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115TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 1221

To counter the influence of the Russian Federation in Europe and Eurasia,
and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 24, 2017

Mr. CARDIN (for himself and Mr. COONS) introduced the following bill; which
was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

JUNE 6, 2017

Reported by Mr. CORKER, with amendments

[Omit the part struck through and insert the part printed in *italic*]

A BILL

To counter the influence of the Russian Federation in
Europe and Eurasia, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Countering Russian
5 Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

1 (1) The Government of the Russian Federation
2 has sought to exert influence throughout Europe and
3 Eurasia, including in the former states of the Soviet
4 Union, by providing resources to political parties,
5 think tanks, and civil society groups that sow dis-
6 trust in democratic institutions and actors, promote
7 xenophobic and illiberal views, and otherwise under-
8 mine European unity. The Government of the Rus-
9 sian Federation has also engaged in well-documented
10 corruption practices as a means toward undermining
11 and buying influence in European and Eurasian
12 countries.

13 (2) The Government of the Russian Federation
14 has largely eliminated a once-vibrant Russian-lan-
15 guage independent media sector and severely curtails
16 free and independent media within the borders of
17 the Russian Federation. Russian-language media or-
18 ganizations that are funded and controlled by the
19 Government of the Russian Federation and dissemi-
20 nate information within and outside of the Russian
21 Federation routinely traffic in anti-Western
22 disinformation, while few independent, fact-based
23 media sources provide objective reporting for Rus-
24 sian-speaking audiences inside or outside of the Rus-
25 sian Federation.

1 (3) The Government of the Russian Federation
2 continues to violate its commitments under the
3 Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection
4 with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-
5 Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Budapest
6 December 5, 1994, and the Conference on Security
7 and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, concluded at
8 Helsinki August 1, 1975 (commonly referred to as
9 the “Helsinki Final Act”), which laid the ground-
10 work for the establishment of the Organization for
11 Security and Co-operation in Europe, of which the
12 Russian Federation is a member, by its illegal an-
13 nexation of Crimea in 2014, its illegal occupation of
14 South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia in 2008, and
15 its ongoing destabilizing activities in eastern
16 Ukraine.

17 (4) The Government of the Russian Federation
18 continues to ignore the terms of the August 2008
19 ceasefire agreement relating to Georgia, which re-
20 quires the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops,
21 free access by humanitarian groups to the regions of
22 South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and monitoring of the
23 conflict areas by the European Union Monitoring
24 Mission.

1 (5) The Government of the Russian Federation
2 is failing to comply with the terms of the Minsk
3 Agreement to address the ongoing conflict in eastern
4 Ukraine, signed in Minsk, Belarus, on February 11,
5 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France,
6 and Germany, as well as the Minsk Protocol, which
7 was agreed to on September 5, 2014.

8 (6) The Government of the Russian Federation
9 is—

10 (A) in violation of the Treaty between the
11 United States of America and the Union of So-
12 viet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of
13 their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
14 Missiles, signed at Washington December 8,
15 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988
16 (commonly known as the “INF Treaty”); and

17 (B) failing to meet its obligations under
18 the Treaty on Open Skies, done at Helsinki
19 March 24, 1992, and entered into force Janu-
20 ary 1, 2002 (commonly known as the “Open
21 Skies Treaty”).

22 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

23 It is the sense of Congress that—

24 (1) the Government of the Russian Federation
25 bears responsibility for the continuing violence in

1 Eastern Ukraine, including the death on April 24,
2 2017, of Joseph Stone, a citizen of the United
3 States working as a monitor for the Organization for
4 Security and Co-operation in Europe;

5 (2) the President should call on the Govern-
6 ment of the Russian Federation—

7 (A) to withdraw all of its forces from the
8 territories of Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova;

9 (B) to return control of the borders of
10 those territories to their respective govern-
11 ments; and

12 (C) to cease all efforts to undermine the
13 popularly elected governments of those coun-
14 tries;

15 (3) the Government of the Russian Federation
16 has applied, and continues to apply, to the countries
17 and peoples of Georgia and Ukraine, traditional uses
18 of force, intelligence operations, and influence cam-
19 paigns, which represent clear and present threats to
20 the countries of Europe and Eurasia;

21 (4) in response, the countries of Europe and
22 Eurasia should redouble efforts to build resilience
23 within their institutions, political systems, and civil
24 societies;

1 (5) the United States supports the institutions
2 that the Government of the Russian Federation
3 seeks to undermine, including the North Atlantic
4 Treaty Organization and the European Union;

5 (6) a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
6 tion is critical to maintaining peace and security in
7 Europe and Eurasia;

8 (7) the United States should continue to work
9 with the European Union as a partner against ag-
10 gression by the Government of the Russian Federa-
11 tion, coordinating aid programs, development assist-
12 ance, and other counter-Russian efforts;

13 (8) the United States should encourage the es-
14 tablishment of a commission for media freedom
15 within the Council of Europe, modeled on the Venice
16 Commission regarding rule of law issues, that would
17 be chartered to provide governments with expert rec-
18 ommendations on maintaining legal and regulatory
19 regimes supportive of free and independent media
20 and an informed citizenry able to distinguish be-
21 tween fact-based reporting, opinion, and
22 disinformation;

23 (9) in addition to working to strengthen the
24 North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Euro-

1 pean Union, the United States should work with the
2 individual countries of Europe and Eurasia—

3 (A) to identify vulnerabilities to aggres-
4 sion, disinformation, corruption, and so-called
5 hybrid warfare by the Government of the Rus-
6 sian Federation;

7 (B) to establish strategic and technical
8 plans for addressing those vulnerabilities;

9 (C) to ensure that the financial systems of
10 those countries are not being used to shield il-
11 licit financial activity by officials of the Govern-
12 ment of the Russian Federation or individuals
13 in President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle who
14 have been enriched through corruption;

15 (D) to investigate and prosecute cases of
16 corruption by Russian actors; and

17 (E) to work toward full compliance with
18 the Convention on Combating Bribery of For-
19 eign Public Officials in International Business
20 Transactions (commonly referred to as the
21 “Anti-Bribery Convention”) of the Organization
22 for Economic Co-operation and Development;
23 and

1 (10) the President of the United States should
2 use the authority of the President to impose sanc-
3 tions under—

4 (A) the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Ac-
5 countability Act of 2012 (title IV of Public Law
6 112–208; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note); and

7 (B) the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
8 Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of
9 Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).

10 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

11 The United States, consistent with the principle of
12 *ex injuria jus non oritur*, supports the policy known as
13 the “Stimson Doctrine” and thus does not recognize terri-
14 torial changes effected by force, including the illegal inva-
15 sions and occupations of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea,
16 Eastern Ukraine, and Transnistria.

17 **SEC. 5. COORDINATING AID AND ASSISTANCE ACROSS EU-**
18 **ROPE AND EURASIA.**

19 (a) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There
20 are authorized to be appropriated for the Countering Rus-
21 sian Influence Fund \$250,000,000 for fiscal years 2018
22 and 2019.

23 (b) **MANAGEMENT OF THE FUND.**—Not later than 90
24 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
25 retary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of

1 the United States Agency for International Development
2 and, as appropriate, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
3 the Director of National Intelligence, and the Secretary
4 of Defense, shall establish a working group to administer
5 the Countering Russian Influence Fund in order to facili-
6 tate the achievement of the goals described in subsection
7 (c) while minimizing the expense to United States tax-
8 payers.

9 (c) USE OF FUNDS.—

10 (1) MANDATORY USE OF FUNDS.—Amounts in
11 the Countering Russian Influence Fund shall be
12 used for the following:

13 (A) To assist in protecting critical infra-
14 structure and electoral mechanisms from
15 cyberattacks in the following countries:

16 (i) Countries that are members of the
17 North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the
18 European Union that the Secretary of
19 State determines—

20 (I) are vulnerable to influence by
21 the Russian Federation; and

22 (II) lack the economic capability
23 to effectively respond to aggression by
24 the Russian Federation without the
25 support of the United States.

1 (ii) Countries that are participating in
2 the enlargement process of the North At-
3 lantic Treaty Organization or the Euro-
4 pean Union, including Albania, Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia,
6 Moldova, Kosovo, Serbia, and Ukraine.

7 (B) To combat corruption, improve the
8 rule of law, and otherwise strengthen inde-
9 pendent judiciaries and prosecutors general of-
10 fices in the countries described in subparagraph
11 (A).

12 (2) DISCRETIONARY USE OF FUNDS.—Amounts
13 in the Countering Russian Influence Fund may be
14 used to seek to achieve the following, to the extent
15 practicable and as appropriate:

16 (A) Responding to the humanitarian crises
17 and instability caused or aggravated by the in-
18 vasions and occupations of Georgia and
19 Ukraine by the Russian Federation.

20 (B) Improving participatory legislative
21 processes and legal education, political trans-
22 parency and competition, and compliance with
23 international obligations in the countries de-
24 scribed in paragraph (1)(A).

1 (C) Building the capacity of civil society,
2 media, and other nongovernmental organiza-
3 tions countering the influence and propaganda
4 of the Russian Federation in the countries de-
5 scribed in paragraph (1)(A).

6 (d) IMPLEMENTATION.—

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, act-
8 ing through Coordinator of United States Assistance
9 to Europe and Eurasia (authorized pursuant to sec-
10 tion 601 of the Support for East European Democ-
11 racy (SEED) Act of 1989 (22 U.S.C. 5461) and
12 section 102 of the Freedom for Russia and Emerg-
13 ing Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Sup-
14 port Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5812)), shall coordinate
15 efforts to implement the goals described in sub-
16 section (c) and establish metrics relating to efforts
17 to achieve those goals.

18 (2) REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.—

19 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than April 1
20 of each year, the Secretary of State, acting
21 through the Coordinator of United States As-
22 sistance to Europe and Eurasia, shall submit to
23 the appropriate congressional committees a re-
24 port on the programs and activities carried out

1 to achieve the goals described in subsection (e)
 2 during the preceding fiscal year.

3 (B) ELEMENTS.—Each report required by
 4 subparagraph (A) shall include, with respect to
 5 each program or activity described in that sub-
 6 paragraph—

7 (i) the amount of funding for the pro-
 8 gram or activity;

9 (ii) the goal described in subsection
 10 (e) to which the program or activity re-
 11 lates; and

12 (iii) an assessment of whether or not
 13 the goal was met.

14 (b) USE OF FUNDS.—Amounts in the Countering Rus-
 15 sian Influence Fund shall be used for the following:

16 (1) To assist in protecting critical infrastructure
 17 and electoral mechanisms from cyberattacks in the
 18 following countries:

19 (A) Countries that are members of the North
 20 Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European
 21 Union that the Secretary of State determines—

22 (i) are vulnerable to influence by the
 23 Russian Federation; and

24 (ii) lack the economic capability to ef-
 25 fectively respond to aggression by the Rus-

1 *sian Federation without the support of the*
2 *United States.*

3 *(B) Countries that are participating in the*
4 *enlargement process of the North Atlantic Treaty*
5 *Organization or the European Union, including*
6 *Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Mac-*
7 *edonia, Moldova, Kosovo, Serbia, and Ukraine.*

8 *(2) To combat corruption, improve the rule of*
9 *law, and otherwise strengthen independent judiciaries*
10 *and prosecutors general offices in the countries de-*
11 *scribed in paragraph (1).*

12 *(3) To respond to the humanitarian crises and*
13 *instability caused or aggravated by the invasions and*
14 *occupations of Georgia and Ukraine by the Russian*
15 *Federation.*

16 *(4) To improve participatory legislative proc-*
17 *esses and legal education, political transparency and*
18 *competition, and compliance with international obli-*
19 *gations in the countries described in paragraph (1).*

20 *(5) To build the capacity and resilience of civil*
21 *society, media, and other nongovernmental organiza-*
22 *tions in countering the influence and propaganda of*
23 *the Russian Federation in such countries.*

24 *(6) To support the efforts of independent media*
25 *outlets and public broadcasters to broadcast, dis-*

1 tribute, and share information in all regions in such
2 countries.

3 (7) *To support objective, Russian-language, inde-*
4 *pendent media, investigative journalism, and civil so-*
5 *ciety watchdog groups working to combat corruption*
6 *in such countries and encourage cooperation with so-*
7 *cial media entities to strengthen the integrity of infor-*
8 *mation on the Internet.*

9 (8) *To promote and protect Internet freedom and*
10 *information security in such countries.*

11 (9) *To support research and analysis on the ef-*
12 *fects of information warfare on target audiences and*
13 *best practices for promoting resilience.*

14 (10) *To assist the Secretary of State in executing*
15 *the functions specified in section 1287(b) of the Na-*
16 *tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017*
17 *(Public Law 114–328) for the purposes of recognizing,*
18 *understanding, exposing, and countering propaganda*
19 *and disinformation efforts by foreign governments.*

20 (c) *IMPLEMENTATION.—*

21 (1) *IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall,*
22 *acting through the Coordinator of United States As-*
23 *istance to Europe and Eurasia (authorized pursuant*
24 *to section 601 of the Support for East European De-*
25 *mocracy (SEED) Act of 1989 (22 U.S.C. 5461) and*

1 *section 102 of the Freedom for Russia and Emerging*
2 *Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support*
3 *Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5812)) and in consultation*
4 *with the Administrator for the United States Agency*
5 *for International Development, the Director of the*
6 *Global Engagement Center of the Department of*
7 *State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the*
8 *Broadcasting Board of Governors, and the heads of*
9 *other relevant Federal agencies, coordinate and carry*
10 *out activities described in subsection (b).*

11 (2) *METHOD.—The activities described in sub-*
12 *section (b) shall be carried out through—*

13 (A) *initiatives of the United States Govern-*
14 *ment;*

15 (B) *Federal grant programs such as the In-*
16 *formation Access Fund; or*

17 (C) *nongovernmental or international orga-*
18 *nizations, such as the Organization for Security*
19 *and Co-operation in Europe, the National En-*
20 *dowment for Democracy, the Black Sea Trust,*
21 *the Balkan Trust for Democracy, the Prague*
22 *Civil Society Centre, the North Atlantic Treaty*
23 *Organization Strategic Communications Centre*
24 *of Excellence, the European Endowment for De-*
25 *mocracy, and related organizations.*

1 (3) *REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.*—

2 (A) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than April 1 of
3 each year, the Secretary of State, acting through
4 the Coordinator of United States Assistance to
5 Europe and Eurasia, shall submit to the appro-
6 priate congressional committees a report on the
7 programs and activities carried out to achieve
8 the goals described in subsection (b) during the
9 preceding fiscal year.

10 (B) *ELEMENTS.*—Each report required by
11 subparagraph (A) shall include, with respect to
12 each program or activity described in that sub-
13 paragraph—

14 (i) the amount of funding for the pro-
15 gram or activity;

16 (ii) the goal described in subsection (b)
17 to which the program or activity relates;
18 and

19 (iii) an assessment of whether or not
20 the goal was met.

21 ~~(c)~~(d) *COORDINATION WITH GLOBAL PARTNERS.*—

22 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—In order to maximize cost
23 efficiency, eliminate duplication, and speed the
24 achievement of the goals described in subsection ~~(c)~~
25 (b), the working group established under subsection

1 ~~(b)~~ *the Secretary of State* shall ensure coordination
2 with—

3 (A) the European Union and its institu-
4 tions;

5 (B) the governments of countries that are
6 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
7 zation or the European Union; and

8 (C) international organizations and quasi-
9 governmental funding entities that carry out
10 programs and activities that seek to accomplish
11 the goals described in subsection ~~(e)~~ *(b)*.

12 (2) REPORT BY SECRETARY OF STATE.—Not
13 later than April 1 of each year, the Secretary of
14 State shall submit to the appropriate congressional
15 committees a report that includes—

16 (A) the amount of funding provided to
17 each country referred to in subsection ~~(e)~~ *(b)*
18 by—

19 (i) the European Union or its institu-
20 tions;

21 (ii) the government of each country
22 that is a member of the European Union
23 or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
24 and

1 (iii) international organizations and
2 quasi-governmental funding entities that
3 carry out programs and activities that seek
4 to accomplish the goals described in sub-
5 section ~~(e)~~ (b); and

6 (B) an assessment of whether the funding
7 described in subparagraph (A) is commensurate
8 with funding provided by the United States for
9 those goals.

10 ~~(f)~~(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this
11 section shall be construed to apply to or limit United
12 States foreign assistance not provided using amounts
13 available in the Countering Russian Influence Fund.

14 (f) *ENSURING ADEQUATE STAFFING FOR GOVERNANCE*
15 *ACTIVITIES.*—*In order to ensure that the United States*
16 *Government is properly focused on combating corruption,*
17 *improving rule of law, and building the capacity of civil*
18 *society, media, and other nongovernmental organizations in*
19 *countries described in subsection (b)(1), the Secretary of*
20 *State shall establish a pilot program for Foreign Service*
21 *officer positions focused on governance and anticorruption*
22 *activities in such countries.*

1 **SEC. 6. REPORT ON MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS CONTROLLED**
2 **AND FUNDED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE**
3 **RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

4 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 90 days after the
5 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter,
6 the President shall submit to the appropriate congress-
7 sional committees a report that includes a description of
8 media organizations that are controlled and funded by the
9 Government of the Russian Federation, and any affiliated
10 entities, whether operating within or outside the Russian
11 Federation, including broadcast and satellite-based tele-
12 vision, radio, Internet, and print media organizations.

13 (b) **FORM OF REPORT.**—The report required by sub-
14 section (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may
15 include a classified annex.

16 **SEC. 7. REPORT ON RUSSIAN FEDERATION INFLUENCE ON**
17 **ELECTIONS IN EUROPE AND EURASIA.**

18 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 90 days after the
19 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter,
20 the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
21 committees a report on funds provided by, or funds the use
22 of which was directed by, the Government of the Russian
23 Federation or any Russian person with the intention of in-
24 fluencing the outcome of any election or campaign in any
25 country in Europe or Eurasia during the preceding year,
26 including through direct support to any political party,

1 candidate, lobbying campaign, nongovernmental organiza-
2 tion, or civic organization.

3 (b) *FORM OF REPORT.*—Each report required by sub-
4 section (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may
5 include a classified annex.

6 (c) *RUSSIAN PERSON DEFINED.*—In this section, the
7 term “Russian person” means—

8 (1) an individual who is a citizen or national of
9 the Russian Federation; or

10 (2) an entity organized under the laws of the
11 Russian Federation or otherwise subject to the juris-
12 diction of the Government of the Russian Federation.

13 **SEC. 8. UKRANIAN ENERGY SECURITY.**

14 (a) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.*—It is the policy of the
15 United States—

16 (1) to support the Government of Ukraine in re-
17 storing its sovereign and territorial integrity;

18 (2) to condemn and oppose all of the desta-
19 bilizing efforts by the Government of the Russian Fed-
20 eration in Ukraine in violation of its obligations and
21 international commitments;

22 (3) to never recognize the illegal annexation of
23 Crimea by the Government of the Russian Federation
24 or the separation of any portion of Ukrainian terri-
25 tory through the use of military force;

1 (4) to deter the Government of the Russian Fed-
2 eration from further destabilizing and invading
3 Ukraine and other independent countries in Central
4 and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus;

5 (5) to assist in promoting reform in regulatory
6 oversight and operations in Ukraine's energy sector,
7 including the establishment and empowerment of an
8 independent regulatory organization;

9 (6) to encourage and support fair competition,
10 market liberalization, and reliability in Ukraine's en-
11 ergy sector;

12 (7) to help Ukraine and United States allies and
13 partners in Europe reduce their dependence on Rus-
14 sian energy resources, especially natural gas, which
15 the Government of the Russian Federation uses as a
16 weapon to coerce, intimidate, and influence other
17 countries;

18 (8) to work with European Union member states
19 and European Union institutions to promote energy
20 security through developing diversified and liberalized
21 energy markets that provide diversified sources, sup-
22 pliers, and routes;

23 (9) to continue to oppose the NordStream 2 pipe-
24 line given its detrimental impacts on the European
25 Union's energy security, gas market development in

1 *Central and Eastern Europe, and energy reforms in*
2 *Ukraine; and*

3 *(10) that the United States Government should*
4 *prioritize the export of United States energy resources*
5 *in order to create American jobs, help United States*
6 *allies and partners, and strengthen United States for-*
7 *ign policy.*

8 ***(b) PLAN TO PROMOTE ENERGY SECURITY IN***
9 ***UKRAINE.—***

10 ***(1) IN GENERAL.—****The Secretary of State, in co-*
11 *ordination with the Administrator of the United*
12 *States Agency for International Development and the*
13 *Secretary of Energy, shall work with the Government*
14 *of Ukraine to develop a plan to increase energy secu-*
15 *rity in Ukraine, increase the amount of energy pro-*
16 *duced in Ukraine, and reduce Ukraine’s reliance on*
17 *energy imports from the Russian Federation.*

18 ***(2) ELEMENTS.—****The plan developed under*
19 *paragraph (1) shall include strategies for market lib-*
20 *eralization, effective regulation and oversight, supply*
21 *diversification, energy reliability, and energy effi-*
22 *ciency, such as through supporting—*

23 ***(A) the promotion of advanced technology***
24 ***and modern operating practices in Ukraine’s oil***
25 ***and gas sector;***

1 (B) modern geophysical and meteorological
2 survey work as needed followed by international
3 tenders to help attract qualified investment into
4 exploration and development of areas with un-
5 tapped resources in Ukraine;

6 (C) a broadening of Ukraine's electric power
7 transmission interconnection with Europe;

8 (D) the strengthening of Ukraine's capa-
9 bility to maintain electric power grid stability
10 and reliability;

11 (E) independent regulatory oversight and
12 operations of Ukraine's gas market and elec-
13 tricity sector;

14 (F) the implementation of primary gas law
15 including pricing, tariff structure, and legal reg-
16 ulatory implementation;

17 (G) privatization of government owned en-
18 ergy companies through credible legal frame-
19 works and a transparent process compliant with
20 international best practices;

21 (H) procurement and transport of emer-
22 gency fuel supplies, including reverse pipeline
23 flows from Europe;

1 (I) provision of technical assistance for cri-
2 sis planning, crisis response, and public out-
3 reach;

4 (J) repair of infrastructure to enable the
5 transport of fuel supplies;

6 (K) repair of power generating or power
7 transmission equipment or facilities; and

8 (L) improved building energy efficiency and
9 other measures designed to reduce energy de-
10 mand in Ukraine.

11 (3) *REPORTS.*—

12 (A) *IMPLEMENTATION OF UKRAINE FREE-*
13 *DOM SUPPORT ACT OF 2014 PROVISIONS.*—Not
14 later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
15 ment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall sub-
16 mit to the appropriate congressional committees
17 a report detailing the status of implementing the
18 provisions required under section 7(c) of the
19 Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (Public
20 Law 113–272), including detailing the plans re-
21 quired under that section, the level of funding
22 that has been allocated to and expended for the
23 strategies set forth under that section, and
24 progress that has been made in implementing the
25 strategies developed pursuant to that section.

1 (B) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 180 days
2 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
3 every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State
4 shall submit to the appropriate congressional
5 committees a report detailing the plan developed
6 under paragraph (1), the level of funding that
7 has been allocated to and expended for the strate-
8 gies set forth in paragraph (2), and progress that
9 has been made in implementing the strategies.

10 (C) *BRIEFINGS.*—The Secretary of State, or
11 a designee of the Secretary, shall brief the appro-
12 priate congressional committees not later than
13 30 days after the submission of each report
14 under subparagraph (B). In addition, the De-
15 partment of State shall make relevant officials
16 available upon request to brief the appropriate
17 congressional committees on all available infor-
18 mation that relates directly or indirectly to
19 Ukraine or energy security in Eastern Europe.

20 (D) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-*
21 *TEES DEFINED.*—In this paragraph, the term
22 “appropriate congressional committees” means—

23 (i) the Committee on Foreign Relations
24 and the Committee on Appropriations of the
25 Senate; and

1 (ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs
2 and the Committee on Appropriations of the
3 House of Representatives.

4 (c) *SUPPORTING EFFORTS OF COUNTRIES IN EUROPE*
5 *AND EURASIA TO DECREASE THEIR DEPENDENCE ON RUS-*
6 *SIAN SOURCES OF ENERGY.—*

7 (1) *FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following*
8 *findings:*

9 (A) *The Government of the Russian Federa-*
10 *tion uses its strong position in the energy sector*
11 *as leverage to manipulate the internal politics*
12 *and foreign relations of the countries of Europe*
13 *and Eurasia.*

14 (B) *This influence is based not only on the*
15 *Russian Federation's oil and natural gas re-*
16 *sources, but also on its state-owned nuclear*
17 *power and electricity companies.*

18 (2) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of*
19 *Congress that—*

20 (A) *the United States should assist the ef-*
21 *forts of the countries of Europe and Eurasia to*
22 *enhance their energy security through diver-*
23 *sification of energy supplies in order to lessen*
24 *dependencies on Russian Federation energy re-*
25 *sources and state-owned entities; and*

1 (B) the Export-Import Bank of the United
2 States and the Overseas Private Investment Cor-
3 poration should play key roles in supporting
4 critical energy projects that contribute to that
5 goal.

6 (3) *USE OF COUNTERING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE*
7 *FUND TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—*
8 *Amounts in the Countering Russian Influence Fund*
9 *pursuant to section 5 shall be used to provide tech-*
10 *nical advice to countries described in subsection (b)(1)*
11 *of such section designed to enhance energy security*
12 *and lessen dependence on energy from Russian Fed-*
13 *eration sources.*

14 (d) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is*
15 *authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State*
16 *a total of \$30,000,000 for fiscal years 2018 and 2019 to*
17 *carry out the strategies set forth in subsection (b)(2) and*
18 *other activities under this section related to the promotion*
19 *of energy security in Ukraine.*

20 (e) *RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section*
21 *shall be construed as affecting the responsibilities required*
22 *and authorities provided under section 7 of the Ukraine*
23 *Freedom Support Act of 2014 (Public Law 113–272).*

1 **SEC. 79. TERMINATION.**

2 The provisions of this Act shall terminate on the date
3 that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this
4 Act.

5 **SEC. 810. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES**
6 **DEFINED.**

7 ~~It~~ *Except as otherwise provided, in this Act, the term*
8 “appropriate congressional committees” means—

9 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
10 Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
11 fairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Com-
12 mittee on Homeland Security and Governmental Af-
13 fairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Se-
14 lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

15 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
16 Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on
17 Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Secu-
18 rity, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Per-
19 manent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
20 House of Representatives.

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115TH CONGRESS
1ST Session

S. 1221

A BILL

To counter the influence of the Russian Federation
in Europe and Eurasia, and for other purposes.

JUNE 6, 2017

Reported with amendments