

Calendar No. 90

117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION**S. 2000**

To promote the United States-Greece defense partnership, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 9, 2021

Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself, Mr. RUBIO, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, Mr. COONS, and Mr. ROUNDS) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

JUNE 24, 2021

Reported by Mr. MENENDEZ, with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]

A BILL

To promote the United States-Greece defense partnership,
and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “U.S.-Greece Defense
5 and Interparliamentary Partnership Act of 2021”.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress makes the following findings:

3 (1) The United States and Greece are strong
4 allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
5 (NATO) and have deepened their defense relation-
6 ship in recent years in response to growing security
7 challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

8 (2) Greece participates in several NATO mis-
9 sions, including Operation Sea Guardian in the Med-
10 iterranean and NATO's mission in Kosovo.

11 (3) The Eastern Mediterranean Security and
12 Energy Partnership Act (title II of division J of
13 Public Law 116–94), authorized new security assist-
14 ance for Greece and Cyprus, lifted the United States
15 prohibition on arms transfers to Cyprus, and author-
16 ized the establishment of a United States–Eastern
17 Mediterranean Energy Center to facilitate energy co-
18 operation among the United States, Greece, Israel,
19 and Cyprus.

20 (4) The United States has demonstrated its
21 support for the trilateral partnership of Greece,
22 Israel, and Cyprus through joint engagement with
23 Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and the United States in the
24 “3+1” format.

25 (5) The United States and Greece have held
26 Strategic Dialogue meetings in Athens, Washington

1 DC, and virtually, and have committed to hold an
2 upcoming Strategic Dialogue session in 2021 in
3 Washington, DC.

4 (6) In October 2019, the United States and
5 Greece agreed to update the U.S.-Greece Mutual De-
6 fense Cooperation Agreement, and the amended
7 agreement officially entered into force on February
8 13, 2020.

9 (7) The amended Mutual Defense Cooperation
10 Agreement provides for increased joint United
11 States-Greece and NATO activities at Greek military
12 bases and facilities in Larissa, Stefanovikeio,
13 Alexandroupolis, and other parts of central and
14 northern Greece, and allows for infrastructure im-
15 provements at the United States Naval Support Ac-
16 tivity Souda Bay base on Crete.

17 (8) In October 2020, Greek Foreign Minister
18 Nikos Dendias announced that Greece hopes to fur-
19 ther expand the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agree-
20 ment with the United States.

21 (9) The United States Naval Support Activity
22 Souda Bay serves as a critical naval logistics hub for
23 the United States Navy's 6th Fleet.

24 (10) In June 2020, United States Ambassador
25 to Greece Geoffrey Pyatt characterized the impor-

1 tance of Naval Support Activity Souda Bay as “our
2 most important platform for the projection of Amer-
3 ican power into a strategically dynamic Eastern
4 Mediterranean region. From Syria to Libya to the
5 chokepoint of the Black Sea, this is a critically im-
6 portant asset for the United States, as our air force,
7 naval, and other resources are applied to support
8 our Alliance obligations and to help bring peace and
9 stability.”.

10 (11) During a September 2020 visit to Souda
11 Bay, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo an-
12 nounced that the USS Hershel “Woody” Williams,
13 the second of a new class of United States sea-bas-
14 ing ships, will be based out of Souda Bay, the first
15 permanent United States naval deployment at the
16 base.

17 (12) The United States cooperates with the
18 Hellenic Armed Forces at facilities in Larissa,
19 Stefanovikeio, and Alexandroupolis, where the
20 United States Armed Forces conduct training, re-
21 fueling, temporary maintenance, storage, and emer-
22 gency response.

23 (13) The United States has conducted a long-
24 standing International Military Education and
25 Training program with Greece, and the Government

1 of Greece has committed to provide \$3 for every dol-
2 lar invested by the United States in the program.

3 (14) Greece's defense spending in 2020
4 amounted to an estimated 2.68 percent of its gross
5 domestic product (GDP), exceeding NATO's 2 per-
6 cent of GDP benchmark agreed to at the 2014
7 NATO Summit in Wales.

8 (15) In September 2020, Greek Prime Minister
9 Kyriakos Mitsotakis announced plans to modernize
10 all three branches of the Hellenic Armed Forces,
11 which will strengthen Greece's military position in
12 the Eastern Mediterranean.

13 (16) The modernization includes upgrades to
14 the arms of all three branches, including new anti-
15 tank weapons for the Hellenic Army, new heavy-duty
16 torpedoes for the Hellenic Navy, and new guided
17 missiles for the Hellenic Air Force.

18 (17) The Hellenic Navy also plans to upgrade
19 its four MEKO 200HN frigates and purchase four
20 new multirole frigates of an undisclosed type, to be
21 accompanied by 4 MH-60R anti-submarine heli-
22 copters.

23 (18) The Hellenic Air Force plans to upgrade
24 84 of its fleet of F-16 jets to the F-16 Viper vari-

1 ant by 2027 and has expressed interest in partici-
2 pating in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.

3 (19) The United States ejected Turkey from
4 the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program in July
5 2019 as a result of its purchase of the Russian S-
6 400 air defense system. Eight F-35 Joint Strike
7 Fighters were produced for Turkey but never deliv-
8 ered as a result of its ejection from the program.

9 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

10 It is the sense of Congress that—

11 (1) Greece is a pillar of stability in the Eastern
12 Mediterranean region and the United States should
13 remain committed to supporting its security and
14 prosperity;

15 (2) the 3+1 format of cooperation among Cy-
16 prus, Greece, Israel, and the United States has been
17 a successful forum to cooperate on energy issues and
18 should be expanded to include other areas of com-
19 mon concern to the members;

20 (3) the United States should increase and deep-
21 en efforts to partner with and support the mod-
22 ernization of the Greek military;

23 (4) it is in the interests of the United States
24 that Greece continue to transition its military equip-
25 ment away from Russian-produced platforms and

1 weapons systems through the European Recapital-
2 ization Investment Program;

3 (5) the United States Government should con-
4 tinue to deepen strong partnerships with the Greek
5 military, especially in co-development and co-produce-
6 tion opportunities with the Greek Navy;

7 (6) the naval partnership with Greece at Souda
8 Bay and Alexandroupolis is mutually beneficial to
9 the national security of the United States and
10 Greece;

11 (7) the United States should support the sale of
12 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Greece to include
13 those F-35 aircraft produced for but never delivered
14 to Turkey as a result of Turkey's exclusion from the
15 program due to its purchase of the Russian S-400
16 air defense system;

17 (8) the United States Government should con-
18 tinue to invest in International Military Education
19 and Training (IMET) programs in Greece;

20 (9) the United States Government should sup-
21 port joint maritime security cooperation exercises
22 with Cyprus, Greece, and Israel;

23 (10) in accordance with its legal authorities and
24 project selection criteria, the United States Develop-
25 ment Finance Corporation should support private in-

1 vestment in strategic infrastructure projects in
2 Greece, to include shipyards and ports that con-
3 tribute to the security of the region and Greece's
4 prosperity;

5 (11) the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agree-
6 ment with Greece should be extended and include
7 deepened partnerships at Greek military facilities
8 throughout the country, and, as appropriate and
9 necessary, the United States should partner with
10 Greece in order to increase rotational deployments
11 and presences of forward-based troops at Greek
12 bases;

13 (12) the United States Government should re-
14 store congressionally appropriated military construc-
15 tion funds for construction projects at Naval Sup-
16 port Activity Souda Bay focused on a warehouse
17 storage facility and an airport passenger terminal;
18 and

19 (13) the United States Government should es-
20 tablish the United States-Eastern Mediterranean
21 Energy Center as authorized in the Eastern Medi-
22 terranean Energy and Security Partnership Act of
23 2019.

1 **SEC. 4. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR EURO-**
2 **PEAN RECAPITALIZATION INCENTIVE PRO-**
3 **GRAM.**

4 There is authorized to be appropriated for the De-
5 partment of State \$25,000,000 for each of fiscal years
6 2022 through 2026 for European Recapitalization Incen-
7 tive Program (ERIP) assistance to Greece to assist the
8 country in meeting its defense needs and transitioning
9 away from Russian-produced military equipment.

10 **SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON LOAN PROGRAM.**

11 It is the sense of Congress that—

12 (1) as appropriate, the United States Govern-
13 ment should provide direct loans to Greece for the
14 procurement of defense articles, defense services,
15 and design and construction services pursuant to the
16 authority of section 23 of the Arms Export Control
17 Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) to support the further devel-
18 opment of Greece's military forces; and

19 (2) such loans should be considered an additive
20 security partnership tool, and not a substitute for
21 European Recapitalization Incentive Program assist-
22 ance.

23 **SEC. 6. EXPEDITED EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES TRANSFER**
24 **PROGRAM.**

25 (a) IN GENERAL.—During fiscal years 2022 through
26 2026, the delivery of excess defense articles to Greece shall

1 be given the same priority as that given other countries
2 and regions under section 516(e)(2) of the Foreign Assist-
3 ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(e)(2)).

4 (b) REPORT.—During each fiscal year listed in sub-
5 section (a), the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence
6 of the Secretary of State, shall report not later than Octo-
7 ber 31 to the appropriate congressional committees and
8 the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the
9 House of Representatives on Greece's defense needs and
10 how the United States will seek to address such needs
11 through transfers of excess defense equipment to Greece
12 for that fiscal year.

13 **SEC. 7. DELIVERY OF F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER AIR-**
14 **CRAFT TO GREECE.**

15 The President is authorized to expedite delivery of
16 any future F-35 aircraft once Greece is prepared to move
17 forward with such a purchase on such terms and condi-
18 tions as the President may require. Such transfer shall
19 be submitted to Congress pursuant to the certification re-
20 quirements under section 36 of the Arms Export Control
21 Act (22 U.S.C. 2776).

22 **SEC. 8. IMET COOPERATION WITH GREECE.**

23 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
24 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State
25 \$1,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026

1 for International Military Education and Training
 2 (IMET) assistance for Greece. The assistance shall be
 3 made available for the following purposes:

4 (1) Training of future leaders.

5 (2) Fostering a better understanding of the
 6 United States.

7 (3) Establishing a rapport between the United
 8 States Armed Forces and Greece's military to build
 9 partnerships for the future.

10 (4) Enhancement of interoperability and capa-
 11 bilities for joint operations.

12 (5) Focusing on professional military education,
 13 civilian control of the military, and protection of
 14 human rights.

15 **SEC. 9. CYPRUS, GREECE, ISRAEL, AND THE UNITED**
 16 **STATES 3+1 INTERPARLIAMENTARY GROUP.**

17 (a) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—There is established a group,
 18 to be known as the “Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and the
 19 United States 3+1 Interparliamentary Group”, to serve
 20 as a legislative component to the 3+1 process launched
 21 in Jerusalem in March 2019.

22 (b) **MEMBERSHIP.**—The Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and
 23 the United States 3+1 Interparliamentary Group shall in-
 24 clude a group of not more than 6 United States Senators,
 25 to be known as the “United States group”, who shall be

1 appointed jointly by the majority leader and the minority
2 leader of the Senate.

3 (c) ~~MEETINGS.~~—Not less frequently than once each
4 year, the United States group shall meet with members
5 of the ~~3+1~~ group to discuss issues on the agenda of the
6 ~~3+1~~ deliberations of the Governments of Greece, Israel,
7 Cyprus, and the United States to include maritime secu-
8 rity, defense cooperation, energy initiatives, and coun-
9 tering malign influence efforts by the People’s Republic
10 of China and the Russian Federation.

11 **SEC. 10. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**

12 In this Act, the term “appropriate congressional com-
13 mittees” means—

14 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
15 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

16 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
17 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
18 resentatives.

19 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

20 *This Act may be cited as the “U.S.-Greece Defense and*
21 *Interparliamentary Partnership Act of 2021”.*

22 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

23 *Congress makes the following findings:*

24 (1) *The United States and Greece are strong al-*
25 *lies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*

1 (NATO) and have deepened their defense relationship
2 in recent years in response to growing security chal-
3 lenges in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

4 (2) Greece participates in several NATO mis-
5 sions, including Operation Sea Guardian in the Med-
6 iterranean and NATO's mission in Kosovo.

7 (3) The Eastern Mediterranean Security and
8 Energy Partnership Act (title II of division J of Pub-
9 lic Law 116–94), authorized new security assistance
10 for Greece and Cyprus, lifted the United States prohi-
11 bition on arms transfers to Cyprus, and authorized
12 the establishment of a United States-Eastern Medi-
13 terranean Energy Center to facilitate energy coopera-
14 tion among the United States, Greece, Israel, and Cy-
15 prus.

16 (4) The United States has demonstrated its sup-
17 port for the trilateral partnership of Greece, Israel,
18 and Cyprus through joint engagement with Cyprus,
19 Greece, Israel, and the United States in the “3+1”
20 format.

21 (5) The United States and Greece have held
22 Strategic Dialogue meetings in Athens, Washington
23 D.C., and virtually, and have committed to hold an
24 upcoming Strategic Dialogue session in 2021 in
25 Washington, D.C.

1 (6) *In October 2019, the United States and*
2 *Greece agreed to update the United States-Greece Mu-*
3 *tual Defense Cooperation Agreement, and the amend-*
4 *ed agreement officially entered into force on February*
5 *13, 2020.*

6 (7) *The amended Mutual Defense Cooperation*
7 *Agreement provides for increased joint United States-*
8 *Greece and NATO activities at Greek military bases*
9 *and facilities in Larissa, Stefanovikio,*
10 *Alexandroupolis, and other parts of central and*
11 *northern Greece, and allows for infrastructure im-*
12 *provements at the United States Naval Support Ac-*
13 *tivity Souda Bay base on Crete.*

14 (8) *In October 2020, Greek Foreign Minister*
15 *Nikos Dendias announced that Greece hopes to further*
16 *expand the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement*
17 *with the United States.*

18 (9) *The United States Naval Support Activity*
19 *Souda Bay serves as a critical naval logistics hub for*
20 *the United States Navy's 6th Fleet.*

21 (10) *In June 2020, United States Ambassador to*
22 *Greece Geoffrey Pyatt characterized the importance of*
23 *Naval Support Activity Souda Bay as "our most im-*
24 *portant platform for the projection of American*
25 *power into a strategically dynamic Eastern Medi-*

1 *terranean region. From Syria to Libya to the*
2 *chokepoint of the Black Sea, this is a critically im-*
3 *portant asset for the United States, as our air force,*
4 *naval, and other resources are applied to support our*
5 *Alliance obligations and to help bring peace and sta-*
6 *bility.”.*

7 (11) *During a September 2020 visit to Souda*
8 *Bay, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced*
9 *that the USS Hershel “Woody” Williams, the second*
10 *of a new class of United States sea-basing ships, will*
11 *be based out of Souda Bay, the first permanent*
12 *United States naval deployment at the base.*

13 (12) *The United States cooperates with the Hel-*
14 *lenic Armed Forces at facilities in Larissa,*
15 *Stefanovikio, and Alexandroupolis, where the United*
16 *States Armed Forces conduct training, refueling, tem-*
17 *porary maintenance, storage, and emergency re-*
18 *sponse.*

19 (13) *The United States has conducted a long-*
20 *standing International Military Education and*
21 *Training (IMET) program with Greece, and the Gov-*
22 *ernment of Greece has committed to provide \$3 for*
23 *every dollar invested by the United States in the pro-*
24 *gram.*

1 (14) Greece's defense spending in 2020 amounted
2 to an estimated 2.68 percent of its gross domestic
3 product (GDP), exceeding NATO's 2 percent of GDP
4 benchmark agreed to at the 2014 NATO Summit in
5 Wales.

6 (15) Greece is eligible for the delivery of excess
7 defense articles under section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign
8 Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)).

9 (16) In September 2020, Greek Prime Minister
10 Kyriakos Mitsotakis announced plans to modernize
11 all three branches of the Hellenic Armed Forces,
12 which will strengthen Greece's military position in
13 the Eastern Mediterranean.

14 (17) The modernization includes upgrades to the
15 arms of all three branches, including new anti-tank
16 weapons for the Hellenic Army, new heavy-duty tor-
17 pedoes for the Hellenic Navy, and new guided missiles
18 for the Hellenic Air Force.

19 (18) The Hellenic Navy also plans to upgrade its
20 four MEKO 200HN frigates and purchase four new
21 multirole frigates of an undisclosed type, to be accom-
22 panied by 4 MH-60R anti-submarine helicopters.

23 (19) The Hellenic Air Force plans to fully up-
24 grade its fleet of F-16 jets to the F-16 Viper variant

1 *by 2027 and has expressed interest in participating*
2 *in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.*

3 *(20) The United States ejected Turkey from the*
4 *F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program in July 2019 as*
5 *a result of its purchase of the Russian S-400 air de-*
6 *fense system. Eight F-35 Joint Strike Fighters were*
7 *produced for Turkey but never delivered as a result*
8 *of its ejection from the program.*

9 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

10 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

11 *(1) Greece is a pillar of stability in the Eastern*
12 *Mediterranean region and the United States should*
13 *remain committed to supporting its security and*
14 *prosperity;*

15 *(2) the 3+1 format of cooperation among Cy-*
16 *prus, Greece, Israel, and the United States has been*
17 *a successful forum to cooperate on energy issues and*
18 *should be expanded to include other areas of common*
19 *concern to the members;*

20 *(3) the United States should increase and deepen*
21 *efforts to partner with and support the modernization*
22 *of the Greek military;*

23 *(4) it is in the interests of the United States that*
24 *Greece continue to transition its military equipment*
25 *away from Russian-produced platforms and weapons*

1 *systems through the European Recapitalization In-*
2 *vestment Program;*

3 *(5) the United States Government should con-*
4 *tinue to deepen strong partnerships with the Greek*
5 *military, especially in co-development and co-produc-*
6 *tion opportunities with the Greek Navy;*

7 *(6) the naval partnerships with Greece at Souda*
8 *Bay and Alexandroupolis are mutually beneficial to*
9 *the national security of the United States and Greece;*

10 *(7) the United States should, as appropriate,*
11 *support the sale of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to*
12 *Greece to include those F-35 aircraft produced for but*
13 *never delivered to Turkey as a result of Turkey's ex-*
14 *clusion from the program due to its purchase of the*
15 *Russian S-400 air defense system;*

16 *(8) the United States Government should con-*
17 *tinue to invest in International Military Education*
18 *and Training (IMET) programs in Greece;*

19 *(9) the United States Government should support*
20 *joint maritime security cooperation exercises with Cy-*
21 *prus, Greece, and Israel;*

22 *(10) in accordance with its legal authorities and*
23 *project selection criteria, the United States Develop-*
24 *ment Finance Corporation should consider supporting*
25 *private investment in strategic infrastructure projects*

1 *in Greece, to include shipyards and ports that con-*
2 *tribute to the security of the region and Greece's pros-*
3 *perity;*

4 *(11) the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement*
5 *with Greece should be extended for a period of five*
6 *years and include deepened partnerships at Greek*
7 *military facilities throughout the country, and, as ap-*
8 *propriate and necessary, the United States should*
9 *partner with Greece in order to increase rotational*
10 *deployments and presences of forward-based troops at*
11 *Greek bases;*

12 *(12) the United States Government should re-*
13 *store congressionally appropriated military construc-*
14 *tion funds for construction projects at Naval Support*
15 *Activity Souda Bay focused on a warehouse storage*
16 *facility and an airport passenger terminal that were*
17 *redirected to United States border wall programs in*
18 *2019; and*

19 *(13) the United States Government should estab-*
20 *lish the United States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy*
21 *Center as authorized in the Eastern Mediterranean*
22 *Energy and Security Partnership Act of 2019.*

1 **SEC. 4. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR EURO-**
2 **PEAN RECAPITALIZATION INCENTIVE PRO-**
3 **GRAM.**

4 *There is authorized to be appropriated for the Depart-*
5 *ment of State \$25,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022*
6 *through 2026 for European Recapitalization Incentive Pro-*
7 *gram (ERIP) assistance to Greece to assist the country in*
8 *meeting its defense needs and transitioning away from Rus-*
9 *sian-produced military equipment.*

10 **SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON LOAN PROGRAM.**

11 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

12 *(1) as appropriate, the United States Govern-*
13 *ment should provide direct loans to Greece for the*
14 *procurement of defense articles, defense services, and*
15 *design and construction services pursuant to the au-*
16 *thority of section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act*
17 *(22 U.S.C. 2763) to support the further development*
18 *of Greece's military forces; and*

19 *(2) such loans should be considered an additive*
20 *security partnership tool, and not a substitute for Eu-*
21 *ropean Recapitalization Incentive Program assist-*
22 *ance.*

23 **SEC. 6. TRANSFER OF F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER AIR-**
24 **CRAFT TO GREECE.**

25 *The President is authorized to expedite delivery of any*
26 *future F-35 aircraft to Greece once Greece is prepared to*

1 *move forward with such a purchase on such terms and con-*
2 *ditions as the President may require. Such transfer shall*
3 *be submitted to Congress pursuant to the certification re-*
4 *quirements under section 36 of the Arms Export Control*
5 *Act (22 U.S.C. 2776).*

6 **SEC. 7. REPORT ON EXPEDITED EXCESS DEFENSE ARTI-**
7 **CLES TRANSFER PROGRAM.**

8 *During each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, the Sec-*
9 *retary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of*
10 *State, shall report not later than October 31 to the appro-*
11 *priate congressional committees and the Committees on*
12 *Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representa-*
13 *tives on Greece's defense needs and how the United States*
14 *will seek to address such needs through transfers of excess*
15 *defense equipment to Greece for that fiscal year.*

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17 *(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is*
18 *authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State*
19 *\$1,800,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for*
20 *International Military Education and Training (IMET)*
21 *assistance for Greece. The assistance shall be made available*
22 *for the following purposes:*

23 *(1) Training of future leaders.*

24 *(2) Fostering a better understanding of the*
25 *United States.*

1 (3) *Establishing a rapport between the United*
 2 *States Armed Forces and Greece’s military to build*
 3 *partnerships for the future.*

4 (4) *Enhancement of interoperability and capa-*
 5 *bilities for joint operations.*

6 (5) *Focusing on professional military education,*
 7 *civilian control of the military, and protection of*
 8 *human rights.*

9 **SEC. 9. CYPRUS, GREECE, ISRAEL, AND THE UNITED STATES**

10 **3+1 INTERPARLIAMENTARY GROUP.**

11 (a) *ESTABLISHMENT.*—*There is established a group, to*
 12 *be known as the “Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and the United*
 13 *States 3+1 Interparliamentary Group”, to serve as a legis-*
 14 *lative component to the 3+1 process launched in Jerusalem*
 15 *in March 2019.*

16 (b) *MEMBERSHIP.*—*The Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and*
 17 *the United States 3+1 Interparliamentary Group shall in-*
 18 *clude a group of not more than 6 United States Senators,*
 19 *to be known as the “United States group”, who shall be*
 20 *appointed jointly by the majority leader and the minority*
 21 *leader of the Senate.*

22 (c) *MEETINGS.*—*Not less frequently than once each*
 23 *year, the United States group shall meet with members of*
 24 *the 3+1 group to discuss issues on the agenda of the 3+1*
 25 *deliberations of the Governments of Greece, Israel, Cyprus,*

1 *and the United States to include maritime security, defense*
2 *cooperation, energy initiatives, and countering malign in-*
3 *fluence efforts by the People’s Republic of China and the*
4 *Russian Federation.*

5 **SEC. 10. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**

6 *In this Act, the term “appropriate congressional com-*
7 *mittees” means—*

8 *(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the*
9 *Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and*

10 *(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the*
11 *Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-*
12 *resentatives.*

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