

117TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# S. 3090

To address the participation of Taiwan in the Inter-American Development Bank.

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## IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 27, 2021

Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself, Mr. RISCH, Mr. KAINE, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. MARKEY, and Mr. RUBIO) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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## A BILL

To address the participation of Taiwan in the Inter-American Development Bank.

1       *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2       *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3       **SECTION 1. FINDINGS.**

4       Congress makes the following findings:

5               (1) The Inter-American Development Bank (re-  
6       ferred to in this Act as the “IDB”) was established  
7       in 1959 and—

8               (A) is the premier multilateral development  
9       bank in the Western Hemisphere;

1 (B) is the largest source of development fi-  
2 nancing for Latin America and the Caribbean;  
3 and

4 (C) issued more than \$140,000,000,000 in  
5 loans and grants between 2011 and 2021.

6 (2) The IDB—

7 (A) has 48 member states, of which 26 are  
8 borrowing members in the Latin America and  
9 the Caribbean region; and

10 (B) constitutes a critical forum for fos-  
11 tering collective action and meeting shared re-  
12 gional challenges, including COVID–19 recovery  
13 and response.

14 (3) Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Peo-  
15 ple’s Republic of China are among the 22 non-bor-  
16 rowing, non-Western Hemisphere members of the  
17 IDB.

18 (4) Taiwan—

19 (A) has been an observer at the IDB since  
20 1991;

21 (B) has contributed to a specialized finan-  
22 cial intermediary development fund at IDB Lab  
23 since 2006;

1 (C) has been a non-regional member coun-  
2 try of the Central American Bank for Economic  
3 Integration since 1992;

4 (D) is a member of the Asian Development  
5 Bank, the World Trade Organization, the Asia-  
6 Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the Inter-  
7 national Chamber of Commerce; and

8 (E) is a participant of the Organisation for  
9 Economic Co-operation and Development's  
10 Competition Committee, its Steel Committee,  
11 and its Fisheries Committee.

12 (5) Taiwan's economy is the 7th largest in Asia  
13 and the 20th largest in the world by purchasing  
14 power parity.

15 (6) Taiwan has been a model contributor of for-  
16 eign aid in Latin America and the Caribbean, allo-  
17 cating between 30 percent and 50 percent of its for-  
18 eign aid budget to Latin America and the Carib-  
19 bean.

20 (7) Since 2010, Taiwan's International Co-  
21 operation and Development Fund has funded 95  
22 projects in Central America, 64 projects in the Car-  
23ibbean, and 21 projects in South America.

24 (8) Taiwan has been a firm supporter of Haiti  
25 as it confronts multiple simultaneous crises—

1 (A) by providing more than \$145,000,000  
2 in financing to modernize Haiti’s electrical grid;

3 (B) by delivering 280,000 masks at the  
4 height of the COVID–19 pandemic; and

5 (C) by pledging \$500,000 in disaster relief  
6 immediately after the August 14, 2021, earth-  
7 quake in Haiti.

8 (9) According to data from the Pan American  
9 Development Foundation, communities receiving as-  
10 sistance from Taiwan display increased—

11 (A) food security;

12 (B) income generation; and

13 (C) capacity to recover from natural disas-  
14 ters.

15 (10) Taiwan has placed special emphasis on  
16 fostering development in Central America and in the  
17 Caribbean, including by signing the Agreement on  
18 the Republic of China (Taiwan)—Central America  
19 Economic Development Fund in 1998.

20 (11) Through its non-regional partner status at  
21 the Central American Bank for Economic Integra-  
22 tion, Taiwan has provided \$266,700,000 in financial  
23 assistance to help Central American countries re-  
24 spond to the COVID–19 pandemic. On April 22,  
25 2021, the Central American Bank for Economic In-

1       tegration announced the opening of its Representa-  
2       tive Office in Taiwan, deepening investment ties be-  
3       tween Taiwan and Central America.

4           (12) Taiwan maintains diplomatic relations  
5       with 9 countries in Latin America and the Carib-  
6       bean and 8 representative offices in 7 other coun-  
7       tries in the region.

8           (13) Since 2016, the Government of the Peo-  
9       ple’s Republic of China has engaged in aggressive  
10      economic diplomacy to compel the withdrawal of dip-  
11      lomatic recognition for Taiwan, most notably in  
12      Panama, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador,  
13      all of which have terminated longstanding and pro-  
14      ductive diplomatic relationships with Taiwan and  
15      granted diplomatic recognition to the People’s Re-  
16      public of China.

17           (14) The Government of the People’s Republic  
18      of China—

19           (A) announced a \$1,100,000,000 construc-  
20      tion project in Panama on the day that Panama  
21      switched its recognition from Taiwan to the  
22      People’s Republic of China; and

23           (B) similarly offered assistance packages  
24      to the Dominican Republic and El Salvador in

1           2018 in exchange for these countries ceasing  
2           their diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.

3           (15) Taiwan’s international engagement has  
4           faced increased resistance from the Government of  
5           the People’s Republic of China, which has used its  
6           influence to deny Taiwan’s invitations to multilateral  
7           fora. For example, Taiwan was not invited to the  
8           2016 Assembly of the International Civil Aviation  
9           Organization (ICAO), despite participating as a  
10          guest at ICAO’s 2013 summit. Taiwan’s requests to  
11          participate in the General Assembly of the Inter-  
12          national Criminal Police Organization (commonly  
13          known as “INTERPOL”) were also rejected.

14          (16) Taiwan’s inclusion in multilateral organi-  
15          zations, such as the IDB, advances peace and sta-  
16          bility in the world and in the Western Hemisphere  
17          specifically.

18          (17) Congress has demonstrated a longstanding  
19          policy of supporting Taiwan’s participation in inter-  
20          national bodies that address shared transnational  
21          challenges by—

22                 (A) authorizing the Secretary of State, in  
23                 Public Law 106–137, Public Law 107–10, and  
24                 Public Law 108–235, to initiate a United  
25                 States plan for supporting Taiwan’s participa-

1           tion as an observer in the activities of the  
2           World Health Organization;

3           (B) directing the Secretary of State, in  
4           Public Law 113–17, to report on a strategy to  
5           obtain observer status for Taiwan at the Inter-  
6           national Civil Aviation Organization Assembly;  
7           and

8           (C) directing the Secretary of State, in  
9           Public Law 114–139, to develop a strategy to  
10          obtain observer status for Taiwan at the  
11          INTERPOL Assembly.

12          (18) Despite these efforts, Taiwan has not re-  
13          ceived an invitation to attend as an observer any of  
14          the events of the international organizations referred  
15          to in paragraph (17) since 2016.

16 **SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

17          It is the sense of Congress that—

18           (1) the United States fully supports Taiwan’s  
19           participation in, and contribution to, international  
20           organizations and underscores the importance of the  
21           relationship between Taiwan and the United States;

22           (2) diversifying the Inter-American Develop-  
23           ment Bank’s donor base and increasing ally engage-  
24           ment in the Western Hemisphere reinforces United  
25           States national interests;

1           (3) Taiwan’s significant contribution to the de-  
2           velopment and economies of Latin America and the  
3           Caribbean demonstrate that Taiwan’s membership  
4           in the IDB as a non-borrowing member would ben-  
5           efit the IDB and the entire Latin American and  
6           Caribbean region; and

7           (4) non-borrowing membership in the IDB  
8           would allow Taiwan to substantially leverage and  
9           channel the immense resources Taiwan already pro-  
10          vides to Latin America and the Caribbean to reach  
11          a larger number of beneficiaries.

12 **SEC. 3. PLAN FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN THE**  
13 **INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK.**

14          The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Sec-  
15          retary of the Treasury, is authorized—

16               (1) to initiate a United States plan to endorse  
17               non-borrowing IDB membership for Taiwan; and

18               (2) to instruct the United States Governor of  
19               the IDB to work with the IDB Board of Governors  
20               to admit Taiwan as a non-borrowing member of the  
21               IDB.



1 **SEC. 4. REPORT CONCERNING MEMBER STATE STATUS FOR**  
2 **TAIWAN AT THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOP-**  
3 **MENT BANK.**

4 Not later than 90 days after the date of the enact-  
5 ment of this Act, and not later than April 1 of each year  
6 thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the  
7 Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit an unclassified re-  
8 port to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate  
9 and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of  
10 Representatives that—

11 (1) describes the United States plan to endorse  
12 and obtain non-borrowing membership status for  
13 Taiwan at the IDB;

14 (2) includes an account of the efforts that the  
15 Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury  
16 have made to encourage IDB member states to pro-  
17 mote Taiwan's bid to obtain non-borrowing member-  
18 ship at the IDB; and

19 (3) identifies the steps that the Secretary of  
20 State and the Secretary of the Treasury will take to  
21 endorse and obtain non-borrowing membership sta-  
22 tus for Taiwan at the IDB in the following year.

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