-  
11      Pacific strategies.

12              (8) At the 2022 Madrid Summit, the North At-  
13      lantic Treaty Organization unveiled a new Strategic  
14      Concept, stating that allies will work together “to  
15      address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to  
16      Euro-Atlantic security” and underscored the impor-  
17      tance of the Indo-Pacific for NATO, “given that de-  
18      velopments in that region can directly affect Euro-  
19      Atlantic security.”.

20              (9) In September 2022, the North Atlantic  
21      Council held its first dedicated discussion about the  
22      status of Taiwan, its democratic government, and its  
23      critical role in the manufacturing of microchips glob-  
24      ally.

1           (10) In 2022, the United Kingdom approved a  
2           substantial increase in exports of submarine compo-  
3           nents and technology to Taiwan to upgrade its naval  
4           forces.

5           (11) In 2024, Taiwan’s defense ministry signed  
6           an agreement with France’s DCI Group for the sup-  
7           ply of parts and accessories to maintain its Lafay-  
8           ette-class frigates.

9           (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
10          gress that—

11           (1) preserving peace and security in the Taiwan  
12          Strait is a shared interest of the United States and  
13          Europe;

14           (2) European countries, particularly countries  
15          with experience combating Russian aggression and  
16          malign activities, can provide Taiwan with lessons  
17          learned from their “total defense” programs to mo-  
18          bilize the military and civilians in a time of crisis;

19           (3) the United States and Europe should in-  
20          crease coordination to strengthen Taiwan’s cyberse-  
21          curity, especially for critical infrastructure and net-  
22          work defense operations;

23           (4) the United States and Europe should work  
24          with Taiwan—

25                   (A) to improve its energy resiliency;

1 (B) to strengthen its food security;

2 (C) to combat misinformation,  
3 disinformation, digital authoritarianism, and  
4 foreign interference; and

5 (D) to provide expertise on how to improve  
6 defense infrastructure;

7 (5) European naval powers, in coordination  
8 with the United States, should increase freedom of  
9 navigation transits through the Taiwan Strait; and

10 (6) European naval powers, the United States,  
11 and Taiwan should establish exchanges and partner-  
12 ships among their coast guards to counter coercion  
13 by the PRC.

14 (c) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS.—Not later than  
15 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and  
16 semiannually thereafter for the following 5 years the Sec-  
17 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of De-  
18 fense, shall provide a briefing to the Committee on For-  
19 eign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Armed  
20 Services of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs  
21 of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on  
22 Armed Services of the House of Representatives regarding  
23 discussions with governments of European NATO coun-  
24 tries about contributions to Taiwan's self-defense  
25 through—

1           (1) public statements of support for Taiwan’s  
2 security;

3           (2) arms transfers or arms sales, particularly of  
4 weapons consistent with an asymmetric defense  
5 strategy;

6           (3) transfers or sales of dual-use items and  
7 technology;

8           (4) transfers or sales of critical nonmilitary  
9 supplies, such as food and medicine;

10          (5) increasing the military presence of such  
11 countries in the Indo-Pacific region;

12          (6) joint training and military exercises;

13          (7) enhancing Taiwan’s critical infrastructure  
14 resiliency, including communication and digital in-  
15 frastructure;

16          (8) coordination to counter disinformation;

17          (9) coordination to counter offensive cyber oper-  
18 ations; and

19          (10) any other matter deemed important by the  
20 Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

21 **SEC. 6. EXPEDITED LICENSING FOR EUROPEAN COUN-**  
22 **TRIES TRANSFERRING MILITARY EQUIPMENT**  
23 **TO TAIWAN.**

24          (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
25 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State

1 shall establish an expedited decision-making process for  
2 blanket third party transfers of defense articles and serv-  
3 ices from NATO countries to Taiwan, including transfers  
4 and re-transfers of United States origin grant, Foreign  
5 Military Sales, and Direct Commercial Sales end-items not  
6 covered by an exemption under the International Traffic  
7 in Arms Regulations under subchapter M of chapter I of  
8 title 22, Code of Federal Regulations.

9 (b) AVAILABILITY.—The expedited decision-making  
10 process described in subsection (a)—

11 (1) shall be available for classified and unclassi-  
12 fied items; and

13 (2) shall, to the extent practicable—

14 (A) require the approval, return, or denial  
15 of any licensing application to export defense  
16 articles and services that is related to a govern-  
17 ment-to-government agreement within 15 days  
18 after the submission of such application; and

19 (B) require the completion of the review of  
20 all other licensing requests not later than 30  
21 days after the submission of such application.

○