#### 111TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION

# H. R. 557

To promote transparency, accountability, and reform within the United Nations system, and for other purposes.

#### IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

January 15, 2009

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen (for herself, Mr. Boehner, Mr. Cantor, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Pence, Mr. McCotter, Mr. Smith of New Jersey, Mr. Burton of Indiana, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Rohrabacher, Mr. Manzullo, Mr. Royce, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart of Florida, Mrs. Blackburn, Mr. Sam Johnson of Texas, Mr. Shuster, Mr. Garrett of New Jersey, Mr. Buyer, Mr. Wolf, Mr. Poe of Texas, Mr. Boozman, Mr. McCaul, Mr. Bilirakis, Mr. Broun of Georgia, Mr. Lamborn, Mrs. Bachmann, Mr. Graves, Mr. Mario Diaz-Balart of Florida, Mr. Mack, and Mr. Hall of Texas) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

## A BILL

To promote transparency, accountability, and reform within the United Nations system, and for other purposes.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
- 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
- 4 (a) Short Title.—This Act may be cited as the
- 5 "United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Re-
- 6 form Act of 2009".

#### 1 (b) Table of Contents is

#### 2 as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Definitions.

#### TITLE I—FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

- Sec. 101. Findings.
- Sec. 102. Apportionment of the United Nations regular budget on a voluntary basis.
- Sec. 103. Budget justification for United States contributions to the regular budget of the United Nations.

# TITLE II—TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

- Sec. 201. Findings.
- Sec. 202. Definitions.
- Sec. 203. Establishment and management of the Office of the United States Inspector General for contributions to the United Nations System.
- Sec. 204. Transparency for United States contributions.
- Sec. 205. Authorization of appropriations.

#### TITLE III—UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS

- Sec. 301. Annual publication.
- Sec. 302. Annual financial disclosure.
- Sec. 303. Policy with respect to expansion of the security council.
- Sec. 304. Access to reports and audits.
- Sec. 305. Waiver of immunity.
- Sec. 306. Terrorism and the United Nations.
- Sec. 307. Report on United Nations reform.
- Sec. 308. Report on United Nations personnel.
- Sec. 309. Withholding of United States contributions to UNRWA.
- Sec. 310. United Nations treaty bodies.
- Sec. 311. Equality at the United Nations.
- Sec. 312. Anti-Semitism and the United Nations.
- Sec. 313. Regional group inclusion of Israel.

#### TITLE IV—UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

- Sec. 401. Findings.
- Sec. 402. Human Rights Council membership and funding.

#### TITLE V—INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

- Sec. 501. International Atomic Energy Agency.
- Sec. 502. Sense of Congress regarding the Nuclear Security Action Plan of the IAEA.

#### TITLE VI—PEACEKEEPING

- Sec. 601. Reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations.
- Sec. 602. Policy relating to reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations.
- Sec. 603. Certification.

## 1 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

2	In this Act:
3	(1) Employee.—The term "employee" means
4	an individual who is employed in the general serv-
5	ices, professional staff, or senior management of the
6	United Nations, including consultants, contractors
7	and subcontractors.
8	(2) General assembly.—The term "General
9	Assembly" means the General Assembly of the
10	United Nations.
11	(3) Member state.—The term "Member
12	State" means a Member State of the United Na-
13	tions. Such term is synonymous with the term
14	"country".
15	(4) Secretary.—The term "Secretary" means
16	the Secretary of State.
17	(5) Secretary General.—The term "Sec-
18	retary General" means the Secretary General of the
19	United Nations.
20	(6) Security Council.—The term "Security
21	Council" means the Security Council of the United
22	Nations.
23	(7) UN.—The term "UN" means the United
24	Nations.

1	(8) Appropriate congressional commit-
2	TEES.—The term "appropriate congressional com-
3	mittees" means—
4	(A) the Committees on Foreign Affairs,
5	Appropriations, and Oversight and Government
6	Reform of the House; and
7	(B) the Committees on Foreign Relations,
8	Appropriations, and Homeland Security and
9	Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
10	TITLE I—FUNDING OF THE
11	<b>UNITED NATIONS</b>
12	SEC. 101. FINDINGS.
13	The Congress makes the following findings:
14	(1) The United States pays billions of dollars
15	into the United Nations system every year (over
16	5,300,000,000 dollars in 2005, according to the
17	White House Office of Management and Budget),
18	significantly more than any other nation.
19	(2) Under current rules and contribution levels,
20	it is possible to assemble the two-thirds majority
21	needed for important United Nations budget votes
22	with a group of countries that, taken together, pay
23	less than 1 percent of the total United Nations reg-
24	ular budøet.

- 1 (3) The disconnect between contribution levels 2 and management control creates significant perverse 3 incentives in terms of United Nations spending, 4 transparency, and accountability.
  - (4) The United Nations system suffers from unacceptably high levels of waste, fraud, and abuse, which seriously impair its ability to fulfill the lofty ideals of its founding.
  - (5) Amidst the continuing financial, corruption, and sexual abuse scandals of the past several years, American public disapproval of United Nations has reached all-time highs. A 2008 Gallup poll revealed that 65 percent of Americans believe that the United Nations is doing a poor job, a negative assessment shared by a majority of respondents from both political parties. Research polling by another firm in late 2006 found that 71 percent of Americans think that the United Nations is "no longer effective" and needs to be significantly reformed, while 75 percent think that the United Nations "needs to be held more accountable."
  - (6) Significant improvements in United Nations transparency and accountability are necessary for improving public perceptions of and American support for United Nations operations.

- 1 (7) Because of their need to justify future con-2 tributions from donors, voluntarily funded organiza-3 tions have more incentive to be responsive and effi-4 cient in their operations than organizations funded 5 by compulsory contributions that are not tied to per-6 formance.
  - (8) Article XVII of the Charter of the United Nations, which states that "[t]he expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly," leaves to the discretion of the General Assembly the basis of apportionment, which could be done on the basis of voluntary pledges by Member States.
  - (9) Unlike United States assessed contributions to the United Nations regular budget, which are statutorily capped at 22 percent of the total, there is no cap on voluntary contributions.
  - (10) The United States, which contributes generously to international organizations whose activities it recognizes as credible, worthwhile, and efficient, contributes more than 22 percent of the budget of certain voluntarily funded United Nations Specialized Agencies.

#### SEC. 102. APPORTIONMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS REG-

(a) United States Policy.—

3

- (1) It is the policy of the United States to seek to shift the funding mechanism for the regular budget of the United Nations from an assessed to a voluntary basis.
- 8 (2) The President shall direct the United States 9 Permanent Representative to the United Nations to 10 use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 11 States at the United Nations to shift the funding 12 mechanism for the regular budget of the United Na-13 tions to a voluntary basis, and to make it a priority 14 to build support for such a transformational change 15 among Member States, particularly key United Na-16 tions donors.
- 17 (b) CERTIFICATION Predominantly OFVol-18 UNTARY UN REGULAR BUDGET FINDING.—A certifi-19 cation described in this section is a certification by the 20 Secretary of State to the Appropriate Congressional Committees that at least 80 percent of the total regular budget 22 of the United Nations is apportioned on a voluntary basis. Each such certification shall be shall be effective for a pe-24 riod of no more than 1 year, and shall be promptly revoked

by the Secretary, with notice to the Appropriate Congres-

- 1 sional Committees, if the underlying circumstances change
- 2 so as not to warrant such certification.
- 3 (c) WITHHOLDING OF NONVOLUNTARY CONTRIBU-
- 4 Tions.—

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

(b).

- (1) Beginning 2 years after the effective date of 5 6 this act and notwithstanding any other provision of 7 law, no funds may be obligated or expended for a 8 United States assessed contribution to the regular 9 budget of the United Nations in an amount greater 10 than 50 percent of the United States share of as-11 sessed contributions for the regular budget of the 12 United Nations unless there is in effect a certifi-13 cation by the Secretary, as described in subsection
  - (2) For a period of 3 years after appropriation, funds appropriated for use as a United States contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to paragraph (1) may be obligated and expended for that purpose upon the certification described in subsection (b). After 3 years, in the absence of such certification, those funds shall revert to the United States Treasury.

1	SEC. 103. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR UNITED STATES
2	CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE REGULAR BUDGET
3	OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
4	(a) Detailed Itemization.—The annual congres-
5	sional budget justification shall include a detailed itemized
6	request in support of the contribution of the United States
7	to the regular budget of the United Nations.
8	(b) Contents of Detailed Itemization.—The
9	detailed itemization required under subsection (a) shall—
10	(1) contain information relating to the amounts
11	requested in support of each of the various sections
12	and titles of the regular budget of the United Na-
13	tions; and
14	(2) compare the amounts requested for the cur-
15	rent year with the actual or estimated amounts con-
16	tributed by the United States in previous fiscal years
17	for the same sections and titles.
18	(c) Adjustments and Notification.—If the
19	United Nations proposes an adjustment to its regular as-
20	sessed budget, the Secretary of State shall, at the time
21	such adjustment is presented to the Advisory Committee
22	on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ)
23	notify and consult with the appropriate congressional com-
24	mittees.

#### 10 II—TRANSPARENCY TITLE **AND** ACCOUNTABILITY **FOR** 2 **STATES** UNITED **CONTRIBU-**3 TIONS THE UNITED TO 4 **TIONS** 5 SEC. 201. FINDINGS. 7 The Congress makes the following findings: 8 (1) As underscored by continuing revelations of 9 waste, fraud, and abuse, oversight and account-10 ability mechanisms within the United Nations sys-11 tem remain significantly deficient, despite decades of 12 reform attempts, including those initiated by Secre-13 taries-General of the United Nations. 14 (2) Notwithstanding the personal intentions of 15 any Secretary General of the United Nations to pro-16 mote institutional transparency and accountability 17 within the United Nations System, the Secretary 18 General lacks the power to impose far reaching man-19 agement reforms without the concurrence of the 20 General Assembly. 21 (3) Groupings of Member States whose voting

(3) Groupings of Member States whose voting power in the General Assembly significantly outpaces their proportional contributions to the United Nations system have repeatedly and successfully defeated, delayed, and diluted various reform proposals

22

23

24

- that would have enabled more detailed oversight and scrutiny of United Nations system operations and expenditures.
- 4 (4) To an unacceptable degree, major donor 5 states, including the United States, lack access to 6 reasonably detailed, reliable information that would 7 allow them to determine how their contributions 8 have been spent by various United Nations system 9 entities, further contributing to the lack of account-10 ability within the United Nations system.

#### 11 SEC. 202. DEFINITIONS.

- 12 In this title:
- 13 ENTITY.—The United NATIONS 14 "United Nations Entity" means any United Nations 15 agency, commission, conference, council, court, de-16 partment, forum, fund, institute, office, organiza-17 tion, partnership, program, subsidiary body, tri-18 bunal, trust, university or academic body, related or-19 ganization or subsidiary body, wherever located, that 20 flies the United Nations flag or is authorized to use 21 the United Nations logo, including but not limited to 22 those United Nations affiliated agencies and bodies 23 identified as recipients of United States contribu-24 tions under section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John War-

- ner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
   Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364).
- 3 (2) UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM.—The term
  4 "United Nations System" means the aggregation of
  5 all United Nations Entities, as defined in paragraph
  6 (1).
  - (3) United States Contribution.—The term "United States Contribution" means an assessed or voluntary contribution, whether financial, in-kind, or otherwise, from the United States Federal Government to a United Nations Entity, including contributions passed through other entities for ultimate use by a United Nations Entity. United States Contributions include, but are not limited to, those contributions identified pursuant to section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364).
    - (4) Transparency Certification.—The term "Transparency Certification" means an annual, written affirmation by the head or authorized designee of a United Nations Entity that the Entity will cooperate with the Inspector General, including by providing the Inspector General, upon request, with

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

1	full access to Oversight Information as defined in
2	this title.
3	(5) Oversight information.—The term
4	"Oversight Information" includes—
5	(A) internally and externally commissioned
6	audits, program reviews, performance reports,
7	and evaluations;
8	(B) financial statements, records, and bill-
9	ing systems;
10	(C) program budgets and program budget
11	implications, including revised estimates and re-
12	ports produced by or provided to the Secretary
13	General and the Secretary General's agents on
14	budget related matters;
15	(D) operational plans, budgets, and budg-
16	etary analyses for peacekeeping operations;
17	(E) analyses and reports regarding the
18	scale of assessments;
19	(F) databases and other data systems con-
20	taining financial or programmatic information;
21	(G) documents or other records alleging or
22	involving improper use of resources, mis-
23	conduct, mismanagement, or other violations of
24	rules and regulations applicable to the United
25	Nations Entity; and

1	(H) other documentation relevant to the
2	audit and investigative work of the United
3	States Inspector General for Contributions to
4	the United Nations System.
5	SEC. 203. ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE OF-
6	FICE OF THE UNITED STATES INSPECTOR
7	GENERAL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
8	UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM.
9	(a) Purpose.—The purpose of this section is to
10	make possible the independent and objective conduct of
11	audits and investigations relating to United States Con-
12	tributions to the United Nations System and the use of
13	those contributions by United Nations Entities, in an ef-
14	fort to eliminate and deter waste, fraud, and abuse in the
15	use of those contributions, and thereby to contribute to
16	the development of greater transparency, accountability,
17	and internal controls throughout the United Nations Sys-
18	tem.
19	(b) Establishment.—There is hereby established
20	the Office of the United States Inspector General for Con-
21	tributions to the United Nations System.
22	(c) Inspector General.—
23	(1) Appointment.—The head of the Office of
24	the United States Inspector General for Contribu-
25	tions to the United Nations System is the Inspector

- General for Contributions to the United Nations
  System, who shall be appointed by the President, by
  and with the advice and consent of the Senate, on
  the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations.
  - (2) Nomination.—The nomination of an individual as Inspector General shall be made not later than 30 days after the enactment of this Act.
  - (3) Removal.—The Inspector General may be removed from office by the President. The President shall communicate the reasons for any such removal to both Houses of Congress.
  - (4) COMPENSATION.—The annual rate of basic pay of the Inspector General shall be the annual rate of basic pay provided for positions at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

#### (5) Relationship to Board.—

(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector General shall report directly to and be under the general supervision of, the Board of Directors created in subsection (d).

1	(B) Neither the Board, any officer of the
2	Board, nor any officer of a federal department
3	or agency shall prevent or prohibit the Inspec
4	tor General from initiating, carrying out, or
5	completing any audit or investigation.
6	(6) Duties.—
7	(A) It shall be the duty of the Inspector
8	General to conduct, supervise, and coordinate
9	audits and investigations of—
10	(i) the treatment, handling, expendi-
11	ture, and use of United States Contribu-
12	tions by and to United Nations Entities
13	and
14	(ii) the adequacy of accounting, over-
15	sight, and internal control mechanisms as
16	United Nations Entities that receive
17	United States Contributions.
18	(B) The Inspector General shall establish
19	maintain, and oversee such systems, procedures
20	and controls as the Inspector General considers
21	appropriate to discharge the duty under sub-
22	paragraph (A).
23	(C) The Inspector General shall carry our
24	the duties specified in subparagraphs (A) and

1	(B) in accordance with section 4(b)(1) of the
2	Inspector General Act of 1978.
3	(D) The Inspector General shall collect
4	and maintain current records regarding Trans-
5	parency Certifications by all United Nations
6	Entities that receive United States Contribu-
7	tions.
8	(E) The Inspector General shall keep the
9	Board of Directors and the Congress fully and
10	promptly informed of how United Nations Enti-
11	ties are spending United States Contributions
12	by means of reports, testimony, and briefings.
13	(F) Referrals.—
14	(i) The Inspector General shall
15	promptly report to the United States At-
16	torney General when Inspector General has
17	reasonable grounds to believe a United
18	States Federal criminal law has been vio-
19	lated by a United Nations Entity or one of
20	its employees, contractors, or representa-
21	tives.
22	(ii) The Inspector General shall
23	promptly report, when appropriate, to the
24	Secretary General or the head of the ap-

propriate United Nations Entity cases

where the Inspector General reasonably be-
lieves that mismanagement, misfeasance,
or malfeasance is likely to have taken place
within a United Nations Entity and dis-
ciplinary proceedings are likely justified.
(7) Personnel, facilities, and other re-
SOURCES.—
(A) The Inspector General may select, ap-
point, and employ such officers and employees
as may be necessary for carrying out the duties
of the Inspector General.
(B) The inspector general may obtain serv-
ices as authorized by section 3109 of title 5,
United States Code, at daily rates not to exceed
the equivalent rate prescribed for grade GS $-15$
of the General Schedule by section 5332 of such
title.
(C) The Inspector General may lease, pur-
chase, or otherwise acquire, improve, and use
such real property wherever situated, as may be
necessary for carrying out this section.
(D) To the extent and in such amounts as
may be provided in advance by appropriations
Acts, the Inspector General my enter into con-

tracts and other arrangements for audits, stud-

ies, analyses, and other services with public agencies and with private persons, and make such payments as may be necessary to carry out the duties of the Inspector General.

(E) Upon request by the Inspector General, the head of an agency may detail any employee of such agency to the Office of the United States Inspector General for Contributions to the United Nations System on a reimbursable basis. Any employee so detailed remains, for the purpose of preserving such employee's allowances, privileges, rights, seniority, and other benefits, an employee of the agency from which detailed.

# (8) Cooperation by united states government entities.—

- (A) In carrying out the duties, responsibilities, and authorities of the Inspector General under this section, the Inspector General shall receive the cooperation of inspectors general of other Federal Government agencies.
- (B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or assistance from any department, agency, or other entity of the Federal Government, the head of such entity shall, inso-

far as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing law, furnish such information or assistance to the Inspector General, or an authorized designee.

- (C) Whenever information or assistance requested by the Inspector General is, in the judgment of the Inspector General, unreasonably refused or not provided, the Inspector General shall report the circumstances to the Board of Directors and to the Appropriate Congressional Committees without delay.
- (9) Confirmation of transparency by united nations entities.—
  - (A) PROMPT NOTICE BY INSPECTOR GENERAL.—Whenever information or assistance requested from a United Nations Entity by the Inspector General pursuant to a Transparency Certification is, in the opinion of the Inspector General, unreasonably refused or not provided in a timely manner, the Inspector General shall notify the Board of Directors, the head of that particular United Nations Entity, and the Secretary General of the circumstances in writing, without delay.

(B) Notice of compliance.—If and when the information or assistance being sought by the Inspector General in connection with a notification pursuant to subparagraph (A) is provided to the satisfaction of the Inspector General, the Inspector General shall so notify in writing the United Nations Entity, the Board of Directors, and the Appropriate Congressional Committees.

(C) Noncompliance.—If the information or assistance being sought by the Inspector General in connection with a notification pursuant to subparagraph (A) is not provided to the satisfaction of the Inspector General within 90 days of that notification, then the United Nations Entity that is the subject of the notification is deemed to be noncompliant with its Transparency Certification, and the Inspector General shall provide prompt, written notification of that fact to the Board of Directors, Appropriate Congressional Committees, the head of that United Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and any office or agency of the Federal Government that has provided that United

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Nations Entity with any United States Contribution during the prior 2 years.

(D) RESTORATION OF COMPLIANCE.— After the situation has been resolved to the satisfaction of the Board of Directors, a finding of Transparency Certification noncompliance pursuant to subparagraph (B) may be reversed by an affirmative vote of at least 5 of the 7 members of the Board of Directors. The Board shall promptly provide notification of such restoration, along with a description of the basis for the Board's decision, to the Inspector General, Appropriate Congressional Committees, head of the affected United Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and the head of any office or agency of the Federal Government that has provided that United Nations Entity with any United States Contribution during the prior 2 years.

(E) Cost Reimbursement.—The Inspector General may reimburse United Nations Entities for the reasonable cost of providing to the Inspector General information or assistance sought pursuant to a Transparency Certifi-

1 cation for the purpose of performing the duties 2 described in paragraph (6). (10) Reports.— 3 (A) AUDIT INVESTIGATION AND RE-PORTS.—Promptly upon completion, the Inspec-6 tor General shall provide copies of each audit 7 and investigation report completed pursuant to 8 paragraph (6) to the Board of Directors, the 9 Appropriate Congressional Committees, and, to 10 the extent permissible under United States law, 11 the head of each United Nations Entity that is 12 the subject of that particular report. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS.—Not later 13 14 than May 30, 2010, and semiannually there-15 after, the Inspector General shall submit to the 16 Appropriate Congressional Committees a report 17 that, among other things— 18 (i) meets the requirements of section 19 5 of the Inspector General Act of 1978; 20 and 21 (ii) includes a list of and detailed de-22 scription of the circumstances surrounding 23 any notification of noncompliance issued 24 pursuant to paragraph (9)(C) during the

covered timeframe, and whether and when

1	Board of Directors has reversed such find-
2	ing of noncompliance.
3	(C) Prohibited disclosures.—Nothing
4	in this subsection shall be construed to author-
5	ize the public disclosure of information that
6	is—
7	(i) specifically prohibited from disclo-
8	sure by any other provision of law;
9	(ii) specifically required by Executive
10	order to be protected from disclosure in
11	the interest of national defense or national
12	security or in the conduct of foreign af-
13	fairs; or
14	(iii) a part of an ongoing criminal in-
15	vestigation.
16	(D) PRIVACY PROTECTIONS.—The Inspec-
17	tor General shall exempt from public disclosure
18	information received from a United Nations
19	Entity or developed during an audit or inves-
20	tigation that the Inspector General believes—
21	(i) constitutes a trade secret or privi-
22	leged and confidential personal financial
23	information;
24	(ii) accuses a particular person of a
25	crime;

1	(iii) would, if publicly disclosed, con-
2	stitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
3	personal privacy; and
4	(iv) would compromise an ongoing law
5	enforcement investigation or judicial trial
6	in the United States.
7	(E) Publication.—Subject only to the
8	exceptions detailed in subparagraphs (C) and
9	(D), the Inspector General shall promptly pub-
10	lish each report under this subsection on a pub-
11	licly available and searchable Internet website.
12	(d) Board of Directors.—
13	(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Office of the
14	United States Inspector General for Contributions to
15	the United Nations System shall have a Board of
16	Directors.
17	(2) Duties.—The Board shall receive informa-
18	tion and reports of audits and investigations from
19	the Office and the Inspector General, provide gen-
20	eral direction and supervision to the Office and the
21	Inspector General, and determine the restoration of
22	compliance by any United Nations Entity with its
23	Transparency Certification pursuant to subsection
24	(e)(9)(D).

- (3) Membership.—The Board shall consist of 1 2 the Secretary of State (or the Secretary's designee), 3 the Secretary of Labor (or the Secretary's designee), the Secretary of Agriculture (or the Secretary's designee), the Secretary of Defense (or the Secretary's 5 6 designee), the Administrator of the Environmental 7 Protection Agency (or the Administrator's designee), 8 the Secretary of the Treasury (or the Secretary's 9 designee), and the Director of the Office of Manage-10 ment and Budget (or the Director's designee).
- 11 (4) CHAIRMANSHIP.—The Board shall be
  12 chaired by a board member, and the chairmanship
  13 shall rotate among the member departments and
  14 agencies on an annual basis. The first chair shall be
  15 the Director or designee from the Office of Manage16 ment and Budget.

#### 17 SEC. 204. TRANSPARENCY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBU-

- 18 TIONS.
- 19 (a) Funding Prerequisites.—Notwithstanding
- 20 any other provision of law, no funds made available for
- 21 use as a United States Contribution to any United Na-
- 22 tions Entity may be obligated or expended if—
- 23 (1) the intended United Nations Entity recipi-
- ent has not provided to the Inspector General within

- 1 the preceding year a Transparency Certification as
- 2 defined in section 202(4); or
- 3 (2) the intended United Nations Entity recipi-
- 4 ent is noncompliant with its Transparency Certifi-
- 5 cation as described in section 203(c)(9)(C).
- 6 (b) Treatment of Funds Withheld for Non-
- 7 COMPLIANCE.—At the conclusion of each fiscal year, any
- 8 funds that had been appropriated for use as a United
- 9 States Contribution to a United Nations Entity during
- 10 that fiscal year, but could not be obligated or expended
- 11 because of the restrictions of paragraph (1), shall be re-
- 12 turned to the United States Treasury, and are not subject
- 13 to reprogramming for any other use. Any such funds re-
- 14 turned to the Treasury shall not be considered arrears to
- 15 be repaid to any United Nations Entity.
- 16 (c) President Maiver.—The President may
- 17 waive the limitations of this subsection with respect to a
- 18 particular United States Contribution to a particular
- 19 United Nations Entity within a single fiscal year if the
- 20 President determines that it is required by the national
- 21 security interests of the United States and provides notifi-
- 22 cation and explanation of that determination to the Appro-
- 23 priate Congressional Committees.

#### 1 SEC. 205. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

- 2 There are authorized to be appropriated such sums
- 3 as are necessary to carry out the activities of this title,
- 4 provided that such sums be not less than one half of 1
- 5 percent of the total amount of all assessed and voluntary
- 6 contributions of the United States Government to the
- 7 United Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies
- 8 and related bodies during the prior fiscal year, as identi-
- 9 fied pursuant to section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John War-
- 10 ner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
- 11 2007 (Public Law 109–364).

## 12 TITLE III—UNITED STATES POL-

### 13 ICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS

- 14 SEC. 301. ANNUAL PUBLICATION.
- The President shall direct the United States Perma-
- 16 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the
- 17 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
- 18 United Nations to ensure the United Nations publishes
- 19 annually, including on a publicly searchable internet
- 20 website, a list of all United Nations subsidiary bodies and
- 21 their functions, budgets, staff, and contributions, both vol-
- 22 untary and assessed, sorted by donor.
- 23 SEC. 302. ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE.
- The President shall direct the United States Perma-
- 25 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the
- 26 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the

- 1 United Nations to implement a system for the required
- 2 filing of individual annual financial disclosure forms by
- 3 each employee of the United Nations and its specialized
- 4 agencies, programs, and funds at the P-5 level and above,
- 5 which shall be made available to the Office of Internal
- 6 Oversight Services and, upon request, to Member States
- 7 and their public.
- 8 SEC. 303. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO EXPANSION OF THE
- 9 **SECURITY COUNCIL.**
- 10 It shall be the policy of the United States to use the
- 11 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
- 12 United Nations to oppose any proposals on expansion of
- 13 the Security Council if such expansion would—
- 14 (1) diminish the influence of the United States
- on the Security Council;
- 16 (2) include veto rights for any new members of
- the Security Council; or
- 18 (3) undermine the effectiveness of the Security
- 19 Council.
- 20 SEC. 304. ACCESS TO REPORTS AND AUDITS.
- The President shall direct the United States Perma-
- 22 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the
- 23 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
- 24 United Nations to ensure that Member States may, upon

- 1 request, have access to all reports and audits completed
- 2 by the Board of External Auditors.

#### 3 SEC. 305. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY.

- 4 The President shall direct the United States Perma-
- 5 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the
- 6 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
- 7 United Nations to ensure that the Secretary General exer-
- 8 cises the right and duty of the Secretary General under
- 9 section 20 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immu-
- 10 nities of the United Nations to waive the immunity of any
- 11 United Nations official in any case in which such immu-
- 12 nity would impede the course of justice. In exercising such
- 13 waiver, the Secretary General is urged to interpret the in-
- 14 terests of the United Nations as favoring the investigation
- 15 or prosecution of a United Nations official who is credibly
- 16 under investigation for having committed a serious crimi-
- 17 nal offense or who is credibly charged with a serious crimi-
- 18 nal offense.

#### 19 SEC. 306. TERRORISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.

- The President shall direct the United States Perma-
- 21 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the
- 22 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
- 23 United Nations to work toward adoption by the general
- 24 assembly of—
- 25 (1) a definition of terrorism that—

1	(A) builds upon the recommendations of
2	the December 2004 report of the High-Level
3	Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change;
4	(B) includes as an essential component of

- (B) includes as an essential component of such definition any action that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do, or abstain from doing, any act; and
- (C) does not propose a legal or moral equivalence between an action described in paragraph (1)(B) and measures taken by a government or international organization in self-defense against an action described in paragraph (1)(B); and
- 17 (2) a comprehensive convention on terrorism 18 that includes the definition described in paragraph 19 (1).

#### 20 SEC. 307. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM.

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 22 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually for each 23 of the next 3 years, the Secretary shall submit to the ap-24 propriate congressional committees a report on United 25 Nations reform.

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

- 1 (b) CONTENTS.—The report required under sub-2 section (a) shall describe—
- (1) progress toward the goal of shifting the funding for the United Nations Regular Budget to a voluntary basis as identified in section 102 above, and a detailed description of efforts and activities by United States diplomats and officials toward that end;
  - (2) progress toward each of the policy goals identified in the prior sections of this title, and a detailed, goal-specific description of efforts and activities by United States diplomats and officials toward those ends;
  - (3) the status of the implementation of management reforms within the United Nations and its specialized agencies;
  - (4) the number of outputs, reports, or other mandates generated by General Assembly resolutions that have been eliminated;
  - (5) the progress of the General Assembly to modernize and streamline the committee structure and its specific recommendations on oversight and committee outputs, consistent with the March 2005 report of the Secretary General entitled "In larger

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

- freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all";
- 3 (6) the status of the review by the General As-4 sembly of all mandates older than 5 years and how 5 resources have been redirected to new challenges, 6 consistent with such March 2005 report of the Sec-7 retary General;
- 8 (7) the continued utility and relevance of the 9 Economic and Financial Committee and the Social, 10 Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee, in light of 11 the duplicative agendas of those committees and the 12 Economic and Social Council; and
- 13 (8) whether the United Nations or any of its 14 specialized agencies has contracted with any party 15 included on the Lists of Parties Excluded from Fed-16 eral Procurement and Nonprocurement Programs.

#### 17 SEC. 308. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL.

- 18 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the 19 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 20 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 21 a report—
- 22 (1) concerning the progress of the General As-23 sembly to modernize human resource practices, con-24 sistent with the March 2005 report of the Secretary

1	General entitled "In larger freedom: towards devel
2	opment, security and human rights for all"; and
3	(2) containing the information described in sub
4	section (b).
5	(b) CONTENTS.—The report shall include—
6	(1) a comprehensive evaluation of human re
7	sources reforms at the United Nations, including ar
8	evaluation of—
9	(A) tenure;
10	(B) performance reviews;
11	(C) the promotion system;
12	(D) a merit-based hiring system and en
13	hanced regulations concerning termination of
14	employment of employees; and
15	(E) the implementation of a code of con
16	duct and ethics training;
17	(2) the implementation of a system of proce
18	dures for filing complaints and protective measures
19	for work-place harassment, including sexual harass
20	ment;
21	(3) policy recommendations relating to the es
22	tablishment of a rotation requirement for non
23	administrative positions;
24	(4) policy recommendations relating to the es
25	tablishment of a prohibition preventing personne

- and officials assigned to the mission of a member
- 2 state to the united nations from transferring to a
- 3 position within the United Nations Secretariat that
- 4 is compensated at the P–5 level and above;
- 5 (5) policy recommendations relating to a reduc-
- 6 tion in travel allowances and attendant oversight
- 7 with respect to accommodations and airline flights;
- 8 and
- 9 (6) an evaluation of the recommendations of the
- 10 Secretary General relating to greater flexibility for
- the Secretary General in staffing decisions to accom-
- modate changing priorities.
- 13 SEC. 309. WITHHOLDING OF UNITED STATES CONTRIBU-
- 14 TIONS TO UNRWA.
- 15 (a) WITHHOLDING.—Contributions by the United
- 16 States to the regular budget of the United Nations Relief
- 17 and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
- 18 East (UNRWA), to any successor or related entity, or to
- 19 the regular budget of the United Nations for the support
- 20 of UNRWA or a successor entity (through staff positions
- 21 provided by the United Nations Secretariat, or otherwise),
- 22 may be provided only during a period for which a certifi-
- 23 cation described in subsection (b) is in effect.
- 24 (b) CERTIFICATION.—A certification described in this
- 25 paragraph is a written determination by the Secretary,

1	based on all information available after diligent inquiry,
2	and transmitted to the Appropriate Congressional Com-
3	mittees along with a detailed description of the factual
4	basis therefor, that—
5	(1) no official, employee, consultant, contractor,
6	subcontractor, representative, or affiliate of
7	UNRWA—
8	(A) is a member of a foreign terrorist or-
9	ganization;
10	(B) has propagated, disseminated, or in-
11	cited anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic
12	rhetoric or propaganda; or
13	(C) has used any UNRWA resources, in-
14	cluding publications or websites, to propagate
15	or disseminate political materials, including po-
16	litical rhetoric regarding the Israeli-Palestinian
17	conflict;
18	(2) no UNRWA school, hospital, clinic, other
19	facility, or other infrastructure or resource is being
20	used by a foreign terrorist organization for oper-
21	ations, planning, training, recruitment, fundraising,
22	indoctrination, communications, sanctuary, storage
23	of weapons or other materials, or any other pur-
24	poses;

- 1 (3) UNRWA is subject to comprehensive finan2 cial audits by an internationally recognized third
  3 party independent auditing firm and has imple4 mented an effective system of vetting and oversight
  5 to prevent the use, receipt, or diversion of any
  6 UNRWA resources by any foreign terrorist organiza7 tion or members thereof;
- 8 (4) no UNRWA-funded school or educational 9 institution uses textbooks or other educational mate-10 rials that propagate or disseminate anti-American, 11 anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic rhetoric, propaganda or 12 incitement; and
- 13 (5) no recipient of UNRWA funds or loans is 14 a member of a foreign terrorist organization.
- 15 (c) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term "foreign 16 terrorist organization" means an organization designated 17 as a foreign terrorist organization by the Secretary of 18 State in accordance with section 219(a) of the Immigra-19 tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)).
- 20 (d) Effective Duration of Certification.—The 21 certification described in subsection (b) shall be effective 22 for a period of 180 days from the date of transmission 23 to the Appropriate Congressional Committees, or until the 24 Secretary receives information rendering that certification 25 factually inaccurate, whichever is earliest. In the event

- 1 that a certification becomes ineffective, the Secretary shall
- 2 promptly transmit to the Appropriate Congressional Com-
- 3 mittees a description of any information that precludes the
- 4 renewal or continuation of the certification.
- 5 (e) LIMITATION.—During a period for which a certifi-
- 6 cation described in subsection (b) is in effect, the United
- 7 States may not contribute to the United Nations Relief
- 8 and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
- 9 East (UNRWA) or a successor entity an annual amount—
- 10 (1) greater than the highest annual contribu-
- tion to UNRWA made by a member country of the
- 12 League of Arab States;
- 13 (2) that, as a proportion of the total UNRWA
- budget, exceeds the proportion of the total budget
- for the United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-
- 16 ugees (UNHCR) paid by the United States; or
- 17 (3) that exceeds 22 percent of the total budget
- of UNRWA.
- 19 (f) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Con-
- 20 gress that, in order to alleviate the suffering of Palestinian
- 21 refugees, responsibility for those refugees should be fully
- 22 transferred to the Office of the United Nations High Com-
- 23 missioner for Refugees.

### 1 SEC. 310. UNITED NATIONS TREATY BODIES.

2	The United States shall withhold from United States
3	contributions to the regular assessed budget of the United
4	Nations for a biennial period amounts that are propor-
5	tional to the percentage of such budget that are expended
6	with respect to a United Nations human rights treaty
7	monitoring body or committee that was established by—
8	(1) a convention (without any protocols) or an
9	international covenant (without any protocols) to
10	which the United States is not party; or
11	(2) a convention, with a subsequent protocol, if
12	the United States is a party to neither.
13	SEC. 311. EQUALITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS.
14	(a) Department of State Review and Re-
15	PORT.—
16	(1) In general.—To avoid duplicative efforts
17	and funding with respect to Palestinian interests
18	and to ensure balance in the approach to Israeli-Pal-
19	estinian issues, the Secretary shall, not later than
20	180 days after the date of the enactment of this
21	Act—
22	(A) complete an audit of the functions of
23	the entities listed in paragraph (2); and
24	(B) submit to the appropriate congres-
25	sional committees a report containing audit
26	findings and conclusions, and recommendations

1	for the elimination of such duplicative entities
2	and efforts.
3	(2) Entities.—The entities referred to in
4	paragraph (1) are the following:
5	(A) The United Nations Division for Pales-
6	tinian Rights.
7	(B) The Committee on the Exercise of the
8	Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.
9	(C) The United Nations Special Coordi-
10	nator for the Middle East Peace Process and
11	Personal Representative to the Palestine Lib-
12	eration Organization and the Palestinian Au-
13	thority.
14	(D) The NGO Network on the Question of
15	Palestine.
16	(E) The Special Committee to Investigate
17	Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of
18	the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the
19	Occupied Territories.
20	(F) Any other entity the Secretary deter-
21	mines results in duplicative efforts or funding
22	or fails to ensure balance in the approach to
23	Israeli-Palestinian issues.
24	(b) Implementation by Permanent Representa-
25	TIVE —

- 1 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct
  2 the United States Permanent Representative to the
  3 United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence
  4 of the United States at the United Nations to seek
  5 the implementation of the recommendations con6 tained in the report required under subsection
  7 (a)(1)(B).
  - (2) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS.—Until such recommendations have been implemented, the United States shall withhold from United States contributions to the regular assessed budget of the United Nations for a biennial period amounts that are proportional to the percentage of such budget that are expended for such entities.
- 15 (c) GAO AUDIT.—The Comptroller General of the 16 United States of the Government Accountability Office 17 shall conduct an audit of—
- 18 (1) the status of the implementation of the rec-19 ommendations contained in the report required 20 under subsection (a)(1)(B); and
- 21 (2) United States actions and achievements 22 under subsection (b).
- 23 SEC. 312. ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.
- The President shall direct the United States perma-25 nent representative to the United Nations to use the voice,

9

10

11

12

13

1	vote, and influence of the United States at the United Na-
2	tions to make every effort to—
3	(1) ensure the issuance and implementation of
4	a directive by the Secretary General or the Secre-
5	tariat, as appropriate, that—
6	(A) requires all employees of the United
7	Nations and its specialized agencies to officially
8	and publicly condemn anti-Semitic statements
9	made at any session of the United Nations or
10	its specialized agencies, or at any other session
11	sponsored by the United Nations;
12	(B) requires employees of the United Na-
13	tions and its specialized agencies, programs,
14	and funds to be subject to punitive action, in-
15	cluding immediate dismissal, for making anti-
16	Semitic statements or references;
17	(C) proposes specific recommendations to
18	the General Assembly for the establishment of
19	mechanisms to hold accountable employees and
20	officials of the United Nations and its special-
21	ized agencies, programs, and funds, or Member
22	States, that make such anti-Semitic statements
23	or references in any forum of the United Na-

tions or of its specialized agencies;

- 1 (D) continues to develop and implements 2 education awareness programs about the Holo-3 caust and anti-Semitism throughout the world, 4 as part of an effort to combat intolerance and hatred; and 6 (E) requires the Office of the United Na-7 tions High Commissioner for Human Rights 8 (OHCHR) to develop programming and other 9 measures that address anti-Semitism; 10 (2) secure the adoption of a resolution by the 11 General Assembly that establishes the mechanisms 12 described in paragraph (1)(C); and
- (3) continue working toward further reduction
   of anti-Semitic language and anti-Israel resolutions
   in the United Nations and its specialized agencies,
   programs, and funds.

#### 17 SEC. 313. REGIONAL GROUP INCLUSION OF ISRAEL.

The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the
voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
United Nations to expand the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) in the United Nations to include
Israel as a permanent member with full rights and privileges.

# 1 TITLE IV—UNITED NATIONS 2 HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

3 SEC. 401. FINDINGS.

- 4 The Congress makes the following findings:
  - (1) Since its establishment in 2006, the United Nations Human Rights Council has failed to meaningfully promote the protection of internationally recognized human rights, and has proven to be even more problematic than the United Nations Human Rights Commission that it was created to replace.
    - (2) The United Nations Human Rights Council suffers from significant structural flaws, such as the fact that it draws its members from the General Assembly without any substantive membership criteria, with the perverse result that a number of the world's worst human rights abusers are members of the council.
    - (3) The structure and composition of the United Nations Human Rights Council have made it subject to gross political manipulation, with the result that, during its two and one-half years of operation, the Council has passed 20 resolutions censuring the democratic state of Israel, as compared to only 4 censuring the dictatorship in Burma, just one censuring the North Korean regime, and none con-

1	demning the severe, ongoing human rights abuses in
2	Sudan, China, Cuba, Zimbabwe, Belarus, and else-
3	where.
4	SEC. 402. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP AND
5	FUNDING.
6	(a) In General.—For each and every fiscal year
7	subsequent to the effective date of this Act, until the Sec-
8	retary of State submits to Congress a certification that
9	the requirements described in subsection (b) have been
10	satisfied—
11	(1) the Secretary of State shall withhold from
12	a United States contribution each fiscal year to a
13	regularly assessed biennial budget of the United Na-
14	tions an amount that is equal to the percentage of
15	such contribution that the Secretary determines
16	would be allocated by the United Nations to support
17	the United Nations Human Rights Council;
18	(2) the Secretary of State shall not make a vol-
19	untary contribution to the United Nations Human
20	Rights Council; and
21	(3) the United States shall not run for a seat
22	on the United Nations Human Rights Council.
23	(b) Certification.—The annual certification re-
24	ferred to in subsection (a) is a certification made by the

1	Secretary to Congress that the United Nations Human
2	Rights Council does not include a Member State—
3	(1) subject to sanctions by the Security Council
4	(2) under a Security Council-mandated inves-
5	tigation for human rights abuses;
6	(3) subject, within the prior 5 years, to a coun-
7	try-specific resolution passed under Agenda Item 9
8	by the former United Nations Human Rights Com-
9	mission;
10	(4) which the Secretary of State has deter-
11	mined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Ad-
12	ministration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect pur-
13	suant to the International Emergency Economic
14	Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export Control
15	Act, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
16	1961, or other provision of law, is a government that
17	has repeatedly provided support for acts of inter-
18	national terrorism; or
19	(5) which the President has designated as a
20	country of particular concern for religious freedom
21	under section 402(b) of the International Religious

Freedom Act of 1998.

## 1 TITLE V—INTERNATIONAL 2 ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

3	SEC. 501. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.
4	(a) Enforcement and Compliance.—
5	(1) Office of compliance.—
6	(A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President
7	shall direct the United States Permanent Rep-
8	resentative to International Atomic Energy
9	Agency (IAEA) to use the voice, vote, and influ-
10	ence of the United States at the IAEA to estab-
11	lish an Office of Compliance in the Secretariat
12	of the IAEA.
13	(B) OPERATION.—The Office of Compli-
14	ance shall—
15	(i) function as an independent body
16	composed of technical experts who shall
17	work in consultation with IAEA inspectors
18	to assess compliance by IAEA Member
19	States and provide recommendations to the
20	IAEA Board of Governors concerning pen-
21	alties to be imposed on IAEA Member
22	States that fail to fulfill their obligations
23	under IAEA Board resolutions;

1	(ii) base its assessments and rec-
2	ommendations on IAEA inspection reports;
3	and
4	(iii) take into consideration informa-
5	tion provided by IAEA Board Members
6	that are 1 of the 5 nuclear weapons states
7	as recognized by the Treaty on the Non-
8	Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 UST
9	483) (commonly referred to as the "Nu-
10	clear Nonproliferation Treaty" or the
11	"NPT").
12	(C) Staffing.—The Office of Compliance
13	shall be staffed from existing personnel in the
14	Department of Safeguards of the IAEA or the
15	Department of Nuclear Safety and Security of
16	the IAEA.
17	(2) Committee on safeguards and
18	VERIFICATION.—The President shall direct the
19	United States Permanent Representative to the
20	IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the
21	United States at the IAEA to ensure that the Com-
22	mittee on Safeguards and Verification established in
23	2005 shall develop and seek to put into force a
24	workplan of concrete measures that will—

1	(A) improve the ability of the IAEA to
2	monitor and enforce compliance by Member
3	States of the IAEA with the Nuclear Non-
4	proliferation Treaty and the Statute of the
5	International Atomic Energy Agency; and
6	(B) enhance the ability of the IAEA, be-
7	yond the verification mechanisms and authori-
8	ties contained in the Additional Protocol to the
9	Safeguards Agreements between the IAEA and
10	Member States of the IAEA, to detect with a
11	high degree of confidence undeclared nuclear
12	activities by a Member State.
13	(3) Penalties with respect to the IAEA.—
14	(A) In general.—The President shall di-
15	rect the United States Permanent Representa-
16	tive to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and in-
17	fluence of the United States at the IAEA to en-
18	sure that a Member State of the IAEA that is
19	under investigation for a breach of or non-
20	compliance with its IAEA obligations or the
21	purposes and principles of the Charter of the
22	United Nations has its privileges suspended, in-
23	cluding—
24	(i) limiting its ability to vote on its
25	case;

case;

1	(ii) being prevented from receiving
2	any technical assistance; and
3	(iii) being prevented from hosting
4	meetings.
5	(B) TERMINATION OF PENALTIES.—The
6	penalties specified under subparagraph (A)
7	shall be terminated when such investigation is
8	concluded and such Member State is no longer
9	in such breach or noncompliance.
10	(4) Penalties with respect to the nu-
11	CLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY.—The Presi-
12	dent shall direct the United States Permanent Rep-
13	resentative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and
14	influence of the United States at the IAEA to en-
15	sure that a Member State of the IAEA that is found
16	to be in breach of, in noncompliance with, or has
17	withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
18	shall return to the IAEA all nuclear materials and
19	technology received from the IAEA, any Member
20	State of the IAEA, or any Member State of the Nu-
21	clear Nonproliferation Treaty.
22	(b) United States Contributions.—
23	(1) Voluntary contributions.—Voluntary
24	contributions of the United States to the IAEA
25	should primarily be used to fund activities relating

to Nuclear Safety and Security or activities relating
to Nuclear Verification.

- (2) Limitation on use of funds.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to—
  - (A) ensure that funds for safeguards inspections are prioritized for countries that have newly established nuclear programs or are initiating nuclear programs; and
  - (B) block the allocation of funds for any other IAEA development, environmental, or nuclear science assistance or activity to a country—
    - (i) the government of which the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, or other provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism and the government of which the Secretary has determined has not dismantled and surrendered its weap-

1	ons of mass destruction programs under
2	international verification;
3	(ii) that is under investigation for a
4	breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA
5	obligations or the purposes and principles
6	of the Charter of the United Nations; or
7	(iii) that is in violation of its IAEA
8	obligations or the purposes and principles
9	of the Charter of the United Nations.
10	(3) Detail of expenditures.—The Presi-
11	dent shall direct the United States Permanent Rep-
12	resentative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and
13	influence of the United States at the IAEA to se-
14	cure, as part of the regular budget presentation of
15	the IAEA to Member States of the IAEA, a detailed
16	breakdown by country of expenditures of the IAEA
17	for safeguards inspections and nuclear security ac-
18	tivities.
19	(c) Membership.—
20	(1) In general.—The President shall direct
21	the United States Permanent Representative to the
22	IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the
23	United States at the IAEA to block the membership

on the Board of Governors of the IAEA for a Mem-

1	ber State of the IAEA that has not signed and rati-
2	fied the Additional Protocol and—
3	(A) is under investigation for a breach of
4	or noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or
5	the purposes and principles of the Charter of
6	the United Nations; or
7	(B) that is in violation of its IAEA obliga-
8	tions or the purposes and principles of the
9	Charter of the United Nations.
10	(2) Criteria.—The United States Permanent
11	Representative to the IAEA shall make every effort
12	to modify the criteria for Board membership to re-
13	flect the principles described in paragraph (1).
14	(d) SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOL.—The President
15	shall direct the United States Permanent Representative
16	to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the
17	United States at the IAEA to make every effort to ensure
18	that the IAEA changes the policy regarding the Small
19	Quantities Protocol in order to—
20	(1) rescind and eliminate the Small Quantities
21	Protocol;
22	(2) require that any IAEA Member State that
23	has previously signed a Small Quantities Protocol to
24	sign, ratify, and implement the Additional Protocol,
25	provide immediate access for IAEA inspectors to its

- nuclear-related facilities, and agree to the strongest inspections regime of its nuclear efforts; and
- 3 (3) require that any IAEA Member State that
  4 does not comply with paragraph (2) to be ineligible
  5 to receive nuclear material, technology, equipment,
  6 or assistance from any IAEA Member State and
  7 subject to the penalties described in subsection
  8 (a)(3).

### (e) Nuclear Program of Iran.—

- (1) United States action.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to make every effort to ensure the adoption of a resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors that, in addition to the restrictions already imposed, makes Iran ineligible to receive any nuclear material, technology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA Member State and ineligible for any IAEA assistance not related to safeguards inspections or nuclear security until the IAEA Board of Governors determines that Iran—
- 23 (A) is providing full access to IAEA in-24 spectors to its nuclear-related facilities;

- 1 (B) has fully implemented and is in com-2 pliance with the Additional Protocol; and
  - (C) has permanently ceased and dismantled all activities and programs related to nuclear-enrichment and reprocessing.
  - (2) Penalties.—If an IAEA Member State is determined to have violated the prohibition on assistance to Iran described in paragraph (1) before the IAEA Board of Governors determines that Iran has satisfied the conditions described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of such paragraph, such Member State shall be subject to the penalties described in subsection (a)(3), shall be ineligible to receive nuclear material, technology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA Member State, and shall be ineligible to receive any IAEA assistance not related to safeguards inspections or nuclear security until such time as the IAEA Board of Governors makes such determination with respect to Iran.
- 20 (f) REPORT.—Not later than 6 months after the date 21 of the enactment of this Act and annually for 2 years 22 thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate 23 congressional committees a report on the implementation 24 of this section

1	SEC. 502. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NUCLEAR
2	SECURITY ACTION PLAN OF THE IAEA.
3	It is the sense of Congress that the national security
4	interests of the United States are enhanced by the Nuclean
5	Security Action Plan of the IAEA and the Board of Gov-
6	ernors should recommend, and the General Conference
7	should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear Secu-
8	rity Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA.
9	TITLE VI—PEACEKEEPING
10	SEC. 601. REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
11	OPERATIONS.
12	It is the sense of Congress that—
13	(1) although United Nations peacekeeping oper-
14	ations have contributed greatly toward the pro-
15	motion of peace and stability for nearly 6 decades
16	and the majority of peacekeeping personnel who
17	have served under the United Nations flag have
18	done so with honor and courage, the record of
19	United Nations peacekeeping has been severely tar-
20	nished by operational failures and unconscionable
21	acts of misconduct;
22	(2) in response to such failures, in 2000 and
23	2005, respectively, the Secretary General charged
24	the high-level Panel on United Nations Peace Oper-
25	ations, led by former Foreign Minister of Algeria

Lakhdar Brahimi, and his Special Advisor on the

2 Royal Highness Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein 3 of Jordan, to provide honest assessments of the 4 United Nations' shortcomings and make rec-

Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, His

- 5 ommendations that would help restore the con-
- 6 fidence of the international community in United
- 7 Nations peacekeeping operations;

- (3) audits of procurement practices in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, conducted by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, also have uncovered "significant" corruption schemes, including a 2007 audit of peacekeeping contracts valued at \$1.4 billion, of which more than \$614 million, or 44%, were subject to corruption;
  - (4) despite the fact that the United Nations has had more than eight years to implement the reforms contained in the Brahimi Report, nearly four years to implement the reforms in the Zeid Report, and the fact that Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, his predecessor Kofi Annan, and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations repeatedly have expressed their commitment "to implementing fundamental, systematic changes as a matter of urgency," a number of critical reforms continue to be blocked

1	or delayed by Members States who arguably benefit
2	from maintenance of the status quo; and
3	(5) if the reputation of and confidence in
4	United Nations peacekeeping operations is to be re-
5	stored, fundamental and far-reaching reforms, par-
6	ticularly in the areas of planning, management, pro-
7	curement, training, conduct, and discipline, must be
8	implemented without further delay.
9	SEC. 602. POLICY RELATING TO REFORM OF UNITED NA-
10	TIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
11	It shall be the policy of the United States to pursue
12	reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the
13	following areas:
14	(1) Planning and management.—
15	(A) GLOBAL AUDIT.—As the size, cost,
16	and number of United Nations peacekeeping
17	operations have increased substantially over the
18	past decade, an independent audit of each such
19	operation, with a view toward "right-sizing" op-
20	erations and ensuring that such operations are
21	cost effective, should be conducted and its find-
22	ings reported to the Security Council.
23	(B) Procurement and trans-
24	PARENCY.—A modern logistics system and
25	transparent, streamlined procurement proce-

dures should be established within the United Nations Department of Field Support to ensure that all peacekeeping missions are resourced appropriately and in a timely fashion while individual accountability for waste, fraud and abuse within United Nations peacekeeping missions is established and uniformly enforced.

- (C) Review of Mandates and Closing Operations.—In conjunction with the audit described in subparagraph (A), the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations should conduct a comprehensive review of all United Nations peacekeeping operation mandates, with a view toward identifying objectives that are practical and achievable, and report its findings to the Security Council. In particular, the review should consider the following:
  - (i) Except in extraordinary cases, including genocide, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations should not be tasked with activities that are impractical or unachievable without the cooperation of the Member State(s) hosting a United Nations peacekeeping operation, or which amount to de-facto

Trusteeship outside of the procedures established for such under Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter, thereby creating unrealistic expectations and obfuscating the primary responsibility of the Member States themselves in creating and maintaining conditions for peace.

- (ii) Long-standing operations that are static and cannot fulfill their mandate should be downsized or closed.
- (iii) Where there is legitimate concern that the withdrawal from a country of an otherwise static United Nations peace-keeping operation would result in the resumption of major conflict, a burden-sharing arrangement that reduces the level of assessed contributions, similar to that currently supporting the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, should be explored and instituted.
- (D) LEADERSHIP.—As peacekeeping operations become larger and increasingly complex, the Secretariat should adopt a minimum standard of qualifications for senior leaders and managers, with particular emphasis on specific

skills and experience, and current senior leaders and managers who do not meet those standards should be removed.

- (E) Pre-deployment training on interpretation of the mandate of the operation, specifically in the areas of use of force, civilian protection and field conditions, the Code of Conduct, HIV/AIDS, and human rights should be mandatory, and all personnel, regardless of category or rank, should be required to sign an oath that each has received and understands such training as a condition of participation in the operation.
- (F) Gratis military personnel.—The General Assembly should seek to strengthen the capacity the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and ease the extraordinary burden currently placed upon the limited number of headquarters staff by lifting restrictions on the utilization of gratis military personnel by the Department so that the Department may accept secondments from Member States of military personnel with expertise in mission planning, logistics, and other operational specialties.

### (2) CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE.—

- (A) Adoption of a uniform code of Conduct conduct.—A single, uniform code of Conduct that has the status of a binding rule and applies equally to all personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of category or rank, including military personnel, should be adopted and incorporated into legal documents governing participation in such an operation, including all contracts and Memorandums of Understanding, promulgated and effectively enforced.
- (B) Understanding the code of conduct.—All personnel, regardless of category or rank, should receive training on the Code of Conduct prior to deployment with a peace-keeping operation, in addition to periodic follow-on training. In particular—
  - (i) all personnel, regardless of category or rank, should be provided with a personal copy of the Code of Conduct that has been translated into the national language of such personnel, regardless of whether such language is an official language of the United Nations;

(ii) all personnel, regardless of category or rank, should sign an oath that each has received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that each pledges to abide by the Code of Conduct, and that each understands the consequences of violating the Code of Conduct, including immediate termination of participation in and permanent exclusion from all current and future peacekeeping operations, as well as the assumption of personal liability for victims compensation, as a condition of appointment to any such operation; and

(iii) peacekeeping operations should conduct educational outreach programs to reach local communities where peacekeeping personnel of such operations are based, including explaining prohibited acts on the part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel and identifying the individual to whom the local population may direct complaints or file allegations of exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct.

1	(C) Monitoring mechanisms.—Dedi-
2	cated monitoring mechanisms, such as the Con-
3	duct and Discipline Units already deployed to
4	support United Nations peacekeeping oper-
5	ations in Haiti, Sudan, Kosovo, Burundi, Libe-
6	ria, Lebanon, Timor Leste, Cote d'Ivoire, West-
7	ern Sahara, and the Democratic Republic of
8	Congo, should be present in each operation to
9	monitor compliance with the Code of Conduct,
10	and—
11	(i) should report simultaneously to the
12	Head of Mission, the United Nations De-
13	partment of Peacekeeping Operations, and
14	the Associate Director of OIOS for Peace-
15	keeping Operations (established under sec-
16	tion $1114(b)(9)$ ; and
17	(ii) should be tasked with designing
18	and implementing mission-specific meas-
19	ures to prevent misconduct, conduct follow-
20	on training for personnel, coordinate com-
21	munity outreach programs, and assist in
22	investigations, as OIOS determines nec-
23	essary and appropriate.
24	(D) Investigations.—A permanent, pro-
25	fessional, and independent investigative body

1	should be established and introduced into
2	United Nations peacekeeping operations. In
3	particular—
4	(i) the investigative body should in-
5	clude professionals with experience in in-
6	vestigating sex crimes and the illegal ex-
7	ploitation of resources, as appropriate, as
8	well as experts who can provide guidance
9	on standards of proof and evidentiary re-
10	quirements necessary for any subsequent
11	legal action;
12	(ii) provisions should be included in
13	all Memorandums of Understanding, in-
14	cluding a Model Memorandum of Under-
15	standing, that obligate Member States that
16	contribute troops to a peacekeeping oper-
17	ation to designate a military prosecutor
18	who will participate in any investigation
19	into credible allegations of misconduct
20	brought against an individual of such
21	Member State, so that evidence is collected
22	and preserved in a manner consistent with
23	the military law of such Member State;
24	(iii) the investigative body should be
25	regionally based to ensure rapid deploy-

1	ment and should be equipped with modern
2	forensics equipment for the purpose of
3	positively identifying perpetrators and,
4	where necessary, for determining paternity;
5	and
6	(iv) the investigative body should re-
7	port directly to the Associate Director of
8	OIOS for Peacekeeping Operations, while
9	providing copies of any reports to the De-
10	partment of Peacekeeping Operations, the
11	Head of Mission, and the Member State
12	concerned.
13	(E) Follow-up.—The Conduct and Dis-
14	cipline Team in the headquarters of the United
15	Nations Department of Peacekeeping Oper-
16	ations should be appropriately staffed,
17	resourced, and tasked with—
18	(i) promulgating measures to prevent
19	misconduct;
20	(ii) receiving reports by field per-
21	sonnel and coordinating the Department's
22	response to allegations of misconduct;
23	(iii) gathering follow-up information
24	on completed investigations, particularly by
25	focusing on disciplinary actions against the

1	individual concerned taken by the United
2	Nations or by the Member State that is
3	contributing troops to which such indi-
4	vidual belongs, and sharing such informa-
5	tion with the Security Council, the Head of
6	Mission, and the community hosting the
7	peacekeeping operation; and
8	(iv) contributing pertinent data on
9	conduct and discipline to the data base re-
10	quired pursuant to subparagraph (H).
11	(F) FINANCIAL LIABILITY AND VICTIMS
12	ASSISTANCE.—Although peacekeeping oper-
13	ations should provide immediate medical assist-
14	ance to victims of sexual abuse or exploitation,
15	the responsibility for providing longer-term
16	treatment, care, or restitution lies solely with
17	the individual found guilty of the misconduct.
18	In particular, the following reforms should be
19	implemented:
20	(i) The United Nations should not as-
21	sume responsibility for providing long-term
22	treatment or compensation by creating a
23	"Victims Trust Fund", or any other such
24	similar fund, financed through assessed

contributions to United Nations peace-

keeping operations, thereby shielding individuals from personal liability and reinforcing an atmosphere of impunity.

- (ii) If an individual responsible for misconduct has been repatriated, reassigned, redeployed, or is otherwise unable to provide assistance, responsibility for providing assistance to a victim should be assigned to the Member State that contributed the contingent to which such individual belonged or to the manager concerned.
- (iii) In the case of misconduct by a member of a military contingent, appropriate funds shall be withheld from the troop contributing country concerned.
- (iv) In the case of misconduct by a civilian employee or contractor of the United Nations, appropriate wages shall be garnished from such individual or fines shall be imposed against such individual, consistent with existing United Nations Staff Rules, and retirement funds shall not be shielded from liability.

- (G) Managers and commanders manner in which managers and commanders handle cases of misconduct by those serving under them should be included in their individual performance evaluations, so that managers and commanders who take decisive action to deter and address misconduct are rewarded, while those who create a permissive environment or impede investigations are penalized or relieved of duty, as appropriate.
  - (H) Data Base.—A centralized data base, including personnel photos and fingerprints, should be created and maintained within the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office of Field Support, and other relevant United Nations bodies without further delay to track cases of misconduct, including the outcome of investigations and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel who have engaged in misconduct or other criminal activities, regardless of category or rank, are permanently barred from participation in future peacekeeping operations.
  - (I) Cooperation of member states.—

    If a Member State routinely refuses to cooper-

ate with the directives contained herein or acts to shield its nationals from personal liability, that Member State should be barred from contributing troops or personnel to future peacekeeping operations.

(J) Welfare.—Peacekeeping operations should continue to seek to maintain a minimum standard of welfare for mission personnel to ameliorate conditions of service, while adjustments are made to the discretionary welfare payments currently provided to Member States that contribute troops to offset the cost of operation-provided recreational facilities, as necessary and appropriate.

### 15 SEC. 603. CERTIFICATION.

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

- 16 (a) New or Expanded Peacekeeping Oper-17 ations Contingent Upon Presidential Certifi-18 cation of Peacekeeping Operations Reforms.—
- 19 (1) No New or expanded peacekeeping op-20 erations.—
- 21 (A) CERTIFICATION.—Except as provided 22 in subparagraph (B), until the Secretary of 23 State certifies that the requirements described 24 in paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the Presi-25 dent shall direct the United States Permanent

Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to oppose the creation of new, or expansion of existing, United Nations peacekeeping operations.

- (B) EXCEPTION AND NOTIFICATION.—The requirements described under paragraph (2) may be waived with respect to a particular peacekeeping operation if the President determines that failure to deploy new or additional peacekeepers in such situation will significantly contribute to the widespread loss of human life, genocide, or the endangerment of a vital national security interest of the United States. If the President makes such a determination, the President shall, not later than 15 days before the exercise of such waiver, notify the appropriate congressional committees of such determination and resulting waiver.
- (2) CERTIFICATION OF PEACEKEEPING OPER-ATIONS REFORMS.—The certification referred to in paragraph (1) is a certification made by the Secretary to the appropriate congressional committees that the following reforms, or an equivalent set of reforms, related to peacekeeping operations have

- been adopted by the United Nations Department of
  Peacekeeping Operations or the General Assembly,
  as appropriate:
  - (A) A single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the status of a binding rule and applies equally to all personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of category or rank, has been adopted by the General Assembly and duly incorporated into all contracts and a Model Memorandum of Understanding, and mechanisms have been established for training such personnel concerning the requirements of the Code and enforcement of the Code.
    - (B) All personnel, regardless of category or rank, serving in a peacekeeping operation have been trained concerning the requirements of the Code of Conduct and each has been given a personal copy of the Code, translated into the national language of such personnel.
    - (C) All personnel, regardless of category or rank, are required to sign an oath that each has received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that each pledges to abide by the Code, and that each understands the consequences of violating

the Code, including immediate termination of participation in and permanent exclusion from all current and future peacekeeping operations, as well as the assumption of personal liability for victims compensation as a condition of the appointment to such operation.

- (D) All peacekeeping operations have designed and implemented educational outreach programs to reach local communities where peacekeeping personnel of such operations are based to explain prohibited acts on the part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel and to identify the individual to whom the local population may direct complaints or file allegations of exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct.
- (E) The creation of a centralized data base, including personnel photos and finger-prints, has been completed and is being maintained in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations that tracks cases of misconduct, including the outcomes of investigations and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel, regardless of category or rank, who have engaged in misconduct or other

1	criminal activities are permanently barred from
2	participation in future peacekeeping operations.
3	(F) A Model Memorandum of Under-
4	standing between the United Nations and each
5	Member State that contributes troops to a
6	peacekeeping operation has been adopted by the
7	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
8	Operations that specifically obligates each such
9	Member State to—
10	(i) uphold the uniform Code of Con-
11	duct which shall apply equally to all per-
12	sonnel serving in United Nations peace-
13	keeping operations, regardless of category
14	or rank;
15	(ii) designate a competent legal au-
16	thority, preferably a prosecutor with exper-
17	tise in the area of sexual exploitation and
18	abuse where appropriate, to participate in
19	any investigation into an allegation of mis-
20	conduct brought against an individual of
21	such Member State;
22	(iii) refer to its competent national or
23	military authority for possible prosecution,
24	if warranted, any investigation of a viola-
25	tion of the Code of Conduct or other crimi-

1	nal activity by an individual of such Mem-
2	ber State;
3	(iv) report to the Department of
4	Peacekeeping Operations on the outcome
5	of any such investigation;
6	(v) undertake to conduct on-site court
7	martial proceedings, where practical and
8	appropriate, relating to allegations of mis-
9	conduct alleged against an individual of
10	such Member State; and
11	(vi) assume responsibility for the pro-
12	vision of appropriate assistance to a victim
13	of misconduct committed by an individual
14	of such Member State.
15	(G) A professional and independent inves-
16	tigative and audit function has been established
17	within the United Nations Department of
18	Peacekeeping Operations and the OIOS to mon-
19	itor United Nations peacekeeping operations.

 $\bigcirc$