S. 1245

To combat the theft of trade secrets by China, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 20, 2021

Mr. Graham introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To combat the theft of trade secrets by China, and for other purposes.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
- 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
- 4 (a) Short Title.—This Act may be cited as the
- 5 "Combating Chinese Purloining of Trade Secrets Act" or
- 6 the "CCP Trade Secrets Act".
- 7 (b) Table of Contents for
- 8 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

TITLE I—INCREASED PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 2512 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE, INVOLVING A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

Sec. 101. Manufacture, distribution, possession, and advertising of wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepting devices prohibited.

TITLE II—PROTECTING U.S. BUSINESSES FROM FOREIGN TRADE SECRET THEFT

Sec. 201. Short title.

Sec. 202. Prohibition on misappropriating U.S. trade secrets.

TITLE III—COMBATING CYBERCRIME

Sec. 301. Short title.

Sec. 302. Predicate offenses.

Sec. 303. Forfeiture.

Sec. 304. Shutting down botnets.

Sec. 305. Aggravated damage to a critical infrastructure computer.

Sec. 306. Stopping trafficking in botnets; fraud and related activity in connection with computers.

TITLE IV—ESPIONAGE, THEFT OF TRADE SECRETS, AND IMPROPER INTERFERENCE IN UNITED STATES ELECTIONS

Sec. 401. Espionage, theft of trade secrets, theft of intellectual property, involvement in commercial fraud schemes, and improper interference in United States elections.

Sec. 402. Visa and nonimmigrant status restrictions.

TITLE V—GOVERNMENT-FUNDED RESEARCH PROJECTS

Sec. 501. Findings.

Sec. 502. Definitions.

Sec. 503. Approval of covered persons in sensitive Government-funded research projects.

Sec. 504. Disclosure of research assistance from foreign governments.

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1	TITLE I—INCREASED PENALTIES
2	FOR VIOLATIONS OF SECTION
3	2512 OF TITLE 18, UNITED
4	STATES CODE, INVOLVING A
5	FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
6	SEC. 101. MANUFACTURE, DISTRIBUTION, POSSESSION
7	AND ADVERTISING OF WIRE, ORAL, OR ELEC-
8	TRONIC COMMUNICATION INTERCEPTING
9	DEVICES PROHIBITED.
10	(a) In General.—Section 2512 of title 18, United
11	States Code, is amended by adding at the end the fol-
12	lowing:
13	"(4) Any person who violates this section with the
14	intent to benefit any government of a foreign country (as
15	defined in section 1 of the Foreign Agents Registration
16	Act of 1938, as amended (22 U.S.C. 611)), agency or in-
17	strumentality of a foreign state (as defined in section
18	1603(b) of title 28, United States Code), or agent of a
19	foreign principal (as defined in section 1 of the Foreign
20	Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended (22 U.S.C.

23 (b) Sentencing Enhancement for Foreign In-

more than 20 years, or both.".

611)) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not

- 24 VOLVEMENT IN VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 2512 OF TITLE
- 25 18, United States Code.—Pursuant to its authority

- 1 under section 994 of title 28, United States Code, the
- 2 United States Sentencing Commission shall review and
- 3 amend the Federal sentencing guidelines to ensure that
- 4 the guidelines provide an additional penalty increase of not
- 5 fewer than 4 offense levels if the defendant violated section
- 6 2512 of title 18, United States Code, with the intent to
- 7 benefit any government of a foreign country, agency or
- 8 instrumentality of a foreign state, or agent of a foreign
- 9 principal.

10 TITLE II—PROTECTING U.S.

11 BUSINESSES FROM FOREIGN

12 TRADE SECRET THEFT

- 13 SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.
- 14 This title may be cited as the "Protecting U.S. Busi-
- 15 nesses from Foreign Trade Secrets Theft Act of 2021".
- 16 SEC. 202. PROHIBITION ON MISAPPROPRIATING U.S. TRADE
- 17 SECRETS.
- 18 (a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 90 of title 18, United
- 19 States Code, is amended by adding at the end the fol-
- 20 lowing:
- 21 "§ 1840. Applicability to foreign persons
- 22 "(a) Definitions.—In this section—
- 23 "(1) the term 'critical technology' has the
- meaning given the term 'critical technologies' in sec-

1	tion 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50
2	U.S.C. 4565);
3	"(2) the term 'designated Federal agency'
4	means—
5	"(A) the Department of Homeland Secu-
6	rity;
7	"(B) U.S. Customs and Border Protection;
8	"(C) the Department of Commerce;
9	"(D) the Securities and Exchange Com-
10	mission;
11	"(E) the Export-Import Bank of the
12	United States;
13	"(F) the Department of State; and
14	"(G) the United States Patent and Trade-
15	mark Office;
16	"(3) the term 'foreign person' means a person
17	that is not a United States person;
18	"(4) the term 'International Trade Commission'
19	means the United States International Trade Com-
20	mission;
21	"(5) the term 'offending foreign person' means
22	a foreign person—
23	"(A) who misappropriates a trade secret;
24	and

1	"(B) with respect to whom a petition sub-
2	mitted under subsection (b)(1) satisfies the re-
3	quirements under that subsection, as deter-
4	mined by the Attorney General;
5	"(6) the term 'person' means—
6	"(A) an individual; and
7	"(B) a corporation, business association,
8	partnership, society, or trust, any other non-
9	governmental entity, organization, or group,
10	and any governmental entity operating as a
11	business enterprise; and
12	"(7) the term 'United States person' means—
13	"(A) a United States citizen or an alien
14	lawfully admitted for permanent residence to
15	the United States;
16	"(B) a corporation or other legal entity
17	that is organized under the laws of the United
18	States, any State or territory thereof, or the
19	District of Columbia; and
20	"(C) a corporation or other legal entity—
21	"(i) organized under the laws of a ju-
22	risdiction outside of the United States; and
23	"(ii) with respect to which a United
24	States person described in subparagraph
25	(A) or (B)—

1	"(I) holds more than 50 percent
2	of the equity interest by vote or value;
3	"(II) holds a majority of seats on
4	the board of directors; or
5	"(III) otherwise controls the ac-
6	tions, policies, or personnel decisions.
7	"(b) Petition for Relief.—
8	"(1) Demonstration of Misappropria-
9	TION.—If an owner of a trade secret, who is a
10	United States person, wishes to have the Attorney
11	General or the head of the applicable designated
12	Federal agency apply a penalty under subsection (c)
13	to a foreign person who has misappropriated the
14	trade secret, the owner shall submit to the Attorney
15	General a petition demonstrating that—
16	"(A)(i) a court has entered a temporary
17	restraining order, preliminary injunction, or
18	final judgment under section 1836 of this title
19	against the foreign person for misappropriating
20	a trade secret of the owner;
21	"(ii) the International Trade Commission
22	has issued a temporary exclusion order or final
23	exclusion order under section 337 of the Tariff
24	Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1337) against the for-

1	eign person for misappropriating a trade secret
2	of the owner; or
3	"(iii) an indictment has been issued under
4	section 1831 or 1832 of this title against the
5	foreign person for misappropriating a trade se-
6	cret of the owner;
7	"(B) the trade secret described in the ap-
8	plicable clause of subparagraph (A) involves or
9	is a component of critical technology; and
10	"(C) the remedies available to the owner
11	under section 1836 of this title or section 337
12	of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1337), as
13	applicable, are unlikely to provide complete re-
14	lief to the owner because the foreign person has
15	used or is reasonably likely to use the misappro-
16	priated trade secret in the home country of the
17	foreign person or a third country, such that ac-
18	tivities of the foreign person relevant to the de-
19	terminations under subparagraph (A) take
20	place outside the United States.
21	"(2) Review.—Not later than 60 days after
22	the date on which an owner who is a United States
23	person submits a petition to the Attorney General

under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall de-

termine whether the petition satisfies the requirements under that paragraph.

"(3) Notification.—If the Attorney General determines under paragraph (2) that a petition satisfies the requirements under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall so notify the head of each designated Federal agency not later than 30 days after the date of the determination.

"(4) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of Congress that if the Attorney General determines under paragraph (2) that a petition relating to a foreign person satisfies the requirements under paragraph (1), the Attorney General and the head of each designated Federal agency should impose 1 or more penalties on the foreign person under subsection (c), to the extent that the penalties are applicable.

"(c) Penalties.—

"(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), not later than 90 days after the date on which the Attorney General provides notice to the head of each designated Federal agency under subsection (b)(3) with respect to an offending foreign person, the Attorney General or the head of a designated Federal agency, as applicable, may impose 1

1	or more of the following penalties on the offending
2	foreign person:
3	"(A) Import restriction.—The Com-
4	missioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protec-
5	tion may exclude from entry into the United
6	States any articles produced by the offending
7	foreign person.
8	"(B) Export licenses.—
9	"(i) Dual-use exports.—The Sec-
10	retary of Commerce may refuse to issue
11	any specific license, or grant any other
12	specific permission or authority, for the ex-
13	port, reexport, or in-country transfer of
14	items to the offending foreign person
15	under the Export Control Reform Act of
16	2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.).
17	"(ii) Defense articles and de-
18	FENSE SERVICES.—The Secretary of State
19	may refuse to issue any license or other
20	approval for the export of defense articles
21	or defense services to the offending foreign
22	person under the Arms Export Control Act
23	(22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).
24	"(C) Restricted parties.—

1	"(i) Commerce lists.—The Sec-
2	retary of Commerce may add the offending
3	foreign person to one of the following lists
4	maintained by the Bureau of Industry and
5	Secretary of the Department of Commerce:
6	"(I) The Entity List set forth in
7	Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the
8	Export Administration Regulations
9	under subchapter C of chapter VII of
10	title 15, Code of Federal Regulations.
11	"(II) The Denied Persons List
12	maintained pursuant to section 764.3
13	of the Export Administration Regula-
14	tions.
15	"(ii) Treasury list.—The Secretary
16	of the Treasury may add the offending for-
17	eign person to the list of specially des-
18	ignated nationals and blocked persons
19	maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets
20	Control of the Department of the Treas-
21	ury.
22	"(D) Securities reporting.—The Secu-
23	rities and Exchange Commission may determine
24	whether the use by the offending foreign person
25	of the misappropriated trade secret is a report-

able material condition in any filing by the offending foreign person required under applicable securities laws of the United States.

- "(E) PATENT PROTECTION.—The Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office may prohibit the offending foreign person from applying for patent protection, being listed as an inventor on a patent application, or continuing a patent application under title 35, United States Code.
- "(F) EXPORT-IMPORT BANK ASSISTANCE FOR EXPORTS TO FOREIGN PERSON.—The Export-Import Bank of the United States may refuse to approve the issuance of any guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or participation in the extension of credit in connection with the export of any goods or services to the offending foreign person.
- "(G) EXCLUSION OF CORPORATE OFFI-CERS.—The Secretary of State may deny a visa application, and the Secretary of Homeland Security may deny an application for admission to the United States, of any alien that the applicable Secretary determines is a corporate officer

1	or principal of, or a shareholder with a control-
2	ling interest in, the offending foreign person.
3	"(H) OTHER PENALTIES.—The Attorney
4	General or the head of a designated Federal
5	agency—
6	"(i) may not procure, or enter into a
7	contract for the procurement of, any goods
8	or services from the offending foreign per-
9	son;
10	"(ii) may prohibit, pursuant to notice
11	issued by the Attorney General, a United
12	States person from knowingly investing in
13	or purchasing significant amounts of eq-
14	uity or debt instruments of the offending
15	foreign person;
16	"(iii) may impose on a principal exec-
17	utive officer of the offending foreign per-
18	son, or on an individual performing similar
19	functions and with similar authorities as
20	such an officer, any penalty under this
21	subsection that could be imposed on the of-
22	fending foreign person; and
23	"(iv) may impose on the offending
24	foreign person any other penalty author-

ized under any provision of Federal law, as
 determined appropriate.

"(2) Duration of Penalties.—

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"(A) TEMPORARY PENALTY.—If a court enters a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction under section 1836 of this title against an offending foreign person for misappropriating a trade secret, the International Trade Commission issues a temporary exclusion order under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1337) against an offending foreign person for misappropriating a trade secret, or an indictment is issued under section 1831 or 1832 of this title against an offending foreign person for misappropriating a trade secret, the Attorney General or the head of a designated Federal agency may impose a penalty under paragraph (1) on the offending foreign person during the period during which the temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, temporary exclusion order, or indictment remains in effect.

"(B) PERMANENT PENALTY.—If a court enters a final judgment under section 1836 of this title against an offending foreign person for misappropriating a trade secret, the International Trade Commission issues a final exclusion order under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1337) against an offending foreign person for misappropriating a trade secret, or an offending foreign person is convicted under section 1831or 1832 of this title of misappropriating a trade secret, the Attorney General or the head of a designated Federal agency may permanently impose a penalty under paragraph (1) on the foreign person.

"(3) Petition for review.—

"(A) IN GENERAL.—If the Attorney General or the head of a designated Federal agency imposes a temporary penalty under paragraph (2)(A) or a permanent penalty under paragraph (2)(B) on an offending foreign person, the offending foreign person may submit to the Attorney General or the head of the designated Federal agency a petition for the revocation or modification of the penalty—

"(i) not later 45 days after the date on which the penalty is imposed; or

"(ii) in the case of a permanent penalty, if the final judgment, final exclusion

1	order, or conviction upon which the perma-
2	nent penalty is based is reversed on appeal
3	or otherwise vacated, not later than 45
4	days after the date of the reversal or
5	vacatur.
6	"(B) Contents of Petition.—
7	"(i) In General.—An offending for-
8	eign person shall include in a petition sub-
9	mitted under subparagraph (A) a full writ-
10	ten statement in support of the position of
11	the offending foreign person, including a
12	precise statement of why—
13	"(I) an insufficient basis exists
14	for the penalty; or
15	"(II) the circumstances resulting
16	in the penalty no longer apply.
17	"(ii) Remedial steps.—An offending
18	foreign person may, in a petition submitted
19	under subparagraph (A), propose remedial
20	steps that would negate the basis for the
21	penalty.
22	"(C) Determination.—The Attorney
23	General or the head of a designated Federal
24	agency, as applicable, shall make a determina-

1	tion with respect to a petition submitted under
2	subparagraph (A).
3	"(d) Report.—
4	"(1) In general.—Not later than 1 year after
5	the date of enactment of this section, and each year
6	thereafter, the Attorney General, in coordination
7	with the head of each designated Federal agency
8	shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of
9	the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of
10	the House of Representatives a report that—
11	"(A) with respect to the preceding year—
12	"(i) identifies foreign countries, state-
13	owned and state-controlled entities, and
14	other persons that engaged in the mis-
15	appropriation of trade secrets owned by
16	United States persons;
17	"(ii) describes any strategy used by a
18	foreign country to undertake misappropria-
19	tion of trade secrets owned by United
20	States persons;
21	"(iii) identifies categories of tech-
22	nologies developed by, or trade secrets
23	owned by, United States persons that were
24	targeted for misappropriation;

1	"(iv) lists legal actions taken under
2	section 1836 of this title, section 337 of
3	the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1337),
4	or section 1831 or 1832 of this title—
5	"(I) against an offending foreign
6	person who misappropriated a trade
7	secret owned by a United States per-
8	son; and
9	"(II) as a result of which the
10	products of the offending foreign per-
11	son described in subclause (I) may
12	never enter the United States; and
13	"(v) describes progress made in de-
14	creasing the prevalence of misappropria-
15	tion of trade secrets owned by United
16	States persons; and
17	"(B) recommends strategies to the Com-
18	mittee on the Judiciary of the Senate and the
19	Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
20	Representatives to decrease the misappropria-
21	tion by foreign persons of trade secrets owned
22	by United States persons.
23	"(2) Form of Report.— A report submitted
24	under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassi-
25	fied form but may contain a classified annex.".

1	(b) Table of Sections.—The table of sections for
2	chapter 90 of title 18, United States Code, is amended
3	by adding at the end the following:
	"1840. Applicability to foreign persons.".
4	TITLE III—COMBATING
5	CYBERCRIME
6	SEC. 301. SHORT TITLE.
7	This title may be cited as the "International
8	Cybercrime Prevention Act".
9	SEC. 302. PREDICATE OFFENSES.
10	Part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended—
11	(1) in section $1956(e)(7)(D)$ —
12	(A) by striking "or section 2339D" and in-
13	serting "section 2339D"; and
14	(B) by striking "of this title, section
15	46502" and inserting ", or section 2512 (relat-
16	ing to the manufacture, distribution, possession,
17	and advertising of wire, oral, or electronic com-
18	munication intercepting devices) of this title,
19	section 46502"; and
20	(2) in section 1961(1), by inserting "section
21	1030 (relating to fraud and related activity in con-
22	nection with computers) if the act indictable under
23	section 1030 is felonious," before "section 1084".

20 1 SEC. 303. FORFEITURE. 2 (a) In General.—Section 2513 of title 18, United 3 States Code, is amended to read as follows: 4 "SEC. 2513. CONFISCATION OF WIRE, ORAL, OR ELEC-5 **TRONIC COMMUNICATION** INTERCEPTING 6 DEVICES AND OTHER PROPERTY. 7 "(a) Criminal Forfeiture.— "(1) IN GENERAL.—The court, in imposing a 8 sentence on any person convicted of a violation of 9 10 section 2511 or 2512, or convicted of conspiracy to 11 violate section 2511 or 2512, shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed and irrespective of 12 13 any provision of State law, that such person forfeit to the United States— 14 "(A) such person's interest in any prop-15 16 erty, real or personal, that was used or intended 17 to be used to commit or to facilitate the com-18 mission of such violation; and 19 "(B) any property, real or personal, consti-20 tuting or derived from any gross proceeds, or 21 any property traceable to such property, that 22 such person obtained or retained directly or in-23 directly as a result of such violation. 24

"(2) FORFEITURE PROCEDURES.—Pursuant to section 2461(c) of title 28, the provisions of section 413 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.

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1 853), other than subsection (d) thereof, shall apply 2 to criminal forfeitures under this subsection.

"(b) Civil Forfeiture.—

- "(1) IN GENERAL.—The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States in accordance with provisions of chapter 46 and no property right shall exist in them:
 - "(A) Any property, real or personal, used or intended to be used, in any manner, to commit, or facilitate the commission of a violation of section 2511 or 2512, or a conspiracy to violate section 2511 or 2512.
 - "(B) Any property, real or personal, constituting, or traceable to the gross proceeds taken, obtained, or retained in connection with or as a result of a violation of section 2511 or 2512, or a conspiracy to violate section 2511 or 2512.
- "(2) Forfeiture procedures.—Seizures and forfeitures under this subsection shall be governed by the provisions of chapter 46 relating to civil forfeitures, except that such duties as are imposed on the Secretary of the Treasury under the customs laws described in section 981(d) shall be performed by such officers, agents, and other persons as may

1	be designated for that purpose by the Secretary of
2	Homeland Security or the Attorney General.".
3	(b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.—
4	The table of sections for chapter 119 is amended by strik-
5	ing the item relating to section 2513 and inserting the
6	following:
	"2513. Confiscation of wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepting devices and other property.".
7	SEC. 304. SHUTTING DOWN BOTNETS.
8	(a) In General.—Section 1345 of title 18, United
9	States Code, is amended—
10	(1) in the heading, by inserting "AND ABUSE"
11	after " FRAUD ";
12	(2) in subsection (a)—
13	(A) in paragraph (1)—
14	(i) in subparagraph (B), by striking
15	"or" at the end;
16	(ii) in subparagraph (C), by inserting
17	"or" after the semicolon; and
18	(iii) by inserting after subparagraph
19	(C) the following:
20	"(D) violating or about to violate section
21	1030(a)(5) of this title where such conduct has
22	caused or would cause damage (as defined in
23	section 1030) without authorization to 100 or

1	more protected computers (as defined in section
2	1030) during any 1-year period, including by—
3	"(i) impairing the availability or in-
4	tegrity of the protected computers without
5	authorization; or
6	"(ii) installing or maintaining control
7	over malicious software on the protected
8	computers that, without authorization, has
9	caused or would cause damage to the pro-
10	tected computers;"; and
11	(B) in paragraph (2), in the matter pre-
12	ceding subparagraph (A), by inserting ", a vio-
13	lation described in subsection (a)(1)(D)," before
14	"or a Federal"; and
15	(3) by adding at the end the following:
16	"(c) A restraining order, prohibition, or other action
17	described in subsection (b), if issued in circumstances de-
18	scribed in subsection (a)(1)(D), may, upon application of
19	the Attorney General—
20	"(1) specify that no cause of action shall lie in
21	any court against a person for complying with the
22	restraining order, prohibition, or other action; and
23	"(2) provide that the United States shall pay to
24	such person a fee for reimbursement for such costs
25	as are reasonably necessary and which have been di-

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- 2 order, prohibition, or other action.".
- 3 (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.—
- 4 The table of sections for chapter 63 of title 18, United
- 5 States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to
- 6 section 1345 and inserting the following:

"1345. Injunctions against fraud and abuse.".

7 SEC. 305. AGGRAVATED DAMAGE TO A CRITICAL INFRA-

- 8 STRUCTURE COMPUTER.
- 9 (a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 47 of title 18, United
- 10 States Code, is amended by inserting after section 1030
- 11 the following:
- 12 "§ 1030A. Aggravated damage to a critical infrastruc-
- 13 ture computer
- 14 "(a) Offense.—It shall be unlawful, during and in
- 15 relation to a felony violation of section 1030, to knowingly
- 16 cause or attempt to cause damage to a critical infrastruc-
- 17 ture computer, if such damage results in (or, in the case
- 18 of an attempted offense, would, if completed, have resulted
- 19 in) the substantial impairment—
- 20 "(1) of the operation of the critical infrastruc-
- 21 ture computer; or
- 22 "(2) of the critical infrastructure associated
- with such computer.
- 24 "(b) Penalty.—Any person who violates subsection
- 25 (a) shall, in addition to the term of punishment provided

- 1 for the felony violation of section 1030, be fined under
- 2 this title, imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both.
- 3 "(c) Consecutive Sentence.—Notwithstanding
- 4 any other provision of law—
- 5 "(1) a court shall not place any person con-6 victed of a violation of this section on probation;
- "(2) except as provided in paragraph (4), no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this section shall run concurrently with any term of imprisonment imposed on the person under any other provision of law, including any term of imprisonment imposed for the felony violation of section 13 1030;
 - "(3) in determining any term of imprisonment to be imposed for the felony violation of section 1030, a court shall not in any way reduce the term to be imposed for such violation to compensate for, or otherwise take into account, any separate term of imprisonment imposed or to be imposed for a violation of this section; and
 - "(4) a term of imprisonment imposed on a person for a violation of this section may, in the discretion of the court, run concurrently, in whole or in part, only with another term of imprisonment that is imposed by the court at the same time on that

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1 person for an additional violation of this section, if 2 such discretion shall be exercised in accordance with any applicable guidelines and policy statements 3 4 issued by the United States Sentencing Commission 5 pursuant to section 994 of title 28.

"(d) Definitions.—In this section—

"(1) the terms 'computer' and 'damage' have the meanings given the terms in section 1030; and "(2) the term 'critical infrastructure' means systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have catastrophic regional or national effects on public health or safety, economic security, or national security, including voter registration databases, voting machines, and other communications systems that manage the election process or report and display results on behalf of State and local governments.".

(b) Table of Sections.—The table of sections for

chapter 47 of title 18, United States Code, is amended

by inserting after the item relating to section 1030 the

following:

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[&]quot;1030A. Aggravated damage to a critical infrastructure computer.".

1	SEC. 306. STOPPING TRAFFICKING IN BOTNETS; FRAUD
2	AND RELATED ACTIVITY IN CONNECTION
3	WITH COMPUTERS.
4	(a) In General.—Section 1030 of title 18, United
5	States Code, is amended—
6	(1) in subsection (a)—
7	(A) by striking paragraph (2) and insert-
8	ing the following:
9	"(2)(A) intentionally accesses a computer with-
10	out authorization or exceeds authorized access, and
11	thereby obtains information, if—
12	"(i) the conduct was undertaken in fur-
13	therance of any felony violation of the laws of
14	the United States or of any State, unless an
15	element of such violation would require proof
16	that the information was obtained without au-
17	thorization or in excess of authorization; or
18	"(ii) the protected computer is owned or
19	operated by or on behalf of a State or local gov-
20	ernmental entity responsible for the administra-
21	tion of justice, public health, or safety, or
22	owned or operated by or on behalf of the
23	United States Government; or
24	"(B) intentionally accesses a computer without
25	authorization, and thereby obtains information from
26	any protected computer:":

1	(B) by striking paragraph (6) and insert-
2	ing the following:
3	"(6) knowing such conduct to be wrongful, in-
4	tentionally traffics in any password or similar infor-
5	mation, or any other means of access, further know-
6	ing or having reason to know that a protected com-
7	puter would be accessed or damaged without author-
8	ization in a manner prohibited by this section as the
9	result of such trafficking;";
10	(C) in paragraph (7), by adding "or" at
11	the end; and
12	(D) by inserting after paragraph (7) the
13	following:
14	"(8) intentionally traffics in the means of ac-
15	cess to a protected computer, if—
16	"(A) the trafficker knows or has reason to
17	know the protected computer has been damaged
18	in a manner prohibited by this section; and
19	"(B) the promise or agreement to pay for
20	the means of access is made by, or on behalf of,
21	a person the trafficker knows or has reason to
22	know intends to use the means of access to-
23	"(i) damage a protected computer
24	without authorization; or
25	"(ii) violate section 1037 or 1343;";

1	(2) in subsection (c)—
2	(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ", (a)(3),
3	or (a)(6)" each place it appears and inserting
4	"or (a)(3)";
5	(B) in paragraph (3)—
6	(i) in subparagraph (A), by striking
7	" $(a)(4)$ or $(a)(7)$ " and inserting " $(a)(4)$,
8	(a)(7), or $(a)(8)$ "; and
9	(ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking
10	" $(a)(4)$, or $(a)(7)$ " and inserting " $(a)(4)$,
11	(a)(7), or $(a)(8)$ "; and
12	(C) in paragraph (4)—
13	(i) in subparagraph (C)(i), by striking
14	"or an attempt to commit an offense"; and
15	(ii) in subparagraph (D), by striking
16	clause (ii) and inserting the following:
17	"(ii) an offense, or an attempt to
18	commit an offense, under subsection
19	(a)(6);";
20	(3) in subsection (e)—
21	(A) by striking paragraph (6) and insert-
22	ing the following:
23	"(6) the term 'exceeds authorized access'
24	means—

1	"(A)(i) to access a computer with author-
2	ization and thereby to knowingly obtain infor-
3	mation from such computer that the accessor is
4	not entitled to obtain; or
5	"(ii) to knowingly obtain any information
6	from such computer for a purpose that is pro-
7	hibited by the computer owner; and
8	"(B) provided that the limitation on access
9	to or use of the information is not based solely
10	on the terms governing use of an online service
11	by customers or subscribers thereof, including
12	terms set forth in an acceptable use policy or
13	terms of service;";
14	(B) by striking paragraph (10);
15	(C) by redesignating paragraphs (11) and
16	(12) as paragraphs (10) and (11), respectively;
17	(D) in paragraph (10), as so redesignated,
18	by striking "and";
19	(E) in paragraph (11), as so redesignated,
20	by striking the period at the end and inserting
21	a semicolon; and
22	(F) by adding at the end the following:
23	"(12) the term 'online service'—
24	"(A) means an electronic communication
25	service (as defined in section 2510) to the pub-

1	lic, a remote computing service (as defined in
2	section 2711), or other service that provides
3	content or computing services to the public over
4	the Internet; and
5	"(B) does not include an enterprise serv-
6	ice;
7	"(13) the term 'enterprise service' means any
8	electronic communication service (as defined in sec-
9	tion 2510) to the public, remote computing service
10	(as defined in section 2711), or other service that
11	provides content or computing services to the public
12	for which the user, customer, or subscriber has paid,
13	or on whose behalf has been paid, more than
14	\$10,000 in a calendar year in exchange for the right
15	to access or use the service; and
16	"(14) the term 'traffic', except as provided in
17	subsection (a)(6), means transfer, or otherwise dis-
18	pose of, to another as consideration for the receipt
19	of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement
20	to pay, anything of pecuniary value.";
21	(4) in subsection (g), in the first sentence, by
22	inserting ", except for a violation of subsection
23	(a)(6)," after "of this section"; and
24	(5) by striking subsections (i) and (j) and in-
25	serting the following:

1	"(i) Criminal Forfeiture.—
2	"(1) In general.—The court, in imposing a
3	sentence on any person convicted of a violation of
4	this section, or convicted of conspiracy to violate this
5	section, shall order, in addition to any other sen-
6	tence imposed and irrespective of any provision of
7	State law, that such person forfeit to the United
8	States—
9	"(A) such person's interest in any prop-
10	erty, real or personal, that was used or intended
11	to be used to commit or to facilitate the com-
12	mission of such violation; and
13	"(B) any property, real or personal, consti-
14	tuting or derived from any gross proceeds, or
15	any property traceable to such property, that
16	such person obtained or retained, directly or in-
17	directly, as a result of such violation.
18	"(2) Forfeiture procedures.—Pursuant to
19	section 2461(c) of title 28, the provisions of section
20	413 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.
21	853), other than subsection (d) thereof, shall apply
22	to criminal forfeitures under this subsection.
23	"(j) Civil Forfeiture.—
24	"(1) In general.—The following shall be sub-
25	ject to forfeiture to the United States in accordance

1	with chapter 46, and no property right shall exist in
2	them:
3	"(A) Any property, real or personal, used
4	or intended to be used, in any manner—
5	"(i) to commit, or facilitate the com-
6	mission of, a violation of this section; or
7	"(ii) in a conspiracy to violate this
8	section.
9	"(B) Any property, real or personal, con-
10	stituting or traceable to the gross proceeds
11	taken, obtained, or retained in connection with
12	or as a result of—
13	"(i) a violation of this section; or
14	"(ii) a conspiracy to violate this sec-
15	tion.
16	"(2) Forfeiture procedures.—Seizures and
17	forfeitures under this subsection shall be governed
18	by the provisions of chapter 46 that apply to civil
19	forfeitures, except that such duties as are imposed
20	on the Secretary of the Treasury under the customs
21	laws described in section 981(d) shall be performed
22	by such officers, agents, and other persons as may
23	be designated for that purpose by the Secretary of
24	Homeland Security or the Attorney General.".

1	(b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.—
2	Section 7431(e)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
3	is amended by striking "subparagraph (B)" and inserting
4	"subparagraph (B)(iii)".
5	TITLE IV—ESPIONAGE, THEFT
6	OF TRADE SECRETS, AND IM-
7	PROPER INTERFERENCE IN
8	UNITED STATES ELECTIONS
9	SEC. 401. ESPIONAGE, THEFT OF TRADE SECRETS, THEFT
10	OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INVOLVE-
11	MENT IN COMMERCIAL FRAUD SCHEMES,
12	AND IMPROPER INTERFERENCE IN UNITED
13	STATES ELECTIONS.
14	(a) Definitions.—Section 101(a) of the Immigra-
15	tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)) is amended
16	by adding at the end the following:
17	"(53)(A) The term 'espionage' means con-
18	duct—
19	"(i) in violation of—
20	"(I) the Act of June 15, 1917 (40
21	Stat. 217, chapter 30) (commonly known
22	as the 'Espionage Act of 1917');
23	"(II) chapter 90 of title 18, United
24	States Code (commonly known as the 'Eco-
25	nomic Espionage Act of 1996'): or

1	"(III) any other Federal criminal law
2	relating to an activity described in clause
3	(ii); or
4	"(ii)(I) by an alien who is under the direc-
5	tion of—
6	"(aa) a foreign government; or
7	"(bb) an intermediary individual or
8	entity that seeks to serve, support, or ben-
9	efit a foreign government; and
10	"(II) with respect to confidential informa-
11	tion, that constitutes—
12	"(aa) stealing or, without authoriza-
13	tion, appropriating, taking, carrying away,
14	concealing, or, by fraud, artifice, or decep-
15	tion, obtaining such information;
16	"(bb) without authorization, copying,
17	duplicating, sketching, drawing,
18	photographing, downloading, uploading, al-
19	tering, destroying, photocopying, repli-
20	cating, transmitting, delivering, sending,
21	mailing, communicating, or conveying such
22	information; or
23	"(cc) receiving, buying, or possessing
24	such information, knowing that the infor-
25	mation has been stolen or appropriated,

1	obtained, or converted without authoriza-
2	tion.
3	"(B) The term 'espionage' includes economic
4	espionage.
5	"(54) The term 'improper interference in a
6	United States election' means conduct by an alien
7	that—
8	"(A)(i) violates Federal criminal, voting
9	rights, or campaign finance law; or
10	"(ii) is under the direction of—
11	"(I) a foreign government; or
12	"(II) an intermediary individual or
13	entity that seeks to serve, support, or ben-
14	efit a foreign government; and
15	"(B) interferes with a general or primary
16	Federal, State, or local election or caucus, in-
17	cluding—
18	"(i) the campaign of a candidate; and
19	"(ii) a ballot measure, including—
20	"(I) an amendment;
21	"(II) a bond issue;
22	"(III) an initiative;
23	"(IV) a recall;
24	"(V) a referral; and
25	"(VI) a referendum.

1	"(55) The term 'theft of a trade secret' means
2	conduct—
3	"(A) in violation of—
4	"(i) chapter 90 of title 18, United
5	States Code (commonly known as the 'Eco-
6	nomic Espionage Act of 1996'); or
7	"(ii) any other Federal criminal law
8	relating to an activity described in sub-
9	paragraph (B); or
10	"(B)(i) by an alien who is under the direc-
11	tion of—
12	"(I) a foreign government; or
13	"(II) an intermediary individual or
14	entity that seeks to serve, support, or ben-
15	efit a foreign government; and
16	"(ii) with respect to a trade secret relating
17	to a product or service used or intended for use
18	in interstate or foreign commerce, that con-
19	stitutes—
20	"(I) stealing or, without authoriza-
21	tion, appropriating, taking, carrying away,
22	concealing, or, by fraud, artifice, or decep-
23	tion, obtaining such trade secret for the
24	economic benefit of any person other than
25	the owner of the trade secret;

1	"(II) without authorization, copying,
2	duplicating, sketching, drawing,
3	photographing, downloading, uploading, al-
4	tering, destroying, photocopying, repli-
5	cating, transmitting, delivering, sending,
6	mailing, communicating, or conveying such
7	trade secret; or
8	"(III) receiving, buying, or possessing
9	such trade secret, knowing that the trade
10	secret has been stolen or appropriated, ob-
11	tained, or converted without authoriza-
12	tion.".
13	(b) Inadmissibility.—Section 212(a)(3) of the Im-
14	migration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)) is
15	amended by adding at the end the following:
16	"(H) Espionage and theft of trade
17	SECRETS.—An alien is inadmissible if a con-
18	sular officer, the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
19	rity, the Secretary of State, or the Attorney
20	General knows, or has reasonable grounds to
21	believe—
22	"(i) the alien is seeking admission or
23	sought admission to the United States to
24	engage in espionage or theft of a trade se-
25	cret ;

1	"(ii) the alien has engaged or intends
2	to engage in espionage or theft of a trade
3	secret; or
4	"(iii) the affiliation or activities of the
5	alien with, or the control of the alien by
6	an individual, an entity, or a funding
7	mechanism known or reasonably believed
8	to be engaged in, or to have the intention
9	of engaging in, espionage or theft of a
10	trade secret.
11	"(I) Improper interference in A
12	UNITED STATES ELECTION.—Any alien who a
13	consular officer, the Secretary of Homeland Se-
14	curity, the Secretary of State, or the Attorney
15	General knows, or has reasonable grounds to
16	believe, is seeking admission to the United
17	States to engage in improper interference in a
18	United States election, or who has engaged in
19	improper interference in a United States elec-
20	tion, is inadmissible.".

- 21 (c) Deportability.—Section 237(a) of the Immi-22 gration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)) is amend-23 ed by adding at the end the following:
- 24 "(8) Espionage and theft of trade se-25 Crets.—Any alien who has engaged, is engaged, or

1	at any time after admission engages in espionage or
2	theft of a trade secret is deportable.
3	"(9) Improper interference in a united
4	STATES ELECTION.—Any alien who has engaged, is
5	engaged, or at any time after admission engages in
6	improper interference in a United States election is
7	deportable.".
8	SEC. 402. VISA AND NONIMMIGRANT STATUS RESTRIC-
9	TIONS.
10	(a) Period of Authorized Stay for Certain
11	CITIZENS AND NATIONALS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
12	OF CHINA.—Section 214(a)(2) of the Immigration and
13	Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1184(a)(2)) is amended by add-
14	ing at the end the following:
15	"(C)(i) The period of authorized stay for a cit-
16	izen or national of the People's Republic of China
17	who seeks admission to the United States as a non-
18	immigrant described in subparagraph (F), (J), or
19	(M) of section 101(a)(15) to study, research, teach,
20	or work in any field described in the most recent
21	technology alert list of the Department of State or
22	in section $221(j)(1)$ —
23	"(I) shall be—
24	"(aa) a fixed period of not more than
25	4 years; or

1	"(bb) the length of the program iden-
2	tified on the Form I-20, Certificate of Eli-
3	gibility for Nonimmigrant Student Status,
4	or the Form DS-2019, Certificate of Eligi-
5	bility for Exchange Visitor Status, as ap-
6	plicable, of such citizen or national of the
7	People's Republic of China; and
8	"(II) may be extended by the Secretary of
9	Homeland Security for 1 or more additional pe-
10	riods of not more than 2 years.
11	"(ii) This subparagraph shall not apply to any
12	national of Hong Kong or Macau.".
13	(b) Prohibition on Issuance of Visas to Cer-
14	TAIN CITIZENS AND NATIONALS OF THE PEOPLE'S RE-
15	PUBLIC OF CHINA.—Section 221 of the Immigration and
16	Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201) is amended by adding
17	at the end the following:
18	"(j) Prohibition on Issuance of Visas to Cer-
19	TAIN CITIZENS AND NATIONALS OF THE PEOPLE'S RE-
20	PUBLIC OF CHINA.—
21	"(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State
22	shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland
23	Security shall not admit into the United States, or
24	grant a change of nonimmigrant status to, an alien
25	who is a citizen or national of the People's Republic

1	of China if the Secretary of State or the Secretary
2	of Homeland Security determines that the alien—
3	"(A) presents a risk to national security;
4	or
5	"(B) otherwise seeks to enter the United
6	States to participate in graduate-level
7	coursework or research at an institution of
8	higher education (as defined in section 101(a)
9	of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
10	U.S.C. 1001(a))) in a field described in para-
11	graph (2).
12	"(2) FIELDS DESCRIBED.—The fields described
13	in this paragraph are—
14	"(A) the military or intelligence sector;
15	"(B) the energy sector;
16	"(C) nuclear science or nuclear engineer-
17	ing;
18	"(D) high-end numerical control machinery
19	and robotics;
20	"(E) autonomous systems or machine
21	learning;
22	"(F) artificial intelligence;
23	"(G) production and application of high-
24	performance medical devices;
25	"(H) semiconductors;

1	"(I) new energy vehicles;
2	"(J) mobile phone technology;
3	"(K) next-generation information tech-
4	nology;
5	"(L) aviation, aeronautics, or space;
6	"(M) biomedicine; and
7	"(N) any related field, as determined by
8	the Secretary of State or the Secretary of
9	Homeland Security.
10	"(3) Termination of status.—
11	"(A) In General.—With respect to an
12	alien who is a citizen or national of the People's
13	Republic of China who has been admitted to the
14	United States as a nonimmigrant described in
15	subparagraph (F), (J), or (M) of section
16	101(a)(15), the Secretary of Homeland Security
17	shall terminate the status and employment au-
18	thorization of, and revoke any petition approval
19	of or on behalf of, the alien if the Secretary de-
20	termines that after such admission the alien—
21	"(i) has engaged in an activity or af-
22	filiation that presents a risk to national se-
23	curity; or
24	"(ii) has changed his or her program,
25	course of study, research, or employment

1	to graduate-level coursework or research at
2	an institution of higher education in a field
3	described in paragraph (2).
4	"(B) Failure to maintain non-
5	IMMIGRANT STATUS.—Any change or attempted
6	change described in subparagraph (A) shall be
7	considered to be a failure to maintain non-
8	immigrant status under this Act.
9	"(4) Inapplicability to nationals of hong
10	KONG AND MACAU.—This subsection shall not apply
11	to any national of Hong Kong or Macau.".
12	(c) APPLICABILITY.—The amendments made by this
13	section shall apply with respect to—
14	(1) any visa application filed on or after the
15	date of the enactment of this Act; and
16	(2) the status of any alien, except for a national
17	of Hong Kong or Macau, who—
18	(A) is a citizen or national of the People's
19	Republic of China, regardless of the country of
20	the passport presented by, or the country of
21	residence of, the alien;
22	(B) before, on, or after the date of the en-
23	actment of this Act, has been or is admitted to
24	the United States as a nonimmigrant described
25	in subparagraph (F), (J), or (M) of section

1	101(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality
2	Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)); and
3	(C) has changed or changes his or her pro-
4	gram, course of study, research, or employment
5	to graduate-level coursework or research at an
6	institution of higher education (as defined in
7	section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of
8	1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a))) in a field described
9	in section 221(j)(1) of the Immigration and Na-
10	tionality Act (as added by subsection (b)).
11	TITLE V—GOVERNMENT-
12	FUNDED RESEARCH PROJECTS
13	SEC. 501. FINDINGS.
14	Congress find the following:
15	(1) The People's Republic of China (referred to
16	in this subsection as "the PRC" or "China") poses
17	an existential threat to the economic interests and
18	national security of the United States, in part due
19	to the continued efforts of the PRC to steal sensitive

23 and other forms of nontraditional espionage. 24 (2) The PRC, through the Chinese Communist Party (referred to in this subsection as the "CCP"), 25

to the continued efforts of the PRC to steal sensitive

technology and proprietary information from compa-

nies, academic institutions, and other organizations

of the United States through economic espionage

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- has long had an interest in replacing the United
 States as the world's foremost superpower. China
 takes a holistic approach towards achieving its longterm goals, which are rooted in the concept of a
 comprehensive national power, including achieving
 dominance in economics, military affairs, science and
 technology, education, and global influence.
 - (3) Nontraditional forms of espionage serve as primary tools to further the goals of the CCP. Those tools include talent recruitment programs designed to recruit Chinese nationals to acquire knowledge about—and, often, steal—valuable and sensitive research at universities and research institutions abroad, and to lure foreign experts to China to work on key strategic programs. More broadly, the PRC uses mergers and acquisitions or joint ventures as a means to gain access to high-level technology, uses cyber intrusions to steal information, and uses front companies for PRC-related entities to acquire export-controlled technology.
 - (4) In 2015, President Xi Jinping of the PRC released the "Made in China 2025" initiative, a 10-year plan to update the manufacturing base of China by developing the following 10 high-tech industries:

25 dustries:

1	(A) Electric cars and other new energy ve-
2	hicles.
3	(B) Next-generation information tech-
4	nology and telecommunications.
5	(C) Advanced robotics and artificial intel-
6	ligence.
7	(D) Aerospace equipment.
8	(E) Bio-medicine and high-end medical
9	equipment.
10	(F) Ocean engineering equipment and
11	high-end vessels.
12	(G) High-end rail transportation equip-
13	ment.
14	(H) Electrical equipment.
15	(I) Farming machines.
16	(J) New materials, such as polymers.
17	(5) In attempting to overtake the United States
18	and achieve its Made in China 2025 goals, China
19	has systematically sought to identify areas of Amer-
20	ican innovation, education, and technology that
21	could be replicated, stolen, or appropriated.
22	(6) The very nature of the open society of the
23	United States—a free market economy that
24	incentivizes creativity and ingenuity and promotes
25	the free flow of capital and ideas, a higher education

- system and scientific research community that encourages collaboration domestically and internationally, and a liberal democratic government that lacks a top-down, authoritarian structure—creates opportunities for the PRC to target the United States in ways that are either not adequately protected or not even anticipated as possible threats.
 - (7) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has assessed that "there's no country that's even close" to the PRC when it comes to foreign espionage, in traditional or nontraditional forms.
 - (8) As the 2018 Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyberspace report of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (commonly known as the "NCSC") stated, China has expansive efforts in place to acquire United States technology, including sensitive trade secrets and proprietary information. China continues to use cyber espionage to support its strategic development goals—science and technology advancement, military modernization, and economic policy objectives. Chinese companies and individuals often acquire United States technology for commercial and scientific purposes.

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(9) In April 2020, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (referred to in this subsection as the "USTR") issued its annual Special 301 Report, in which the USTR reviews the state of intellectual property protection and enforcement in trading partners of the United States around the world. The USTR continues to place China on the Priority Watch List, which reflects "United States concerns with China's system of pressuring and coercing technology transfer, and the continued need for fundamental structural changes to strengthen IP protection and enforcement, including as to trade secret theft, obstacles to protecting trademarks, online piracy and counterfeiting, the high-volume manufacturing and export of counterfeit goods, and impediments to pharmaceutical innovation.".

(10) The theft of intellectual property, trade secrets, sensitive technology, and scientific and other academic research all contribute to China's goal of achieving preeminent superpower status. China's failure to respect intellectual property rights, failure to adhere to the rule of law, and efforts to obtain intellectual property, trade secrets, technology, and research through improper or illicit means all pose

- a significant economic and national security threat
 to the United States.
 - (11) In recent years, China has increased its use of nontraditional espionage to target colleges and universities in the United States, particularly with respect to cutting edge research and technologies being developed by such universities, including technology that has military applications.
 - (12) The universities of the United States provide fertile ground for nontraditional espionage given the open, international, and collaborative nature of most university research and the legitimate interest of universities in encouraging international collaboration.
 - (13) While the United States benefits from attracting the top research talent from around the world, universities nevertheless must take appropriate measures to ensure that China is not able to use academic collaboration to steal United States intellectual property or engage in other activities that might harm the national security of the United States.
 - (14) In response to the increased wave of non-traditional espionage over recent years, the Department of Justice launched a China Initiative in 2018.

The goal of the China Initiative is to identify and prosecute individuals and entities engaged in economic and other nontraditional espionage, trade secret theft, hacking, and other crimes, while protecting critical infrastructure against external threats and combating covert efforts to influence the American public.

(15) Several recent criminal and civil enforcement actions taken by the Department of Justice highlight China's pervasive and illegal targeting of intellectual property and valuable research from United States universities, including the following:

(A) Dr. Qing Wang was a former employee of the Cleveland Clinic Foundation. He had received more than \$3,000,000 in grant funding from the National Institutes of Health (commonly known as "NIH"). Dr. Wang was charged in a criminal complaint with knowingly failing to disclose to NIH that he was Dean of the College of Life Sciences and Technology at the Huazhong University of Science and Technology (referred to in this subparagraph as "HUST") and received grant funds from the National Natural Science Foundation of China for some of the same scientific research funded

- by NIH. Dr. Wang also allegedly participated in the Thousand Talents Program, for which China provided \$3,000,000 in research support to enhance the facilities and operations at HUST. Federal law enforcement agencies arrested Dr. Wang in May 2020.
 - (B) Dr. James Patrick Lewis was a tenured professor at West Virginia University in the physics department from 2006 to 2019. In July 2017, Dr. Lewis entered into a contract of employment with the PRC through its Global Experts Thousand Talents Plan. In March 2020, Dr. Lewis pled guilty to 1 count of Federal program fraud.
 - (C) Anming Hu, an Associate Professor in the Department of Mechanical, Aerospace, and Biomedical Engineering at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville (commonly known as "UT"), allegedly engaged in a scheme to defraud the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (commonly known as "NASA") by concealing his affiliation with Beijing University of Technology (referred to in this subparagraph as "BJUT"). Hu's false representations to UT about his affiliation with BJUT caused UT to

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falsely certify to NASA that UT was in compliance with Federal law. In February 2020, Mr. Hu was indicted on Federal charges of wire fraud and false statements.

(D) Dr. Charles Lieber served as the Principal Investigator of the Lieber Research Group at Harvard University, which specialized in the area of nanoscience. Dr. Lieber had received more than \$15,000,000 in grant funding from NIH and the Department of Defense since 2008. Unbeknownst to Harvard University, beginning in 2011, Lieber allegedly became a "Strategic Scientist" at Wuhan University of Technology in China (referred to in this subparagraph as "WUT") and was a contractual participant in the Thousand Talents Plan from 2012 to 2017. Under the terms of the Thou-Talents contract, WUT paid Lieber sand \$50,000 per month, paid him living expenses of up to approximately \$158,000, and awarded him more than \$1,500,000 to establish a research lab at WUT. In return, Lieber was obligated to work for WUT for 9 months per year. Lieber lied about his involvement with WUT to both Harvard University and Federal investiga-

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tors. In January 2020, Lieber was arrested and charged with making a materially false, fictitious and fraudulent statement.

(E) In January 2020, Yanqing Ye, a Chinese national, Lieutenant of the People's Liberation Army (referred to in this subparagraph as the "PLA", and member of the CCP, was indicted on visa fraud, false statements, and acting as an agent of a foreign power without prior notification. Ye allegedly falsely identified as a student and lied about her ongoing military service at the National University of Defense Technology. While studying at Boston University's Department of Physics, Chemistry, and Biomedical Engineering, Ye continued to work as a PLA Lieutenant and completed assignments from PLA officers, including conducting research, assessing United States military websites, and sending United States documents and information to China.

(F) In January 2020, Zaoson Zheng, a Chinese national, was arrested at Logan Airport in Boston and charged with attempting to smuggle 21 vials of biological research to China. Zheng had allegedly entered the United

States in 2018 on a J–1 visa and conducted cancer cell research at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston. Zheng admitted he stole the vials from a lab at Beth Israel, and that he intended to bring the vials to China, use them to conduct research in his own laboratory, and publish the results under his own name.

- (G) In December 2019, the Van Andel Research Institute (referred to in this subparagraph as "VARI") reached a settlement with the Department of Justice to pay \$5,500,000 to resolve allegations that it violated the law commonly known as the False Claims Act (section 3729 through 3733 of title 31, United States Code) by failing to disclose, in Federal grant applications and progress reports submitted to NIH, that the Chinese government funded 2 VARI researchers through grants. The VARI researchers were receiving research funding from Chinese sources while VARI was applying for and receiving NIH funding on their behalf.
- (H) In September 2019, Yu Zhou and Li Chen were charged with crimes related to stealing exosome-related trade secrets. Zhou and Chen, spouses who worked in separate medical

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research labs at the Nationwide Children's Hospital Research Institute, conspired to steal scientific trade secrets related to exosomes and exosome isolation from the Research Institute. The couple allegedly founded a company in China without the hospital's knowledge. While employed at the Research Institute, they marketed products and services related to exosome isolation through their Chinese company. They also founded an American biotechnology company advertising products and services related to exosomes isolation, including a kit developed from a trade secret created at a Nationwide Children's research lab. They eventually received more than \$876,000 and stock related to an asset purchase agreement involving the American company.

(I) In August 2019, Feng Tao, an associate professor at Kansas University, was indicted on Federal charges for concealing the fact that he was a full-time employee for Fuzhou University in China while doing research at Kansas University funded by the United States Government. Tao allegedly defrauded the United States Government by un-

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lawfully receiving Federal grant money at the same time that he was employed and paid by a Chinese research university.

(J) Weigiang Zhang, a Chinese national and United States legal permanent resident, acquired, without authorization, hundreds of rice seeds produced by his employer, Ventria Bioscience. Ventria is a Kansas biopharmaceutical research facility that develops genetically programmed rice to express recombinant human proteins, which are then extracted for use in the therapeutic and medical fields. Ventria spent millions of dollars and years of research developing its seeds and cost-effective methods to extract the proteins. Ventria used locked doors with magnetic card readers to restrict access to the temperature-controlled environment where the seeds were stored and processed. Zhang worked as a rice breeder for Ventria. In 2013, personnel from a crop research institute in China visited Zhang at his home in Kansas. Zhang drove the visitors to tour facilities in several States. United States Customs and Border Protection officers found seeds belonging to Ventria in the luggage of Zhang's visitors as

1	they prepared to leave the United States for
2	China. In April 2018, Zhang was sentenced to
3	121 months in a Federal prison after having
4	been convicted in February 2017 of 1 count of
5	conspiracy to steal trade secrets, 1 count of
6	conspiracy to commit interstate transportation
7	of stolen property, and 1 count of interstate
8	transportation of stolen property.
9	(16) It remains a national security priority for
10	the United States to protect the research and inno-
11	vation developed in United States colleges and uni-
12	versities from misappropriation by any country, in-
13	cluding the PRC.
14	SEC. 502. DEFINITIONS.
15	In this title:
16	(1) AGENCY HEAD.—The term "agency head",
17	with respect to a covered research project, means the
18	head of the covered agency providing the funding for
19	the covered research project.
20	(2) COVERED AGENCY.—The term "covered
21	agency" means—
22	(A) the Department of Defense;
23	(B) the Department of Energy; and

1	(C) an element of the intelligence commu-
2	nity, as defined in section 3 of the National Se-
3	curity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
4	(3) COVERED COUNTRY.—The term "covered
5	country" means—
6	(A) the People's Republic of China; and
7	(B) any other country designated by the
8	Director, based on findings similar to the find-
9	ings under subsection (a), which shall include
10	consideration of—
11	(i) whether the country poses an exis-
12	tential threat to the economic interests and
13	national security of the United States;
14	(ii) whether the country engages in
15	persistent efforts to steal sensitive tech-
16	nology and proprietary information from
17	companies, academic institutions, and
18	other organizations of the United States
19	through economic espionage and other
20	forms of nontraditional espionage;
21	(iii) whether nontraditional forms of
22	espionage serve as primary tools to further
23	the goals of the country;

1	(iv) whether the nontraditional forms
2	of espionage described in clause (iii) in-
3	clude—
4	(I) talent recruitment programs
5	designed to recruit the country's na-
6	tionals to acquire knowledge about—
7	and, often, steal—valuable and sen-
8	sitive research at universities and re-
9	search institutions abroad;
10	(II) luring foreign experts to the
11	country to work on key strategic pro-
12	grams;
13	(III) using mergers and acquisi-
14	tions or joint ventures as a means to
15	gain access to high-level technology;
16	(IV) using cyber intrusions to
17	steal information; and
18	(V) using front companies for
19	state-affiliated entities to acquire ex-
20	port-controlled technology;
21	(v) whether the country has system-
22	atically sought to identify areas of United
23	States innovation, education, and tech-
24	nology that could be replicated, stolen, or
25	appropriated; and

1	(vi) whether the Office of the United
2	States Trade Representative has placed the
3	country on the Priority Watch List.
4	(4) COVERED PERSON.—The term "covered
5	person" means an individual or institution of higher
6	education that has a financial relationship with—
7	(A) a covered country;
8	(B) a political party within a covered coun-
9	try;
10	(C) a person who acts as an agent, rep-
11	resentative, employee, or servant of a covered
12	country; or
13	(D) a person who acts in any other capac-
14	ity at the order or request, or under the direc-
15	tion or control, of a covered country.
16	(5) COVERED RESEARCH PROJECT.—The term
17	"covered research project" means a research project
18	at an institution of higher education—
19	(A) that is funded in whole or in part by
20	a covered agency; and
21	(B) the subject of which is—
22	(i) an item subject to the Export Con-
23	trol Reform Act of 2018 (20 U.S.C. 4801
24	et seq.);

1	(ii) an item listed on the Commerce
2	Control List (commonly known as the
3	"CCL") set forth in Supplement No. 1 to
4	part 774 of title 15, Code of Federal Regu-
5	lations; or
6	(iii) an item listed on the United
7	States Munitions List under section
8	38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act
9	(22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).
10	(6) Director.—The term "Director" means
11	the Director of National Intelligence.
12	(7) Financial relationship.—The term "fi-
13	nancial relationship" means—
14	(A) any arrangement under which com-
15	pensation is provided, directly or indirectly, by
16	a covered country, or another entity or person
17	described in subparagraph (B), (C), or (D) of
18	paragraph (4), to—
19	(i) a covered person; or
20	(ii) an institution of higher education;
21	or
22	(B) any direct or indirect ownership or in-
23	vestment interest by a covered country, or an-
24	other entity or person described in subpara-

1	graph (B), (C), or (D) of paragraph (4), in an
2	institution of higher education.
3	(8) Institution of higher education.—The
4	term "institution of higher education" has the
5	meaning given the term in section 101(a) of the
6	Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)).
7	SEC. 503. APPROVAL OF COVERED PERSONS IN SENSITIVE
8	GOVERNMENT-FUNDED RESEARCH
9	PROJECTS.
10	(a) Approval Required.—
11	(1) In general.—A covered person may not
12	participate in a covered research project unless the
13	covered person applies for and receives approval
14	from the agency head to participate.
15	(2) REQUIREMENTS.—An agency head may not
16	approve a covered person to participate in a covered
17	research project unless the agency head—
18	(A) performs a background check on the
19	covered person in consultation with the Direc-
20	tor; and
21	(B) collects any other relevant information
22	about the covered person that the agency head
23	determines appropriate, except any information
24	pertaining to United States persons that the

1	agency head is prohibited by law from col-
2	lecting.
3	(b) Penalty.—If an agency head determines that a
4	covered person participating in a covered research project
5	commenced on the date of enactment of this section has
6	violated subsection (a), the agency head may—
7	(1) impose a probationary period, not to exceed
8	6 months, on the head of the project or the project;
9	(2) reduce, limit, or eliminate the funding for
10	the project until the violation is remedied;
11	(3) permanently eliminate the funding for the
12	project; or
13	(4) take any other action determined appro-
14	priate by the agency head.
15	SEC. 504. DISCLOSURE OF RESEARCH ASSISTANCE FROM
16	FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.
17	(a) In General.—Chapter 45 of title 18, United
18	States Code, is amended by inserting after section 951 the
19	following:
20	"§951A. Disclosure of research assistance from for-
21	eign governments
22	"(a) Definitions.—In this section—
23	"(1) the terms 'agent of a foreign principal'
24	and 'foreign principal' have the meanings given

1	those terms in section 1 of the Foreign Agents Reg-
2	istration Act of 1938, as amended (22 U.S.C. 611);
3	"(2) the term 'covered research project' has the
4	meaning given the term in section 502 of the Com-
5	bating Chinese Purloining of Trade Secrets Act; and
6	"(3) the term 'institution of higher education'
7	has the meaning given the term in section 101 of the
8	Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001).
9	"(b) Funding and Other Assistance.—
10	"(1) Failure to disclose foreign fund-
11	ING.—
12	"(A) Offense.—It shall be unlawful for a
13	person, while applying for or accepting a grant
14	or other funding from an agency of the United
15	States for a covered research project, to know-
16	ingly and willfully fail to disclose to the agency
17	any grant or other funding that the person has
18	received or will receive for the same project
19	from a foreign principal or an agent of a for-
20	eign principal, including through an inter-
21	mediary.
22	"(B) Penalty.—Any person who violates
23	subparagraph (A) shall be fined under this title,
24	imprisoned for not more than 3 years, or both.

1	"(2) Failure to disclose material
2	FACTS.—
3	"(A) Offense.—It shall be unlawful for a
4	person, while applying for or accepting a grant
5	or other funding from an agency of the United
6	States for a covered research project, to know-
7	ingly and willfully fail to disclose to the agency
8	a material fact relating to a connection between
9	a foreign country and the project that might
10	substantially impact the decision of the agency
11	to provide funding to the project, including the
12	fact that a person providing any assistance, in-
13	cluding financial assistance, to the project is—
14	"(i) a national of a foreign country;
15	"(ii) affiliated with an institution
16	comparable to an institution of higher edu-
17	cation of higher learning, or another orga-
18	nization, that is headquartered in or sub-
19	stantially funded by a foreign country; or
20	"(iii) engaging in research activities
21	for the project in a foreign country.
22	"(B) Penalty.—Any person who violates
23	subparagraph (A) shall be fined under this title
24	imprisoned for not more than 1 year, or both

1 "(3) Institutions of Higher education.—
2 Any institution of higher education that knowingly
3 and willfully fails to disclose to the appropriate
4 agency of the United States that an officer, agent,
5 or employee of the institution of higher education
6 violated this subsection shall be fined not more than
7 \$1,000,000 for each such violation.

"(c) Transmission of Information.—

- "(1) Offense.—It shall be unlawful for any person, while applying for or accepting a grant or other funding from an agency of the United States for a covered research project, to knowingly transmit or attempt to transmit information gained in violation of a contract to which the person is a party, including a contract regarding nondisclosure of information, employment, or the provision of goods or services, intending or knowing that the transmission will benefit a foreign principal or an agent of a foreign principal.
- 20 "(2) Penalty.—Any person who violates para-21 graph (1) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned 22 for not more than 10 years, or both.".
- 23 (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.—
- 24 The table of sections for chapter 45 of title 18, United

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- 1 States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relat-
- 2 ing to section 950 the following:

"951A. Disclosure of research assistance from foreign governments.".

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