

117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 3524

To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 25, 2021

Mr. MEEKS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Financial Services, Ways and Means, the Judiciary, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement
6 Act” or the “EAGLE Act”.

7 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
8 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Definitions.
- Sec. 3. Statement of policy.
- Sec. 4. Sense of Congress.
- Sec. 5. Rules of construction.

TITLE I—INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS

Subtitle A—Science and Technology

- Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global supply chain diversification and management.

Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure and Energy Development

- Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
- Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure investment standards.
- Sec. 113. Supporting economic independence from China.
- Sec. 114. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure.
- Sec. 115. Report on the People’s Republic of China’s investments in foreign energy development.
- Sec. 116. Ensuring the International Development Finance Corporation is positioned to achieve national security, economic, and development objectives.

Subtitle C—Economic Diplomacy and Leadership

- Sec. 121. Findings on regional economic order.
- Sec. 122. Review of PRC trade and economic engagement globally.
- Sec. 123. Report on entrenching American economic diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 124. Sense of Congress on the need to bolster American leadership in APEC.
- Sec. 125. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues.
- Sec. 126. Digital trade agreements.
- Sec. 127. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership.

Subtitle D—Financial Diplomacy and Leadership

- Sec. 131. Findings on Chinese financial industrial policy.
- Sec. 132. Report on importance of American financial strength for global leadership.
- Sec. 133. Review of Chinese companies on United States capital markets.
- Sec. 134. Report on diplomatic and economic implications of changes to cross-border payment and financial messaging systems.

TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

Subtitle A—Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

- Sec. 201. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
- Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 203. Boosting Quad cooperation.
- Sec. 204. Establishment of Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group.
- Sec. 205. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN.
- Sec. 206. United States representation in standards-setting bodies.

- Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 and G20 countries.
- Sec. 208. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership.
- Sec. 209. Taiwan Fellowship Program.
- Sec. 210. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources devoted to the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 211. Diplomatic and economic efforts to deter PRC use of force against Taiwan.
- Sec. 212. Report on bilateral efforts to address Chinese fentanyl trafficking.
- Sec. 213. Facilitation of increased equity investments under the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018.
- Sec. 214. Expanding investment by United States International Development Finance Corporation for vaccine manufacturing.
- Sec. 215. Ensuring United States diplomatic posts align with American strategic national security and economic objectives.
- Sec. 216. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays Program.
- Sec. 217. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation.
- Sec. 218. Global Engagement Center.

Subtitle B—International Security Matters

- Sec. 221. Definitions.
- Sec. 222. Additional funding for international military education and training in the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 223. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in international waterways and airspace of the Indo-Pacific and on artificial land features in the South China Sea.
- Sec. 224. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and partners.

Subtitle C—Multilateral Strategies to Bolster American Power

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- Sec. 232. Statement of policy on America’s multilateral engagement.
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- Sec. 234. Report on American employment in international organizations.

Subtitle D—Regional Strategies To Bolster American Power

- Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners around the world.

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- Sec. 601. Ensuring national security and economic priorities with China and other countries account for environmental issues and climate change.
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Sec. 609. Building United States economic growth and technological innovation through the Green Climate Fund.

1 **SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.**

2 In this Act:

3 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
4 TEES.—Unless otherwise defined, the term “appro-
5 priate congressional committees” means—

6 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
7 the Senate; and

8 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
9 the House of Representatives.

10 (2) CCP.—The term “CCP” means the Chinese
11 Communist Party.

12 (3) PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY; PLA.—The
13 terms “People’s Liberation Army” and “PLA” mean
14 the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China.

15 (4) PRC; CHINA.—The terms “PRC” and
16 “China” mean the People’s Republic of China.

17 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

18 (a) OBJECTIVES.—It is the policy of the United
19 States to pursue the following objectives:

20 (1) The United States global leadership role is
21 sustained and its political system and major founda-
22 tions of national power are secured for the long-term

1 in the political, economic, technological, and military
2 domains.

3 (2) The United States position as an indispen-
4 sable power in the Indo-Pacific and globally is sus-
5 tained through diplomacy, multilateralism, and en-
6 gagement.

7 (3) The United States deters military con-
8 frontation with the PRC and both nations work to
9 reduce the risk of conflict.

10 (4) The United States and its allies maintain a
11 stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific with
12 China. The United States and its allies maintain un-
13 fettered access to the region, including through free-
14 dom of navigation and the free flow of commerce,
15 consistent with international law and practice.

16 (5) The allies and partners of the United
17 States—

18 (A) maintain confidence in United States
19 leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pa-
20 cific region;

21 (B) can withstand and combat subversion
22 by the PRC; and

23 (C) work closely with the United States in
24 setting global rules, norms, and standards that
25 benefit the international community.

1 (6) The combined weight of the United States
2 and its allies and partners is strong enough to dem-
3 onstrate to the PRC that the risks of attempts to
4 dominate other states outweigh the potential bene-
5 fits.

6 (7) The United States leads the free and open
7 international order, which comprises resilient states
8 and institutions that uphold and defend principles,
9 such as sovereignty, rule of law, individual freedom,
10 and human rights. The international order is
11 strengthened to withstand attempts at destabiliza-
12 tion by illiberal and authoritarian actors.

13 (8) The key rules, norms, and standards of
14 international engagement in the 21st century are
15 maintained, including—

16 (A) the protection of human rights, com-
17 mercial engagement and investment, and tech-
18 nology; and

19 (B) that such rules, norms, and standards
20 are in alignment with the values and interests
21 of the United States, its allies and partners,
22 and other stakeholders in the liberal inter-
23 national order.

24 (9) The United States counters attempts by the
25 PRC to—

1 (A) undermine open and democratic soci-
2 eties;

3 (B) distort global markets;

4 (C) manipulate the international trade sys-
5 tem;

6 (D) coerce other nations via economic and
7 military means; or

8 (E) use its technological advantages to un-
9 dermine individual freedoms or other states' na-
10 tional security interests.

11 (10) The United States deters military con-
12 frontation with the PRC and both nations work to
13 reduce the risk of conflict.

14 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States,
15 in pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)—

16 (1) to strengthen the United States domestic
17 foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic
18 growth, education, scientific and technological inno-
19 vation, democratic institutions, and other areas that
20 improve the ability of the United States to pursue
21 its vital economic, foreign policy, and national secu-
22 rity interests;

23 (2) to maximize the United States strengths in
24 the political, diplomatic, economic, development,
25 military, informational, and technological realms in

1 order to safeguard United States interests and the
2 values of United States allies and partners, and to
3 strengthen incentives for the PRC to collaborate in
4 addressing common global and regional challenges;

5 (3) to lead a free, open, and secure inter-
6 national system characterized by the rule of law,
7 open markets and the free flow of commerce, and a
8 shared commitment to security and peaceful resolu-
9 tion of disputes, human rights, good and transparent
10 governance, and freedom from coercion;

11 (4) to strengthen and deepen United States alli-
12 ances and partnerships by pursuing greater bilateral
13 and multilateral cooperative initiatives that advance
14 shared interests and values and bolster partner
15 countries' confidence that the United States is and
16 will remain a strong, committed, and reliable partner
17 that respects the views and interests of its allies and
18 friends;

19 (5) to encourage and collaborate with United
20 States allies and partners in boosting their own ca-
21 pabilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and pro-
22 tect shared interests and values, free from coercion
23 and external pressure;

1 (6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and
2 healthy, constructive competition in United States-
3 China economic relations by—

4 (A) advancing policies that harden the
5 United States economy against unfair and ille-
6 gal commercial or trading practices and the co-
7 ercion of United States businesses; and

8 (B) improving United States laws and reg-
9 ulations as necessary to prevent any PRC at-
10 tempts to harm United States economic com-
11 petitiveness;

12 (7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-
13 led growth in emerging markets around the world,
14 including through the use of United States Govern-
15 ment tools that—

16 (A) support greater private sector invest-
17 ment and advance capacity-building initiatives
18 that are grounded in the rule of law;

19 (B) promote open markets;

20 (C) establish clear policy and regulatory
21 frameworks;

22 (D) improve the management of key eco-
23 nomic sectors;

24 (E) combat corruption; and

1 (F) foster and support greater collabora-
2 tion with and among partner countries and the
3 United States private sector to develop secure
4 and sustainable infrastructure;

5 (8) to play a leading role in advancing inter-
6 national rules and norms that foster free and recip-
7 rocal trade and open and integrated markets;

8 (9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy
9 in support of United States companies and busi-
10 nesses in partner countries that seek fair competi-
11 tion;

12 (10) to ensure that the United States is second
13 to none in the innovation of critical and emerging
14 technologies, such as next-generation telecommuni-
15 cations, artificial intelligence, quantum computing,
16 semiconductors, and biotechnology, by—

17 (A) providing necessary investment and
18 concrete incentives for the private sector to ac-
19 celerate development of such technologies;

20 (B) modernizing export controls and in-
21 vestment screening regimes and associated poli-
22 cies and regulations;

23 (C) enhancing the role of the United
24 States in technical standards-setting bodies and

1 avenues for developing norms regarding the use
2 of emerging critical technologies;

3 (D) reducing United States barriers and
4 increasing incentives for collaboration with al-
5 lies and partners on the research and co-devel-
6 opment of critical technologies;

7 (E) collaborating with allies and partners
8 to protect critical technologies by—

9 (i) coordinating and aligning export
10 control measures;

11 (ii) building capacity for defense tech-
12 nology security;

13 (iii) safeguarding chokepoints in stra-
14 tegically critical supply chains; and

15 (iv) ensuring diversification; and

16 (F) designing major defense capabilities
17 for export to vetted allies and partners;

18 (11) to collaborate with like-minded democ-
19 racies and other willing partners to promote ideals
20 and principles that—

21 (A) advance a free and open international
22 order;

23 (B) strengthen democratic institutions;

24 (C) protect and promote human rights;

25 and

1 (D) uphold a free press and fact-based re-
2 porting;

3 (12) to develop comprehensive strategies and
4 policies to counter PRC disinformation campaigns;

5 (13) to demonstrate effective leadership at the
6 United Nations, its associated agencies, and other
7 multilateral organizations and ensure the integrity
8 and effectiveness of these organizations in facili-
9 tating solutions to global challenges;

10 (14) to advocate for the defense of fundamental
11 freedoms and human rights in the United States re-
12 lationship with the PRC;

13 (15) to cooperate with allies, partners, and mul-
14 tilateral organizations that sustain and strengthen a
15 free and open order and address regional and global
16 challenges posed by the Government of the PRC re-
17 garding—

18 (A) violations and abuses of human rights;

19 (B) restrictions on religious practices; and

20 (C) the undermining and abrogation of
21 treaties, other international agreements, and
22 other international norms related to human
23 rights;

24 (16) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, re-
25 pression, and coercion to attain unfair economic ad-

1 vantages or compel other nations to defer to its po-
2 litical and strategic objectives in ways that threaten
3 the United States or its allies and partners;

4 (17) to maintain United States access to the
5 Western Pacific, including through necessary invest-
6 ments in United States military capabilities, policies,
7 and concepts in the Indo-Pacific, as well as robust
8 cooperation, exercises, and interoperability with al-
9 lies and partners;

10 (18) to deter the PRC from—

11 (A) initiating armed conflict;

12 (B) coercing nations; or

13 (C) using malign grey-zone tactics to
14 achieve national goals;

15 (19) to attempt to strengthen United States-
16 PRC military-to-military communication and im-
17 prove both military and civilian crisis avoidance and
18 management procedures to de-conflict operations
19 and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict; and

20 (20) to strengthen stability and reduce sus-
21 picions, cooperate with the PRC when interests
22 align, including through bilateral or multilateral
23 means and at the United Nations, as appropriate,
24 and especially in the following areas—

25 (A) global fight against climate change;

- 1 (B) nuclear security; and
2 (C) global financial stability.

3 **SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

4 It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the
5 policy described in section 3(b) requires the following ac-
6 tions:

7 (1) Revitalizing American leadership globally
8 and in the Indo-Pacific will require the United
9 States—

10 (A) to marshal sustained political will to
11 protect its vital interests, promote its values,
12 and advance its economic and national security
13 objectives; and

14 (B) to achieve this sustained political will,
15 persuade the American people and United
16 States allies and partners of—

17 (i) the current challenges facing the
18 international rules based order; and

19 (ii) the need for long-term invest-
20 ments and engagement to defend shared
21 interests and values.

22 (2) The United States must coordinate closely
23 with allies and partners to compete effectively with
24 the PRC, including to encourage allies and partners

1 to assume, as appropriate, greater roles in balancing
2 and checking aggressive PRC behavior.

3 (3) Effective United States strategy toward
4 China requires—

5 (A) bipartisan cooperation within Con-
6 gress; and

7 (B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful
8 collaboration and consultation between the exec-
9 utive branch and Congress.

10 (4) The United States must ensure close inte-
11 gration among economic and foreign policymakers
12 and provide support to the private sector, civil soci-
13 ety, universities and academic institutions, and other
14 relevant actors in free and open societies to enable
15 such actors—

16 (A) to collaborate to advance common in-
17 terests; and

18 (B) to identify appropriate policies—

19 (i) to strengthen the United States
20 and its allies; and

21 (ii) to promote a compelling vision of
22 a free and open order.

23 (5) The United States must ensure that all
24 Federal departments, agencies, and overseas mis-

1 sions are organized and resourced to effectively de-
2 fend and advance United States interests, by—

3 (A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-
4 Pacific region, at posts around the world, and
5 in Washington, DC;

6 (B) placing greater numbers of foreign
7 service officers, international development pro-
8 fessionals, members of the foreign commercial
9 service, intelligence professionals, and other
10 United States Government personnel in the
11 Indo-Pacific region; and

12 (C) ensuring that this workforce has the
13 training, demonstrated proficiency in language
14 and culture, technical skills, and other com-
15 petencies required to advance a successful strat-
16 egy in relation to the PRC.

17 (6) The United States must place renewed pri-
18 ority and emphasis on strengthening the nonmilitary
19 instruments of national power, including diplomacy,
20 information, technology, economics, foreign assist-
21 ance and development finance, commerce, intel-
22 ligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial for
23 addressing the challenges posed by the PRC.

1 (7) The United States must sustain military ca-
2 pabilities necessary to achieve United States political
3 objectives in the Indo-Pacific, including—

4 (A) promoting regional security in the
5 Indo-Pacific;

6 (B) reassuring allies and partners while
7 protecting them from coercion; and

8 (C) deterring PRC aggression and pre-
9 venting unwanted conflict.

10 (8) Competition with the PRC requires skillful
11 adaptation to the information environment of the
12 21st century. United States public diplomacy and
13 messaging efforts must effectively—

14 (A) promote the value of partnership with
15 the United States; and

16 (B) counter CCP propaganda and
17 disinformation that threatens United States in-
18 terests.

19 **SEC. 5. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.**

20 (a) **APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON**
21 **ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES.**—Nothing
22 in this Act shall be construed to diminish, supplant, super-
23 sede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities of the
24 United States Government under section 620M of the

1 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or sec-
2 tion 362 of title 10, United States Code.

3 (b) NO AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY
4 FORCE.—Nothing in this Act may be construed as author-
5 izing the use of military force.

6 **TITLE I—INVESTING IN**
7 **AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS**
8 **Subtitle A—Science and**
9 **Technology**

10 **SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COM-**
11 **PANIES WITH GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN DIVER-**
12 **SIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.**

13 (a) AUTHORIZATION TO CONTRACT SERVICES.—The
14 Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
15 Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facili-
16 tate the contracting by the Department of State for the
17 professional services of qualified experts, on a reimburs-
18 able fee for service basis, to assist interested United States
19 persons and business entities with supply chain manage-
20 ment issues related to the PRC, including—

21 (1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating
22 certain production facilities to locations outside the
23 PRC;

1 (2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other ef-
2 forts to diversify supply chains to locations outside
3 of the PRC;

4 (3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other chal-
5 lenges in the course of the activities described in
6 paragraphs (1) and (2); and

7 (4) identifying alternative markets for produc-
8 tion or sourcing outside of the PRC, including
9 through providing market intelligence, facilitating
10 contact with reliable local partners as appropriate,
11 and other services.

12 (b) CHIEF OF MISSION OVERSIGHT.—The persons
13 hired to perform the services described in subsection (a)
14 shall—

15 (1) be under the authority of the United States
16 Chief of Mission in the country in which they are
17 hired, in accordance with existing United States
18 laws;

19 (2) coordinate with Department of State and
20 Department of Commerce officers; and

21 (3) coordinate with United States missions and
22 relevant local partners in other countries as needed
23 to carry out the services described in subsection (a).

24 (c) PRIORITIZATION OF MICRO-, SMALL-, AND ME-
25 DIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES.—The services described in

1 subsection (a) shall be prioritized for assisting micro-,
2 small-, and medium-sized enterprises with regard to the
3 matters described in subsection (a).

4 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
5 authorized to be appropriated \$15,000,000 for each of fis-
6 cal years 2022 through 2026 for the purposes of carrying
7 out this section.

8 (e) PROHIBITION ON ACCESS TO ASSISTANCE BY
9 FOREIGN ADVERSARIES.—None of the funds appropriated
10 pursuant to this section may be provided to an entity—

11 (1) under the foreign ownership, control, or in-
12 fluence of the Government of the People’s Republic
13 of China or the Chinese Communist Party, or other
14 foreign adversary;

15 (2) determined to have beneficial ownership
16 from foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction,
17 direction, or influence of foreign adversaries; and

18 (3) that has any contract in effect at the time
19 of the receipt of such funds, or has had a contract
20 within the previous one year that is no longer in ef-
21 fect, with—

22 (A) the Government of the People’s Repub-
23 lic of China;

24 (B) the Chinese Communist Party;

25 (C) the Chinese military;

1 (D) an entity majority-owned, majority-
2 controlled, or majority-financed by the Govern-
3 ment of the People’s Republic of China, the
4 CCP, or the Chinese military; or

5 (E) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of an
6 entity described in subparagraph (D).

7 (f) DEFINITIONS.—The terms “foreign ownership,
8 control, or influence” and “FOCI” have the meanings
9 given to those terms in the National Industrial Security
10 Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22–M), or a suc-
11 cessor document.

12 **Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure**
13 **and Energy Development**

14 **SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-**
15 **FINED.**

16 In this subtitle, the term “appropriate committees of
17 Congress” means—

18 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
19 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

20 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
21 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
22 resentatives.

1 **SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUAL-**
2 **ITY INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT STAND-**
3 **ARDS.**

4 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
5 gress that the United States should initiate collaboration
6 among governments, the private sector, and civil society
7 to encourage the adoption of the standards for quality
8 global infrastructure development advanced by the G20 at
9 Osaka in 2018, including with respect to the following
10 issues:

11 (1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in
12 which infrastructure investments are made.

13 (2) Anti-corruption.

14 (3) Rule of law.

15 (4) Human rights and labor rights.

16 (5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.

17 (6) Social and governance safeguards.

18 (7) Transparency.

19 (8) Environmental and energy standards.

20 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
21 gress that the United States should launch a series of fora
22 around the world showcasing the commitment of the
23 United States and partners of the United States to high-
24 quality development cooperation, including with respect to
25 the issues described in subsection (a).

1 **SEC. 113. SUPPORTING ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE FROM**
2 **CHINA.**

3 (a) FINDINGS.—It is in the national interest of the
4 United States to establish a coordinated interagency strat-
5 egy to marshal the resources of the United States Govern-
6 ment to provide foreign countries with financing that
7 strengthens independent economic capacity and therefore
8 reduce a foreign government’s need to enter into agree-
9 ments with China, including support from its Belt and
10 Road Initiative.

11 (b) STRATEGY.—

12 (1) AUTHORITY.—Within 180 days of enact-
13 ment of this Act, the President should develop and
14 submit a strategy to the relevant congressional com-
15 mittees to utilize the resources of Federal agencies
16 to counteract offers of assistance and financing from
17 China to foreign governments that are of strategic
18 importance to the United States.

19 (2) COMPONENTS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy
20 should—

21 (A) identify primary sectors where the
22 United States could provide a competitive ad-
23 vantage to increase a country’s economic inde-
24 pendence;

25 (B) select countries with corresponding
26 economic needs, with priority given to those

1 who are vulnerable to Chinese economic influ-
2 ence;

3 (C) identify any corresponding existing fi-
4 nancing available from United States Govern-
5 ment entities to prioritize and devise specific fi-
6 nancing tailored to the needs of such foreign
7 governments if none are currently available;

8 (D) identify any cooperative and com-
9 plementary assistance and financing from
10 friendly foreign governments, including coordi-
11 nated assistance and co-financing;

12 (E) create a streamlined decision-making
13 process, directed by the National Security
14 Council, to devise financing and make agency
15 decisions and commitments on a timely basis to
16 support United States competitive offers;

17 (F) establish a formal G7+European Com-
18 mission Working Group to develop a com-
19 prehensive strategy to develop alternatives to
20 the People's Republic of China's Belt and Road
21 Initiative for development finance; and

22 (G) integrate existing efforts into the
23 strategy, including efforts to address the Gov-
24 ernment of the People's Republic of China's use
25 of the United Nations to advance the Belt and

1 Road Initiative, including the proliferation of
2 memoranda of understanding between the Peo-
3 ple’s Republic of China and United Nations
4 funds and programs regarding the implementa-
5 tion of the Belt and Road Initiative.

6 (3) PARTICIPATING AGENCIES.—Participating
7 Federal agencies should include the Department of
8 State, Department of the Treasury, USAID, DFC,
9 MCC, USTDA, Department of Commerce, and other
10 Federal departments and agencies as appropriate.

11 (4) EXECUTION OF STRATEGY.—The President
12 should issue an Executive order to implement the
13 strategy and make such changes in agency regula-
14 tions and procedures as are necessary to put the
15 strategy into effect.

16 (5) RELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
17 TEES.—For the purposes of this subsection, the
18 phrase “relevant congressional committees” shall
19 mean the House and Senate Committees on Appro-
20 priations, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
21 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the
22 House Committee on Financial Services, and the
23 Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
24 Affairs.

1 (c) **AUTHORITY.**—The Secretary of State in coordina-
2 tion with the USAID Administrator is authorized to estab-
3 lish or continue an initiative, to be known as the “Infra-
4 structure Transaction and Assistance Network”, under
5 which the Secretary of State, in consultation with other
6 relevant Federal agencies, including those represented on
7 the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may
8 carry out various programs to advance the development
9 of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastruc-
10 ture worldwide in the Indo-Pacific region by—

11 (1) strengthening capacity-building programs to
12 improve project evaluation processes, regulatory and
13 procurement environments, and project preparation
14 capacity of countries that are partners of the United
15 States in such development;

16 (2) providing transaction advisory services and
17 project preparation assistance to support sustainable
18 infrastructure; and

19 (3) coordinating the provision of United States
20 assistance for the development of infrastructure, in-
21 cluding infrastructure that utilizes United States
22 manufactured goods and services, and catalyzing in-
23 vestment led by the private sector.

24 (d) **TRANSACTION ADVISORY FUND.**—As part of the
25 “Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network” de-

1 scribed under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is au-
2 thorized to provide support, including through the Trans-
3 action Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost
4 the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and
5 assess the financial and environmental impacts of poten-
6 tial infrastructure projects, including through providing
7 services such as—

- 8 (1) legal services;
- 9 (2) project preparation and feasibility studies;
- 10 (3) debt sustainability analyses;
- 11 (4) bid or proposal evaluation; and
- 12 (5) other services relevant to advancing the de-
13 velopment of sustainable, transparent, and high-
14 quality infrastructure.

15 (e) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE FUND.—

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—As part of the “Infrastruc-
17 ture Transaction and Assistance Network” described
18 under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is au-
19 thorized to provide support, including through the
20 Strategic Infrastructure Fund, for technical assist-
21 ance, project preparation, pipeline development, and
22 other infrastructure project support.

23 (2) JOINT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.—
24 Funds authorized for the Strategic Infrastructure
25 Fund should be used in coordination with the De-

1 partment of Defense, the International Development
2 Finance Corporation, like-minded donor partners,
3 and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to support
4 joint infrastructure projects.

5 (3) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.—
6 Funds authorized for the Strategic Infrastructure
7 Fund should be used to support strategic infrastruc-
8 ture projects that are in the national security inter-
9 est of the United States and vulnerable to strategic
10 competitors.

11 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
12 authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years
13 2022 to 2026, \$75,000,000 to the Infrastructure Trans-
14 action and Assistance Network, of which \$20,000,000
15 should be provided for the Transaction Advisory Fund.

16 **SEC. 114. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE EN-**
17 **ERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.**

18 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct a com-
19 prehensive, multi-year, whole of government effort, in con-
20 sultation with the private sector, to counter predatory
21 lending and financing by the Government of the People’s
22 Republic of China, including support to companies incor-
23 porated in the PRC that engage in such activities, in the
24 energy sectors of developing countries.

1 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States
2 to—

3 (1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted
4 energy needs and capacities of developing countries,
5 and analyze the presence and involvement of PRC
6 state-owned industries and other companies incor-
7 porated in the PRC, Chinese nationals providing
8 labor, and financing of energy projects, including di-
9 rect financing by the PRC government, PRC finan-
10 cial institutions, or direct state support to state-
11 owned enterprises and other companies incorporated
12 in the PRC;

13 (2) pursue strategic support and investment op-
14 portunities, and diplomatic engagement on power
15 sector reforms, to expand the development and de-
16 ployment of advanced energy technologies in devel-
17 oping countries;

18 (3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants,
19 and other financial products on terms that advance
20 domestic economic and local employment opportuni-
21 ties, utilize advanced energy technologies, encourage
22 private sector growth, and, when appropriate United
23 States equity and sovereign lending products as al-
24 ternatives to the predatory lending tools offered by
25 Chinese financial institutions;

1 (4) pursue partnerships with likeminded inter-
2 national financial and multilateral institutions to le-
3 verage investment in advanced energy technologies
4 in developing countries; and

5 (5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the
6 cooperative development of advanced energy tech-
7 nologies with countries of strategic significance, par-
8 ticularly in the Indo-Pacific region, to address the
9 effects of energy engagement by the PRC through
10 predatory lending or other actions that negatively
11 impact other countries.

12 (c) **ADVANCED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES EXPORTS.**—
13 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
14 of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Sec-
15 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of En-
16 ergy, shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
17 mittees a United States Government strategy to increase
18 United States exports of advanced energy technologies
19 to—

20 (1) improve energy security in allied and devel-
21 oping countries;

22 (2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and
23 transparent energy markets;

24 (3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy
25 trading relationships; and

1 (4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.

2 **SEC. 115. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S**
3 **INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN ENERGY DEVEL-**
4 **OPMENT.**

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 180 days after the
6 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
7 for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the ap-
8 propriate congressional committees a report that—

9 (1) identifies priority countries for deepening
10 United States engagement on energy matters, in ac-
11 cordance with the economic and national security in-
12 terests of the United States and where deeper en-
13 ergy partnerships are most achievable;

14 (2) describes the involvement of the PRC gov-
15 ernment and companies incorporated in the PRC in
16 the development, operation, financing, or ownership
17 of energy generation facilities, transmission infra-
18 structure, or energy resources in the countries iden-
19 tified in paragraph (1);

20 (3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and
21 implications for United States national interests and
22 the interests of the countries identified in paragraph
23 (1), with respect to the PRC's involvement and in-
24 fluence in developing country energy production or
25 transmission; and

1 (4) outlines current and planned efforts by the
2 United States to partner with the countries identi-
3 fied in paragraph (1) on energy matters that sup-
4 port shared interests between the United States and
5 such countries.

6 (b) PUBLICATION.—The assessment required in sub-
7 section (a) shall be published on the Department of State’s
8 website.

9 **SEC. 116. ENSURING THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**
10 **FINANCE CORPORATION IS POSITIONED TO**
11 **ACHIEVE NATIONAL SECURITY, ECONOMIC,**
12 **AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES.**

13 (a) IN GENERAL.—

14 (1) When establishing the U.S. International
15 Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Congress
16 sought to facilitate the participation of private sector
17 capital and skills in the economic development of
18 countries with low- or lower-middle-income econo-
19 mies and countries transitioning from nonmarket to
20 market economies in order to complement United
21 States assistance and foreign policy objectives.

22 (2) The priority for such support has been and
23 remains intended for less developed countries with a
24 low-income economy or a lower-middle-income econ-
25 omy; however, using income as a discriminator for

1 which countries merit investment will not often cap-
2 ture other important factors, such as the wealth dis-
3 parity within a country, vulnerability to external
4 shocks including from natural disasters, and United
5 States foreign policy and national security concerns.
6 For this reason, Congress has currently authorized
7 DFC investment in less developed countries with an
8 upper-middle-income economy where the President
9 certifies to the appropriate congressional committees
10 that such support furthers the national economic or
11 foreign policy interests of the United States and
12 such support is designed to produce significant de-
13 velopmental outcomes or provide developmental ben-
14 efits to the poorest population of that country.

15 (3) It is the intent of Congress that this flexi-
16 bility in DFC directed assistance be made available
17 to all countries, including those with so-called high-
18 income economies such as the Bahamas, Barbados,
19 Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, and other allies and
20 partners exceeding the Gross National Income per
21 Capita definition threshold for high-income country.
22 Otherwise, previously eligible partner countries find
23 themselves now ineligible.

24 (4) The United States already provides a simi-
25 lar national security interest exception for high in-

1 come countries under the European Energy Security
2 and Diversification Act of 2019, which gives the
3 DFC the authority to work in Europe and Eurasia
4 on energy and energy related investments regardless
5 of the income status of the countries.

6 (5) While continuing to prioritize DFC invest-
7 ment in low and lower-middle income countries, it is
8 the sense of Congress that the DFC should support
9 investments in certain projects in both upper-middle
10 income and high-income countries that address key
11 national security and economic interests. The DFC
12 is authorized to and should support projects in any
13 country regardless of income status when not doing
14 so would damage the United States interest or those
15 of its allies and partners vis-à-vis its global strategic
16 competitors.

17 (b) AMENDMENT.—To address the objectives in para-
18 graph (1) above, section 1412 of Public Law 115–254 per-
19 taining to the United States International Development
20 Finance Corporation is amended, replacing the text under
21 section 1412(c) with the following: by striking subsection
22 (c) and inserting the following:

23 “(c) SUPPORT IN UPPER-MIDDLE-INCOME AND
24 HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES/THE LESS DEVELOPED COUN-
25 TRY FOCUS.—

1 “(1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation shall
2 prioritize the provision of support under title II in
3 less developed countries with a low-income economy
4 or a lower-middle-income economy.

5 “(2) SUPPORT IN UPPER-MIDDLE-INCOME AND
6 HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES.—The Corporation shall
7 restrict the provision of support under title II in
8 countries with an upper-middle-income or high-in-
9 come economy unless—

10 “(A) the President certifies to the appro-
11 priate congressional committees that such sup-
12 port furthers the national economic, foreign pol-
13 icy, or development interests of the United
14 States; and

15 “(B) such support is designed to produce
16 significant developmental outcomes or provide
17 developmental benefits to the poorest,
18 marginalized, or equity-disadvantaged popu-
19 lation groups of that country.”.

20 **Subtitle C—Economic Diplomacy**
21 **and Leadership**

22 **SEC. 121. FINDINGS ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER.**

23 Congress makes the following findings:

24 (1) The United States played a leadership role
25 in constructing the architecture, rules, and norms

1 governing the international economic order following
2 the Second World War, yielding decades of domestic
3 economic and geopolitical prosperity and stability.

4 (2) In 2017, the United States withdrew from
5 the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an economic
6 pact that was negotiated by 12 countries that covered
7 40 percent of the world economy, leading the
8 11 remaining Asia-Pacific countries to sign the
9 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
10 Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) the following
11 year, setting high-standard rules for regional economic
12 engagement.

13 (3) In 2020, the 10 countries of the Association
14 of Southeast Asian Nations along with South Korea,
15 China, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand signed
16 the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
17 (RCEP), the world's biggest trade deal in terms of
18 GDP.

19 (4) Reduced United States economic engagement
20 has led United States allies and partners to
21 question the United States commitment to the Indo-
22 Pacific region. Despite its distortive and unfair trade
23 practices, the People's Republic of China is taking
24 advantage of this vacuum by deepening its partner-

1 ships in the region and promoting its own state-led
2 economic model.

3 (5) The United States is increasingly on the
4 outside looking in with regards to economic pacts in
5 the Indo-Pacific. United States absence from these
6 agreements puts it at both a strategic and competi-
7 tive disadvantage in the region and allows competi-
8 tors to expand their economic influence at the
9 United States expense.

10 (6) Given that these partnerships and agree-
11 ments will define the rules and norms that will gov-
12 ern regional commerce over the coming decades, the
13 United States is currently not well positioned to
14 shape the coming economic landscape.

15 (7) It is in the United States vital interest to
16 upgrade its economic engagement and leadership in
17 the Indo-Pacific and develop concrete steps to
18 strengthen its commercial diplomacy to fully par-
19 ticipate in the region's economic dynamism.

20 **SEC. 122. REVIEW OF PRC TRADE AND ECONOMIC ENGAGE-**
21 **MENT GLOBALLY.**

22 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
23 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
24 coordination with the Office of the U.S. Trade Represent-
25 ative and the Department of Commerce, shall submit a

1 report to the appropriate congressional committees that
2 describes the PRC's global trade and investment diplo-
3 macy and engagement over the past decade, including any
4 bilateral or plurilateral trade and investment agreements
5 it has signed, and their impact on the United States econ-
6 omy, American companies and workers, as well as on the
7 countries that have entered into agreements with the PRC
8 and the global economy as a whole.

9 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall
10 include the following:

11 (1) A Survey and Comparison of China's inter-
12 national economic practices, which will—

13 (A) provide an overview of the PRC's dis-
14 tortive trade policies;

15 (B) list the PRC's trade and investment
16 agreements globally, both agreements it has
17 signed or entered into and any ongoing negotia-
18 tions it has with individual countries or groups
19 of countries;

20 (C) detail the other mechanisms the PRC
21 uses to advance its international economic ob-
22 jectives, including economic and commercial
23 dialogues and BRI related activities;

24 (D) compare the United States and Chi-
25 nese approaches and priorities on trade and in-

1 investment with major global economies, United
2 States allies, and for each region of the world;
3 and

4 (E) outline what further steps China may
5 take in the Indo-Pacific region to bolster its
6 economic position and influence.

7 (2) An evaluation of the impacts of China's
8 trade and investment policies, including—

9 (A) the impact of these trade and invest-
10 ment agreements on China's economy, with a
11 focus on its trade and investment profile, the
12 impact on China's economic growth and per-
13 capita income; and the impact on the profit-
14 ability and market share of Chinese companies
15 and SOEs;

16 (B) the impact of these agreements on
17 China's political and diplomatic relations with
18 the countries it entered into agreements with
19 and by region; and

20 (C) the impact of China's trade and invest-
21 ment relationships with other countries on the
22 market share of United States companies.

1 **SEC. 123. REPORT ON ENTRENCHING AMERICAN ECO-**
2 **NOMIC DIPLOMACY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.**

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that United States national interests and the pri-
5 macy of United States power in the Indo-Pacific are inti-
6 mately tied to the following economic objectives:

7 (1) Deepening United States trade and invest-
8 ment relationships in the region, especially with key
9 allies and partners.

10 (2) Confirming American leadership and par-
11 ticipation in global regional economic organizations
12 and fora, including APEC and the WTO.

13 (3) Leveraging bilateral and plurilateral sec-
14 toral agreements on trade and investment, as well as
15 negotiations at the WTO to reassert United States
16 economic leadership by writing the rules of the road
17 on critical economic questions.

18 (4) Building secure and resilient supply chains
19 for industries critical for United States national in-
20 terest, including semiconductors and vaccines and
21 PPE.

22 (5) Showcasing the benefits and appeal of a
23 market-based economic model.

24 (b) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the
25 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
26 in coordination with the Office of the U.S. Trade Rep-

1 representative and the Department of Commerce, shall sub-
2 mit a report to the appropriate congressional committees
3 that presents the steps the United States is taking and
4 plans to take to achieve the objectives outlined in sub-
5 section (a) above and includes specific action plans for the
6 following:

7 (1) Enhancing American trade and investment
8 relationships in the region bilaterally and
9 plurilaterally, especially with American allies and
10 ASEAN.

11 (2) Reenergizing APEC as a critical component
12 of the region's economic architecture.

13 (3) Work to ensure that the United States ab-
14 sence from CPTPP and RCEP do not undermine
15 the United States ability to shape regional trade and
16 investment rules.

17 (4) Working with allies and partners to build
18 resilient and trusted supply chains especially for
19 critical and emerging technologies, including semi-
20 conductors, and products and components critical
21 for national health, including vaccines and related
22 materials, and PPE.

23 (5) Driving the formation and adoption of high-
24 standards and rules for the region in the following
25 areas:

1 (A) Advanced technologies and the digital
2 sphere.

3 (B) Labor practices and environmental
4 standards.

5 (C) Intellectual property rights.

6 (6) Developing roadmaps for how to counter the
7 PRC's unfair trade and economic practices, with a
8 specific focus on—

9 (A) subsidies and unfair competition by
10 state-owned enterprises; and

11 (B) corruption and politicized infrastruc-
12 ture.

13 (c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
14 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
15 tees of Congress” means—

16 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
17 the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
18 fairs; and

19 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
20 Committee on Energy and Commerce.

21 **SEC. 124. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED TO BOLSTER**
22 **AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN APEC.**

23 It is the sense of Congress that—

24 (1) the United States has benefitted from the
25 regional economic integration agenda of the Asia Pa-

1 cific Economic Cooperation forum since its inception
2 in 1989;

3 (2) APEC is a hub of trade and commerce for
4 21 member economies that, as of 2018, accounted
5 for 60 percent of global GDP and 48 percent of
6 global trade;

7 (3) APEC has contributed to the reduction in
8 trade barriers, harmonization of regulations, and en-
9 hanced access to global value chains, while raising
10 the profile of critical topics such as fair trade, sus-
11 tainability, gender parity, and inclusive growth;

12 (4) it is in the United States interest to engage
13 and lead at APEC to push for an open and inclusive
14 regional economy that benefits United States work-
15 ers, consumers, and businesses and better integrates
16 the United States economy with others in the region;

17 (5) when the United States last hosted APEC
18 in 2011, it was able to promote United States inter-
19 ests, while reassuring allies and partners about its
20 strong commitment to the region in the economic
21 arena;

22 (6) today, APEC can again be used as a forum
23 to make progress on several United States priorities,
24 that are shared by United States allies and partners,
25 including—

1 (A) making regional commerce more inclu-
2 sive;

3 (B) fostering innovation and digitization;
4 and

5 (C) addressing climate change and environ-
6 mental protection;

7 (7) hosting APEC would provide a tremendous
8 opportunity to leverage American leadership to
9 shape the regional economic agenda;

10 (8) hosting APEC would allow the United
11 States to advance several of its own priorities in the
12 region, including to—

13 (A) expand the participation of APEC
14 stakeholders to include labor groups, environ-
15 mental advocates, and other part of civil soci-
16 ety;

17 (B) upgrade APEC’s work to empower and
18 promote small and medium enterprises;

19 (C) spotlight best practices and plans to
20 upgrade skills for the next-generation of tech-
21 nology jobs;

22 (D) advance a climate and sustainable
23 trade and development agenda with a focus on
24 green technologies, infrastructure and finance;
25 and

1 (E) advance work on digital trade, includ-
2 ing by expanding rules on data privacy, pro-
3 moting digital inclusiveness and promoting the
4 free flow of data; and

5 (9) with no host confirmed for 2023, the United
6 States should immediately announce its interest to
7 host APEC in 2023 and work with the APEC Secre-
8 tariat and like-minded APEC members to build sup-
9 port.

10 **SEC. 125. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY**

11 **ISSUES.**

12 (a) LEADERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
13 SETTING.—It is the sense of Congress that the United
14 States must lead in international bodies that set the gov-
15 ernance norms and rules for critical digitally enabled tech-
16 nologies in order to ensure that these technologies operate
17 within a free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital do-
18 main.

19 (b) COUNTERING DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM.—It
20 is the sense of Congress that the United States, along with
21 allies and partners, should lead an international effort
22 that utilizes all of the economic and diplomatic tools at
23 its disposal to combat the expanding use of information
24 and communications technology products and services to

1 surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (also known
2 as “digital authoritarianism”).

3 (c) **FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE DIGITAL**
4 **AGE.**—It is the sense of Congress that the United States
5 should lead a global effort to ensure that freedom of infor-
6 mation, including the ability to safely consume or publish
7 information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained
8 as the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral
9 mechanism for communication.

10 (d) **EFFORTS TO ENSURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVEL-**
11 **OPMENT DOES NOT THREATEN DEMOCRATIC GOVERN-**
12 **ANCE OR HUMAN RIGHTS.**—It is the sense of Congress
13 that the United States should lead a global effort to de-
14 velop and adopt a set of common principles and standards
15 for critical technologies to ensure that the use of such
16 technologies cannot be abused by malign actors, whether
17 they are governments or other entities, and that they do
18 not threaten democratic governance or human rights.

19 **SEC. 126. DIGITAL TRADE AGREEMENTS.**

20 It is the sense of Congress that—

21 (1) as the COVID–19 pandemic accelerated our
22 dependence on digital tools, international rules
23 around digital governance and trade have remained
24 largely piecemeal;

1 (2) the People’s Republic of China is operating
2 under and advancing a set of digital rules that are
3 contrary to United States values and interests, and
4 those of United States allies and partners;

5 (3) a patchwork of plurilateral, trilateral, and
6 bilateral digital trade agreements, including the
7 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
8 Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Singapore-
9 Australia Digital Trade Agreement, and the Singa-
10 pore-New Zealand-Chile Digital Economy Partner-
11 ship Agreement have emerged, creating a set of
12 rules that the United States should be driving;

13 (4) the United States has already underscored
14 the need for such agreements by signing the U.S.-
15 Japan Digital Trade Agreement in October 2019
16 and including a robust digital trade or e-commerce
17 chapter in the USMCA;

18 (5) a regional deal on digital governance and
19 trade would allow the United States to unite a group
20 of like-minded economies around common standards
21 and norms, including the principles of openness, in-
22 clusiveness, fairness, transparency, and the free flow
23 of data with trust, that are increasingly vital for the
24 global economy;

1 (6) such an agreement would facilitate the cre-
2 ation of common rules and standards that govern
3 cross-border data flows, the protection of privacy,
4 and cybersecurity at a time of growing digital
5 vulnerabilities for individuals, businesses, and insti-
6 tutions around the world;

7 (7) such an agreement would facilitate the par-
8 ticipation of SMEs in the global economy through
9 trade facilitation measures, including e-marketing, e-
10 invoicing and e-payment; and

11 (8) the United States Trade Representative, in
12 consultation with the Coordinator for Cyber Diplo-
13 macy at the Department of State should negotiate
14 bilateral and plurilateral agreements or arrange-
15 ments relating to digital trade with the like-minded
16 countries in the Indo-Pacific region, the European
17 Union, the member countries of the Five Eyes intel-
18 ligence-sharing alliance, and other partners and al-
19 lies, as appropriate.

20 **SEC. 127. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY**
21 **PARTNERSHIP.**

22 (a) **DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY**
23 **PARTNERSHIP.**—The President is authorized to establish
24 a program, to be known as the “Digital Connectivity and
25 Cybersecurity Partnership” to help foreign countries—

1 (1) expand and increase secure Internet access
2 and digital infrastructure in emerging markets;

3 (2) adopt policies and regulatory positions that
4 foster and encourage open, interoperable, reliable,
5 and secure internet, the free flow of data, multi-
6 stakeholder models of internet governance, and pro-
7 competitive and secure information and communica-
8 tions technology (ICT) policies and regulations;

9 (3) promote exports of United States ICT
10 goods and services and increase United States com-
11 pany market share in target markets;

12 (4) promote the diversification of ICT goods
13 and supply chain services to be less reliant on PRC
14 imports; and

15 (5) build cybersecurity capacity, expand inter-
16 operability, and promote best practices for a national
17 approach to cybersecurity.

18 (b) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 180
19 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
20 retary of State and the Administrator of the United States
21 Agency for International Development shall jointly submit
22 to the appropriate committees of Congress an implementa-
23 tion plan for the coming three years to advance the goals
24 identified in subsection (a).

1 (c) CONSULTATION.—In developing the action plan
2 required by subsection (b), the Secretary of State and
3 USAID Administrator shall consult with—

- 4 (1) the appropriate congressional committees;
- 5 (2) leaders of the United States industry;
- 6 (3) other relevant technology experts, including
7 the Open Technology Fund;
- 8 (4) representatives from relevant United States
9 Government agencies; and
- 10 (5) representatives from like-minded allies and
11 partners.

12 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
13 authorized to be appropriated such sums as necessary for
14 each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this
15 section.

16 **Subtitle D—Financial Diplomacy** 17 **and Leadership**

18 **SEC. 131. FINDINGS ON CHINESE FINANCIAL INDUSTRIAL** 19 **POLICY.**

20 Congress makes the following findings:

- 21 (1) The People’s Republic of China operates a
22 system of state-owned financial institutions including
23 retail banks, investment banks, asset managers, and
24 insurers which are given favorable treatment under
25 Chinese law while foreign financial institutions have

1 strict restrictions on their ability to operate in
2 China.

3 (2) On October 24, 2020, Chinese billionaire
4 Jack Ma referred to “pawnshop mentality” of state-
5 owned banks. Shortly thereafter, the initial public
6 offering of his firm Ant Financial was canceled by
7 Chinese regulators.

8 (3) In order to join the World Trade Organiza-
9 tion (WTO) in 2001, the Chinese Government com-
10 mitted to opening the credit card payment business
11 to foreign firms by 2006.

12 (4) After years of China refusing to open its
13 payment market, the United States brought a case
14 against China before the WTO. In 2012, the WTO
15 mandated China to open its card payment market to
16 global competitors.

17 (5) Even after the WTO’s ruling, the PRC Gov-
18 ernment refused to comply with the ruling and
19 maintained a rule that required all yuan-denomi-
20 nated payment cards to utilize China’s Union Pay
21 network. Only in 2020, after the Chinese payment
22 market had grown to \$27 trillion, did the PRC Gov-
23 ernment approve the application of foreign firms to
24 enter the market.

1 (6) The PRC continues to maintain aggressive
2 capital controls, limiting access to the Chinese mar-
3 ket to foreign investors while hamstringing its own
4 citizens ability to control their money.

5 (7) On November 5, 2018, Chinese President
6 Xi Jinping announced that China would launch a
7 technology innovation stock exchange. The Shanghai
8 Stock Exchange STAR Market launched on July 22,
9 2019.

10 (8) The PRC Government is pioneering the use
11 a fully digitized yuan, which is set to be the world's
12 first central bank backed digital currency, and the
13 People's Bank of China and the Hong Kong Mone-
14 tary Authority have already begun testing the cross-
15 border functionality of the digital currency.

16 **SEC. 132. REPORT ON IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN FINAN-**
17 **CIAL STRENGTH FOR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP.**

18 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
19 gress that—

20 (1) the dominance of the dollar as the global re-
21 serve currency has yielded significant benefits to the
22 United States and the American people by allowing
23 the United States to maintain economic independ-
24 ence, better control its monetary policy, and finance
25 government outlays;

1 (2) American global leadership has benefited
2 from the United States monetary stability, credit-
3 worthiness, deep capital markets, and financial tech-
4 nology innovations;

5 (3) effective diplomacy and safeguarding of
6 American national security rely on the United States
7 role as the global financial leader, hub of global
8 trade, and source of economic opportunity;

9 (4) by cracking down on dissent in the key fi-
10 nancial center of Hong Kong, driving the creation of
11 a technology focused stock exchange, and pushing
12 forward a Central Bank digital currency, the Peo-
13 ple’s Republic of China is attempting to become the
14 leading hub of finance in the world; and

15 (5) the United States must maintain its posi-
16 tion as a global financial leader to continue its
17 broader global leadership role around the world.

18 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
19 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
20 coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall sub-
21 mit a report to the appropriate congressional committees
22 that—

23 (1) lists and examines the benefits to American
24 foreign policy that derive from the United States fi-

1 nancial leadership and the dollar’s status as the
2 world’s global reserve currency;

3 (2) describes the actions taken by the People’s
4 Republic of China that could cement China’s role as
5 the world’s leading financial center;

6 (3) analyzes the possible impact on American
7 national security and foreign policy were the yuan to
8 supplant the dollar as the world’s leading reserve
9 currency;

10 (4) outlines how the United States can work
11 diplomatically with allies, partners, and other na-
12 tions to preserve a financial system that is free,
13 open, and fair; and

14 (5) identifies steps the United States can take
15 to preserve its status as the world’s leading financial
16 center and maintain the dollar’s position as the glob-
17 al reserve currency.

18 (c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
19 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
20 tees of Congress” means—

21 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
22 House of Representatives;

23 (2) the Committee on Financial Services of the
24 House of Representatives;

1 (3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
2 Senate; and

3 (4) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
4 Urban Affairs of the Senate.

5 **SEC. 133. REVIEW OF CHINESE COMPANIES ON UNITED**
6 **STATES CAPITAL MARKETS.**

7 (a) REPORT.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
9 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
10 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
11 the Treasury, shall submit a report to the appro-
12 priate congressional committees that describes the
13 costs and benefits to the United States posed by the
14 presence of companies incorporated in the PRC that
15 are listed on American stock exchanges or traded
16 over the counter in the form of American depository
17 receipts.

18 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report
19 shall—

20 (A) identify companies incorporated in the
21 PRC that—

22 (i) are listed or traded on one or sev-
23 eral stock exchanges within the United
24 States, including over-the-counter market
25 and “A Shares” added to indexes and ex-

1 change-traded funds out of mainland ex-
2 changes in the PRC; and

3 (ii) based on the factors for consider-
4 ation described in paragraph (3), have
5 knowingly and materially contributed to—

6 (I) activities that undermine
7 United States national security;

8 (II) serious abuses of internation-
9 ally recognized human rights; or

10 (III) a substantially increased fi-
11 nancial risk exposure for United
12 States-based investors;

13 (B) describe the activities of the companies
14 identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and
15 their implications for the United States; and

16 (C) develop policy recommendations for the
17 United States Government, State governments,
18 United States financial institutions, United
19 States equity and debt exchanges, and other
20 relevant stakeholders to address the risks posed
21 by the presence in United States capital mar-
22 kets of the companies identified pursuant to
23 subparagraph (A).

24 (3) FACTORS FOR INCLUSION OF A COMPANY.—

25 In completing the report under paragraph (1), the

1 President shall consider whether a company identi-
2 fied pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)—

3 (A) has materially contributed to the devel-
4 opment or manufacture, or sold or facilitated
5 procurement by the PLA, of lethal military
6 equipment or component parts of such equip-
7 ment;

8 (B) has contributed to the construction
9 and militarization of features in the South
10 China Sea;

11 (C) has been sanctioned by the United
12 States or has been determined to have con-
13 ducted business with sanctioned entities;

14 (D) has engaged in an act or a series of
15 acts of intellectual property theft;

16 (E) has engaged in corporate or economic
17 espionage;

18 (F) has contributed to the proliferation of
19 nuclear or missile technology in violation of
20 United Nations Security Council resolutions or
21 United States sanctions;

22 (G) has contributed to the repression of re-
23 ligious and ethnic minorities within the PRC,
24 including in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re-
25 gion or Tibet Autonomous Region;

1 (H) has contributed to the development of
2 technologies that enable censorship directed or
3 directly supported by the Government of the
4 PRC; and

5 (I) has contributed to other activities or
6 behavior determined to be relevant by the Presi-
7 dent.

8 (4) FACTORS FOR MAKING POLICY REC-
9 OMMENDATIONS.—In completing the report under
10 paragraph (1), the President shall weigh the na-
11 tional security implications considering the following
12 factors identified pursuant to paragraph (3)—

13 (A) the possibility that banning or
14 delisting companies from our markets could
15 lead to an outflow of companies to list in the
16 PRC;

17 (B) the possibility that banning or
18 delisting companies from our markets could im-
19 pact United States leadership in the asset man-
20 agement industry, particularly vis-à-vis the
21 PRC;

22 (C) the possibility that banning or delisting
23 companies from our markets could impact the
24 impact the United States status as the world's

1 leading capital markets center, particularly vis-
2 à-vis the PRC; and

3 (D) the impact on American foreign policy
4 and national security if United States leader-
5 ship in capital markets was weakened vis-à-vis
6 the PRC.

7 (b) REPORT FORM.—The report required under sub-
8 section (b)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form.

9 (c) PUBLICATION.—The unclassified portion of the
10 report under subsection (b)(1) shall be made accessible to
11 the public online through relevant United States Govern-
12 ment websites.

13 **SEC. 134. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC IMPLI-**
14 **CATIONS OF CHANGES TO CROSS-BORDER**
15 **PAYMENT AND FINANCIAL MESSAGING SYS-**
16 **TEMS.**

17 (a) REPORT.—

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
19 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
20 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
21 the Treasury, shall submit a report to the appro-
22 priate congressional committees on the diplomatic
23 and economic implications of cross-border payment
24 systems.

1 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report
2 shall—

3 (A) assess the extent to which American
4 diplomacy and global leadership hinge upon the
5 current infrastructure and existing ecosystem of
6 cross-border payment and financial messaging
7 systems;

8 (B) examine the durability of the Society
9 for Worldwide Interbank Financial Tele-
10 communication cooperative;

11 (C) review and analyze ways in which the
12 Cross Border Interbank Payment Systems
13 (CIPS), cryptocurrencies, and central bank dig-
14 ital currencies could erode this system; and

15 (D) analyze how changes to global cross-
16 border payment systems could undermine
17 United States national security interests includ-
18 ing impacts on the efficacy of sanctions, the
19 countering of terrorist finance, and the enforce-
20 ment of anti-money laundering provisions.

21 (b) REPORT FORM.—The report required under sub-
22 section (a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form.

23 (c) PUBLICATION.—The unclassified portion of the
24 report under subsection (a)(1) shall be made accessible to

1 the public online through relevant United States Govern-
2 ment websites.

3 **TITLE II—INVESTING IN**
4 **ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS**
5 **Subtitle A—Strategic and**
6 **Diplomatic Matters**

7 **SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-**
8 **FINED.**

9 In this subtitle, the term “appropriate committees of
10 Congress” means—

11 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
12 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee
13 on Appropriations of the Senate; and

14 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
15 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee
16 on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

17 **SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT**
18 **FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PA-**
19 **CIFIC.**

20 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
21 gress that—

22 (1) the United States treaty alliances in the
23 Indo-Pacific provide a unique strategic advantage to
24 the United States and are among the Nation’s most
25 precious assets, enabling the United States to ad-

1 vance its vital national interests, defend its territory,
2 expand its economy through international trade and
3 commerce, establish enduring cooperation with allies
4 while seeking to establish new partnerships, prevent
5 the domination of the Indo-Pacific and its sur-
6 rounding maritime and air lanes by a hostile power
7 or powers, and deter potential aggressors;

8 (2) the Governments of the United States,
9 Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Phil-
10ippines, and Thailand are critical allies in advancing
11 a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region and
12 tackling challenges with unity of purpose, and have
13 collaborated to advance specific efforts of shared in-
14terest in areas such as defense and security, eco-
15nomic prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and
16 fundamental freedoms;

17 (3) the United States greatly values other part-
18 nerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with
19 India, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand,
20 and Vietnam as well as its trilateral and quadrilat-
21 eral dialogues, and regional architecture such as the
22 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
23 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC),
24 which are essential to further shared interests;

1 (4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific
2 demands consistent United States and allied com-
3 mitment to strengthening and advancing alliances so
4 that they are postured to meet these challenges, and
5 will require sustained political will, concrete partner-
6 ships, economic, commercial, technological, and secu-
7 rity cooperation, consistent and tangible commit-
8 ments, high-level and extensive consultations on
9 matters of mutual interest, mutual and shared co-
10 operation in the acquisition of key capabilities im-
11 portant to allied defenses, and unified mutual sup-
12 port in the face of political, economic, or military co-
13 ercion;

14 (5) fissures in the United States alliance rela-
15 tionships and partnerships benefit United States ad-
16 versaries and weaken the collective ability to advance
17 shared interests;

18 (6) the United States must work with allies to
19 prioritize human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific
20 region;

21 (7) as the report released in August 2020 by
22 the Expert Group of the International Military
23 Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS), titled
24 “Climate and Security in the Indo-Asia Pacific”
25 noted, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the regions

1 most vulnerable to climate impacts and as former
2 Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations
3 and Environment Sherri Goodman, Secretary Gen-
4 eral of IMCCS, noted, climate shocks act as a threat
5 multiplier in the Indo-Pacific region, increasing hu-
6 manitarian response costs and impacting security
7 throughout the region as sea levels rise, fishing pat-
8 terns shift, food insecurity rises, and storms grow
9 stronger and more frequent;

10 (8) the United State should continue to engage
11 on and deepen cooperation with allies and partners
12 of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, as
13 laid out in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Pub-
14 lic Law 115–409), in the areas of—

15 (A) forecasting environmental challenges;

16 (B) assisting with transnational coopera-
17 tion on sustainable uses of forest and water re-
18 sources with the goal of preserving biodiversity
19 and access to safe drinking water;

20 (C) fisheries and marine resource conserva-
21 tion; and

22 (D) meeting environmental challenges and
23 developing resilience;

24 (9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with
25 the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of

1 the United States Agency for International Develop-
2 ment, should facilitate a robust interagency Indo-Pa-
3 cific climate resiliency and adaptation strategy fo-
4 cusing on internal and external actions needed—

5 (A) to facilitate regional early recovery,
6 risk reduction, and resilience to weather-related
7 impacts on strategic interests of the United
8 States and partners and allies of the United
9 States in the region; and

10 (B) to address humanitarian and food se-
11 curity impacts of weather-related changes in the
12 region; and

13 (10) ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mecha-
14 nisms remain essential to the evolving institutional
15 architecture of the Indo-Pacific region.

16 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
17 of the United States—

18 (1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and secu-
19 rity cooperation between and among the United
20 States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the
21 Philippines, and Thailand, as appropriate, including
22 through diplomatic engagement, regional develop-
23 ment, energy security and development, scientific
24 and health partnerships, educational and cultural ex-

1 changes, intelligence-sharing, and other diplomatic
2 and defense-related initiatives;

3 (2) to uphold the United States multilateral
4 and bilateral treaty obligations, including—

5 (A) defending Japan consistent with the
6 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Be-
7 tween the United States of America and Japan,
8 done at Washington, January 19, 1960, and all
9 related and subsequent bilateral security agree-
10 ments and arrangements concluded on or before
11 the date of enactment of this Act;

12 (B) defending the Republic of Korea con-
13 sistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty Be-
14 tween the United States and the Republic of
15 Korea, done at Washington, October 1, 1953,
16 and all related and subsequent bilateral security
17 agreements and arrangements concluded on or
18 before the date of enactment of this Act;

19 (C) defending the Philippines consistent
20 with article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty
21 Between the United States and the Republic of
22 the Philippines, done at Washington, August
23 30, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilat-
24 eral security agreements and arrangements con-

1 cluded on or before the date of enactment of
2 this Act;

3 (D) defending Thailand consistent with the
4 Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (“Ma-
5 nila Pact”), done at Manila, September 8,
6 1954, understanding thereto the Thanat-Rusk
7 communique of 1962, and all related and subse-
8 quent bilateral security agreements and ar-
9 rangements concluded on or before the date of
10 enactment of this Act; and

11 (E) defending Australia consistent with the
12 Security Treaty Between Australia and the
13 United States of America, done at San Fran-
14 cisco, September 1, 1951, and all related and
15 subsequent bilateral security agreements and
16 arrangements concluded on or before the date
17 of enactment of this Act;

18 (3) to strengthen and deepen the United States
19 bilateral and regional partnerships, including with
20 India, Taiwan, ASEAN, and New Zealand;

21 (4) to cooperate with Japan, the Republic of
22 Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand to
23 promote human rights bilaterally and through re-
24 gional and multilateral fora and pacts; and

1 (5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, eco-
2 nomic, and security cooperation with regional part-
3 ners, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore,
4 Indonesia, and India.

5 **SEC. 203. BOOSTING QUAD COOPERATION.**

6 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
7 gress that—

8 (1) as a Pacific power, the United States should
9 continue to strengthen its cooperation with Aus-
10 tralia, India, and Japan, (through the Quadrilateral
11 Security Dialogue or “Quad”) to enhance and imple-
12 ment a shared vision to meet regional challenges and
13 to promote a free, open, inclusive, resilient, and
14 healthy Indo-Pacific, characterized by respect for
15 democratic norms, rule of law, and market-driven
16 economic growth, and is free from undue influence
17 and coercion;

18 (2) the United States should expand dialogue
19 and cooperation through the Quad with a range of
20 partners to support the rule of law, freedom of navi-
21 gation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes,
22 democratic values, and territorial integrity, and to
23 uphold peace and prosperity and strengthen demo-
24 cratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific;

1 (3) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad
2 leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to
3 the economic and health impacts of COVID–19, in-
4 cluding expanding safe, affordable, and effective vac-
5 cine production and equitable access, and to address
6 shared challenges, including in cyberspace, critical
7 technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure
8 investment, and humanitarian assistance and dis-
9 aster relief, as well as maritime domains, further ad-
10 vances the important cooperation among Quad na-
11 tions that is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region;

12 (4) building upon their announced commitment
13 to finance 1,000,000,000 or more COVID–19 vac-
14 cines by the end of 2022 for use in the Indo-Pacific
15 region, the United States International Development
16 Finance Corporation, the Japan International Co-
17 operation Agency, and the Japan Bank for Inter-
18 national Cooperation, including through partnerships
19 other multilateral development banks, should also
20 venture to finance development and infrastructure
21 projects in the Indo-Pacific region that are competi-
22 tive, transparent, and sustainable;

23 (5) the United States should participate in the
24 Resilient Supply Chain Initiative launched by Aus-
25 tralia, Japan, and India in 2020, along with similar

1 initiatives that relocate supply chains in the health,
2 economic, and national security sectors to the
3 United States, its Quad partners, and other like-
4 minded countries; and

5 (6) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamen-
6 tary Working Group could—

7 (A) sustain and deepen engagement be-
8 tween senior officials of the Quad countries on
9 a full spectrum of issues; and

10 (B) be modeled on the successful and long-
11 standing bilateral intra-parliamentary groups
12 between the United States and Mexico, Canada,
13 and the United Kingdom, as well as other for-
14 mal and informal parliamentary exchanges.

15 (b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
17 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
18 retary of State shall develop and submit a com-
19 prehensive strategy for bolstering engagement and
20 cooperation with the Quad and submit a report to
21 the appropriate congressional committees laying out
22 the strategy.

23 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy
24 required by subsection (a) shall include the fol-
25 lowing:

1 (A) A description of how the United States
2 intends to demonstrate democratic leadership in
3 the Indo-Pacific through quadrilateral engage-
4 ment with India, Japan, and Australia on
5 shared interests and common challenges.

6 (B) A summary of—

7 (i) current and past Quad initiatives
8 across the whole of the United States Gov-
9 ernment, including to promote broad based
10 and inclusive economic growth, trade, in-
11 vestment, and to advance technology co-
12 operation, energy innovation, climate miti-
13 gation and adaptation, physical and digital
14 infrastructure development, education, dis-
15 aster management, and global health secu-
16 rity;

17 (ii) proposals shared among Quad na-
18 tions to deepen existing security coopera-
19 tion, intelligence sharing, economic part-
20 nerships, and multilateral coordination;
21 and

22 (iii) initiatives and agreements under-
23 taken jointly with Quad nations plus other
24 like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific on
25 areas of shared interest.

- 1 (C) A description of efforts to jointly—
- 2 (i) expand ongoing COVID–19 co-
- 3 operation to prepare for the next pandemic
- 4 by focusing on medium-term vaccine and
- 5 medical supply production and building a
- 6 broader dialogue on global public health;
- 7 (ii) combat economic coercion, deepen
- 8 regional economic engagement and integra-
- 9 tion, and strengthen regional rules and
- 10 standards around trade and investment;
- 11 (iii) strengthen climate actions on
- 12 mitigation, adaptation, resilience, tech-
- 13 nology, capacity-building, and climate fi-
- 14 nance;
- 15 (iv) facilitate the development of qual-
- 16 ity infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific
- 17 through joint financing, investment, tech-
- 18 nical assistance, and standards setting;
- 19 (v) enhance joint maritime security
- 20 and maritime domain awareness initiatives
- 21 to protecting the maritime commons and
- 22 supporting international law and freedom
- 23 of navigation in the Indo-Pacific; and

1 (vi) develop international technology
2 standards and share or co-develop new in-
3 novative technologies of the future.

4 **SEC. 204. ESTABLISHMENT OF QUAD INTRA-PARLIAMEN-**
5 **TARY WORKING GROUP.**

6 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 30 days after
7 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
8 State shall seek to enter into negotiations with the govern-
9 ments of Japan, Australia, and India (collectively, with the
10 United States, known as the “Quad”) with the goal of
11 reaching a written agreement to establish a Quad Intra-
12 Parliamentary Working Group for the purpose of acting
13 on the recommendations of the Quad Working Groups de-
14 scribed in section 203(6) and to facilitate closer coopera-
15 tion on shared interests and values.

16 (b) UNITED STATES GROUP.—

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—At such time as the govern-
18 ments of the Quad countries enter into a written
19 agreement described in subsection (a), there shall be
20 established a United States Group, which shall rep-
21 resent the United States at the Quad Intra-Par-
22 liamentary Working Group.

23 (2) MEMBERSHIP.—

1 (A) IN GENERAL.—The United States
2 Group shall be comprised of not more than 24
3 Members of Congress.

4 (B) APPOINTMENT.—Of the Members of
5 Congress appointed to the United States Group
6 under subparagraph (A)—

7 (i) half shall be appointed by the
8 Speaker of the House of Representatives
9 from among Members of the House, not
10 less than 4 of whom shall be members of
11 the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and

12 (ii) half shall be appointed by the
13 President pro tempore of the Senate, based
14 on recommendations of the majority leader
15 and minority leader of the Senate, from
16 among Members of the Senate, not less
17 than 4 of whom shall be members of the
18 Committee on Foreign Relations (unless
19 the majority leader and minority leader de-
20 termine otherwise).

21 (3) MEETINGS.—

22 (A) IN GENERAL.—The United States
23 Group shall seek to meet not less frequently
24 than annually with representatives and appro-
25 priate staff of the legislatures of Japan, Aus-

1 tralia, and India, and any other country invited
2 by mutual agreement of the Quad countries.

3 (B) LIMITATION.—A meeting described in
4 subparagraph (A) may be held—

5 (i) in the United States;

6 (ii) in another Quad country during
7 periods when Congress is not in session; or

8 (iii) virtually.

9 (4) CHAIRPERSON AND VICE CHAIRPERSON.—

10 (A) HOUSE DELEGATION.—The Speaker of
11 the House of Representatives shall designate
12 the chairperson or vice chairperson of the dele-
13 gation of the United States Group from the
14 House from among members of the Committee
15 on Foreign Affairs.

16 (B) SENATE DELEGATION.—The President
17 pro tempore of the Senate shall designate the
18 chairperson or vice chairperson of the delega-
19 tion of the United States Group from the Sen-
20 ate from among members of the Committee on
21 Foreign Relations.

22 (5) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

23 (A) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to
24 be appropriated \$1,000,000 for each fiscal year

1 2022 through 2025 for the United States
2 Group.

3 (B) DISTRIBUTION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

4 (i) IN GENERAL.—For each fiscal year
5 for which an appropriation is made for the
6 United States Group, half of the amount
7 appropriated shall be available to the dele-
8 gation from the House of Representatives
9 and half of the amount shall be available
10 to the delegation from the Senate.

11 (ii) METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION.—The
12 amounts available to the delegations of the
13 House of Representatives and the Senate
14 under clause (i) shall be disbursed on
15 vouchers to be approved by the chairperson
16 of the delegation from the House of Rep-
17 resentatives and the chairperson of the del-
18 egation from the Senate, respectively.

19 (6) PRIVATE SOURCES.—The United States
20 Group may accept gifts or donations of services or
21 property, subject to the review and approval, as ap-
22 propriate, of the Committee on Ethics of the House
23 of Representatives and the Committee on Ethics of
24 the Senate.

1 (7) CERTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES.—The
2 certificate of the chairperson of the delegation from
3 the House of Representatives or the delegation of
4 the Senate of the United States Group shall be final
5 and conclusive upon the accounting officers in the
6 auditing of the accounts of the United States Group.

7 (8) ANNUAL REPORT.—The United States
8 Group shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Af-
9 fairs of the House of Representatives and the Com-
10 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report
11 for each fiscal year for which an appropriation is
12 made for the United States Group, which shall in-
13 clude a description of its expenditures under such
14 appropriation.

15 **SEC. 205. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH**
16 **ASEAN.**

17 It is the policy of the United States to—

18 (1) stand with the nations of the Association of
19 Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond
20 to COVID–19 and support greater cooperation in
21 building capacity to prepare for and respond to
22 pandemics and other public health challenges;

23 (2) support high-level United States participa-
24 tion in the annual ASEAN Summit held each year;

1 (3) reaffirm the importance of United States-
2 ASEAN economic engagement, including the elimi-
3 nation of barriers to cross-border commerce, and
4 support the ASEAN Economic Community’s (AEC)
5 goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable
6 long-term economic growth and cooperation with the
7 United States that focuses on innovation and capac-
8 ity-building efforts in technology, education, disaster
9 management, food security, human rights, and trade
10 facilitation, particularly for ASEAN’s poorest coun-
11 tries;

12 (4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to fos-
13 ter greater integration and unity within the ASEAN
14 community, as well as to foster greater integration
15 and unity with non-ASEAN economic, political, and
16 security partners, including Japan, the Republic of
17 Korea, Australia, the European Union, and India;

18 (5) recognize the value of strategic economic
19 initiatives like United States-ASEAN Connect,
20 which demonstrates a commitment to ASEAN and
21 the AEC and builds upon economic relationships in
22 the region;

23 (6) support ASEAN nations in addressing mar-
24 itime and territorial disputes in a constructive man-
25 ner and in pursuing claims through peaceful, diplo-

1 matic, and, as necessary, legitimate regional and
2 international arbitration mechanisms, consistent
3 with international law, including through the adop-
4 tion of a code of conduct in the South China Sea
5 that represents the interests of all parties and pro-
6 motes peace and stability in the region;

7 (7) urge all parties involved in the maritime
8 and territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region,
9 including the Government of the People’s Republic
10 of China—

11 (A) to cease any current activities, and
12 avoid undertaking any actions in the future,
13 that undermine stability, or complicate or esca-
14 late disputes through the use of coercion, in-
15 timidation, or military force;

16 (B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals,
17 and other features, and refrain from new ef-
18 forts to militarize, including the construction of
19 new garrisons and facilities and the relocation
20 of additional military personnel, material, or
21 equipment;

22 (C) to oppose actions by any country that
23 prevent other countries from exercising their
24 sovereign rights to the resources in their exclu-
25 sive economic zones and continental shelves by

1 enforcing claims to those areas in the South
2 China Sea that lack support in international
3 law; and

4 (D) to oppose unilateral declarations of ad-
5 ministrative and military districts in contested
6 areas in the South China Sea;

7 (8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral ac-
8 tions that cause permanent physical damage to the
9 marine environment and support the efforts of the
10 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
11 and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the
12 illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the
13 region;

14 (9) urge ASEAN member states to develop a
15 common approach to encourage China and the Phil-
16ippines to comply with the decision of the Perma-
17nent Court of Arbitration's 2016 ruling in favor of
18the Republic of the Philippines in the case against
19the People's Republic of China's excessive maritime
20claims;

21 (10) reaffirm the commitment of the United
22States to continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt
23human smuggling and trafficking in persons and
24urge ASEAN to create and strengthen regional

1 mechanisms to provide assistance and support to
2 refugees and migrants;

3 (11) support the Mekong-United States Part-
4 nership;

5 (12) support newly created initiatives with
6 ASEAN countries, including the United States-
7 ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Pol-
8 icy Implementation Project, the United States-
9 ASEAN Innovation Circle, and the United States-
10 ASEAN Health Futures;

11 (13) encourage the President to communicate
12 to ASEAN leaders the importance of promoting the
13 rule of law and open and transparent government,
14 strengthening civil society, and protecting human
15 rights, including releasing political prisoners, ceasing
16 politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary
17 killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, free-
18 dom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom
19 of speech and expression;

20 (14) support efforts by organizations in
21 ASEAN that address corruption in the public and
22 private sectors, enhance anti-bribery compliance, en-
23 force bribery criminalization in the private sector,
24 and build beneficial ownership transparency through
25 the ASEAN-USAID PROSPECT project partnered

1 with the South East Asia Parties Against Corrup-
2 tion (SEA-PAC);

3 (15) support the Young Southeast Asian Lead-
4 ers Initiative as an example of a people-to-people
5 partnership that provides skills, networks, and lead-
6 ership training to a new generation that will create
7 and fill jobs, foster cross-border cooperation and
8 partnerships, and rise to address the regional and
9 global challenges of the future;

10 (16) support the creation of initiatives similar
11 to the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative for
12 other parts of the Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-
13 people partnerships with an emphasis on civil society
14 leaders;

15 (17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments
16 that have fully upheld and implemented all United
17 Nations Security Council resolutions and inter-
18 national agreements with respect to the Democratic
19 People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and ballistic
20 missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN
21 governments to do the same; and

22 (18) allocate appropriate resources across the
23 United States Government to articulate and imple-
24 ment an Indo-Pacific strategy that respects and sup-
25 ports the crucial role of ASEAN and supports

1 ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and prob-
2 lem-solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific
3 community.

4 **SEC. 206. UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION IN STAND-**
5 **ARDS-SETTING BODIES.**

6 (a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This section may be cited as the
7 “Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G
8 Act of 2021”.

9 (b) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of Con-
10 gress that—

11 (1) the United States and its allies and part-
12 ners should maintain participation and leadership at
13 international standards-setting bodies for 5th and
14 future generation mobile telecommunications sys-
15 tems and infrastructure;

16 (2) the United States should work with its allies
17 and partners to encourage and facilitate the develop-
18 ment of secure supply chains and networks for 5th
19 and future generation mobile telecommunications
20 systems and infrastructure; and

21 (3) the maintenance of a high standard of secu-
22 rity in telecommunications and cyberspace between
23 the United States and its allies and partners is a na-
24 tional security interest of the United States.

1 (c) ENHANCING REPRESENTATION AND LEADERSHIP
2 OF UNITED STATES AT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS-
3 SETTING BODIES.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall—

5 (A) establish an interagency working group
6 to provide assistance and technical expertise to
7 enhance the representation and leadership of
8 the United States at international bodies that
9 set standards for equipment, systems, software,
10 and virtually defined networks that support 5th
11 and future generation mobile telecommuni-
12 cations systems and infrastructure, such as the
13 International Telecommunication Union and the
14 3rd Generation Partnership Project; and

15 (B) work with allies, partners, and the pri-
16 vate sector to increase productive engagement.

17 (2) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.—The
18 interagency working group described in paragraph
19 (1)—

20 (A) shall be chaired by the Secretary of
21 State or a designee of the Secretary of State;
22 and

23 (B) shall consist of the head (or designee)
24 of each Federal department or agency the
25 President determines appropriate.

1 (3) BRIEFINGS.—

2 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180
3 days after the date of the enactment of this
4 Act, and subsequently thereafter as provided
5 under subparagraph (B), the interagency work-
6 ing group described in paragraph (1) shall pro-
7 vide a strategy to the appropriate congressional
8 committees that addresses—

9 (i) promotion of United States leader-
10 ship at international standards-setting bod-
11 ies for equipment, systems, software, and
12 virtually defined networks relevant to 5th
13 and future generation mobile telecommuni-
14 cations systems and infrastructure, taking
15 into account the different processes fol-
16 lowed by the various international stand-
17 ard-setting bodies;

18 (ii) diplomatic engagement with allies
19 and partners to share security risk infor-
20 mation and findings pertaining to equip-
21 ment that supports or is used in 5th and
22 future generation mobile telecommuni-
23 cations systems and infrastructure and co-
24 operation on mitigating such risks;

1 (iii) China's presence and activities at
2 international standards-setting bodies rel-
3 evant to 5th and future generation mobile
4 telecommunications systems and infra-
5 structure, including information on the dif-
6 ferences in the scope and scale of China's
7 engagement at such bodies compared to
8 engagement by the United States or its al-
9 lies and partners and the security risks
10 raised by Chinese proposals in such stand-
11 ards-setting bodies; and

12 (iv) engagement with private sector
13 communications and information service
14 providers, equipment developers, academia,
15 federally funded research and development
16 centers, and other private-sector stake-
17 holders to propose and develop secure
18 standards for equipment, systems, soft-
19 ware, and virtually defined networks that
20 support 5th and future generation mobile
21 telecommunications systems and infra-
22 structure.

23 (B) SUBSEQUENT BRIEFINGS.—Upon re-
24 ceiving a request from the appropriate congres-
25 sional committees, or as determined appropriate

1 by the chair of the interagency working group
2 established pursuant to paragraph (1), the
3 interagency working group shall provide such
4 committees an updated briefing that covers the
5 matters described in clauses (i) through (iv) of
6 subparagraph (A).

7 **SEC. 207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7**
8 **AND G20 COUNTRIES.**

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress that
10 the President, acting through the Secretary of State,
11 should initiate an agenda with G7 and G20 countries on
12 matters relevant to economic and democratic freedoms, in-
13 cluding the following:

14 (1) Trade and investment issues and enforce-
15 ment.

16 (2) Building support for international infra-
17 structure standards, including those agreed to at the
18 G20 summit in Osaka in 2018.

19 (3) The erosion of democracy and human
20 rights.

21 (4) The security of 5G telecommunications.

22 (5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellec-
23 tual property theft, massive subsidization of compa-
24 nies, and other policies and practices.

1 (6) Predatory international sovereign lending
2 that is inconsistent with Organisation for Economic
3 Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Paris
4 Club principles.

5 (7) International influence campaigns.

6 (8) Environmental standards.

7 (9) Coordination with like-minded regional part-
8 ners that are not in the G7 and G20.

9 **SEC. 208. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PART-**
10 **NERSHIP.**

11 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
12 United States—

13 (1) to support the close economic, political, and
14 security relationship between Taiwan and the United
15 States and recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the
16 approach to the United States Indo-Pacific;

17 (2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its
18 democracy a vital national security interest of the
19 United States;

20 (3) to reinforce all existing United States Gov-
21 ernment commitments to Taiwan, consistent with
22 the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8), the
23 three joint communiques, and the “Six Assurances”;

1 (4) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its
2 asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities
3 identified in Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept;

4 (5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense
5 spending in order to fully resource its defense strat-
6 egy;

7 (6) to conduct regular transfers of defense arti-
8 cles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-de-
9 fense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop
10 and integrate asymmetric capabilities, such as anti-
11 ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, ad-
12 vanced command, control, communications, com-
13 puters, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
14 and resilient command and control capabilities, into
15 its military forces;

16 (7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan’s
17 meaningful participation in international organiza-
18 tions, including the World Health Assembly, the
19 International Civil Aviation Organization, the Inter-
20 national Criminal Police Organization, and other
21 international bodies as appropriate;

22 (8) to advocate for information sharing with
23 Taiwan in the International Agency for Research on
24 Cancer;

1 (9) to promote meaningful cooperation among
2 the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded
3 partners;

4 (10) to enhance bilateral trade, including poten-
5 tially through new agreements or resumption of
6 talks under the Trade and Investment Framework
7 Agreement;

8 (11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursu-
9 ance of a bilateral free trade agreement;

10 (12) to expand bilateral economic and techno-
11 logical cooperation, including improving supply chain
12 security;

13 (13) to support United States educational and
14 exchange programs with Taiwan, including by pro-
15 moting the study of Chinese language, culture, his-
16 tory, and politics in Taiwan; and

17 (14) to expand people-to-people exchanges be-
18 tween the United States and Taiwan.

19 (b) SUPPORTING UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL
20 AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH TAIWAN.—

21 (1) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES-
22 TAIWAN CULTURAL EXCHANGE FOUNDATION.—The
23 Secretary of State should consider establishing an
24 independent nonprofit that—

1 (A) is dedicated to deepening ties between
2 the future leaders of Taiwan and the United
3 States; and

4 (B) works with State and local school dis-
5 tricts and educational institutions to send high
6 school and university students to Taiwan to
7 study the Chinese language, culture, history,
8 politics, and other relevant subjects.

9 (2) PARTNER.—State and local school districts
10 and educational institutions, including public univer-
11 sities, are encouraged to partner with the Taipei
12 Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the
13 United States to establish programs to promote an
14 increase in educational and cultural exchanges.

15 **SEC. 209. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.**

16 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the
17 “Taiwan Fellowship Act”.

18 (b) FINDINGS; PURPOSES.—

19 (1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

20 (A) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law
21 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) affirmed United
22 States policy “to preserve and promote exten-
23 sive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural,
24 and other relations between the people of the
25 United States and the people on Taiwan, as

1 well as the people on the China mainland and
2 all other peoples of the Western Pacific area”.

3 (B) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance
4 Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409),
5 the United States has grown its strategic part-
6 nership with Taiwan’s vibrant democracy of
7 23,000,000 people.

8 (C) Despite a concerted campaign by the
9 People’s Republic of China to isolate Taiwan
10 from its diplomatic partners and from inter-
11 national organizations, including the World
12 Health Organization, Taiwan has emerged as a
13 global leader in the coronavirus global pandemic
14 response, including by donating more than
15 2,000,000 surgical masks and other medical
16 equipment to the United States.

17 (D) The creation of a United States fellow-
18 ship program with Taiwan would support—

19 (i) a key priority of expanding people-
20 to-people exchanges, which was outlined in
21 President Donald J. Trump’s 2017 Na-
22 tional Security Strategy;

23 (ii) President Joseph R. Biden’s com-
24 mitment to Taiwan, “a leading democracy
25 and a critical economic and security part-

1 ner”, as expressed in his March 2021 In-
2 terim National Security Strategic Guid-
3 ance; and

4 (iii) April 2021 guidance from the De-
5 partment of State based on a review re-
6 quired under the Taiwan Assurance Act of
7 2020 (subtitle B of title III of division FF
8 of Public Law 116–260) to “encourage
9 U.S. government engagement with Taiwan
10 that reflects our deepening unofficial rela-
11 tionship”.

12 (2) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this Act
13 are—

14 (A) to further strengthen the United
15 States-Taiwan strategic relationship and broad-
16 en understanding of the Indo-Pacific region by
17 temporarily assigning officials of agencies of the
18 United States Government to Taiwan for inten-
19 sive study in Mandarin Chinese and placement
20 as Fellows with the governing authorities on
21 Taiwan or a Taiwanese civic institution;

22 (B) to expand United States Government
23 expertise in Mandarin Chinese language skills
24 and understanding of the politics, history, and
25 culture of Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific region

1 by providing eligible United States personnel
2 the opportunity to acquire such skills and un-
3 derstanding through the Taiwan Fellowship
4 Program established under subsection (c); and

5 (C) to better position the United States to
6 advance its economic, security, and human
7 rights interests and values in the Indo-Pacific
8 region.

9 (c) TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.—

10 (1) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

11 (A) AGENCY HEAD.—The term “agency
12 head” means, in the case of the executive
13 branch of United States Government, or in the
14 case of a legislative branch agency specified in
15 subparagraph (B), the head of the respective
16 agency.

17 (B) AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOV-
18 ERNMENT.—The term “agency of the United
19 States Government” includes the Government
20 Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget
21 Office, the Congressional Research Service, and
22 the United States-China Economic and Security
23 Review Commission of the legislative branch, as
24 well as any agency of the executive branch.

1 (C) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COM-
2 MITTEES.—The term “appropriate congress-
3 sional committees” means—

4 (i) the Committee on Appropriations
5 of the Senate;

6 (ii) the Committee on Foreign Rela-
7 tions of the Senate;

8 (iii) the Committee on Appropriations
9 of the House of Representatives;

10 (iv) the Committee on Foreign Affairs
11 of the House of Representatives; and

12 (v) the Committee on Armed Services
13 of the House of Representatives.

14 (D) DETAILEE.—The term “detailee”
15 means an employee of an agency of the United
16 States Government on loan to the American In-
17 stitute in Taiwan, without a change of position
18 from the agency at which such employee is em-
19 ployed.

20 (E) IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—The term
21 “implementing partner” means any United
22 States organization described in section
23 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
24 and exempt from tax under section 501(a) of
25 such Code that—

1 (i) is selected through a competitive
2 process;

3 (ii) performs logistical, administrative,
4 and other functions, as determined by the
5 Department of State and the American In-
6 stitute of Taiwan, in support of the Tai-
7 wan Fellowship Program; and

8 (iii) enters into a cooperative agree-
9 ment with the American Institute in Tai-
10 wan to administer the Taiwan Fellowship
11 Program.

12 (2) ESTABLISHMENT OF TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP
13 PROGRAM.—

14 (A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of
15 State shall establish the “Taiwan Fellowship
16 Program” (hereafter referred to in this section
17 as the “Program”) to provide a fellowship op-
18 portunity in Taiwan of up to two years for eligi-
19 ble United States citizens through the coopera-
20 tive agreement established in subparagraph (B).
21 The Department of State, in consultation with
22 the American Institute in Taiwan and the im-
23 plementing partner, may modify the name of
24 the Program.

25 (B) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS.—

1 (i) IN GENERAL.—The American In-
2 stitute in Taiwan shall use amounts au-
3 thorized to be appropriated pursuant to
4 paragraph (6)(A) to enter into an annual
5 or multi-year cooperative agreement with
6 an appropriate implementing partner.

7 (ii) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Department
8 of State, in consultation with the American
9 Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate,
10 the implementing partner, shall award to
11 eligible United States citizens, subject to
12 available funding—

13 (I) not fewer than five fellow-
14 ships during the first two years of the
15 Program; and

16 (II) not fewer than ten fellow-
17 ships during each of the remaining
18 years of the Program.

19 (C) INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; IMPLI-
20 MENTING PARTNER.—Not later than 30 days
21 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
22 American Institute in Taiwan, in consultation
23 with the Department of State, shall—

24 (i) begin negotiations with the Taipei
25 Economic and Cultural Representative Of-

1 fice, or with another appropriate entity, for
2 the purpose of entering into an agreement
3 to facilitate the placement of fellows in an
4 agency of the governing authorities on Tai-
5 wan; and

6 (ii) begin the process of selecting an
7 implementing partner, which—

8 (I) shall agree to meet all of the
9 legal requirements required to operate
10 in Taiwan; and

11 (II) shall be composed of staff
12 who demonstrate significant experi-
13 ence managing exchange programs in
14 the Indo-Pacific region.

15 (D) CURRICULUM.—

16 (i) FIRST YEAR.—During the first
17 year of each fellowship under this sub-
18 section, each fellow should study—

19 (I) the Mandarin Chinese lan-
20 guage;

21 (II) the people, history, and polit-
22 ical climate on Taiwan; and

23 (III) the issues affecting the rela-
24 tionship between the United States
25 and the Indo-Pacific region.

1 (ii) SECOND YEAR.—During the sec-
2 ond year of each fellowship under this sec-
3 tion, each fellow, subject to the approval of
4 the Department of State, the American In-
5 stitute in Taiwan, and the implementing
6 partner, and in accordance with the pur-
7 poses of this Act, shall work in—

8 (I) a parliamentary office, min-
9 istry, or other agency of the governing
10 authorities on Taiwan; or

11 (II) an organization outside of
12 the governing authorities on Taiwan,
13 whose interests are associated with
14 the interests of the fellow and the
15 agency of the United States Govern-
16 ment from which the fellow had been
17 employed.

18 (E) FLEXIBLE FELLOWSHIP DURATION.—

19 Notwithstanding any requirement under this
20 section, the Secretary of State, in consultation
21 with the American Institute in Taiwan and, as
22 appropriate, the implementing partner, may
23 award fellowships that have a duration of be-
24 tween nine months and two years, and may

1 alter the curriculum requirements under sub-
2 paragraph (D) for such purposes.

3 (F) SUNSET.—The Program shall termi-
4 nate ten years after the date of the enactment
5 of this Act.

6 (3) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.—

7 (A) ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS.—A
8 United States citizen is eligible for a fellowship
9 under this section if he or she—

10 (i) is an employee of the United
11 States Government;

12 (ii) has received at least one exem-
13 plary performance review in his or her cur-
14 rent United States Government role within
15 at least the last three years prior to the be-
16 ginning the fellowship;

17 (iii) has at least two years of experi-
18 ence in any branch of the United States
19 Government;

20 (iv) has a demonstrated professional
21 or educational background in the relation-
22 ship between the United States and coun-
23 tries in the Indo-Pacific region; and

1 (v) has demonstrated his or her com-
2 mitment to further service in the United
3 States Government.

4 (B) RESPONSIBILITIES OF FELLOWS.—

5 Each recipient of a fellowship under this section
6 shall agree, as a condition of such fellowship—

7 (i) to maintain satisfactory progress
8 in language training and appropriate be-
9 havior in Taiwan, as determined by the
10 Department of State, the American Insti-
11 tute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, its im-
12 plementing partner;

13 (ii) to refrain from engaging in any
14 intelligence or intelligence-related activity
15 on behalf of the United States Govern-
16 ment; and

17 (iii) to continue Federal Government
18 employment for a period of not less than
19 four years after the conclusion of the fel-
20 lowship or for not less than two years for
21 a fellowship that is one year or shorter.

22 (C) RESPONSIBILITIES OF IMPLEMENTING
23 PARTNER.—

24 (i) SELECTION OF FELLOWS.—The
25 implementing partner, in close coordination

1 with the Department of State and the
2 American Institute in Taiwan, shall—

3 (I) make efforts to recruit fellow-
4 ship candidates who reflect the diver-
5 sity of the United States;

6 (II) select fellows for the Pro-
7 gram based solely on merit, with ap-
8 propriate supervision from the De-
9 partment of State and the American
10 Institute in Taiwan; and

11 (III) prioritize the selection of
12 candidates willing to serve a fellow-
13 ship lasting one year or longer.

14 (ii) FIRST YEAR.—The implementing
15 partner should provide each fellow in the
16 first year (or shorter duration, as jointly
17 determined by the Department of State
18 and the American Institute in Taiwan for
19 those who are not serving a two-year fel-
20 lowship) with—

21 (I) intensive Mandarin Chinese
22 language training; and

23 (II) courses in the politic, cul-
24 ture, and history of Taiwan, China,
25 and the broader Indo-Pacific.

1 (iii) WAIVER OF REQUIRED TRAIN-
2 ING.—The Department of State, in coordi-
3 nation with the American Institute in Tai-
4 wan and, as appropriate, the implementing
5 partner, may waive any of the training re-
6 quired under clause (ii) to the extent that
7 a fellow has Mandarin Chinese language
8 skills, knowledge of the topic described in
9 clause (ii)(II), or for other related reasons
10 approved by the Department of State and
11 the American Institute in Taiwan. If any
12 of the training requirements are waived for
13 a fellow serving a two-year fellowship, the
14 training portion of his or her fellowship
15 may be shortened to the extent appro-
16 priate.

17 (iv) OFFICE; STAFFING.—The imple-
18 menting partner, in consultation with the
19 Department of State and the American In-
20 stitute in Taiwan, shall maintain an office
21 and at least one full-time staff member in
22 Taiwan—

23 (I) to liaise with the American
24 Institute in Taiwan and the governing
25 authorities on Taiwan; and

1 (II) to serve as the primary in-
2 country point of contact for the recipi-
3 ents of fellowships under this section
4 and their dependents.

5 (v) OTHER FUNCTIONS.—The imple-
6 menting partner should perform other
7 functions in association in support of the
8 Program, including logistical and adminis-
9 trative functions, as prescribed by the De-
10 partment of State and the American Insti-
11 tute in Taiwan.

12 (D) NONCOMPLIANCE.—

13 (i) IN GENERAL.—Any fellow who
14 fails to comply with the requirements
15 under this section shall reimburse the
16 American Institute in Taiwan for—

17 (I) the Federal funds expended
18 for the fellow's participation in the
19 fellowship, as set forth in clauses (ii)
20 and (iii); and

21 (II) interest accrued on such
22 funds (calculated at the prevailing
23 rate).

24 (ii) FULL REIMBURSEMENT.—Any fel-
25 low who violates clause (i) or (ii) of sub-

1 paragraph (B) shall reimburse the Amer-
2 ican Institute in Taiwan in an amount
3 equal to the sum of—

4 (I) all of the Federal funds ex-
5 pended for the fellow's participation
6 in the fellowship; and

7 (II) interest on the amount speci-
8 fied in subclause (I), which shall be
9 calculated at the prevailing rate.

10 (iii) PRO RATA REIMBURSEMENT.—
11 Any fellow who violates subparagraph
12 (B)(iii) shall reimburse the American Insti-
13 tute in Taiwan in an amount equal to the
14 difference between—

15 (I) the amount specified in clause
16 (ii); and

17 (II) the product of—

18 (aa) the amount the fellow
19 received in compensation during
20 the final year of the fellowship,
21 including the value of any allow-
22 ances and benefits received by
23 the fellow; multiplied by

24 (bb) the percentage of the
25 period specified in subparagraph

1 (B)(iii) during which the fellow
2 did not remain employed by the
3 United States Government.

4 (E) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90
5 days after the selection of the first class of fel-
6 lows under this Act, and annually thereafter for
7 10 years, the Department of State shall offer to
8 brief the appropriate congressional committees
9 regarding the following issues:

10 (i) An assessment of the performance
11 of the implementing partner in fulfilling
12 the purposes of this section.

13 (ii) The number of applicants each
14 year, the number of applicants willing to
15 serve a fellowship lasting one year or
16 longer, and the number of such applicants
17 selected for the fellowship.

18 (iii) The names and sponsoring agen-
19 cies of the fellows selected by the imple-
20 menting partner and the extent to which
21 such fellows represent the diversity of the
22 United States.

23 (iv) The names of the parliamentary
24 offices, ministries, other agencies of the
25 governing authorities on Taiwan, and non-

1 governmental institutions to which each
2 fellow was assigned.

3 (v) Any recommendations, as appro-
4 priate, to improve the implementation of
5 the Program, including added flexibilities
6 in the administration of the program.

7 (vi) An assessment of the Program's
8 value upon the relationship between the
9 United States and Taiwan or the United
10 States and Asian countries.

11 (F) ANNUAL FINANCIAL AUDIT.—

12 (i) IN GENERAL.—The financial
13 records of any implementing partner shall
14 be audited annually in accordance with
15 generally accepted auditing standards by
16 independent certified public accountants or
17 independent licensed public accountants
18 who are certified or licensed by a regu-
19 latory authority of a State or another po-
20 litical subdivision of the United States.

21 (ii) LOCATION.—Each audit under
22 clause (i) shall be conducted at the place
23 or places where the financial records of the
24 implementing partner are normally kept.

1 (iii) ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS.—The
2 implementing partner shall make available
3 to the accountants conducting an audit
4 under clause (i)—

5 (I) all books, financial records,
6 files, other papers, things, and prop-
7 erty belonging to, or in use by, the
8 implementing partner that are nec-
9 essary to facilitate the audit; and

10 (II) full facilities for verifying
11 transactions with the balances or se-
12 curities held by depositories, fiscal
13 agents, and custodians.

14 (iv) REPORT.—

15 (I) IN GENERAL.—Not later than
16 six months after the end of each fiscal
17 year, the implementing partner shall
18 provide a report of the audit con-
19 ducted for such fiscal year under
20 clause (i) to the Department of State
21 and the American Institute in Taiwan.

22 (II) CONTENTS.—Each audit re-
23 port shall—

24 (aa) set forth the scope of
25 the audit;

1 (bb) include such state-
2 ments, along with the auditor's
3 opinion of those statements, as
4 may be necessary to present fair-
5 ly the implementing partner's as-
6 sets and liabilities, surplus or
7 deficit, with reasonable detail;

8 (cc) include a statement of
9 the implementing partner's in-
10 come and expenses during the
11 year; and

12 (dd) include a schedule of—

13 (AA) all contracts and
14 cooperative agreements re-
15 quiring payments greater
16 than \$5,000; and

17 (BB) any payments of
18 compensation, salaries, or
19 fees at a rate greater than
20 \$5,000 per year.

21 (III) COPIES.—Each audit report
22 shall be produced in sufficient copies
23 for distribution to the public.

24 (4) TAIWAN FELLOWS ON DETAIL FROM GOV-
25 ERNMENT SERVICE.—

1 (A) IN GENERAL.—

2 (i) DETAIL AUTHORIZED.—With the
3 approval of the Secretary of State, an
4 agency head may detail, for a period of not
5 more than two years, an employee of the
6 agency of the United States Government
7 who has been awarded a fellowship under
8 this Act, to the American Institute in Tai-
9 wan for the purpose of assignment to the
10 governing authorities on Taiwan or an or-
11 ganization described in paragraph
12 (2)(D)(ii)(II).

13 (ii) AGREEMENT.—Each detailee shall
14 enter into a written agreement with the
15 Federal Government before receiving a fel-
16 lowship, in which the fellow shall agree—

17 (I) to continue in the service of
18 the sponsoring agency at the end of
19 fellowship for a period of at least four
20 years (or at least two years if the fel-
21 lowship duration is one year or short-
22 er) unless such detailee is involun-
23 tarily separated from the service of
24 such agency; and

1 (II) to pay to the American Insti-
2 tute in Taiwan any additional ex-
3 penses incurred by the United States
4 Government in connection with the
5 fellowship if the detailee voluntarily
6 separates from service with the spon-
7 soring agency before the end of the
8 period for which the detailee has
9 agreed to continue in the service of
10 such agency.

11 (iii) EXCEPTION.—The payment
12 agreed to under clause (ii)(II) may not be
13 required of a detailee who leaves the serv-
14 ice of the sponsoring agency to enter into
15 the service of another agency of the United
16 States Government unless the head of the
17 sponsoring agency notifies the detailee be-
18 fore the effective date of entry into the
19 service of the other agency that payment
20 will be required under this subsection.

21 (B) STATUS AS GOVERNMENT EM-
22 PLOYEE.—A detailee—

23 (i) is deemed, for the purpose of pre-
24 serving allowances, privileges, rights, se-

1 niority, and other benefits, to be an em-
2 ployee of the sponsoring agency;

3 (ii) is entitled to pay, allowances, and
4 benefits from funds available to such agen-
5 cy, which is deemed to comply with section
6 5536 of title 5, United States Code; and

7 (iii) may be assigned to a position
8 with an entity described in paragraph
9 (2)(D)(ii)(I) if acceptance of such position
10 does not involve—

11 (I) the taking of an oath of alle-
12 giance to another government; or

13 (II) the acceptance of compensa-
14 tion or other benefits from any foreign
15 government by such detailee.

16 (C) RESPONSIBILITIES OF SPONSORING
17 AGENCY.—

18 (i) IN GENERAL.—The agency of the
19 United States Government from which a
20 detailee is detailed should provide the fel-
21 low allowances and benefits that are con-
22 sistent with Department of State Stand-
23 ardized Regulations or other applicable
24 rules and regulations, including—

1 (I) a living quarters allowance to
2 cover the cost of housing in Taiwan;

3 (II) a cost of living allowance to
4 cover any possible higher costs of liv-
5 ing in Taiwan;

6 (III) a temporary quarters sub-
7 sistence allowance for up to seven
8 days if the fellow is unable to find
9 housing immediately upon arriving in
10 Taiwan;

11 (IV) an education allowance to
12 assist parents in providing the fellow's
13 minor children with educational serv-
14 ices ordinarily provided without
15 charge by public schools in the United
16 States;

17 (V) moving expenses to transport
18 personal belongings of the fellow and
19 his or her family in their move to Tai-
20 wan, which is comparable to the al-
21 lowance given for American Institute
22 in Taiwan employees assigned to Tai-
23 wan; and

24 (VI) an economy-class airline
25 ticket to and from Taiwan for each

1 fellow and the fellow's immediate fam-
2 ily.

3 (ii) MODIFICATION OF BENEFITS.—

4 The American Institute in Taiwan and its
5 implementing partner, with the approval of
6 the Department of State, may modify the
7 benefits set forth in clause (i) if such
8 modification is warranted by fiscal cir-
9 cumstances.

10 (D) NO FINANCIAL LIABILITY.—The
11 American Institute in Taiwan, the imple-
12 menting partner, and any governing authorities
13 on Taiwan or nongovernmental entities in Tai-
14 wan at which a fellow is detailed during the sec-
15 ond year of the fellowship may not be held re-
16 sponsible for the pay, allowances, or any other
17 benefit normally provided to the detailee.

18 (E) REIMBURSEMENT.—Fellows may be
19 detailed under clause (A)(ii) without reimburse-
20 ment to the United States by the American In-
21 stitute in Taiwan.

22 (F) ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS.—
23 Detailees may be paid by the American Insti-
24 tute in Taiwan for the allowances and benefits
25 listed in subparagraph (C).

1 (5) GAO REPORT.—Not later than one year
2 prior to the sunset of the Program pursuant to
3 paragraph (2)(F), the Comptroller General of the
4 United States shall transmit to the Committee on
5 Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee
6 on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
7 a report that includes the following:

8 (A) An analysis of United States Govern-
9 ment participants in the Program, including the
10 number of applicants and the number of fellow-
11 ships undertaken, the places of employment.

12 (B) An assessment of the costs and bene-
13 fits for participants in the Program and for the
14 United States Government of such fellowships.

15 (C) An analysis of the financial impact of
16 the fellowship on United States Government of-
17 fices that have detailed fellows to participate in
18 the Program.

19 (D) Recommendations, if any, on how to
20 improve the Program.

21 (6) FUNDING.—

22 (A) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
23 TIONS.—There are authorized to be appro-
24 priated to the American Institute in Taiwan—

1 (i) for fiscal year 2022, \$2,900,000,
2 of which \$500,000 should be used by an
3 appropriate implementing partner to
4 launch the Program; and

5 (ii) for fiscal year 2023, and each suc-
6 ceeding fiscal year, \$2,400,000.

7 (B) PRIVATE SOURCES.—The imple-
8 menting partner selected to implement the Pro-
9 gram may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or
10 donations of services or property in carrying
11 out such program, subject to the review and ap-
12 proval of the American Institute in Taiwan.

13 **SEC. 210. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PER-**
14 **SONNEL AND RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE**
15 **INDO-PACIFIC.**

16 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
17 ings:

18 (1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of
19 State allocated \$1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific
20 region in bilateral and regional foreign assistance
21 (FA) resources, including as authorized by section
22 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of
23 2018 (Public Law 115–409; 132 Stat. 5391), and
24 \$798,000,000 in the fiscal year 2020 diplomatic en-
25 gagement (DE) budget. These amounts represent

1 only 5 percent of the DE budget and only 4 percent
2 of the total Department of State-USAID budget.

3 (2) Over the last 5 years the DE budget and
4 personnel levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5
5 percent of the total, while FA resources averaged
6 only 4 percent of the total.

7 (3) In 2020, the Department of State began a
8 process to realign certain positions at posts to en-
9 sure that its personnel footprint matches the de-
10 mands of great-power competition, including in the
11 Indo-Pacific.

12 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
13 gress that—

14 (1) the size of the United States diplomatic
15 corps must be sufficient to meet the current and
16 emerging challenges of the 21st century, including
17 those in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere;

18 (2) the increase must be designed to meet the
19 objectives of an Indo-Pacific strategy focused on
20 strengthening the good governance and sovereignty
21 of states that adhere to and uphold the rules-based
22 international order; and

23 (3) the increase must be implemented with a
24 focus on increased numbers of economic, political,
25 and public diplomacy officers, representing a cumu-

1 lative increase of at least 200 foreign service officer
2 generalists, to—

3 (A) advance free, fair, and reciprocal trade
4 and open investment environments for United
5 States companies, and engaged in increased
6 commercial diplomacy in key markets;

7 (B) better articulate and explain United
8 States policies, strengthen civil society and
9 democratic principles, enhance reporting on
10 global activities, promote people-to-people ex-
11 changes, and advance United States influence;
12 and

13 (C) increase capacity at small- and me-
14 dium-sized embassies and consulates in the
15 Indo-Pacific and other regions around the
16 world, as necessary.

17 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—

18 (1) It shall be the policy of the United States
19 to ensure Department of State funding levels and
20 personnel footprint in the Indo-Pacific reflect the re-
21 gion’s high degree of importance and significance to
22 United States political, economic, and security inter-
23 ests.

24 (2) It shall be the policy of the United States
25 to increase DE and FA funding and the quantity of

1 personnel dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region re-
2 spective to the Department of State's total budget.

3 (d) ACTION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after
4 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
5 State shall provide to the appropriate committees of Con-
6 gress an action plan with the following elements:

7 (1) Identification of requirements to advance
8 United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific
9 and the personnel and budgetary resources for the
10 Department of State needed to meet them, assuming
11 an unconstrained resource environment.

12 (2) A plan to increase the portion of the De-
13 partment's budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in
14 terms of DE and FA focused on development, eco-
15 nomic, and security assistance.

16 (3) A plan to increase the number of positions
17 at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with
18 responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a
19 description of increases at each post or bureau, a
20 breakdown of increases by cone, and a description of
21 how such increases in personnel will advance United
22 States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.

23 (4) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks
24 that the Department will meet in implementing the
25 action plan.

1 (5) A description of any barriers to imple-
2 menting the action plan.

3 (e) UPDATES TO REPORT AND BRIEFING.—Every
4 180 days after the submission of the action plan described
5 in subsection (c) for no more than 3 years, the Secretary
6 shall submit an update and brief the appropriate commit-
7 tees of Congress on the implementation of such action
8 plan, with supporting data and including a detailed assess-
9 ment of benchmarks reached.

10 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
11 authorized to be appropriated, for fiscal year 2022,
12 \$2,000,000,000, under titles III and IV of the Foreign
13 Assistance Act for the Indo-Pacific region and
14 \$1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement resources to the
15 Indo-Pacific region.

16 (g) INCLUSION OF AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED PURSU-
17 ANT TO ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018.—
18 Amounts authorized to be appropriated under subsection
19 (f) include funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant
20 to section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act
21 of 2018 (Public Law 115–409).

22 (h) SECRETARY OF STATE.—Not later than 2 years
23 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
24 of State should report on the extent to which the bench-

1 marks described in the action plan in subsection (c) have
2 been met or progress has been made.

3 **SEC. 211. DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC EFFORTS TO DETER**
4 **PRC USE OF FORCE AGAINST TAIWAN.**

5 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
6 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
7 tees of Congress” means—

8 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
9 Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-
10 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

11 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
12 Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent
13 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
14 Representatives.

15 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—In order to deter the
16 use of force by the People’s Republic of China to change
17 the status quo on Taiwan, the United States should co-
18 ordinate with allies and partners to identify and develop
19 significant economic and diplomatic measures to deter and
20 impose costs on any such action by the People’s Republic
21 of China.

22 **SEC. 212. REPORT ON BILATERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS**
23 **CHINESE FENTANYL TRAFFICKING.**

24 (a) CHINA’S CLASS SCHEDULING OF FENTANYL AND
25 SYNTHETIC OPIOID PRECURSORS.—Not later than 180

1 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a written report—

4 (1) detailing a description of United States Government efforts to gain a commitment from the Chinese Government to submit unregulated fentanyl precursors such as 4-AP to controls; and

8 (2) detailing a plan for future steps the United States Government will take to urge China to combat illicit fentanyl production and trafficking originating in China.

12 (b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under subsection (c) shall be unclassified with a classified annex.

14 **SEC. 213. FACILITATION OF INCREASED EQUITY INVESTMENTS UNDER THE BETTER UTILIZATION OF INVESTMENTS LEADING TO DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 2018.**

18 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that support provided under section 1421(c)(1) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9621(c)(1)) should be considered to be a Federal credit program that is subject to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.) for purposes of applying the requirements of such Act to such support.

1 (b) MAXIMUM CONTINGENT LIABILITY.—Section
2 1433 of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to
3 Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9633) is amended
4 by striking “\$60,000,000,000” and inserting
5 “\$100,000,000,000”.

6 **SEC. 214. EXPANDING INVESTMENT BY UNITED STATES**
7 **INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE**
8 **CORPORATION FOR VACCINE MANUFAC-**
9 **TURING.**

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Development Finance Cor-
11 poration is authorized to provide financing to entities in
12 India and in other less developed countries to increase vac-
13 cine manufacturing capacity for the following purposes—

14 (1) manufacturing of Stringent Regulatory Au-
15 thorization (SRA) or World Health Organization
16 (WHO) Emergency Use Listing COVID–19 vac-
17 cines;

18 (2) manufacturing of SRA or WHO Emergency
19 Use Listing therapeutics used to treat symptoms re-
20 lated to COVID–19; and

21 (3) manufacturing of critical medical supplies
22 needed for preventing, detecting and treating
23 COVID–19, including ventilators, personal protective
24 equipment (PPE), oxygen, diagnostics, therapeutics
25 and vaccines.

1 (b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180
2 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief
3 Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corpora-
4 tion, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall pro-
5 vide a report to the appropriate congressional commit-
6 tees—

7 (1) outlining the countries where DFC financ-
8 ing could be most impactful for vaccine manufac-
9 turing and to achieve the goal of manufacturing 1
10 billion COVID–19 vaccines by 2022;

11 (2) a detailed explanation of the United States
12 and partner country interests served by the United
13 States providing support to such projects;

14 (3) a detailed description of any support pro-
15 vided by other United States allies and partners to
16 expand the initiatives outlined in subsection (a); and

17 (4) a detailed description of any support pro-
18 vided by China in support of the initiatives outlined
19 in subsection (a).

20 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by sub-
21 section (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form with
22 a classified annex if necessary.

1 **SEC. 215. ENSURING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC POSTS**
2 **ALIGN WITH AMERICAN STRATEGIC NA-**
3 **TIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC OBJEC-**
4 **TIVES.**

5 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—

6 (1) With 276 embassies and other representa-
7 tive offices globally, China now has more diplomatic
8 posts around the world than any other country, in-
9 cluding the United States. Many of Beijing's new
10 missions can be found in countries that recently
11 broke ties with Taiwan (Burkina Faso, the Domini-
12 can Republic, El Salvador, the Gambia, and Sao
13 Tome and Principe) or do not have any United
14 States diplomatic physical presence despite these
15 countries asking for increased United States engage-
16 ment and investment (Antigua and Barbuda and
17 Dominica).

18 (2) It is the sense of Congress, that the Depart-
19 ment of State conduct an assessment of all United
20 States diplomatic posts to verify that they align with
21 its United States national security and economic in-
22 terests, as well as ensuring that these locations posi-
23 tion the United States appropriately with its stra-
24 tegic competitors to advance the national interest in
25 every country worldwide, including those countries
26 currently lacking any physical United States diplo-

1 matic presence whether an embassy, consulate gen-
2 eral, or principal officer post.

3 (b) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the
4 date of the enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter,
5 the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on
6 Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
7 Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report
8 assessing the number, location, and objectives of each of
9 its diplomatic missions and posts worldwide, including an
10 assessment of any gaps that exist compared to other coun-
11 try strategic competitors. The Secretary of State shall co-
12 ordinate with other Department and Agency heads having
13 an overseas presence at any and all United States diplo-
14 matic missions to ensure this assessment reflects all Fed-
15 eral Government equities and viewpoints, and then certify
16 in writing the findings of this assessment.

17 **SEC. 216. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE**
18 **FULBRIGHT-HAYS PROGRAM.**

19 There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 5-
20 year period beginning on October 1, 2021, \$105,500,000,
21 to promote education, training, research, and foreign lan-
22 guage skills through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in ac-
23 cordance with section 102(b) of the Mutual Educational
24 and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).

1 **SEC. 217. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUN-**
2 **TERING DISINFORMATION.**

3 (a) **AUTHORIZATION OF USAGM APPROPRIA-**
4 **TIONS.**—There is authorized to be appropriated, for each
5 of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the United States
6 Agency for Global Media, \$100,000,000 for ongoing and
7 new programs to support local media, build independent
8 media, combat PRC disinformation inside and outside of
9 China, invest in technology to subvert censorship, and
10 monitor and evaluate these programs.

11 (b) **SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MEDIA.**—The Secretary of
12 State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for
13 Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the Adminis-
14 trator of the United States Agency for International De-
15 velopment, acting through the Assistant Administrator for
16 Development, Democracy, and Innovation, shall support
17 and train journalists on investigative techniques necessary
18 to ensure public accountability, promote transparency,
19 fight corruption, and support the ability of the public to
20 develop informed opinions about pressing issues facing
21 their countries.

22 (c) **INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.**—The Bureau
23 of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor shall continue
24 to support internet freedom programs.

25 (d) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There is
26 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State

1 and United States Agency for International Development,
2 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, \$170,000,000
3 for ongoing and new programs in support of press free-
4 dom, training, and protection of journalists. Amounts ap-
5 propriated pursuant to this authorization are authorized
6 to remain available until expended and shall be in addition
7 to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to
8 support press freedom, training, and protection of journal-
9 ists.

10 **SEC. 218. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.**

11 (a) FINDING.—Congress established the Global En-
12 gagement Center to “direct, lead, and coordinate efforts”
13 of the Federal Government to “recognize, understand, ex-
14 pose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda
15 and disinformation globally”.

16 (b) EXTENSION.—Section 1287(j) of the National
17 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22
18 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by striking “the date that
19 is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act”
20 and inserting “December 31, 2027”.

21 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
22 gress that the Global Engagement Center should expand
23 its coordinating capacity of diplomatic messaging through
24 the exchange of liaison officers with Federal departments
25 and agencies that manage aspects of identifying and coun-

1 tering foreign disinformation, including the Office of the
2 Director of National Intelligence and Special Operations
3 Command’s Joint MISO Web Operations Center.

4 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
5 authorized to be appropriated \$150,000,000 for fiscal year
6 2022 for the Global Engagement Center to counter foreign
7 state and non-state sponsored propaganda and
8 disinformation.

9 **Subtitle B—International Security** 10 **Matters**

11 **SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS.**

12 In this subtitle:

13 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON-
14 GRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Con-
15 gress” means—

16 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
17 the Committee on Armed Services, and the
18 Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
19 and

20 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
21 Committee on Armed Services, and the Com-
22 mittee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
23 resentatives.

24 (2) COMPANY.—The term “company” means
25 any corporation, company, limited liability company,

1 limited partnership, business trust, business associa-
2 tion, or other similar entity.

3 (3) OTHER SECURITY FORCES.—The term
4 “other security forces”—

5 (A) includes national security forces that
6 conduct maritime security; and

7 (B) does not include self-described militias
8 or paramilitary organizations.

9 **SEC. 222. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL**
10 **MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE**
11 **INDO-PACIFIC.**

12 There is authorized to be appropriated for each of
13 fiscal years 2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Depart-
14 ment of State, out of amounts appropriated or otherwise
15 made available for assistance under chapter 5 of part II
16 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347
17 et seq.) (relating to international military education and
18 training (IMET) assistance), \$45,000,000 for activities in
19 the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with this Act.

20 **SEC. 223. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM**
21 **OF OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATER-**
22 **WAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC**
23 **AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE**
24 **SOUTH CHINA SEA.**

25 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress—

1 (1) condemns coercive and threatening actions
2 or the use of force to impede freedom of navigation
3 operations in international airspace by military or ci-
4 vilian aircraft, to alter the status quo, or to desta-
5 bilize the Indo-Pacific region;

6 (2) urges the Government of the People’s Re-
7 public of China to refrain from implementing the de-
8 clared East China Sea Air Defense Identification
9 Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea,
10 where contrary to freedom of overflight in inter-
11 national airspace, and to refrain from taking similar
12 provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific re-
13 gion;

14 (3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court
15 of Arbitration decision is final and legally binding on
16 both parties and that the People’s Republic of Chi-
17 na’s claims to offshore resources across most of the
18 South China Sea are unlawful; and

19 (4) condemns the People’s Republic of China
20 for failing to abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of
21 Arbitration ruling, despite the PRC’s obligations as
22 a state party to the United Nations Convention on
23 the Law of the Sea.

24 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
25 of the United States to—

1 (1) reaffirm its commitment and support for al-
2 lies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, includ-
3 ing to the mutual defense treaties with Indo-Pacific
4 allies as referenced elsewhere in this Act;

5 (2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights,
6 freedoms, and lawful use of the sea, or the airspace
7 above it, that are available to all nations, and oppose
8 the militarization of new and reclaimed land features
9 in the South China Sea;

10 (3) continue certain policies with respect to the
11 PRC claims in the South China Sea, namely—

12 (A) that PRC claims in the South China
13 Sea, including to offshore resources across most
14 of the South China Sea, are unlawful;

15 (B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a
16 maritime claim vis-à-vis the Philippines in areas
17 that the Permanent Court of Arbitration found
18 to be in the Philippines' Exclusive Economic
19 Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf;

20 (C) to reject any PRC claim to waters be-
21 yond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived
22 from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands;
23 and

24 (D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial
25 or maritime claim to James Shoal;

1 (4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in
2 destabilizing activities, including environmentally
3 harmful and provocative land reclamation;

4 (5) ensure that disputes are managed without
5 intimidation, coercion, or force;

6 (6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust
7 claims in accordance with international law;

8 (7) uphold the principle that territorial and
9 maritime claims, including territorial waters or terri-
10 torial seas, must derive from land features and oth-
11 erwise comport with international law;

12 (8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regula-
13 tions covering disputed areas in the South China
14 Sea, regulations which have raised tensions in the
15 region;

16 (9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if
17 that Code of Conduct reflects the interests of South-
18 east Asian claimant states and does not serve as a
19 vehicle for the People's Republic of China to advance
20 its unlawful maritime claims;

21 (10) reaffirm that an existing body of inter-
22 national rules and guidelines, including the Inter-
23 national Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
24 Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs),
25 is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation be-

1 tween the United States Armed Forces and the
2 forces of other countries, including the People’s Re-
3 public of China;

4 (11) support the development of regional insti-
5 tutions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional
6 Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting
7 Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded
8 ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical coopera-
9 tion in the region and reinforce the role of inter-
10 national law;

11 (12) encourage the deepening of partnerships
12 with other countries in the region for maritime do-
13 main awareness and capacity building, as well as ef-
14 forts by the United States Government to explore
15 the development of appropriate multilateral mecha-
16 nisms for a “common operating picture” in the
17 South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries
18 that would serve to help countries avoid destabilizing
19 behavior and deter risky and dangerous activities;

20 (13) oppose actions by any country to prevent
21 any other country from exercising its sovereign
22 rights to the resources of the exclusive economic
23 zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by making claims
24 to those areas in the South China Sea that have no
25 support in international law; and

1 (14) assure the continuity of operations by the
2 United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including,
3 when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and
4 allies, to reaffirm freedom of navigation and over-
5 flight and other lawful uses of the sea.

6 **SEC. 224. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO-**
7 **PACIFIC ALLIES AND PARTNERS.**

8 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
9 gress that—

10 (1) the Secretary of State should expand and
11 strengthen existing measures under the United
12 States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide
13 capabilities to allies and partners consistent with
14 agreed-on division of responsibility for alliance roles,
15 missions and capabilities, prioritizing allies and part-
16 ners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with
17 United States strategic imperatives;

18 (2) the United States should design for export
19 to Indo-Pacific allies and partners capabilities crit-
20 ical to maintaining a favorable military balance in
21 the region, including long-range precision fires, air
22 and missile defense systems, anti-ship cruise mis-
23 siles, land attack cruise missiles, conventional
24 hypersonic systems, intelligence, surveillance, and re-
25 connaissance capabilities, and command and control

1 systems consistent with law, regulation, policy, and
2 international commitments;

3 (3) the United States should pursue, to the
4 maximum extent possible, anticipatory technology
5 security and foreign disclosure policy on the systems
6 described in paragraph (2); and

7 (4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with
8 the Secretary of Defense, should—

9 (A) urge allies and partners to invest in
10 sufficient quantities of munitions to meet con-
11 tingency requirements and avoid the need for
12 accessing United States stocks in wartime; and

13 (B) cooperate with allies to deliver such
14 munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies'
15 capacity to produce such munitions.

16 (b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In
17 this section, the term “appropriate committees of Con-
18 gress” means—

19 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
20 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee
21 on Appropriations of the Senate; and

22 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
23 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee
24 on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

25 (c) REPORT.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
2 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
3 of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of
4 Defense, shall submit to the appropriate committees
5 of Congress a report that describes United States
6 priorities for building more capable security partners
7 in the Indo-Pacific region.

8 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report
9 required under paragraph (1) shall—

10 (A) provide a priority list of defense and
11 military capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and
12 partners must possess for the United States to
13 be able to achieve its military objectives in the
14 Indo-Pacific region;

15 (B) identify, from the list referred to in
16 subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best
17 provided, or can only be provided, by the
18 United States;

19 (C) identify—

20 (i) actions required to expedite field-
21 ing the capabilities identified in subpara-
22 graph (B); and

23 (ii) steps needed to fully account for
24 and a plan to integrate all means of
25 United States foreign military sales, direct

1 commercial sales, security assistance, and
2 all applicable authorities of the Depart-
3 ment of State and the Department of De-
4 fense;

5 (D) assess the requirements for United
6 States security assistance, including Inter-
7 national Military Education and Training, in
8 the Indo-Pacific region, as a part of the means
9 to deliver critical partner capability require-
10 ments identified in subparagraph (B);

11 (E) assess the resources necessary to meet
12 the requirements for United States security as-
13 sistance, and identify resource gaps;

14 (F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling
15 requirements for United States security assist-
16 ance in the Indo-Pacific region, including re-
17 sources and personnel limits, foreign legislative
18 and policy barriers, and factors related to spe-
19 cific partner countries;

20 (G) identify limitations on the ability of
21 the United States to provide such capabilities,
22 including those identified under subparagraph
23 (B), because of existing United States treaty
24 obligations, United States policies, or other reg-
25 ulations;

1 (H) recommend improvements to the proc-
2 ess for developing requirements for United
3 States partner capabilities; and

4 (I) identify required jointly agreed rec-
5 ommendations for infrastructure and posture,
6 based on any ongoing mutual dialogues.

7 (3) FORM.—The report required under this
8 subsection shall be unclassified, but may include a
9 classified annex.

10 **Subtitle C—Multilateral Strategies** 11 **to Bolster American Power**

12 **SEC. 231. FINDINGS ON MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT.**

13 Congress finds the following:

14 (1) Every UN member state is legally required
15 to finance the UN’s core budget in order to ensure
16 that these missions are properly resourced, and as-
17 sessment rates are renegotiated every three years by
18 the UN General Assembly.

19 (2) While the United States is the largest single
20 financial contributor to the UN system, the current
21 model is beneficial because it requires all UN mem-
22 ber states, no matter how big or small, to help
23 shoulder the UN’s regular and peacekeeping budgets
24 at specified levels.

1 (3) Failing to meet our financial commitments
2 to the UN also empowers the PRC, which has raised
3 our annual shortfalls to claim we are not a reliable
4 partner and is seeking to leverage its own contribu-
5 tions to the regular budget and peacekeeping in
6 ways that run counter to United States interests and
7 values.

8 (4) The People’s Republic of China is now the
9 second largest financial contributor to UN peace-
10 keeping, having gone from an assessment rate of
11 just 3 percent in 2008 to more than 15 percent
12 today, and is the ninth largest troop-contributor to
13 UN missions, providing more personnel than the
14 other four permanent members of the Security
15 Council combined.

16 (5) With greater engagement comes greater in-
17 fluence, and PRC diplomats have sought to use their
18 expanded clout to push back against the human
19 rights, civilian protection, and gender-based violence
20 aspects of UN peacekeeping mandates, using United
21 States funding shortfalls as a pretext.

22 (6) The PRC has also used its growing clout to
23 fill key posts at UN agencies: Chinese nationals cur-
24 rently occupy the top posts of four of the UN’s 15

1 specialized agencies, while the United States occu-
2 pies only one.

3 (7) From 2021 to 2022, there will be 15 elec-
4 tions for the heads of UN specialized agencies and
5 five for major UN funds and programs. With the ex-
6 ception of the World Food Programme, none are
7 currently led by Americans.

8 (8) A 2020 Department of State Inspector Gen-
9 eral Inspection found that the Bureau for Inter-
10 national Organizations did not have a standard oper-
11 ating procedure for tracking and promoting the em-
12 ployment of American Citizens in the UN system,
13 and their recommendation to the department to es-
14 tablish one remains open.

15 **SEC. 232. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON AMERICA'S MULTI-**
16 **LATERAL ENGAGEMENT.**

17 It is the policy of the United States that—

18 (1) the Special Representative of the United
19 States to the United Nations serves as a standing
20 member of the cabinet;

21 (2) assessed dues to multilateral organizations
22 be paid in full in a timely fashion;

23 (3) Federal agencies utilize all the authorities
24 under section 3343 of title 5, United States Code,
25 and subpart C of title 5, Code of Federal Regula-

1 tions: Detail and Transfer of Federal Employees to
2 International Organizations to detail or transfer em-
3 ployees to relevant international organizations;

4 (4) the Secretary of State shall assist the De-
5 partment of State and other Federal agencies in car-
6 rying out paragraph (3) to the fullest extent;

7 (5) the Secretary of State shall support quali-
8 fied American candidates in their bid to win election
9 to UN-related leadership positions; and

10 (6) the Secretary of State shall support the
11 placement of Junior Professional Officers (JPOs)
12 sponsored by the United States in UN-affiliated
13 agencies.

14 **SEC. 233. SUPPORT FOR AMERICANS AT THE UNITED NA-**
15 **TIONS.**

16 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State is au-
17 thorized to establish within the Department of State’s Bu-
18 reau of International Organization Affairs (IO) an Office
19 for American Citizens.

20 (b) DUTIES.—The office established under subsection
21 (a) of this section will be responsible for—

22 (1) advocating for the employment of American
23 citizens by all international organizations of which
24 the United States is a member, including the United

1 Nations and any of its agencies, offices, and other
2 affiliated entities;

3 (2) coordinating the interagency support of
4 non-American candidates for leadership roles within
5 all international organizations of which the United
6 States is a member, including the United Nations
7 and any of its agencies, offices, and other affiliated
8 entities, when—

9 (A) no American candidate has been nomi-
10 nated for election; and

11 (B) it is determined that providing such
12 support is in the interest of the United States;

13 (3) establishing and implementing a standard
14 operating procedure for the promotion and efficient
15 tracking of United States citizen employment at the
16 United Nations and other international organiza-
17 tions that includes Mission Geneva;

18 (4) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations
19 jobs and identifying qualified Americans and other
20 qualified nationals to promote for these positions;

21 (5) tracking leadership changes in United Na-
22 tions secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies, and
23 developing strategies to ensure that coalitions of
24 likeminded states are assembled to ensure leadership

1 races are not won by countries that do not share
2 United States interests;

3 (6) eliminating current barriers to the employ-
4 ment of United States nationals in the United Na-
5 tions Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies;
6 and

7 (7) increasing the number of qualified United
8 States candidates for leadership and oversight posi-
9 tions at the United Nations Secretariat, funds, pro-
10 grams, agencies, and at other international organiza-
11 tions.

12 **SEC. 234. REPORT ON AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT IN INTER-**
13 **NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.**

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
15 date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter,
16 the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of
17 other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate,
18 shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional
19 committees a report on how many Federal employees are
20 currently detailed or transferred to an international orga-
21 nization during the immediately preceding 12-month pe-
22 riod and a one-time strategy for increasing the number
23 of Federal employees so detailed or transferred.

24 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report re-
25 quired by subsection (a) shall include the following:

1 (1) The number of Federal employees detailed
2 or transferred to an international organization under
3 section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, and sub-
4 part C of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations: De-
5 tail and Transfer of Federal Employees to Inter-
6 national Organizations, and—

7 (A) an identification of the Federal agency
8 from which such employees were detailed or
9 transferred; and

10 (B) an identification of the international
11 organizations to and from which such employ-
12 ees have been detailed or transferred.

13 (2) A list of international organizations to and
14 from which the United States previously detailed or
15 transferred Federal employees.

16 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
17 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
18 sional committees” means—

19 (1) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
20 House of Representatives; and

21 (2) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the
22 Senate.

1 **Subtitle D—Regional Strategies To**
2 **Bolster American Power**

3 **SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH**
4 **ALLIES AND PARTNERS AROUND THE WORLD.**

5 It is the policy of the United States—

6 (1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships
7 with like-minded countries around the globe; and

8 (2) to work in collaboration with such allies and
9 partners—

10 (A) to address significant diplomatic, eco-
11 nomic, and military challenges posed by the
12 People’s Republic of China;

13 (B) to deter the People’s Republic of
14 China from pursuing military aggression;

15 (C) to promote the peaceful resolution of
16 territorial disputes in accordance with inter-
17 national law;

18 (D) to promote private sector-led long-term
19 economic development while countering efforts
20 by the Government of the People’s Republic of
21 China to leverage predatory economic practices
22 as a means of political and economic coercion in
23 the Indo-Pacific region and beyond;

24 (E) to promote the values of democracy
25 and human rights, including through efforts to

1 end the repression by the People’s Republic of
2 China of political dissidents, Uyghurs and other
3 Muslim minorities, Tibetan Buddhists, Chris-
4 tians, and other ethnic minorities;

5 (F) to respond to the crackdown by the
6 People’s Republic of China, in contravention of
7 the commitments made under the Sino-British
8 Joint Declaration of 1984 and the Basic Law
9 of Hong Kong, on the legitimate aspirations of
10 the people of Hong Kong; and

11 (G) to counter the Chinese Government’s
12 efforts to spread disinformation in China and
13 beyond with respect to its response to COVID-
14 19.

15 **PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE**

16 **SEC. 242. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED**
17 **STATES-CANADA RELATIONS.**

18 It is the sense of Congress that—

19 (1) the United States and Canada have a
20 unique relationship based on shared geography, ex-
21 tensive personal connections, deep economic ties,
22 mutual defense commitments, and a shared vision to
23 uphold democracy, human rights, and the rules
24 based international order established after World
25 War II;

1 (2) the United States and Canada can better
2 address the People’s Republic of China’s economic,
3 political, and security influence through closer co-
4 operation on counternarcotics, environmental stew-
5 ardship, transparent practices in public procurement
6 and infrastructure planning, the Arctic, energy and
7 connectivity issues, trade and commercial relations,
8 bilateral legal matters, and support for democracy,
9 good governance, and human rights;

10 (3) amidst the COVID–19 pandemic, the
11 United States and Canada should maintain joint ini-
12 tiatives to address border management, commercial
13 and trade relations and infrastructure, a shared ap-
14 proach with respect to the People’s Republic of
15 China, and transnational challenges, including
16 pandemics, energy security, and environmental stew-
17 ardship;

18 (4) the United States and Canada should en-
19 hance cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation,
20 influence operations, economic espionage, and propa-
21 ganda efforts;

22 (5) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastruc-
23 ture investments, particularly in 5G telecommuni-
24 cations technology, extraction of natural resources,

1 and port infrastructure, pose national security risks
2 for the United States and Canada;

3 (6) the United States should share, as appropriate,
4 intelligence gathered regarding—

5 (A) Huawei’s 5G capabilities; and

6 (B) the PRC government’s intentions with
7 respect to 5G expansion;

8 (7) the United States and Canada should continue
9 to advance collaborative initiatives to implement
10 the January 9, 2020, United States-Canada
11 Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals Development
12 Collaboration; and

13 (8) the United States and Canada must
14 prioritize cooperation on continental defense and in
15 the Arctic, including by modernizing the North
16 American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
17 sensor architecture to provide effective warning and
18 tracking of threats by peer competitors, including
19 long-range missiles and high-precision weapons, to
20 the Northern Hemisphere.

21 **SEC. 243. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE GOVERN-**
22 **MENT OF CHINA’S ARBITRARY IMPRISON-**
23 **MENT OF CANADIAN CITIZENS.**

24 It is the sense of Congress that—

1 (1) the Government of the People’s Republic of
2 China’s apparent arbitrary detention and abusive
3 treatment of Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and
4 Michael Kovrig in apparent retaliation for the Gov-
5 ernment of Canada’s arrest of Meng Wanzhou is
6 deeply concerning;

7 (2) the Government of Canada has shown inter-
8 national leadership by—

9 (A) upholding the rule of law and com-
10 plying with its international legal obligations,
11 including those pursuant to the Extradition
12 Treaty Between the United States of America
13 and Canada, signed at Washington December
14 3, 1971; and

15 (B) launching the Declaration Against Ar-
16 bitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations,
17 which has been endorsed by 57 countries and
18 the European Union, and reaffirms well-estab-
19 lished prohibitions under international human
20 rights conventions against the arbitrary deten-
21 tion of foreign nationals to be used as leverage
22 in state-to-state relations; and

23 (3) the United States continues to join the Gov-
24 ernment of Canada in calling for the immediate re-
25 lease of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and for

1 due process for Canadian national Robert
2 Schellenberg.

3 **SEC. 244. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH**
4 **CANADA.**

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
6 date of the enactment of this Act, the President should
7 submit a strategy to the appropriate congressional com-
8 mittees, and the Committees on Armed Services of the
9 Senate and the House of Representatives, that describes
10 how the United States will enhance cooperation with the
11 Government of Canada in managing relations with the
12 PRC government.

13 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
14 section (a) shall—

15 (1) identify key policy points of convergence
16 and divergence between the United States and Can-
17 ada in managing relations with the People’s Repub-
18 lic of China in the areas of technology, trade, eco-
19 nomic practices, cyber security, secure supply chains
20 and critical minerals, and illicit narcotics;

21 (2) include a description of United States devel-
22 opment and coordination efforts with Canadian
23 counterparts to enhance the cooperation between the
24 United States and Canada with respect to—

1 (A) managing economic relations with the
2 People’s Republic of China;

3 (B) democracy and human rights in the
4 People’s Republic of China;

5 (C) technology issues involving the Peo-
6 ple’s Republic of China;

7 (D) defense issues involving the People’s
8 Republic of China; and

9 (E) international law enforcement and
10 transnational organized crime issues.

11 (3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to
12 work with Canada to counter the PRC’s projection
13 of an authoritarian governing model around the
14 world;

15 (4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence
16 cooperation to date and future plans to support Ca-
17 nadian efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives
18 to Huawei’s 5G technology;

19 (5) detail diplomatic and defense collabora-
20 tion—

21 (A) to advance joint United States-Cana-
22 dian priorities for responsible stewardship in
23 the Arctic Region; and

1 (B) to counter the PRC's efforts to project
2 political, economic, and military influence into
3 the Arctic Region; and

4 (6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Can-
5 ada to track and counter the PRC's attempts to
6 exert influence across the multilateral system.

7 (c) FORM.—The strategy required under this section
8 shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be
9 made available to the public, but may include a classified
10 annex, if necessary.

11 (d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after
12 the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less fre-
13 quently than every 180 days thereafter for 5 years, the
14 Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate con-
15 gressional committees, and the Committees on Armed
16 Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
17 regarding the development and implementation of the
18 strategy required under this section.

19 **SEC. 245. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COM-**
20 **PETITIVENESS, GOVERNANCE, HUMAN**
21 **RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN**
22 **AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.**

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
24 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
25 in consultation, as appropriate, with the Secretary of the

1 Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator
2 of USAID, the Attorney General, the United States Trade
3 Representative, and the Chief Executive Officer of the
4 United States International Development Finance Cor-
5 poration, shall submit a multi-year strategy for increasing
6 United States economic competitiveness and promoting
7 good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in
8 Latin American and Caribbean countries, particularly in
9 the areas of investment, equitable, inclusive, and sustain-
10 able development, commercial relations, anti-corruption
11 activities, and infrastructure projects, to—

12 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
13 Senate;

14 (2) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;

15 (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the
16 Senate;

17 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
18 House of Representatives;

19 (5) the Committee on Ways and Means of the
20 House of Representatives; and

21 (6) the Committee on Appropriations of the
22 House of Representatives.

23 (b) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The strategy required
24 under subsection (a) shall include a plan of action, includ-
25 ing benchmarks to achieve measurable progress, to—

1 (1) enhance the technical capacity of countries
2 in the region to advance the sustainable and inclu-
3 sive development of equitable economies;

4 (2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between
5 the countries of the Americas;

6 (3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and
7 competitive environment for United States busi-
8 nesses in the region;

9 (4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to re-
10 view long term financial sustainability and security
11 implications of foreign investments in strategic sec-
12 tors or services, including transportation, commu-
13 nications, natural resources, and energy;

14 (5) establish competitive, transparent, and in-
15 clusive infrastructure project selection and procure-
16 ment processes that promote transparency, supplier
17 diversity, open competition, financial sustainability,
18 adherence to robust global standards, and the em-
19 ployment of a diverse local workforce and manage-
20 ment;

21 (6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust
22 democratic governance, fair competition, combatting
23 corruption, and ending impunity; and

1 (7) enhance transparent, affordable, and equi-
2 table access to the internet and digital infrastructure
3 in the Western Hemisphere.

4 (c) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 1 year
5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
6 thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, after con-
7 sultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary
8 of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States
9 Trade Representative, and the leadership of the United
10 States International Development Finance Corporation,
11 shall brief the congressional committees listed in sub-
12 section (a) regarding the implementation of this part, in-
13 cluding examples of successes and challenges.

14 **SEC. 246. ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-**
15 **TIONS AND THE DEFENSE SECTOR IN LATIN**
16 **AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.**

17 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
18 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
19 tees of Congress” means—

20 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
21 Senate;

22 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
23 Senate;

24 (3) the Committee on Armed Services of the
25 Senate;

1 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
2 House of Representatives;

3 (5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
4 ligence of the House of Representatives; and

5 (6) the Committee on Armed Services of the
6 House of Representatives.

7 (b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
9 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
10 of State, in coordination with the Director of Na-
11 tional Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intel-
12 ligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency,
13 shall submit a report to the appropriate congress-
14 sional committees that assesses the nature, intent,
15 and impact to United States strategic interests of
16 Chinese diplomatic activity aimed at influencing the
17 decisions, procedures, and programs of multilateral
18 organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean,
19 including the World Bank, International Monetary
20 Fund, Organization of American States, and the
21 Inter-American Development Bank.

22 (2) DEFENSE SECTOR.—The report required
23 under paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of
24 the nature, intent, and impact on United States
25 strategic interests of Chinese military activity in

1 Latin America and the Caribbean, including military
2 education and training programs, weapons sales, and
3 space-related activities in the military or civilian
4 spheres, such as—

5 (A) the satellite and space control station
6 the People’s Republic of China constructed in
7 Argentina; and

8 (B) defense and security cooperation car-
9 ried out by the People’s Republic of China in
10 Latin America and the Caribbean, including
11 sales of surveillance and monitoring technology
12 to governments in the region such as Venezuela,
13 Cuba, Ecuador, and Colombia, and the poten-
14 tial use of such technologies as tools of Chinese
15 intelligence services.

16 (3) FORM.—The report required under para-
17 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form
18 and shall include classified annexes.

19 **SEC. 247. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND**
20 **THE CARIBBEAN.**

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appro-
22 priated to the Department of State \$13,500,000 for the
23 International Military Education and Training Program
24 for Latin America and the Caribbean for each of fiscal
25 years 2022 through 2026.

1 (b) MODERNIZATION.—The Secretary of State shall
2 take steps to modernize and strengthen the programs re-
3 ceiving funding under subsection (a) to ensure that such
4 programs are vigorous, substantive, and the preeminent
5 choice for international military education and training for
6 Latin American and Caribbean partners.

7 (c) REQUIRED ELEMENTS.—The programs referred
8 to in subsection (a) shall—

9 (1) provide training and capacity-building op-
10 portunities to Latin American and Caribbean secu-
11 rity services;

12 (2) provide practical skills and frameworks
13 for—

14 (A) improving the functioning and organi-
15 zation of security services in Latin America and
16 the Caribbean;

17 (B) creating a better understanding of the
18 United States and its values; and

19 (C) using technology for maximum effi-
20 ciency and organization; and

21 (3) promote and ensure that security services in
22 Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian
23 authority and operate in compliance with inter-
24 national norms, standards, and rules of engagement,

1 including a respect for human rights, and full com-
2 pliance with Leahy Law requirements.

3 (d) LIMITATION.—Security assistance under this sec-
4 tion is subject to limitations as enshrined in the require-
5 ments of section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of
6 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d).

7 **SEC. 248. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN**
8 **AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGARDING**
9 **ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE**
10 **RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECH-**
11 **NOLOGIES.**

12 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
13 gress that—

14 (1) the Government of the People’s Republic of
15 China is exporting its model for internal security
16 and state control of society through advanced tech-
17 nology and artificial intelligence; and

18 (2) the inclusion of communication networks
19 and communications supply chains with equipment
20 and services from companies with close ties to or
21 that are susceptible to pressure from governments or
22 security services without reliable legal checks on gov-
23 ernmental powers can lead to breaches of citizens’
24 private information, increased censorship, violations

1 of human rights, and harassment of political oppo-
2 nents.

3 (b) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of
4 State shall conduct diplomatic engagement with govern-
5 ments and civil society organizations in Latin America and
6 the Caribbean to—

7 (1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil
8 liberties posed by technologies and services described
9 in subsection (a); and

10 (2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate
11 such risks.

12 (c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Chief Ex-
13 ecutive Officer of the United States Agency for Global
14 Media, who may work through the Open Technology
15 Fund, and the Secretary of State, working through the
16 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Inter-
17 net Freedom and Business and Human Rights Section,
18 shall expand and prioritize efforts to provide anti-censor-
19 ship technology and services to journalists in Latin Amer-
20 ica and the Caribbean, in order to enhance their ability
21 to safely access or share digital news and information.

22 (d) SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY.—The Secretary of
23 State, in coordination with the Administrator of the
24 United States Agency for International Development, shall
25 work through nongovernmental organizations to—

1 (1) support and promote programs that support
2 internet freedom and the free flow of information
3 online in Latin America and the Caribbean;

4 (2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reli-
5 able access to internet in Latin America and the
6 Caribbean;

7 (3) provide integrated support to civil society
8 for technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy,
9 and applied research programs in Latin America
10 and the Caribbean;

11 (4) train journalists and civil society leaders in
12 Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative
13 techniques necessary to ensure public accountability
14 and prevent government overreach in the digital
15 sphere;

16 (5) assist independent media outlets and jour-
17 nalists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build
18 their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth
19 news reports covering governance and human rights
20 topics;

21 (6) provide training for journalists and civil so-
22 ciety leaders on investigative techniques necessary to
23 improve transparency and accountability in govern-
24 ment and the private sector;

1 (7) provide training on investigative reporting
2 of incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business
3 and commercial practices;

4 (8) assist nongovernmental organizations to
5 strengthen their capacity to monitor the activities
6 described in paragraph (7); and

7 (9) identify local resources to support the pre-
8 ponderance of activities that would be carried out
9 under this subsection.

10 **SEC. 249. CARIBBEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE AS ALTER-**
11 **NATIVE TO CHINA'S BELT AND ROAD INITIA-**
12 **TIVE.**

13 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
14 ings:

15 (1) The countries of the Caribbean are heavily
16 reliant upon imported oil to provide for approxi-
17 mately 90 percent of their energy production.

18 (2) The level of dependence is even higher in-
19 cluding—

20 (A) Jamaica, which relies on oil for 95.9
21 percent of its electricity;

22 (B) Barbados, which relies on oil for 96
23 percent of its electricity;

24 (C) the Virgin Islands, which relies on oil
25 for nearly 100 percent of its electricity; and

1 (D) St. Lucia, which relies on oil for 100
2 percent of its electricity.

3 (3) Overreliance on imported fossil fuels has
4 had a detrimental effect on economic development,
5 growth, and competitiveness in the Caribbean.

6 (4) Since 1970, more than 80 percent of Carib-
7 bean coral reefs have been lost due to coastal devel-
8 opment and pollution. Soot particulates and climate
9 change caused by burning fossil fuels have seriously
10 damaged coral reefs, which are a significant source
11 of tourism dollars, fishing, biodiversity, and natural
12 beauty.

13 (5) Air pollution caused by burning oil for elec-
14 tricity—

15 (A) has serious health impacts in the form
16 of higher rates of asthma and other lung ail-
17 ments; and

18 (B) can also exacerbate climate change.

19 (6) The Caribbean region is particularly vulner-
20 able to sea level rise and stronger storms.

21 (7) Between 2005 and 2018, the dependence of
22 the countries of the Caribbean on oil was perpet-
23 uated by the Venezuelan-led Petrocaribe oil alliance,
24 which—

1 (A) offered preferential terms for oil sales;
2 and

3 (B) supplies some countries with up to 40
4 percent of their energy production needs.

5 (8) The ongoing domestic economic crisis and
6 political turmoil in Venezuela has forced the Govern-
7 ment of Venezuela to retract its commitments to the
8 Petrocaribe oil alliance and step away as a regional
9 power. Only Cuba still receives preferential
10 Petrocaribe pricing on fuel exports from Venezuela,
11 while other Petrocaribe member countries are experi-
12 encing a destabilized flow of oil.

13 (9) China has spent more than
14 \$244,000,000,000 on energy projects worldwide
15 since 2000, 25 percent of which was spent in Latin
16 America and the Caribbean. Although the majority
17 of this spending was for oil, gas, and coal, China has
18 also been the largest investor in clean energy glob-
19 ally for almost a decade.

20 (10) The World Bank estimates that the Carib-
21 bean will need \$12,000,000,000 in power invest-
22 ments through 2035.

23 (11) Renewable energy technology costs have
24 decreased dramatically in recent years, offering a
25 more viable economic alternative for energy produc-

1 tion. Solar energy prices have fallen by 80 percent
2 since 2008, causing significant market growth, and
3 according to data released by the International Re-
4 newable Energy Agency, $\frac{1}{3}$ of global power capacity
5 is based in renewable energy.

6 (12) In 2016, the International Monetary Fund
7 estimated that transportation accounted for 36 per-
8 cent of the total primary energy consumed in the
9 Caribbean subregion.

10 (13) According to the United Nations Environ-
11 ment Programme, Latin America and the Caribbean
12 could achieve annual savings of \$621,000,000,000
13 and a reduction of 1,100,000,000 tons of CO₂ by
14 2050 if the region's energy and transport sectors
15 reach net zero emissions.

16 (14) The Caribbean has an abundance of on-
17 shore and offshore resources needed for renewable
18 energy, including sun, wind, geothermal, and some
19 hydropower production capacity.

20 (15) The United States Government is deeply
21 engaged in providing technical and policy assistance
22 to countries of the Caribbean on energy issues
23 through—

24 (A) the Energy and Climate Partnership of
25 the Americas;

1 (B) Connecting the Americas 2022; and
2 (C) bilateral assistance programs.

3 (16) On February 19, 2014, at the North
4 American Leaders' Summit, President Barack
5 Obama, Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada,
6 and President Enrique Peña Nieto of Mexico re-
7 affirmed their commitment to bring affordable, reli-
8 able, and increasingly renewable power to the Carib-
9 bean, while opening wider markets for clean energy
10 and green technology.

11 (17) On June 19, 2015, President Barack
12 Obama announced the Caribbean Energy Security
13 Initiative, which would partner with individual coun-
14 tries—

15 (A) to transform its energy sector;

16 (B) to work to increase access to finance,
17 good governance, and diversification; and

18 (C) to maximize the impact of existing
19 donor effects.

20 (18) On May 4, 2016, at the United States-
21 Caribbean-Central American Energy Summit, the
22 energy security task force formally launched the
23 Caribbean Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strat-
24 egy (C-SERMS) as a mechanism to manage re-
25 gional coordination and action on energy security

1 and agreed to expand the regional market and trans-
2 mission system.

3 (19) The United States has an important op-
4 portunity—

5 (A) to deepen this engagement;

6 (B) to work as a partner with Caribbean
7 countries on a more regional and coordinated
8 basis;

9 (C) to help ease the region’s dependence
10 on imported oil; and

11 (D) to promote affordable alternative
12 sources of energy.

13 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

14 (1) CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES.—The term “Carib-
15 bean countries” means countries in the Caribbean
16 region, but does not including Cuba or Venezuela.

17 (2) CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS.—The term
18 “Caribbean governments” means the national gov-
19 ernments of the Caribbean countries.

20 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
21 United States to help Caribbean countries—

22 (1) achieve greater energy security and improve
23 domestic energy resource mobilization;

24 (2) lower their dependence on imported fuels;

1 (3) eliminate the use of diesel, heavy fuel oil,
2 other petroleum products, and coal for the genera-
3 tion of electricity;

4 (4) increase production of renewable energy;
5 and

6 (5) meet the greenhouse gas mitigation goals of
7 their national determined contributions to the Paris
8 Agreement.

9 (d) STRATEGY.—

10 (1) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 120 days
11 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
12 retary of State, in coordination with the Adminis-
13 trator of USAID, shall submit a multi-year strategy
14 to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
15 ate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
16 House of Representatives that describes how the De-
17 partment of State will promote regional cooperation
18 with Caribbean countries—

19 (A) to lower dependence on imported fuels,
20 grow domestic clean energy production in the
21 region, strengthen regional energy security, and
22 lower energy sector greenhouse gas emissions;

23 (B) to decrease dependence on oil in the
24 transportation sector;

1 (C) to increase energy efficiency, energy
2 conservation, and investment in alternatives to
3 imported fuels;

4 (D) to improve grid reliability and mod-
5 ernize electricity transmission networks;

6 (E) to advance deployment of innovative
7 solutions to expand community and individuals'
8 access to electricity;

9 (F) to help reform energy markets to en-
10 courage good regulatory governance and to pro-
11 mote a climate of private sector investment; and

12 (G) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions
13 from the energy and transportation sector.

14 (2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under
15 subsection (a) shall include—

16 (A) a thorough review and inventory of
17 United States Government activities that are
18 being carried out bilaterally, regionally, and in
19 coordination with multilateral institutions—

20 (i) to promote energy and climate se-
21 curity in the Caribbean region; and

22 (ii) to reduce the region's reliance on
23 oil for electricity generation;

24 (B) opportunities for marshaling regional
25 cooperation—

- 1 (i) to overcome market barriers result-
2 ing from the small size of Caribbean en-
3 ergy markets;
- 4 (ii) to address the high transportation
5 and infrastructure costs faced by Carib-
6 bean countries;
- 7 (iii) to ensure greater donor coordina-
8 tion between governments, multilateral in-
9 stitutions, multilateral banks, and private
10 investors; and
- 11 (iv) to expand regional financing op-
12 portunities to allow for lower cost energy
13 entrepreneurship;
- 14 (C) measures to ensure that each Carib-
15 bean government has—
- 16 (i) an independent utility regulator or
17 equivalent;
- 18 (ii) affordable access by third party
19 investors to its electrical grid with minimal
20 regulatory interference;
- 21 (iii) effective energy efficiency and en-
22 ergy conservation;
- 23 (iv) programs to address technical and
24 nontechnical issues;

1 (v) a plan to eliminate major market
2 distortions;

3 (vi) cost-reflective tariffs; and

4 (vii) no tariffs or other taxes on clean
5 energy solutions; and

6 (D) recommendations for how United
7 States policy, technical, and economic assist-
8 ance can be used in the Caribbean region—

9 (i) to advance renewable energy devel-
10 opment and the incorporation of renewable
11 technologies into existing energy grids and
12 the development and deployment of micro-
13 grids where appropriate and feasible to
14 boost energy security and reliability, par-
15 ticularly to underserved communities;

16 (ii) to increase the generation of clean
17 energy sufficiently to replace and allow for
18 the retirement of obsolete fossil fuel energy
19 generation units in Caribbean countries;

20 (iii) to create regional financing op-
21 portunities to allow for lower cost energy
22 entrepreneurship;

23 (iv) to deploy transaction advisors in
24 the region to help attract private invest-

1 ment and break down any market or regu-
2 latory barriers; and

3 (v) to establish a mechanism for each
4 host government to have access to inde-
5 pendent legal advice—

6 (I) to speed the development of
7 energy-related contracts; and

8 (II) to better protect the inter-
9 ests of Caribbean governments and
10 citizens.

11 (3) CONSULTATION.—In devising the strategy
12 under this subsection, the Secretary of State shall
13 work with the Secretary of Energy and shall consult
14 with—

15 (A) the Secretary of the Interior;

16 (B) the Secretary of Commerce;

17 (C) the Secretary of the Treasury;

18 (D) the Board of Directors of the Export-
19 Import Bank of the United States;

20 (E) the Board of Directors of the Develop-
21 ment Finance Corporation;

22 (F) the Administrator of the United States
23 Agency for International Development;

24 (G) the Caribbean governments;

1 (H) the Inter-American Development
2 Bank;

3 (I) the World Bank Group; and

4 (J) the Caribbean Electric Utility Services
5 Corporation.

6 **SEC. 250. U.S.-CARIBBEAN RESILIENCE PARTNERSHIP.**

7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
8 ings:

9 (1) The United States shares with the Carib-
10 bean a collective vulnerability to natural disasters,
11 which affects the lives and the economies of our citi-
12 zens.

13 (2) The April 9, 2021, eruption of the La
14 Soufriere volcano is another reminder of the devas-
15 tation caused by the many natural disasters the Car-
16ibbean confronts each year and the region’s vulner-
17 ability to external shocks. Hurricane Dorian, the
18 largest storm to hit the region, wiped out large parts
19 of the northern Bahamas in 2019, and Hurricanes
20 Maria and Irma devastated multiple islands across
21 the region in 2017, including Puerto Rico. According
22 to IMF research, of the 511 plus disasters worldwide
23 to hit small states since 1950, around two-thirds
24 (324) have been in the Caribbean.

1 (3) This region is seven times more likely to ex-
2 perience a natural disaster than elsewhere. And,
3 when one occurs, it will incur as much as six times
4 more damage.

5 (4) Extreme weather events and other environ-
6 mental impacts will only worsen over the coming
7 years, and if not addressed, we will see only increas-
8 ing economic shocks on these countries, driving ir-
9 regular migration.

10 (5) While the United States has considerable
11 expertise and capacity in assisting countries with
12 disaster response, there remains a need for stronger
13 partnerships that build regional resilience through
14 efficient and interoperable platforms, protecting peo-
15 ple and speeding recovery.

16 (6) The People's Republic of China has dra-
17 matically increased its engagement in the Caribbean
18 in the past five years, including offering loans and
19 grants related to disaster response and resilience
20 and sought to acquire property rights in the Carib-
21 bean that would be detrimental to United States na-
22 tional security interests.

23 (7) In 2019, the United States launched a new
24 U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership to deepen co-
25 operation and investment to strengthen our disaster

1 resilience throughout the Caribbean region, includ-
2 ing—

3 (A) to streamline early warning response
4 networks and formalize communication chan-
5 nels;

6 (B) to enhance, encourage, and work col-
7 laboratively on further developing aviation dis-
8 aster resilience plans and partnerships;

9 (C) to prioritize regional technical ex-
10 change in energy planning, risk reduction, and
11 resilience;

12 (D) to increase communications network
13 interoperability between Caribbean partners and
14 the United States;

15 (E) to utilize storm surge mapping data
16 and share real-time information in preparation
17 for potential damage resulting from tropical cy-
18 clones and tsunamis;

19 (F) to use meteorological services to
20 strengthen and deepen physical and commu-
21 nications infrastructure, data collection net-
22 works, and human and technical capacity
23 throughout the region, as well as interactions
24 with the public;

1 (G) to understand that while the use of
2 international and military and civil defense as-
3 sets in disaster response may only be considered
4 as a last resort, when local, national, and inter-
5 national civilian capabilities are overwhelmed,
6 civil-military coordination should occur, in sup-
7 port of the affected nation;

8 (H) to develop a framework that would
9 govern the deployment of international military
10 and civil defense assets in disaster response
11 when local, national, and international civilian
12 capabilities are overwhelmed, in support of the
13 affected nation;

14 (I) to seek common mechanisms for ensur-
15 ing rapid disaster response and recovery, in-
16 cluding waiving or expediting diplomatic clear-
17 ances, waiving of or reducing customs fees,
18 streamlining overflight and airspace clearance,
19 and ensuring that the first responders have the
20 ability to rapidly respond to disasters in other
21 countries;

22 (J) to promote the integration and coordi-
23 nation of regional response mechanisms in the
24 Caribbean, including through the Caribbean
25 Disaster Emergency Management Agency, the

1 Regional Security System, United States Gov-
2 ernment Agencies, and allies in ways that facili-
3 tate more effective and efficient planning, miti-
4 gation, response, and resilience to natural disas-
5 ters;

6 (K) to share best practices in improved
7 building codes with national disaster organiza-
8 tions, including building better programs, at re-
9 gional, national and community levels; and

10 (L) to promote community-based disaster
11 preparedness and mitigation activities, particu-
12 larly in underserved communities, with the aim
13 of increasing broad public participation and re-
14 siliance.

15 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to
16 help Caribbean countries—

17 (1) increase their resilience and adapt to nat-
18 ural disasters and the impacts of severe weather
19 events and a changing environment;

20 (2) partner with United States Federal, State,
21 and local agencies and engage in technical coopera-
22 tion, dialogue, and assistance activities;

23 (3) harmonize standards and practices related
24 to paragraphs (1) and (2) to promote increased in-
25 vestment and integration;

1 (4) increase investment from United States
2 companies in the Caribbean on resilience-building,
3 adaptation, and climate-related mitigation efforts;

4 (5) promote regional cooperation and ensure ef-
5 forts by the United States, Caribbean countries, and
6 international partners complement each other; and

7 (6) further assist with the efforts listed under
8 subsection (a)(7) above.

9 (c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the
10 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
11 in coordination with other departments and agencies shall
12 submit a multi-year strategy to the Committee on Foreign
13 Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign
14 Affairs of the House of Representatives that describes how
15 the Department of State will achieve the policy described
16 in subsection (b) above.

17 (d) APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be
18 appropriated for U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership
19 activities, programs, technical assistance, and engagement
20 the following:

21 (1) \$20,000,000 for fiscal year 2022.

22 (2) \$25,000,000 for fiscal year 2023.

23 (3) \$30,000,000 for fiscal year 2024 and there-
24 after.

25 (e) REPORTING AND MONITORING.—

1 (1) Of the appropriated amount each fiscal
2 year, at least five percent of all programming fund-
3 ing allocation must support and be directed toward
4 reporting, monitoring, and assessment of effective-
5 ness.

6 (2) The Department of State will ensure that at
7 least 20 percent of appropriations for the U.S.-Car-
8ibbean Resilience Partnership directly support the
9 training of, engagement with, collaboration with, and
10 exchange of expertise on resilience between United
11 States Federal, State, and local officials and their
12 Caribbean government counterparts. Funding should
13 also support as appropriate increased academic, civil
14 society, media, and private sector engagement in the
15 fields of resilience-building, adaptation, and mitiga-
16 tion.

17 **PART II—TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS**

18 **SEC. 255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRANSATLANTIC RELA-**
19 **TIONSHIPS.**

20 It is the sense of Congress that—

21 (1) the United States, European Union, and
22 European countries are close partners, sharing val-
23 ues grounded in democracy, human rights, trans-
24 parency, and the rules-based international order es-
25 tablished after World War II;

1 (2) without a common approach by the United
2 States, European Union, and European countries on
3 connectivity, trade, transnational problems, and sup-
4 port for democracy and human rights, the People’s
5 Republic of China will continue to increase its eco-
6 nomic, political, and security leverage in Europe;

7 (3) the People’s Republic of China’s deployment
8 of assistance to European countries following the
9 COVID–19 outbreak showcased a coercive approach
10 to aid, but it also highlighted Europe’s deep eco-
11 nomic ties to the People’s Republic of China;

12 (4) as European states seek to recover from the
13 economic toll of the COVID–19 outbreak, the United
14 States must stand in partnership with Europe to
15 support our collective economic recovery, reinforce
16 our collective national security, and defend shared
17 values;

18 (5) the United States, European Union, and
19 European countries should coordinate on joint strat-
20 egies to diversify reliance on supply chains away
21 from the People’s Republic of China, especially in
22 the medical and pharmaceutical sectors;

23 (6) the United States, European Union, and
24 European countries should leverage their respective
25 economic innovation capabilities to support the glob-

1 al economic recovery from the COVID–19 recession
2 and draw a contrast with the centralized economy of
3 the People’s Republic of China;

4 (7) the United States, United Kingdom, and
5 European Union should accelerate efforts to de-esca-
6 late their trade disputes, including negotiating a
7 United States-European Union trade agreement that
8 benefits workers and the broader economy in both
9 the United States and European Union;

10 (8) the United States, European Union, and
11 Japan should continue trilateral efforts to address
12 economic challenges posed by the People’s Republic
13 of China;

14 (9) the United States, European Union, and
15 countries of Europe should enhance cooperation to
16 counter PRC disinformation, influence operations,
17 and propaganda efforts;

18 (10) the United States and European nations
19 share serious concerns with the repressions being
20 supported and executed by the Government of the
21 People’s Republic of China, and should continue im-
22 plementing measures to address the Government of
23 the People’s Republic of China’s specific abuses in
24 Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang, and should build
25 joint mechanisms and programs to prevent the ex-

1 port of China’s authoritarian governance model to
2 countries around the world;

3 (11) the United States and European nations
4 should remain united in their shared values against
5 attempts by the Government of the People’s Repub-
6 lic of China at the United Nations and other multi-
7 lateral organizations to promote efforts that erode
8 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, like the
9 “community of a shared future for mankind” and
10 “democratization of international relations”;

11 (12) the People’s Republic of China’s infra-
12 structure investments around the world, particularly
13 in 5G telecommunications technology and port infra-
14 structure, could threaten democracy across Europe
15 and the national security of key countries;

16 (13) as appropriate, the United States should
17 share intelligence with European allies and partners
18 on Huawei’s 5G capabilities and the intentions of
19 the Government of the People’s Republic of China
20 with respect to 5G expansion in Europe;

21 (14) the European Union’s Investment Screen-
22 ing Regulation, which came into force in October
23 2020, is a welcome development, and member states
24 should closely scrutinize PRC investments in their

1 countries through their own national investment
2 screening measures;

3 (15) the President should actively engage the
4 European Union on the implementation of the Ex-
5 port Control Reform Act regulations and to better
6 harmonize United States and European Union poli-
7 cies with respect to export controls;

8 (16) the President should strongly advocate for
9 the listing of more items and technologies to restrict
10 dual use exports controlled at the National Security
11 and above level to the People’s Republic of China
12 under the Wassenaar Arrangement;

13 (17) the United States should explore the value
14 of establishing a body akin to the Coordinating
15 Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
16 (CoCom) that would specifically coordinate United
17 States and European Union export control policies
18 with respect to limiting exports of sensitive tech-
19 nologies to the People’s Republic of China; and

20 (18) the United States should work with coun-
21 terparts in Europe to—

22 (A) evaluate United States and European
23 overreliance on goods originating in the Peo-
24 ple’s Republic of China, including in the med-

1 ical and pharmaceutical sectors, and develop
2 joint strategies to diversify supply chains;

3 (B) counter PRC efforts to use COVID–
4 19-related assistance as a coercive tool to pres-
5 sure developing countries by offering relevant
6 United States and European expertise and as-
7 sistance; and

8 (C) leverage the United States and Euro-
9 pean private sectors to advance the post-
10 COVID–19 economic recovery.

11 **SEC. 256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC CO-**
12 **OPERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE PEO-**
13 **PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

14 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the
15 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall brief
16 the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee
17 on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on
18 Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of
19 the House of Representatives on a strategy for how the
20 United States will enhance cooperation with the European
21 Union, NATO, and European partner countries with re-
22 spect to the People’s Republic of China.

23 (b) **ELEMENTS.**—The briefing required by subsection
24 (a) shall do the following:

1 (1) Identify the senior Senate-confirmed De-
2 partment of State official that leads United States
3 efforts to cooperate with the European Union,
4 NATO, and European partner countries to advance
5 a shared approach with respect to the People’s Re-
6 public of China.

7 (2) Identify key policy points of convergence
8 and divergence between the United States and Euro-
9 pean partners with respect to the People’s Republic
10 of China in the areas of technology, trade, and eco-
11 nomic practices.

12 (3) Describe efforts to advance shared interests
13 with European counterparts on—

14 (A) economic challenges with respect to the
15 People’s Republic of China;

16 (B) democracy and human rights chal-
17 lenges with respect to the People’s Republic of
18 China;

19 (C) technology issues with respect to the
20 People’s Republic of China;

21 (D) defense issues with respect to the Peo-
22 ple’s Republic of China; and

23 (E) developing a comprehensive strategy to
24 respond to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

1 established by the Government of the People's
2 Republic of China.

3 (4) Describe the coordination mechanisms
4 among key regional and functional bureaus within
5 the Department of State and Department of Defense
6 tasked with engaging with European partners on the
7 People's Republic of China.

8 (5) Detail diplomatic efforts up to the date of
9 the briefing and future plans to work with European
10 partners to counter the Government of the People's
11 Republic of China's advancement of an authoritarian
12 governance model around the world.

13 (6) Detail the diplomatic efforts made up to the
14 date of the briefing and future plans to support Eu-
15 ropean efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives
16 to Huawei's 5G technology.

17 (7) Detail how United States public diplomacy
18 tools, including the Global Engagement Center of
19 the Department of State, will coordinate efforts with
20 counterpart entities within the European Union to
21 counter Chinese propaganda.

22 (8) Describe the staffing and budget resources
23 the Department of State dedicates to engagement
24 between the United States and the European Union
25 on the People's Republic of China and provide an

1 assessment of out-year resource needs to execute the
2 strategy.

3 (9) Detail diplomatic efforts to work with Euro-
4 pean partners to track and counter Chinese attempts
5 to exert influence across multilateral fora, including
6 at the World Health Organization.

7 (c) FORM.—The briefing required by section (a) shall
8 be classified.

9 (d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 180 days after
10 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there-
11 after for 3 years, the Secretary of State shall consult with
12 the appropriate congressional committees regarding the
13 development and implementation of the elements described
14 in subsection (b).

15 **SEC. 257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON**
16 **PROMOTING PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCE.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President should work with
18 transatlantic partners to build on the agreement among
19 the Development Finance Corporation, FinDev Canada,
20 and the European Development Finance Institutions
21 (called the DFI Alliance) to enhance coordination on
22 shared objectives to foster private sector-led development
23 and provide market-based alternatives to state-directed fi-
24 nancing in emerging markets, particularly as related to

1 the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative
2 (BRI), including by integrating efforts such as—

3 (1) the European Union Strategy on Con-
4 necting Europe and Asia;

5 (2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas
6 Initiative Fund;

7 (3) the Blue Dot Network among the United
8 States, Japan, and Australia; and

9 (4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has
10 leveraged \$65,000,000,000 for infrastructure
11 projects and emphasizes transparency standards.

12 (b) STANDARDS.—The United States and the Euro-
13 pean Union should coordinate and develop a strategy to
14 enhance transatlantic cooperation with the OECD and the
15 Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible standards for
16 Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with devel-
17 oping countries.

18 **SEC. 258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BE-**
19 **TWEEN CHINA AND IRAN AND BETWEEN**
20 **CHINA AND RUSSIA.**

21 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
22 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
23 tees of Congress” means—

24 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
25 Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on

1 Armed Services, the Committee on Commerce,
2 Science, and Transportation, the Committee on En-
3 ergy and Natural Resources, the Committee on
4 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Com-
5 mittee on Finance, and the Committee on Appro-
6 priations of the Senate; and

7 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Per-
8 manent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com-
9 mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy
10 and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Serv-
11 ices, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the
12 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
13 resentatives.

14 (b) REPORT AND BRIEFING REQUIRED.—

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
16 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Di-
17 rector of National Intelligence shall, in coordination
18 with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of De-
19 fense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of
20 Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and such
21 other heads of Federal agencies as the Director con-
22 siders appropriate, submit to the appropriate com-
23 mittees of Congress a report and brief the appro-
24 priate committees of Congress on cooperation be-
25 tween the People's Republic of China and the Is-

1 Islamic Republic of Iran and between the People’s Re-
2 public of China and the Russian Federation.

3 (2) CONTENTS.—The report submitted under
4 paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

5 (A) An identification of major areas of dip-
6 lomatic energy, infrastructure, banking, finan-
7 cial, economic, military, and space coopera-
8 tion—

9 (i) between the People’s Republic of
10 China and the Islamic Republic of Iran;
11 and

12 (ii) between the People’s Republic of
13 China and the Russian Federation.

14 (B) An assessment of the effect of the
15 COVID–19 pandemic on such cooperation.

16 (C) An assessment of the effect that
17 United States compliance with the Joint Com-
18 prehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) starting in
19 January 14, 2016, and United States with-
20 drawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, had
21 on the cooperation described in subparagraph
22 (A)(i).

23 (D) An assessment of the effect on the co-
24 operation described in subparagraph (A)(i) that
25 would be had by the United States reentering

1 compliance with the JCPOA or a successor
2 agreement and the effect of the United States
3 not reentering compliance with the JCPOA or
4 reaching a successor agreement.

5 (3) FORM.—The report submitted under para-
6 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
7 but may include a classified annex.

8 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SHARING WITH ALLIES
9 AND PARTNERS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Di-
10 rector of National Intelligence and the heads of other ap-
11 propriate Federal departments and agencies should share
12 the findings of the report submitted under subsection (b)
13 with important allies and partners of the United States,
14 as appropriate.

15 **PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA**

16 **SEC. 261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL** 17 **ASIA.**

18 It is the sense of Congress that—

19 (1) the United States should continue to stand
20 with friends and partners, while also working to es-
21 tablish new partners in South and Central Asia as
22 they contend with efforts by the Government of the
23 People's Republic of China to interfere in their re-
24 spective political systems and encroach upon their
25 sovereign territory; and

1 (2) the United States should reaffirm its com-
2 mitment to the Comprehensive Global Strategic
3 Partnership with India and further deepen bilateral
4 defense consultations and collaboration with India
5 commensurate with its status as a major defense
6 partner.

7 **SEC. 262. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH**
8 **SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.**

9 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the
10 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-
11 mit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Com-
12 mittee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Com-
13 mittee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed
14 Services of the House of Representatives a strategy for
15 how the United States will engage with the countries of
16 South and Central Asia, including through the C5+1
17 mechanism, with respect to the People’s Republic of
18 China.

19 (b) **ELEMENTS.**—The strategy required under sub-
20 section (a) shall include the following elements:

21 (1) A detailed description of the security and
22 economic challenges that the People’s Republic of
23 China poses to the countries of South and Central
24 Asia, including border disputes with South and Cen-
25 tral Asian countries that border the People’s Repub-

1 lic of China, PRC investments in land and sea ports,
2 transportation infrastructure, and energy projects
3 across the region.

4 (2) A detailed description of United States ef-
5 forts to provide alternatives to PRC investment in
6 infrastructure and other sectors in South and Cen-
7 tral Asia.

8 (3) A detailed description of bilateral and re-
9 gional efforts to work with countries in South Asia
10 on strategies to build resilience against PRC efforts
11 to interfere in their political systems and economies.

12 (4) A detailed description of United States dip-
13 lomatic efforts to work with the Government of Af-
14 ghanistan on addressing the challenges posed by
15 PRC investment in the Afghan mineral sector.

16 (5) A detailed description of United States dip-
17 lomatic efforts with the Government of Pakistan
18 with respect to matters relevant to the People's Re-
19 public of China, including investments by the Peo-
20 ple's Republic of China in Pakistan through the Belt
21 and Road Initiative.

22 (6) In close consultation with the Government
23 of India, identification of areas where the United
24 States Government can provide diplomatic and other
25 support as appropriate for India's efforts to address

1 economic and security challenges posed by the Peo-
2 ple's Republic of China in the region.

3 (7) A description of the coordination mecha-
4 nisms among key regional and functional bureaus
5 within the Department of State and Department of
6 Defense tasked with engaging with the countries of
7 South and Central Asia on issues relating to the
8 People's Republic of China.

9 (8) A description of the efforts being made by
10 Federal departments and agencies, including the De-
11 partment of State, the United States Agency for
12 International Development, the Department of Com-
13 merce, the Department of Energy, and the Office of
14 the United States Trade Representative, to help the
15 nations of South and Central Asia develop trade and
16 commerce links that will help those nations diversify
17 their trade away from the People's Republic of
18 China.

19 (9) A detailed description of United States dip-
20 lomatic efforts with Central Asian countries, Turkey,
21 and any other countries with significant populations
22 of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities fleeing perse-
23 cution in the People's Republic of China to press
24 those countries to refrain from deporting ethnic mi-
25 norities to the People's Republic of China, protect

1 ethnic minorities from intimidation by Chinese gov-
2 ernment authorities, and protect the right to the
3 freedoms of assembly and expression.

4 (c) FORM.—The strategy required under section (a)
5 shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be
6 made available to the public, but may include a classified
7 annex as necessary.

8 (d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 120 days after
9 the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less than
10 annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State
11 shall consult with the Committee on Foreign Relations,
12 the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
13 Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee of For-
14 eign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the
15 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representa-
16 tives regarding the development and implementation of the
17 strategy required under subsection (a).

18 **SEC. 263. INDIAN OCEAN REGION STRATEGIC REVIEW.**

19 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
20 ings:

21 (1) The Indian Ocean region is a vitally impor-
22 tant part of the Indo-Pacific where the United
23 States has political, economic, and security interests.

24 (2) The United States has an interest in work-
25 ing with partners in the Indo-Pacific, including

1 India, Japan, and Australia, to address regional gov-
2 ernance, economic connectivity, and security chal-
3 lenges including threats to freedom of navigation.

4 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—As a part of the
5 United States engagement in the Indo-Pacific, it shall be
6 the policy of the United States to strengthen engagement
7 with the countries in the Indian Ocean region, including
8 with governments, civil society, and private sectors in such
9 countries to—

10 (1) promote United States political engagement
11 with such region, including through active participa-
12 tion in regional organizations, and strengthened dip-
13 lomatic relations with United States partners in
14 such region;

15 (2) enhance United States economic
16 connectivity and commercial exchange with such re-
17 gion;

18 (3) defend freedom of navigation in such region
19 from security challenges, including related to piracy;

20 (4) support the ability of governments and or-
21 ganizations in such region to respond to natural dis-
22 asters;

23 (5) support and facilitate the role of regional al-
24 lies and partners as net providers of security to such
25 region and as partners to the United States in ad-

1 dressing security challenges in such region, including
2 through assistance to such allies and partners to
3 build capacity in maritime security and maritime do-
4 main awareness;

5 (6) continue to build the United States-India
6 relationship in order to regularize security coopera-
7 tion through the negotiation of agreements con-
8 cerning access, communication, and navigation, in-
9 cluding through foundational agreements; and

10 (7) promote cooperation with United States al-
11 lies in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan and Aus-
12 tralia, and major defense partners, including India,
13 and NATO allies, including the United Kingdom and
14 France, to support a rules-based order in such re-
15 gion.

16 (c) STRATEGY.—

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
18 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
19 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
20 Defense and the Administrator of the United States
21 Agency for International Development (USAID),
22 shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
23 mittees a multi-year strategy for United States en-
24 gagement to support United States interests in the
25 Indian Ocean region. Such strategy shall—

1 (A) define United States political, eco-
2 nomic, and security interests in the Indian
3 Ocean region;

4 (B) outline challenges to the interests of
5 the United States in such region;

6 (C) outline efforts to improve cooperation
7 between the United States and members of the
8 Quad, including India, Japan, and Australia,
9 through coordination in diplomacy and develop-
10 ment priorities, joint military exercises and op-
11 erations, and other activities that promote
12 United States political, economic, and security
13 interests;

14 (D) outline efforts to support economic
15 connectivity in such region, including through
16 the United States-India-Japan Trilateral Infra-
17 structure Working Group, the Asia-Africa
18 Growth Corridor, and other efforts to expand
19 and enhance connectivity across the Indo-Pa-
20 cific, including with the countries of Southeast
21 Asia, that maintain high standards of invest-
22 ment and support for civil society and people-
23 to-people connectivity;

24 (E) describe how the United States can en-
25 gage with regional intergovernmental organiza-

1 tions and entities, including the Indian Ocean
2 Rim Association, to promote United States po-
3 litical, economic, and security interests in such
4 region;

5 (F) review the United States diplomatic
6 posture in such region, including an assessment
7 of United States diplomatic engagement in
8 countries without a permanent United States
9 embassy or diplomatic mission, and an assess-
10 ment of ways to improve the cooperation with
11 the Maldives, the Seychelles, and Comoros;

12 (G) review United States diplomatic agree-
13 ments with countries in such region that facili-
14 tate United States military operations in such
15 region, including bilateral and multilateral
16 agreements, and describe efforts to expand
17 United States cooperation with such countries
18 through the negotiation of additional agree-
19 ments; and

20 (H) include a security assistance strategy
21 for such region that outlines priorities, objec-
22 tives, and actions for United States security as-
23 sistance efforts to governments of countries in
24 such region to promote United States political,
25 economic, and security interests in such region.

1 (2) INCLUSION.—The strategy required under
2 paragraph (1) may be submitted as a part of any
3 other strategy relating to the Indo-Pacific.

4 (3) REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later
5 than one year after the submission of the strategy
6 required under paragraph (1) and one year there-
7 after, the Secretary of State shall submit to the ap-
8 propriate congressional committees a report on
9 progress made toward implementing such strategy.

10 (d) UNITED STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECUR-
11 RITY REVIEW COMMISSION.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subparagraph (E) of section
13 1238(e)(2) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense
14 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (22 U.S.C.
15 7002(e)(2)) is amended—

16 (A) by inserting “, including in the Indian
17 Ocean region” after “deployments of the Peo-
18 ple’s Republic of China military”; and

19 (B) by adding at the end the following new
20 sentence: “In this subparagraph, the term ‘In-
21 dian Ocean region’ means the Indian Ocean, in-
22 cluding the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal,
23 and the littoral areas surrounding the Indian
24 Ocean.”.

1 (2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made
2 by paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the
3 enactment of this Act and apply beginning with the
4 first report required under section 1238 of the Floyd
5 D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for
6 Fiscal Year 2001 (as amended by such paragraph)
7 that is submitted after such date.

8 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

9 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
10 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
11 mittees” means the Committee on Foreign Affairs
12 and the Committee on Armed Services of the House
13 of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
14 Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of
15 the Senate.

16 (2) INDIAN OCEAN REGION.—The term “Indian
17 Ocean region” means the Indian Ocean, including
18 the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and the lit-
19 toral areas surrounding the Indian Ocean.

PART IV—AFRICA**SEC. 271. ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY ACTIVITY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA.**

(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(b) INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that assesses the nature and impact of the People’s Republic of China’s political, economic, sociocultural, and security sector activity in Africa, and its impact on United States strategic interests, including—

(1) the amount and impact of direct investment, loans, development financing, oil-for-loans deals, and other preferential trading arrangements;

1 (2) the involvement of PRC state-owned enter-
2 prises in Africa;

3 (3) the amount of African debt held by the Peo-
4 ple's Republic of China;

5 (4) the involvement of PRC private security,
6 technology and media companies in Africa;

7 (5) the scale and impact of PRC arms sales to
8 African countries;

9 (6) the scope of Chinese investment in and con-
10 trol of African energy resources and minerals critical
11 for emerging and foundational technologies;

12 (7) an analysis on the linkages between Bei-
13 jing's aid and assistance to African countries and
14 African countries supporting PRC geopolitical goals
15 in international fora;

16 (8) the methods, tools, and tactics used to fa-
17 cilitate illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in
18 counterfeit and illicit goods, to include smuggled ex-
19 tractive resources and wildlife products, between Af-
20 rica and China;

21 (9) the methods and techniques that the Peo-
22 ple's Republic of China uses to exert undue influence
23 on African governments and facilitate corrupt activ-
24 ity in Africa, including through the CCP's party-to-

1 party training program, and to influence African
2 multilateral organizations; and

3 (10) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and
4 educational activities undertaken by the PRC and
5 CCP to seek to expand its influence in Africa.

6 **SEC. 272. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE**
7 **UNITED STATES IN AFRICA.**

8 (a) **APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-**
9 **FINED.**—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
10 tees of Congress” means—

11 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
12 Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
13 Finance of the Senate; and

14 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
15 Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
16 Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

17 (b) **STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.**—Not later than 180
18 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
19 retary of State shall, in consultation with the Secretary
20 of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney
21 General, the United States Trade Representative, the Ad-
22 ministrator of the United States Agency for International
23 Development, and the leadership of the United States
24 International Development Finance Corporation, submit
25 to the appropriate committees of Congress a report setting

1 forth a multi-year strategy for increasing United States
2 economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in
3 the investment climate in Africa, including through sup-
4 port for democratic institutions, the rule of law, including
5 property rights, and for improved transparency, anti-cor-
6 ruption and governance.

7 (c) ELEMENTS.—The strategy submitted pursuant to
8 subsection (a) shall include—

9 (1) a description and assessment of barriers to
10 United States investment in Africa for United States
11 businesses, including a clear identification of the dif-
12 ferent barriers facing small-sized and medium-sized
13 businesses, and an assessment of whether existing
14 programs effectively address such barriers;

15 (2) a description and assessment of barriers to
16 African diaspora investment in Africa, and rec-
17 ommendations to overcome such barriers;

18 (3) an identification of the economic sectors in
19 the United States that have a comparative advan-
20 tage in African markets;

21 (4) a determination of priority African coun-
22 tries for promoting two-way trade and investment
23 and an assessment of additional foreign assistance
24 needs, including democracy and governance and rule

1 of law support, to promote a conducive operating en-
2 vironment in priority countries;

3 (5) an identification of opportunities for stra-
4 tegic cooperation with European allies on trade and
5 investment in Africa, and for establishing a dialogue
6 on trade, security, development, and environmental
7 issues of mutual interest; and

8 (6) a plan to regularly host a United States-Af-
9 rica Leaders Summit to promote two-way trade and
10 investment, strategic engagement, and security in
11 Africa.

12 (d) ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
13 HUMAN RESOURCES CAPACITY.—The Comptroller Gen-
14 eral of the United States shall—

15 (1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign
16 Commercial Service Officers and Department of
17 State Economic Officers at United States embassies
18 in sub-Saharan Africa; and

19 (2) develop and submit to the appropriate con-
20 gressional committees an assessment of whether
21 human resource capacity in such embassies is ade-
22 quate to meet the goals of the various trade and eco-
23 nomic programs and initiatives in Africa, including
24 the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Pros-
25 per Africa.

1 **SEC. 273. DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT**
2 **TO AFRICA.**

3 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
4 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
5 tees of Congress” means—

6 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
7 Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-
8 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

9 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
10 Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent
11 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
12 Representatives.

13 (b) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP TO COUNTER
14 PRC CYBER AGGRESSION IN AFRICA.—

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish
16 an interagency Working Group, which shall include
17 representatives of the Department of State, the De-
18 partment of Defense, the Office of the Director of
19 National Intelligence, and such other agencies of the
20 United States Government as the President con-
21 siders appropriate, on means to counter PRC cyber
22 aggression with respect to Africa.

23 (2) DUTIES.—The Working Group established
24 pursuant to this subsection shall develop and submit
25 to the appropriate congressional committees a set of
26 recommendations such as for—

1 (A) bolstering the capacity of governments
2 in Africa to ensure the integrity of their data
3 networks and critical infrastructure where ap-
4 plicable;

5 (B) providing alternatives to Huawei;

6 (C) an action plan for United States em-
7 bassies in Africa to provide assistance to host-
8 country governments with respect to protecting
9 their vital digital networks and infrastructure
10 from PRC espionage, including an assessment
11 of staffing resources needed to implement the
12 action plan in embassies in Africa;

13 (D) utilizing interagency resources to
14 counter PRC disinformation and propaganda in
15 traditional and digital media targeted to Afri-
16 can audiences; and

17 (E) helping civil society in Africa counter
18 digital authoritarianism and identifying tools
19 and assistance to enhance and promote digital
20 democracy.

21 **SEC. 274. INCREASING PERSONNEL IN UNITED STATES EM-**
22 **BASSIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA FOCUSED**
23 **ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

24 The Secretary of State may station on a permanent
25 basis Department of State personnel at such United

1 States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa as the Secretary
2 considers appropriate focused on the activities, policies
3 and investments of the People’s Republic of China in Afri-
4 ca.

5 **SEC. 275. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIA-**
6 **TIVE.**

7 (a) FINDING.—Congress finds that youth in Africa
8 can have a positive impact on efforts to foster economic
9 growth, improve public sector transparency and govern-
10 ance, and counter extremism, and should be an area of
11 focus for United States outreach on the continent.

12 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States,
13 in cooperation and collaboration with private sector com-
14 panies, civic organizations, nongovernmental organiza-
15 tions, and national and regional public sector entities, to
16 commit resources to enhancing the entrepreneurship and
17 leadership skills of African youth with the objective of en-
18 hancing their ability to serve as leaders in the public and
19 private sectors in order to help them spur growth and
20 prosperity, strengthen democratic governance, and en-
21 hance peace and security in their respective countries of
22 origin and across Africa.

23 (c) YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is hereby established
2 the Young African Leaders Initiative, to be carried
3 out by the Secretary of State.

4 (2) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Secretary is author-
5 ized to continue to support the participation in the
6 Initiative established under this paragraph, in the
7 United States, of fellows from Africa each year for
8 such education and training in leadership and pro-
9 fessional development through the Department of
10 State as the Secretary of State considers appro-
11 priate. The Secretary shall establish and publish cri-
12 teria for eligibility for participation as such a fellow,
13 and for selection of fellows among eligible applicants
14 for a fellowship.

15 (3) RECIPROCAL EXCHANGES.—Under the Ini-
16 tiative, United States citizens may engage in such
17 reciprocal exchanges in connection with and collabo-
18 ration on projects with fellows under paragraph (1)
19 as the Secretary considers appropriate.

20 (4) NETWORKS.—The Secretary is authorized
21 to continue to maintain an online network that pro-
22 vides information and online courses for young lead-
23 ers in Africa on topics related to entrepreneurship
24 and leadership.

1 (5) REGIONAL CENTERS.—The Administrator
2 of the United States Agency for International Devel-
3 opment is authorized to establish regional centers in
4 Africa to provide in-person and online training
5 throughout the year in business and entrepreneur-
6 ship, civic leadership, and public management.

7 (d) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
8 gress that the Secretary of State should increase the num-
9 ber of fellows from Africa participating in the Mandela
10 Washington Fellowship above the current 700 projected
11 for fiscal year 2021.

12 **SEC. 276. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS.**

13 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
14 ment of this Act, the CEO of the United States Agency
15 for Global Media shall submit to the appropriate congres-
16 sional committees a report on the resources and timeline
17 needed to establish within the Agency an organization
18 whose mission shall be to promote democratic values and
19 institutions in Africa by providing objective, accurate, and
20 relevant news and information to the people of Africa and
21 counter disinformation from malign actors, especially in
22 countries where a free press is banned by the government
23 or not fully established, about the region, the world, and
24 the United States through uncensored news, responsible
25 discussion, and open debate.

1 **SEC. 277. EXPANSION OF AUTHORITIES OF THE UNITED**
2 **STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FI-**
3 **NANCE CORPORATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AF-**
4 **RICA.**

5 (a) **PROMOTION OF AND SUPPORT FOR PRIVATE IN-**
6 **VESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES.—**

7 (1) **IN GENERAL.—**The United States Inter-
8 national Development Corporation (in this section
9 referred to as the “Corporation”) shall carry out
10 feasibility studies for the planning, development, and
11 management of, and procurement for, potential bi-
12 lateral and multilateral development projects eligible
13 for support under title II of the Better Utilization
14 of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018
15 (22 U.S.C. 9621 et seq.) in sub-Saharan Africa in
16 accordance with the provisions described in section
17 1421(e) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 9621(e)).

18 (2) **INAPPLICABILITY OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO**
19 **COSTS REQUIREMENT.—**The requirements relating
20 to contributions of costs described in paragraph (2)
21 of section 1421(e) of such Act shall not apply with
22 respect to any person receiving funds under the au-
23 thorities of paragraph (1).

24 (b) **SPECIAL PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS.—**The Cor-
25 poration shall administer and manage special projects and
26 programs in support of specific transactions undertaken

1 by the Corporation or others in sub-Saharan Africa in ac-
2 cordance with the provisions described in section 1421(f)
3 of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Devel-
4 opment Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9621(f)).

5 (c) ENGAGEMENT WITH INVESTORS.—

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation, acting
7 through the Chief Development Officer, shall, in co-
8 operation with the Administrator of the United
9 States Agency for International Development, carry
10 out the activities described in paragraphs (1)
11 through (5) of section 1445(a) of the Better Utiliza-
12 tion of Investments Leading to Development Act of
13 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9655(a)) with respect to sub-Saha-
14 ran Africa.

15 (2) ASSISTANCE.—To achieve the goals de-
16 scribed in paragraph (1), the Corporation shall carry
17 out the activities described in paragraphs (1)
18 through (10) of section 1445(b) with respect to sub-
19 Saharan Africa.

20 (3) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—The Corporation
21 shall coordinate with the United States Agency for
22 International Development and other agencies and
23 departments, as necessary, on projects and programs
24 supported by the Corporation that include technical
25 assistance with respect to sub-Saharan Africa.

1 (d) EMPLOYEES STATIONED IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRI-
2 CA.—

3 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to the availability of
4 appropriations, the Corporation shall take steps to
5 ensure that at least 6 full-time employees of the Cor-
6 poration, which may include personnel detailed to
7 the Corporation from other Federal agencies, are
8 stationed in sub-Saharan Africa and whose sole du-
9 ties are to support the functions of the Corporation
10 as described in subsections (a), (b), and (c) or under
11 any provision of the Better Utilization of Invest-
12 ments Leading to Development Act of 2018 with re-
13 spect to sub-Saharan Africa.

14 (2) PROHIBITION ON CONFLICTS OF INTER-
15 EST.—The Corporation may not hire or retain any
16 contractor or subcontractor to support the functions
17 of the Corporation as described in paragraph (1) if
18 the contractor or subcontractor has any equity or
19 other financial interest in any specific transactions
20 undertaken by the Corporation or others in sub-Sa-
21 haran Africa as described in this section.

22 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section, the term “sub-Sa-
23 haran Africa” has the meaning given that term in section
24 107 of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (19
25 U.S.C. 3706).

1 **PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA**

2 **SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN,**
3 **AND ACCESS TO, THE MIDDLE EAST AND**
4 **NORTH AFRICA.**

5 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
6 gress that—

7 (1) the People’s Republic of China is upgrading
8 its influence in the Middle East and North Africa
9 through its energy and infrastructure investments,
10 technology transfer, and arms sales;

11 (2) the People’s Republic of China seeks to es-
12 tablish military or dual use facilities in geographi-
13 cally strategic locations in the Middle East and
14 North Africa to further its Belt and Road Initiative
15 at the expense of United States national security in-
16 terests; and

17 (3) the export of certain communications infra-
18 structure from the People’s Republic of China de-
19 grades the security of partner networks, exposes in-
20 tellectual property to theft, threatens the ability of
21 the United States to conduct security cooperation
22 with compromised regional partners, and furthers
23 China’s authoritarian surveillance model.

24 (b) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—

25 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
26 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-

1 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
2 Defense, the Administrator of the United States
3 Agency for International Development, and the
4 heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall
5 jointly develop and submit to the appropriate con-
6 gressional committees and the Committees on Armed
7 Services of the Senate and the House of Representa-
8 tives a strategy for countering and limiting the
9 PRC's influence in, and access to, the Middle East
10 and North Africa.

11 (2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under
12 paragraph (1) shall include—

13 (A) an assessment of the People's Republic
14 of China's intent with regards to increased co-
15 operation with Middle East and North African
16 countries and how these activities fit into its
17 broader global strategic objectives;

18 (B) an assessment of how governments
19 across the region are responding to the People's
20 Republic of China's efforts to increase its mili-
21 tary presence in their countries;

22 (C) efforts to improve regional cooperation
23 through foreign military sales, financing, and
24 efforts to build partner capacity and increase
25 interoperability with the United States;

1 (D) an assessment of the People’s Republic
2 of China’s joint research and development with
3 the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on
4 the United States national security interests,
5 and recommended steps to mitigate the People’s
6 Republic of China’s influence in this area;

7 (E) an assessment of arms sales and weap-
8 ons technology transfers from the People’s Re-
9 public of China to the Middle East and North
10 Africa, impacts on United States national secu-
11 rity interests, and recommended steps to miti-
12 gate the People’s Republic of China’s influence
13 in this area;

14 (F) an assessment of the People’s Republic
15 of China’s military sales to the region including
16 lethal and non-lethal unmanned aerial systems;

17 (G) an assessment of People’s Republic of
18 China military basing and dual-use facility ini-
19 tiatives across the Middle East and North Afri-
20 ca, impacts on United States national security
21 interests, and recommended steps to mitigate
22 the People’s Republic of China’s influence in
23 this area;

1 (H) efforts to improve regional security co-
2 operation with United States allies and partners
3 with a focus on—

4 (i) maritime security in the Arabian
5 Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Medi-
6 terranean;

7 (ii) integrated air and missile defense;

8 (iii) cyber security;

9 (iv) border security; and

10 (v) critical infrastructure security, to
11 include energy security;

12 (I) increased support for government-to-
13 government engagement on critical infrastruc-
14 ture development projects including ports and
15 water infrastructure;

16 (J) efforts to encourage United States pri-
17 vate sector and public-private partnerships in
18 healthcare technology and foreign direct invest-
19 ment in non-energy sectors;

20 (K) efforts to expand youth engagement
21 and professional education exchanges with key
22 partner countries;

23 (L) specific steps to counter increased in-
24 vestment from the People’s Republic of China
25 in telecommunications infrastructure and diplo-

1 matic efforts to stress the political, economic,
2 and social benefits of a free and open internet;

3 (M) efforts to promote United States pri-
4 vate sector engagement in and public-private
5 partnerships on renewable energy development;

6 (N) the expansion of public-private part-
7 nership efforts on water, desalination, and irri-
8 gation projects; and

9 (O) efforts to warn United States partners
10 in the Middle East and North Africa of the
11 risks associated with the People’s Republic of
12 China’s telecommunications infrastructure and
13 provide alternative “clean paths” to the Peo-
14 ple’s Republic of China’s technology.

15 (c) FORM.—The strategy required under section (b)
16 shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be
17 made available to the public, but may include a classified
18 annex as necessary.

19 **SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND**
20 **NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT.**

21 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
22 ings:

23 (1) The United States and the international
24 community have long-term interests in the stability,

1 security, and prosperity of the people of the Middle
2 East and North Africa.

3 (2) In addition to and apart from military and
4 security efforts, the United States should harness a
5 whole of government approach, including bilateral
6 and multilateral statecraft, economic lines of effort,
7 and public diplomacy to compete with and counter
8 PRC influence.

9 (3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of
10 United States engagement, transparent governance
11 structures, and active civil society engagement help
12 counter predatory foreign investment and influence
13 efforts.

14 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
15 United States that the United States and the international
16 community should continue diplomatic and economic ef-
17 forts throughout the Middle East and North Africa that
18 support reform efforts to—

- 19 (1) promote greater economic opportunity;
20 (2) foster private sector development;
21 (3) strengthen civil society; and
22 (4) promote transparent and democratic gov-
23 ernance and the rule of law.

PART VI—ARCTIC REGION**2 SEC. 285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY.**

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ARCTIC SECURITY.—

4 It is the sense of Congress that—

5 (1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment—

6 (A) creates new national and regional secu-
7 rity challenges due to increased military activity
8 in the Arctic;

9 (B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerg-
10 ing as a major theater of conflict in ongoing
11 strategic competition;

12 (C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic lit-
13 toral nations have inadequate capacity to patrol
14 the increased vessel traffic in this remote re-
15 gion, which is a result of diminished annual lev-
16 els of sea ice;

17 (D) impacts public safety due to increased
18 human activity in the Arctic region where
19 search and rescue capacity remains very lim-
20 ited; and

21 (E) threatens the health of the Arctic's
22 fragile and pristine environment and the unique
23 and highly sensitive species found in the Arc-
24 tic's marine and terrestrial ecosystems; and

25 (2) the United States should reduce the con-
26 sequences outlined in paragraph (1) by—

1 (A) carefully evaluating the wide variety
2 and dynamic set of security and safety risks un-
3 folding in the Arctic;

4 (B) developing policies and making prep-
5 arations to mitigate and respond to threats and
6 risks in the Arctic, including by continuing to
7 work with allies and partners in the Arctic re-
8 gion to deter potential aggressive activities and
9 build Arctic competencies;

10 (C) adequately funding the National Earth
11 System Prediction Capability to substantively
12 improve weather, ocean, and ice predictions on
13 the time scales necessary to ensure regional se-
14 curity and trans-Arctic shipping;

15 (D) investing in resources, including a sig-
16 nificantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure
17 that the United States has adequate capacity to
18 prevent and respond to security threats in the
19 Arctic region; and

20 (E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with
21 all states in the Arctic region to reach an agree-
22 ment for—

23 (i) maintaining peace and stability in
24 the Arctic region;

1 (ii) fostering cooperation on steward-
2 ship and safety initiatives in the Arctic re-
3 gion;

4 (iii) ensuring safe and efficient man-
5 agement of commercial maritime traffic in
6 the Arctic;

7 (iv) promoting responsible natural re-
8 source management and economic develop-
9 ment;

10 (v) countering China's Polar Silk
11 Road initiative;

12 (vi) examining the possibility of recon-
13 vening the Arctic Chiefs of Defense
14 Forum; and

15 (vii) reducing black carbon and meth-
16 ane emissions in the Arctic Region, includ-
17 ing by working with observers of the Arctic
18 Council, including India and the PRC, to
19 adopt mitigation plans consistent with the
20 findings and recommendations of the Ar-
21 tic Council's Framework for Action on
22 Black Carbon and Methane.

23 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
24 United States—

1 (1) to recognize only the states enumerated in
2 subsection (c)(1) as Arctic states, and to reject all
3 other claims to this status; and

4 (2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a
5 serious threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the
6 interests of United States allies and partners.

7 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

8 (1) ARCTIC STATES.—The term “Arctic states”
9 means Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway,
10 Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden,
11 and Iceland.

12 (2) ARCTIC REGION.—The term “Arctic Re-
13 gion” means the geographic region north of the
14 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator.

15 (d) DESIGNATION OF AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR
16 ARCTIC AFFAIRS.—There is established within the De-
17 partment of State an Ambassador at Large for Arctic Af-
18 fairs (referred to in this section as the “Ambassador”),
19 appointed in accordance with paragraph (1).

20 (1) APPOINTMENT.—The Ambassador shall be
21 appointed by the President, by and with the advice
22 and consent of the Senate.

23 (2) DUTIES.—

24 (A) DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION.—Sub-
25 ject to the direction of the President and the

1 Secretary of State, the Ambassador is author-
2 ized to represent the United States in matters
3 and cases relevant to the Arctic Region in—

4 (i) contacts with foreign governments,
5 intergovernmental organizations, and spe-
6 cialized agencies of the United Nations,
7 the Arctic Council, and other international
8 organizations of which the United States is
9 a member; and

10 (ii) multilateral conferences and meet-
11 ings relating to Arctic affairs.

12 (B) CHAIR OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL.—The
13 Ambassador shall serve as the Chair of the Arc-
14 tic Council when the United States holds the
15 Chairmanship of the Arctic Council.

16 (3) POLICIES AND PROCEDURES.—The Amba-
17 sador shall coordinate United States policies related
18 to the Arctic Region, including—

19 (A) meeting national security, economic,
20 and commercial needs pertaining to Arctic af-
21 fairs;

22 (B) protecting the Arctic environment and
23 conserving its biological resources;

1 (C) promoting environmentally sustainable
2 natural resource management and economic de-
3 velopment;

4 (D) strengthening institutions for coopera-
5 tion among the Arctic Nations;

6 (E) involving Arctic indigenous people in
7 decisions that affect them;

8 (F) enhancing scientific monitoring and re-
9 search on local, regional, and global environ-
10 mental issues;

11 (G) integrating scientific data on the cur-
12 rent and projected effects of climate change in
13 the Arctic Region and ensure that such data is
14 applied to the development of security strategies
15 for the Arctic Region;

16 (H) making available the methods and ap-
17 proaches on the integration of climate science
18 to other regional security planning programs in
19 the Department of State to better ensure that
20 broader decision-making processes may more
21 adequately account for the effects of climate
22 change; and

23 (I) reducing black carbon and methane
24 emissions in the Arctic Region.

1 (e) ARCTIC REGION SECURITY POLICY.—Arctic Re-
2 gion Security Policy shall assess, develop, budget for, and
3 implement plans, policies, and actions—

4 (1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the
5 United States in Arctic states, including through en-
6 hancements to diplomatic missions and facilities,
7 participation in regional and bilateral dialogues re-
8 lated to Arctic security, and coordination of United
9 States initiatives and assistance programs across
10 agencies to protect the national security of the
11 United States and its allies and partners;

12 (2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic
13 states to the effects of environmental change and in-
14 creased civilian and military activity by Arctic states
15 and other states that may result from increased ac-
16 cessibility of the Arctic Region;

17 (3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic
18 Region and Arctic states that—

19 (A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic
20 environment; and

21 (B) are strategically significant to the
22 United States;

23 (4) to coordinate the integration of environ-
24 mental change and national security risk and vulner-

1 ability assessments into the decision-making process
2 on foreign assistance awards with Greenland;

3 (5) to advance principles of good governance by
4 encouraging and cooperating with Arctic states on
5 collaborative approaches—

6 (A) to responsibly manage natural re-
7 sources in the Arctic Region;

8 (B) to share the burden of ensuring mari-
9 time safety in the Arctic Region;

10 (C) to prevent the escalation of security
11 tensions by mitigating against the militarization
12 of the Arctic Region;

13 (D) to develop mutually agreed upon mul-
14 tilateral policies among Arctic states on the
15 management of maritime transit routes through
16 the Arctic Region and work cooperatively on the
17 transit policies for access to and transit in the
18 Arctic Region by non-Arctic states; and

19 (E) to facilitate the development of Arctic
20 Region Security Action Plans to ensure stability
21 and public safety in disaster situations in a hu-
22 mane and responsible fashion;

23 (6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, sur-
24 vivability, and resiliency of United States interests
25 and non-defense assets in the Arctic Region; and

1 (7) to reduce black carbon and methane emis-
 2 sions in the Arctic.

3 **PART VII—OCEANIA**

4 **SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES EN-**
 5 **GAGEMENT IN OCEANIA.**

6 It shall be the policy of the United States—

7 (1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a
 8 strategic national security and economic priority of
 9 the United States Government;

10 (2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and
 11 democratic governance across Oceania as part of a
 12 free and open Indo-Pacific region;

13 (3) to broaden and deepen relationships with
 14 the Freely Associated States of the Republic of
 15 Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the
 16 Federated States of Micronesia through robust de-
 17 fense, diplomatic, economic, and development ex-
 18 changes that promote the goals of individual states
 19 and the entire region;

20 (4) to work with the governments of Australia,
 21 New Zealand, and Japan to advance shared alliance
 22 goals of the Oceania region concerning health, envi-
 23 ronmental protection, disaster resilience and pre-
 24 paredness, illegal, unreported and unregulated fish-
 25 ing, maritime security, and economic development;

1 (5) to participate, wherever possible and appro-
2 priate, in existing regional organizations and inter-
3 national structures to promote the national security
4 and economic goals of the United States and coun-
5 tries of the Oceania region;

6 (6) to invest in a whole-of-government United
7 States strategy that will enhance youth engagement
8 and advance long-term growth and development
9 throughout the region, especially as it relates to pro-
10 tecting marine resources that are critical to liveli-
11 hoods and strengthening the resilience of the coun-
12 tries of the Oceania region against current and fu-
13 ture threats resulting from extreme weather and se-
14 vere changes in the environment;

15 (7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign
16 influence and corruption aimed at undermining the
17 political, environmental, social, and economic sta-
18 bility of the people and governments of the countries
19 of Oceania;

20 (8) to improve the local capacity of the coun-
21 tries of Oceania to address public health challenges
22 and improve global health security;

23 (9) to help the countries of Oceania access mar-
24 ket-based private sector investments that adhere to
25 best practices regarding transparency, debt sustain-

1 ability, and environmental and social safeguards as
2 an alternative to state-directed investments by au-
3 thoritarian governments;

4 (10) to ensure the people and communities of
5 Oceania remain safe from the risks of old and de-
6 grading munitions hazards and other debris that
7 threaten health and livelihoods;

8 (11) to cooperate with Taiwan by offering
9 United States support for maintaining Taiwan's dip-
10 lomatic partners in Oceania; and

11 (12) to work cooperatively with all governments
12 in Oceania to promote the dignified return of the re-
13 mains of members of the United States Armed
14 Forces that are missing in action from previous con-
15 flicts in the Indo-Pacific region.

16 **SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.**

17 (a) OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.—Not later than
18 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
19 Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congres-
20 sional committees a strategic roadmap for strengthening
21 United States engagement with the countries of Oceania,
22 including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with
23 Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, to address shared
24 concerns and promote shared goals in pursuit of security
25 and resiliency in the countries of Oceania.

1 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategic roadmap required by
2 subsection (a) shall include the following:

3 (1) A description of United States regional
4 goals and concerns with respect to Oceania and in-
5 creasing engagement with the countries of Oceania.

6 (2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of
7 United States regional goals and concerns that are
8 shared by Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, in-
9 cluding a review of issues related to anticorruption,
10 maritime and other security issues, environmental
11 protection, fisheries management, economic growth
12 and development, and disaster resilience and pre-
13 paredness.

14 (3) A review of ongoing programs and initia-
15 tives by the governments of the United States, Aus-
16 tralia, New Zealand, and Japan in pursuit of those
17 shared regional goals and concerns, including with
18 respect to the issues described in paragraph (1).

19 (4) A review of ongoing programs and initia-
20 tives by regional organizations and other related
21 intergovernmental structures aimed at addressing
22 the issues described in paragraph (1).

23 (5) A plan for aligning United States programs
24 and resources in pursuit of those shared regional
25 goals and concerns, as appropriate.

1 (6) Recommendations for additional United
2 States authorities, personnel, programs, or resources
3 necessary to execute the strategic roadmap.

4 (7) Any other elements the Secretary considers
5 appropriate.

6 **SEC. 293. OCEANIA SECURITY DIALOGUE.**

7 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than one year after the
8 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
9 shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the
10 feasibility and advisability of establishing a United States-
11 based public-private sponsored security dialogue (to be
12 known as the “Oceania Security Dialogue”) among the
13 countries of Oceania for the purposes of jointly exploring
14 and discussing issues affecting the economic, diplomatic,
15 and national security of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oce-
16 ania.

17 (b) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—The briefing required by
18 subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, include the following:

19 (1) A review of the ability of the Department
20 of State to participate in a public-private sponsored
21 security dialogue.

22 (2) An assessment of the potential locations for
23 conducting an Oceania Security Dialogue in the ju-
24 risdiction of the United States.

1 (3) Consideration of dates for conducting an
2 Oceania Security Dialogue that would maximize par-
3 ticipation of representatives from the Indo-Pacific
4 countries of Oceania.

5 (4) A review of the funding modalities available
6 to the Department of State to help finance an Oce-
7 ania Security Dialogue, including grant-making au-
8 thorities available to the Department of State.

9 (5) An assessment of any administrative, statu-
10 tory, or other legal limitations that would prevent
11 the establishment of an Oceania Security Dialogue
12 with participation and support of the Department of
13 State as described in subsection (a).

14 (6) An analysis of how an Oceania Security
15 Dialogue could help to advance the Boe Declaration
16 on Regional Security, including its emphasis on the
17 changing environment as the greatest existential
18 threat to countries of Oceania.

19 (7) An evaluation of how an Oceania Security
20 Dialogue could help amplify the issues and work of
21 existing regional structures and organizations dedi-
22 cated to the security of the Oceania region, such as
23 the Pacific Island Forum and Pacific Environmental
24 Security Forum.

1 (8) An analysis of how an Oceania Security
2 Dialogue would help with implementation of the
3 strategic roadmap required by section 292 and ad-
4 vance the National Security Strategy of the United
5 States.

6 (c) INTERAGENCY CONSULTATION.—To the extent
7 practicable, the Secretary of State may consult with the
8 Secretary of Defense and, where appropriate, evaluate the
9 lessons learned of the Regional Centers for Security Stud-
10 ies of the Department of Defense to determine the feasi-
11 bility and advisability of establishing the Oceania Security
12 Dialogue.

13 **SEC. 294. OCEANIA PEACE CORPS PARTNERSHIPS.**

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the
15 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
16 Peace Corps shall submit to Congress a report on strate-
17 gies for to reasonably and safely expand the number of
18 Peace Corps volunteers in Oceania, with the goals of—

19 (1) expanding the presence of the Peace Corps
20 to all currently feasible locations in Oceania; and

21 (2) working with regional and international
22 partners of the United States to expand the presence
23 of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania
24 communities in support of climate resilience initia-
25 tives.

1 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection

2 (a) shall—

3 (1) assess the factors contributing to the cur-
4 rent absence of the Peace Corps and its volunteers
5 in Oceania;

6 (2) examine potential remedies that include
7 working with United States Government agencies
8 and regional governments, including governments of
9 United States allies—

10 (A) to increase the health infrastructure
11 and medical evacuation capabilities of the coun-
12 tries of Oceania to better support the safety of
13 Peace Corps volunteers while in those countries;

14 (B) to address physical safety concerns
15 that have decreased the ability of the Peace
16 Corps to operate in Oceania; and

17 (C) to increase transportation infrastruc-
18 ture in the countries of Oceania to better sup-
19 port the travel of Peace Corps volunteers and
20 their access to necessary facilities;

21 (3) evaluate the potential to expand the deploy-
22 ment of Peace Corps Response volunteers to help the
23 countries of Oceania address social, economic, and
24 development needs of their communities that require
25 specific professional expertise; and

1 (4) explore potential new operational models to
2 address safety and security needs of Peace Corps
3 volunteers in the countries of Oceania, including—

4 (A) changes to volunteer deployment dura-
5 tions; and

6 (B) scheduled redeployment of volunteers
7 to regional or United States-based healthcare
8 facilities for routine physical and behavioral
9 health evaluation.

10 (c) VOLUNTEERS IN LOW-INCOME OCEANIA COMMU-
11 NITIES.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—In examining the potential
13 to expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers in
14 low-income Oceania communities under subsection
15 (a)(2), the Director of the Peace Corps shall con-
16 sider the development of initiatives described in
17 paragraph (2).

18 (2) INITIATIVES DESCRIBED.—Initiatives de-
19 scribed in this paragraph are volunteer initiatives
20 that help the countries of Oceania address social,
21 economic, and development needs of their commu-
22 nities, including by—

23 (A) addressing, through appropriate resil-
24 ience-based interventions, the vulnerability that
25 communities in Oceania face as result of ex-

1 treme weather, severe environmental change,
2 and other climate related trends; and

3 (B) improving, through smart infrastruc-
4 ture principles, access to transportation and
5 connectivity infrastructure that will help ad-
6 dress the economic and social challenges that
7 communities in Oceania confront as a result of
8 poor or nonexistent infrastructure.

9 (d) OCEANIA DEFINED.—In this section, the term
10 “Oceania” includes the following:

- 11 (1) Easter Island of Chile.
- 12 (2) Fiji.
- 13 (3) French Polynesia of France.
- 14 (4) Kiribati.
- 15 (5) New Caledonia of France.
- 16 (6) Nieu of New Zealand.
- 17 (7) Papua New Guinea.
- 18 (8) Samoa.
- 19 (9) Vanuatu.
- 20 (10) The Ashmore and Cartier Islands of Aus-
21 tralia.
- 22 (11) The Cook Islands of New Zealand.
- 23 (12) The Coral Islands of Australia.
- 24 (13) The Federated States of Micronesia.
- 25 (14) The Norfolk Island of Australia.

1 (15) The Pitcairn Islands of the United King-
2 dom.

3 (16) The Republic of the Marshal Islands.

4 (17) The Republic of Palau.

5 (18) The Solomon Islands.

6 (19) Tokelau of New Zealand.

7 (20) Tonga.

8 (21) Tuvalu.

9 (22) Wallis and Futuna of France.

10 **PART VIII—PACIFIC ISLANDS**

11 **SEC. 295. SHORT TITLE.**

12 This part may be cited as the “Boosting Long-term
13 U.S. Engagement in the Pacific Act” or the “BLUE Pa-
14 cific Act”.

15 **SEC. 296. FINDINGS.**

16 Congress finds the following:

17 (1) The Pacific Islands—

18 (A) are home to roughly 10 million resi-
19 dents, including over 8.6 million in Papua New
20 Guinea, constituting diverse and dynamic cul-
21 tures and peoples;

22 (B) are spread across an expanse of the
23 Pacific Ocean equivalent to 15 percent of the
24 Earth’s surface, including the three sub-regions
25 of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia; and

1 (C) face shared challenges in development
2 that have distinct local contexts, including cli-
3 mate change and rising sea levels, geographic
4 distances from major markets, and vulnerability
5 to external shocks such as natural disasters.

6 (2) The United States is a Pacific country with
7 longstanding ties and shared values and interests
8 with the Pacific Islands, including through the Com-
9 pacts of Free Association with the Freely Associated
10 States, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the
11 Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of
12 Palau.

13 (3) The United States has vital national secu-
14 rity interests in the Pacific Islands, including—

15 (A) protecting regional peace and security
16 that fully respects the sovereignty of all nations;

17 (B) advancing economic prosperity free
18 from coercion through trade and sustainable de-
19 velopment; and

20 (C) supporting democracy, good govern-
21 ance, the rule of law, and human rights and
22 fundamental freedoms.

23 (4) Successive United States administrations
24 have recognized the importance of the Pacific region,

1 including the Pacific Islands, in high-level strategic
2 documents, including the following:

3 (A) The 2015 National Security Strategy,
4 which first declared the rebalance to Asia and
5 the Pacific, affirmed the United States as a Pa-
6 cific nation, and paved the way for subsequent
7 United States engagement with the Pacific Is-
8 lands, including several new policies focused on
9 conservation and resilience to climate change
10 announced in September 2016.

11 (B) The 2017 National Security Strategy,
12 which includes a commitment to “shore up
13 fragile partner states in the Pacific Islands re-
14 gion to reduce their vulnerability to economic
15 fluctuations and natural disasters”.

16 (C) The 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Re-
17 port, which identified the Pacific Islands as
18 “critical to U.S. strategy because of our shared
19 values, interests, and commitments” and com-
20 mitted the United States to “building capacity
21 and resilience to address maritime security; Ille-
22 gal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing; drug
23 trafficking; and resilience to address climate
24 change and disaster response”.

1 (5) The United States has deepened its diplo-
2 matic engagement with the Pacific Islands through
3 several recent initiatives, including—

4 (A) the Pacific Pledge, which provided an
5 additional \$100,000,000 in 2019 and
6 \$200,000,000 in 2020, on top of the approxi-
7 mately \$350,000,000 that the United States
8 provides annually to the region to support
9 shared priorities in economic and human devel-
10 opment, climate change, and more; and

11 (B) the Small and Less Populous Island
12 Economies (SALPIE) Initiative launched in
13 March 2021 to strengthen United States col-
14 laboration with island countries and territories,
15 including in the Pacific Islands, on COVID-19
16 economic challenges, long-term economic devel-
17 opment, climate change, and other shared inter-
18 ests.

19 (6) The Boe Declaration on Regional Security,
20 signed by leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum in
21 2018, affirmed that climate change “remains the
22 single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security, and
23 wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific” and asserted
24 “the sovereign right of every Member to conduct its

1 national affairs free of external interference and co-
2ercion”.

3 (7) The Asian Development Bank has estimated
4 that the Pacific Islands region needs upwards of
5 \$2.8 billion a year in investment needs through
6 2030, in addition to \$300 million a year for climate
7 mitigation and adaptation over the same period.

8 (8) The Pacific Islands swiftly enacted effective
9 policies to prevent and contain the spread of the
10 Coronavirus Disease 2019 (commonly referred to as
11 “COVID–19”) pandemic to their populations. The
12 United States has provided over \$130,000,000 in as-
13 sistance to the Pacific Islands for their COVID-19
14 response. However, priorities must be met to ensure
15 continued success in preventing the spread of the
16 COVID–19 pandemic, achieving swift and wide-
17 spread vaccinations, and pursuing long-term eco-
18 nomic recovery in the Pacific Islands, including
19 through—

20 (A) expanding testing capacity and acquisi-
21 tion of needed medical supplies, including avail-
22 able COVID-19 vaccines and supporting vac-
23 cination efforts, through a reliable supply chain;

24 (B) planning for lifting of lockdowns and
25 reopening of economic and social activities; and

1 (C) mitigating and recovering from the im-
2 pacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the health
3 system and the reliance on food and energy im-
4 ports as well as lost tourism revenue and other
5 economic and food security damages caused by
6 the pandemic.

7 (9) Since 1966, thousands of Peace Corps vol-
8 unteers have proudly served in the Pacific Islands,
9 building strong people-to-people relationships and
10 demonstrating the United States commitment to
11 peace and development in the region. Prior to the
12 COVID–19 pandemic, the Peace Corps maintained
13 presence in four countries of the Pacific Islands.
14 Peace Corps volunteers continue to be in high de-
15 mand in the Pacific Islands and have been requested
16 across the region.

17 **SEC. 297. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

18 It is the policy of the United States—

19 (1) to develop and commit to a comprehensive,
20 multifaceted, and principled United States policy in
21 the Pacific Islands that—

22 (A) promotes peace, security, and pros-
23 perity for all countries through a rules-based
24 regional order that respects the sovereignty and
25 political independence of all nations;

1 (B) preserves the Pacific Ocean as an open
2 and vibrant corridor for international maritime
3 trade and promotes trade and sustainable devel-
4 opment that supports inclusive economic growth
5 and autonomy for all nations and addresses so-
6 cioeconomic challenges related to public health,
7 education, renewable energy, digital
8 connectivity, and more;

9 (C) supports regional efforts to address the
10 challenges posed by climate change, including
11 by strengthening resilience to natural disasters
12 and through responsible stewardship of natural
13 resources;

14 (D) improves civil society, strengthens
15 democratic governance and the rule of law, and
16 promotes human rights and the preservation of
17 the region's unique cultural heritages;

18 (E) assists the Pacific Islands in pre-
19 venting and containing the spread of the
20 COVID-19 pandemic and in pursuing long-
21 term economic recovery; and

22 (F) supports existing regional architecture
23 and international norms;

24 (2) to support the vision, values, and objectives
25 of existing regional multilateral institutions and

1 frameworks, such as the Pacific Islands Forum and
2 the Pacific Community, including—

3 (A) the 2014 Framework for Pacific Re-
4 gionalism;

5 (B) the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional
6 Security; and

7 (C) the Boe Declaration Action Plan;

8 (3) to extend and renew the provisions of the
9 Compacts of Free Association and related United
10 States law that will expire in 2023 for the Republic
11 of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of
12 Micronesia and in 2024 for the Republic of Palau
13 unless they are extended and renewed; and

14 (4) to work closely with United States allies
15 and partners with existing relationships and inter-
16 ests in the Pacific Islands, including Australia,
17 Japan, New Zealand, and Taiwan, in advancing
18 common goals.

19 **SEC. 298. DEFINITIONS.**

20 In this Act:

21 (1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-**
22 **TEES.**—Except as otherwise provided, the term “ap-
23 propriate congressional committees” means—

24 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
25 the House of Representatives; and

1 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
2 the Senate.

3 (2) PACIFIC ISLANDS.—The terms “Pacific Is-
4 lands” means the Cook Islands, the Republic of Fiji,
5 the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of the Mar-
6 shall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia,
7 the Republic of Nauru, Niue, the Republic of Palau,
8 the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, the
9 Independent State of Samoa, the Solomon Islands,
10 the Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Republic of
11 Vanuatu.

12 **SEC. 299. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS; FORM**
13 **OF REPORTS.**

14 (a) AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS.—Any
15 reports required to be submitted to the appropriate con-
16 gressional committees under this Act that are subject to
17 deadlines for submission consisting of the same units of
18 time may be consolidated into a single report that is sub-
19 mitted to appropriate congressional committees pursuant
20 to such deadlines and that contains all information re-
21 quired under such reports.

22 (b) FORM OF REPORTS.—Each report required by
23 this Act shall be submitted in unclassified form but may
24 contain a classified annex.

1 **SEC. 299A. DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC IS-**
2 **LANDS.**

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that—

5 (1) the strategic importance of the Pacific Is-
6 lands necessitates an examination of whether United
7 States diplomatic, economic, and development en-
8 gagement and presence in the Pacific Islands region
9 is sufficient to effectively support United States ob-
10 jectives and meaningful participation in regional
11 fora;

12 (2) improving shared understanding of and
13 jointly combatting the transnational challenges perti-
14 nent to the Pacific Islands region with countries of
15 the Pacific Islands and regional partners such as
16 Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Taiwan is vi-
17 tally important to our shared long-term interests of
18 stability, security, and prosperity;

19 (3) the United States should seek to participate
20 in and support efforts to coordinate a regional re-
21 sponse toward maritime security, including through
22 continued United States and Pacific Islands partici-
23 pation in the Pacific Fusion Centre in Vanuatu and
24 Information Fusion Centre in Singapore, and robust
25 cooperation with regional allies; and

1 (4) the United States Government should com-
2 mit to sending appropriate levels of representation to
3 regional events.

4 (b) REPORT.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
6 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
7 nually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State,
8 in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and
9 the Administrator of the United States Agency for
10 International Development, shall submit to the ap-
11 propriate congressional committees a report on the
12 diplomatic and development presence of the United
13 States in the Pacific Islands.

14 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-
15 graph (1) shall include the following:

16 (A) A description of the Department of
17 State, United States Agency for International
18 Development, United States International De-
19 velopment Finance Corporation, Millennium
20 Challenge Corporation, and United States Com-
21 mercial Service presence, staffing, program-
22 ming, and resourcing of operations in the Pa-
23 cific Islands, including programming and
24 resourcing not specifically allocated to the Pa-
25 cific Islands.

1 (B) A description of gaps in such presence,
2 including unfilled full-time equivalent positions.

3 (C) A description of limitations and chal-
4 lenges such gaps pose to United States stra-
5 tegic objectives, including—

6 (i) gaps in support of the Pacific Is-
7 lands due to operations being conducted
8 from the United States Agency for Inter-
9 national Development offices in Manila and
10 Suva; and

11 (ii) gaps in programming and
12 resourcing.

13 (D) A strategy to expand and elevate such
14 presence to fill such gaps, including by estab-
15 lishing new missions, expanding participation in
16 regional forums, and elevating United States
17 representation in regional forums.

18 (e) AUTHORITY TO ENHANCE DIPLOMATIC AND ECO-
19 NOMIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of State and the
20 Secretary of Commerce are authorized to hire locally em-
21 ployed staff in the Pacific Islands for the purpose of pro-
22 moting increased diplomatic engagement and economic
23 and commercial engagement between the United States
24 and the Pacific Islands.

1 (d) REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION STRAT-
2 EGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
3 ment of this Act, and every 5 years thereafter, the Admin-
4 istrator of the United States Agency for International De-
5 velopment shall submit to the appropriate congressional
6 committees a regional development cooperation strategy
7 for the Pacific Islands.

8 **SEC. 299B. COORDINATION WITH REGIONAL ALLIES.**

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall con-
10 sult and coordinate with regional allies and partners, in-
11 cluding Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, and re-
12 gional institutions such as the Pacific Islands Forum and
13 the Pacific Community, with respect to programs to pro-
14 vide assistance to the Pacific Islands, including programs
15 established by this Act, including for purposes of—

16 (1) deconflicting programming;

17 (2) ensuring that any programming does not
18 adversely affect the absorptive capacity of the Pa-
19 cific Islands; and

20 (3) ensuring complementary programs benefit
21 the Pacific Islands to the maximum extent prac-
22 ticable.

23 (b) FORMAL CONSULTATIVE PROCESS.—The Sec-
24 retary of State shall establish a formal consultative proc-
25 ess with such regional allies and partners to coordinate

1 with respect to such programs and future-years program-
2 ming.

3 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
4 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
5 Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congress-
6 sional committees a report that includes—

7 (1) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and
8 programs undertaken by regional allies and part-
9 ners, including multilateral organizations, to advance
10 priorities identified in this Act;

11 (2) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and
12 programs undertaken by non-allied foreign actors
13 that are viewed as being potentially harmful or in
14 any way detrimental to one or more countries of the
15 Pacific Islands;

16 (3) an assessment of United States programs in
17 the Pacific Islands and their alignment and
18 complementarity with the efforts of regional allies
19 and partners identified in paragraph (1); and

20 (4) a review of the formal consultative process
21 required in subsection (b) to summarize engage-
22 ments held and identify opportunities to improve co-
23 ordination with regional allies and partners.

1 **SEC. 299C. CLIMATE RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE PA-**
2 **CIFIC ISLANDS.**

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that—

5 (1) the United States Government should lever-
6 age the full range of authorities and programs avail-
7 able to assist the Pacific Islands in achieving their
8 development goals;

9 (2) United States development assistance
10 should seek to build on existing public and private
11 sector investments while creating new opportunities
12 toward a favorable environment for additional such
13 investments; and

14 (3) United States development efforts should be
15 coordinated with and seek to build on existing ef-
16 forts by like-minded partners and allies and regional
17 and international multilateral organizations.

18 (b) STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State, in coordina-
19 tion with the Administrator of the United States Agency
20 for International Development, the Secretary of the Treas-
21 ury, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States
22 International Development Finance Corporation, shall de-
23 velop and implement a strategy to—

24 (1) invest in and improve critical infrastructure,
25 including transport connectivity, information and
26 communications technology, food security, coastal

1 zone management, marine and water resource man-
2 agement, and energy security and access to elec-
3 tricity in the Pacific Islands, with an emphasis on
4 climate resiliency and sustainable development;

5 (2) provide technical assistance to assist local
6 government and civil society leaders assess risks to
7 local infrastructure, especially those posed by climate
8 change, consider and implement risk mitigation ef-
9 forts and policies to strengthen resilience, and evalu-
10 ate proposed projects and solutions for their efficacy
11 and sustainability; and

12 (3) support investment and improvement in eco-
13 system conservation and protection for the long-term
14 sustainable use of ecosystem services, especially
15 those that mitigate effects of climate change and
16 those that support food security and livelihoods.

17 (c) CONDUCT OF STRATEGY.—The strategy devel-
18 oped under this section shall be coordinated with like-
19 minded partners and allies, regional and international
20 multilateral organizations, and regional frameworks for
21 development in the Pacific Islands.

22 (d) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—
23 The Secretary of the Treasury shall direct the representa-
24 tives of the United States to the World Bank Group, the
25 International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development

1 Bank to use the voice and vote of the United States to
2 support climate resilient infrastructure projects in the Pa-
3 cific Islands.

4 (e) REPORT.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
6 after the date of the enactment this Act, and annu-
7 ally thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit
8 to the appropriate congressional committees a report
9 on foreign infrastructure developments in the Pacific
10 Islands.

11 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report
12 required by paragraph (1) shall include—

13 (A) a review of foreign infrastructure de-
14 velopments in the Pacific Islands by non-United
15 States allies and partners;

16 (B) assessments of the environmental im-
17 pact and sustainability of such developments;
18 and

19 (C) an analysis of the financial sustain-
20 ability of such developments and their impacts
21 on the debt of host countries in the Pacific Is-
22 lands.

23 (3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
24 TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “ap-
25 propriate congressional committees” means—

1 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
2 the Committee on Natural Resources of the
3 House of Representatives; and

4 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
5 and the Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
6 sources of the Senate.

7 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
8 are authorized to be appropriated \$50,000,000 for each
9 of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this
10 section.

11 **TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR**
12 **VALUES**

13 **SEC. 301. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE CONTINUED VIOLA-**
14 **TION OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF THE**
15 **PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.**

16 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

17 (1) Despite international condemnation, the
18 Government of the People’s Republic of China
19 (“PRC”) continues to disregard its international
20 legal obligations under the Joint Declaration of the
21 Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
22 and Northern Ireland and the Government of the
23 People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong
24 Kong (“Joint Declaration”), in which the PRC com-
25 mitted that—

1 (A) Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree
2 of autonomy;

3 (B) for at least 50 years the “social and
4 economic systems in Hong Kong” would remain
5 unchanged; and

6 (C) the personal rights and freedoms of
7 the people of Hong Kong would be protected by
8 law.

9 (2) As part of its continued efforts to under-
10 mine the established rights of the Hong Kong peo-
11 ple, the PRC National People’s Congress Standing
12 Committee (“Standing Committee”) passed and im-
13 posed upon Hong Kong oppressive and intentionally
14 vague national security legislation on June 30, 2020,
15 that grants Beijing sweeping powers to punish acts
16 of “separating the country, subverting state power,
17 and organizing terroristic activities”.

18 (3) The legislative process by which the Stand-
19 ing Committee imposed the national security law on
20 Hong Kong bypassed Hong Kong’s local government
21 in a potential violation of the Basic Law of the
22 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
23 People’s Republic of China (“Basic Law”), and in-
24 volved unusual secrecy, as demonstrated by the fact
25 that the legislation was only the second law since

1 2008 that the Standing Committee has passed with-
2 out releasing a draft for public comment.

3 (4) On July 30, 2020, election officials of the
4 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
5 (HKSAR) disqualified twelve pro-democracy can-
6 didates from participating in the September 6 Legis-
7 lative Council elections, which were subsequently
8 postponed for a year until September 5, 2021, by
9 citing the public health risk of holding elections dur-
10 ing the COVID–19 pandemic.

11 (5) On July 31, 2020, in an attempt to assert
12 extraterritorial jurisdiction, the HKSAR Govern-
13 ment announced indictments of and arrest warrants
14 for six Hong Kong activists living overseas, includ-
15 ing United States citizen Samuel Chu, for alleged
16 violations of the national security law.

17 (6) On November 11, 2020, the HKSAR Gov-
18 ernment removed four lawmakers from office for al-
19 legedly violating the law after the Standing Com-
20 mittee passed additional legislation barring those
21 who promoted or supported Hong Kong independ-
22 ence and refused to acknowledge PRC sovereignty
23 over Hong Kong, or otherwise violates the national
24 security law, from running for or serving in the Leg-
25 islative Council.

1 (7) On December 2, 2020, pro-democracy activ-
2 ists Joshua Wong, Agnes Chow, and Ivan Lam were
3 sentenced to prison for participating in 2019 pro-
4 tests.

5 (8) Ten of the twelve Hong Kong residents
6 (also known as “the Hong Kong 12”) who sought to
7 flee by boat from Hong Kong to Taiwan on August
8 23, 2020, were taken to mainland China and sen-
9 tenced on December 30, 2020, to prison terms rang-
10 ing from seven months to three years for illegal bor-
11 der crossing.

12 (9) On December 31, 2020, Hong Kong’s high-
13 est court revoked bail for Jimmy Lai Chee-Ying, a
14 pro-democracy figure and publisher, who was
15 charged on December 12 with colluding with foreign
16 forces and endangering national security under the
17 national security legislation.

18 (10) On January 4, 2021, the Departments of
19 Justice in Henan and Sichuan province threatened
20 to revoke the licenses of two lawyers hired to help
21 the Hong Kong 12.

22 (11) On January 5, 2021, the Hong Kong Po-
23 lice Force arrested more than fifty opposition fig-
24 ures, including pro-democracy officials, activists, and
25 an American lawyer, for their involvement in an in-

1 formal July 2020 primary to select candidates for
2 the general election originally scheduled for Sep-
3 tember 2020, despite other political parties having
4 held similar primaries without retribution.

5 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
6 gress that Congress—

7 (1) condemns the actions taken by the Govern-
8 ment of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”)
9 and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Ad-
10 ministrative Region (“HKSAR”), including the
11 adoption and implementation of national security
12 legislation for Hong Kong through irregular proce-
13 dures, that violate the rights and freedoms of the
14 people of Hong Kong that are guaranteed by the
15 Joint Declaration and its implementing document,
16 the Basic Law;

17 (2) reaffirms its support for the people of Hong
18 Kong, who face grave threats to their rights and
19 freedoms;

20 (3) calls on the governments of the PRC and
21 HKSAR to—

22 (A) respect and uphold—

23 (i) commitments made to the inter-
24 national community and the people of

1 Hong Kong under the Joint Declaration;
2 and

3 (ii) the judicial independence of the
4 Hong Kong legal system; and

5 (B) release pro-democracy activists and
6 politicians arrested under the national security
7 law; and

8 (4) encourages the President, the Secretary of
9 State, and the Secretary of the Treasury to coordi-
10 nate with allies and partners and continue United
11 States efforts to respond to developments in Hong
12 Kong, including by—

13 (A) providing protection for Hong Kong
14 residents who fear persecution;

15 (B) supporting those who may seek to file
16 a case before the International Court of Justice
17 to hold the Government of the PRC accountable
18 for violating its binding legal commitments
19 under the Joint Declaration;

20 (C) encouraging allies and partner coun-
21 tries to instruct, as appropriate, their respective
22 representatives to the United Nations to use
23 their voice, vote, and influence to press for the
24 appointment of a United Nations special man-

1 date holder to monitor and report on human
2 rights developments in Hong Kong;

3 (D) ensuring the private sector, particu-
4 larly United States companies with economic in-
5 terests in Hong Kong, is aware of risks the na-
6 tional security legislation poses to the security
7 of United States citizens and to the medium
8 and long-term interest of United States busi-
9 nesses in Hong Kong;

10 (E) continuing to implement sanctions au-
11 thorities, especially authorities recently enacted
12 to address actions undermining the rights and
13 freedoms of the Hong Kong people such as the
14 Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public Law 116–
15 149) and the Hong Kong Human Rights and
16 Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–76),
17 with respect to officials of the Chinese Com-
18 munist Party, the Government of the PRC, or
19 the Government of the HKSAR who are respon-
20 sible for undermining such rights and freedoms;
21 and

22 (F) coordinating with allies and partners
23 to ensure that such implementation of sanctions
24 is multilateral.

1 **SEC. 302. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PRO-**
2 **MOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN HONG KONG.**

3 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
4 authorized to be appropriated \$10,000,000 for fiscal year
5 2022 for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
6 Labor of the Department of State to promote democracy
7 in Hong Kong.

8 (b) ADMINISTRATION.—The Secretary of State shall
9 designate an office with the Department of State to ad-
10 minister and coordinate the provision of such funds de-
11 scribed in subsection (a) within the Department of State
12 and across the United States Government.

13 **SEC. 303. HONG KONG PEOPLE’S FREEDOM AND CHOICE.**

14 (a) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section:

15 (1) JOINT DECLARATION.—The term “Joint
16 Declaration” means the Joint Declaration of the
17 Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
18 and Northern Ireland and the Government of the
19 People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong
20 Kong, signed on December 19, 1984, and entered
21 into force on May 27, 1985.

22 (2) PRIORITY HONG KONG RESIDENT.—The
23 term “Priority Hong Kong resident” means—

24 (A) a permanent resident of Hong Kong
25 who—

1 (i) holds no right to citizenship in any
2 country or jurisdiction other than the Peo-
3 ple’s Republic of China (referred to in this
4 Act as “PRC”), Hong Kong, or Macau as
5 of the date of enactment of this Act;

6 (ii) has resided in Hong Kong for not
7 less than the last 10 years as of the date
8 of enactment of this Act; and

9 (iii) has been designated by the Sec-
10 retary of State or Secretary of Homeland
11 Security as having met the requirements of
12 this subparagraph, in accordance with the
13 procedures described in subsection (f) of
14 this Act; or

15 (B) the spouse of a person described in
16 subparagraph (A), or the child of such person
17 as such term is defined in section 101(b)(1) of
18 the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
19 1101(b)(1)), except that a child shall be an un-
20 married person under twenty-seven years of
21 age.

22 (3) HONG KONG NATIONAL SECURITY LAW.—

23 The term “Hong Kong National Security Law”
24 means the Law of the People’s Republic of China on
25 Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong

1 Special Administrative Region that was passed
2 unanimately by the National People’s Congress and
3 signed by President Xi Jinping on June 30, 2020,
4 and promulgated in the Hong Kong Special Admin-
5 istrative Region (referred to in this Act as “Hong
6 Kong SAR”) on July 1, 2020.

7 (4) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
8 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
9 mittees” means—

10 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
11 the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
12 Representatives; and

13 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
14 and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Sen-
15 ate.

16 (b) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

17 (1) The Hong Kong National Security Law pro-
18 mulgated on July 1, 2020—

19 (A) contravenes the Basic Law of the
20 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (re-
21 ferred to in this Act as “the Basic Law”) that
22 provides in Article 23 that the Legislative
23 Council of Hong Kong shall enact legislation re-
24 lated to national security;

1 (B) violates the PRC's commitments under
2 international law, as defined by the Joint Dec-
3 laration; and

4 (C) causes severe and irreparable damage
5 to the "one country, two systems" principle and
6 further erodes global confidence in the PRC's
7 commitment to international law.

8 (2) On July 14, 2020, in response to the pro-
9 mulgation of the Hong Kong National Security Law,
10 President Trump signed an Executive order on
11 Hong Kong normalization that, among other policy
12 actions, suspended the special treatment of Hong
13 Kong persons under U.S. law with respect to the
14 issuance of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas.

15 (3) The United States has a long and proud
16 history as a destination for refugees and asylees flee-
17 ing persecution based on race, religion, nationality,
18 political opinion, or membership in a particular so-
19 cial group.

20 (4) The United States also shares deep social,
21 cultural, and economic ties with the people of Hong
22 Kong, including a shared commitment to democracy,
23 to the rule of law, and to the protection of human
24 rights.

1 (5) The United States has sheltered, protected,
2 and welcomed individuals who have fled authori-
3 tarian regimes, including citizens from the PRC fol-
4 lowing the violent June 4, 1989, crackdown in
5 Tiananmen Square, deepening ties between the peo-
6 ple of the United States and those individuals seek-
7 ing to contribute to a free, open society founded on
8 democracy, human rights, and the respect for the
9 rule of law.

10 (6) The United States has reaped enormous
11 economic, cultural, and strategic benefits from wel-
12 coming successive generations of scientists, doctors,
13 entrepreneurs, artists, intellectuals, and other free-
14 dom-loving people fleeing fascism, communism, vio-
15 lent Islamist extremism, and other repressive
16 ideologies, including in the cases of Nazi Germany,
17 the Soviet Union, and Soviet-controlled Central Eu-
18 rope, Cuba, Vietnam, and Iran.

19 (7) A major asymmetric advantage of the
20 United States in its long-term strategic competition
21 with the Communist Party of China is the ability of
22 people from every country in the world, irrespective
23 of their race, ethnicity, or religion, to immigrate to
24 the United States and become American citizens.

1 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
2 United States—

3 (1) to reaffirm the principles and objectives set
4 forth in the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of
5 1992 (Public Law 102–383), namely that—

6 (A) the United States has “a strong inter-
7 est in the continued vitality, prosperity, and
8 stability of Hong Kong”;

9 (B) “support for democratization is a fun-
10 damental principle of United States foreign pol-
11 icy” and therefore “naturally applies to United
12 States policy toward Hong Kong”;

13 (C) “the human rights of the people of
14 Hong Kong are of great importance to the
15 United States and are directly relevant to
16 United States interests in Hong Kong and
17 serve as a basis for Hong Kong’s continued eco-
18 nomic prosperity”; and

19 (D) Hong Kong must remain sufficiently
20 autonomous from the PRC to “justify treat-
21 ment under a particular law of the United
22 States, or any provision thereof, different from
23 that accorded the People’s Republic of China”;

1 (2) to continue to support the high degree of
2 autonomy and fundamental rights and freedoms of
3 the people of Hong Kong, as enumerated by—

4 (A) the Joint Declaration;

5 (B) the International Covenant on Civil
6 and Political Rights, done at New York Decem-
7 ber 19, 1966; and

8 (C) the Universal Declaration of Human
9 Rights, done at Paris December 10, 1948;

10 (3) to continue to support the democratic aspi-
11 rations of the people of Hong Kong, including the
12 “ultimate aim” of the selection of the Chief Execu-
13 tive and all members of the Legislative Council by
14 universal suffrage, as articulated in the Basic Law;

15 (4) to urge the Government of the PRC, despite
16 its recent actions, to uphold its commitments to
17 Hong Kong, including allowing the people of Hong
18 Kong to govern Hong Kong with a high degree of
19 autonomy and without undue interference, and en-
20 suring that Hong Kong voters freely enjoy the right
21 to elect the Chief Executive and all members of the
22 Hong Kong Legislative Council by universal suf-
23 frage;

24 (5) to support the establishment of a genuine
25 democratic option to freely and fairly nominate and

1 elect the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and the es-
2 tablishment of open and direct democratic elections
3 for all members of the Hong Kong Legislative Coun-
4 cil;

5 (6) to support the robust exercise by residents
6 of Hong Kong of the rights to free speech, the press,
7 and other fundamental freedoms, as provided by the
8 Basic Law, the Joint Declaration, and the Inter-
9 national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

10 (7) to support freedom from arbitrary or unlaw-
11 ful arrest, detention, or imprisonment for all Hong
12 Kong residents, as provided by the Basic Law, the
13 Joint Declaration, and the International Covenant
14 on Civil and Political Rights;

15 (8) to draw international attention to any viola-
16 tions by the Government of the PRC of the funda-
17 mental rights of the people of Hong Kong, as pro-
18 vided by the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
19 litical Rights, and any encroachment upon the au-
20 tonomy guaranteed to Hong Kong by the Basic Law
21 and the Joint Declaration;

22 (9) to protect United States citizens and long-
23 term permanent residents living in Hong Kong, as
24 well as people visiting and transiting through Hong
25 Kong;

1 (10) to maintain the economic and cultural ties
2 that provide significant benefits to both the United
3 States and Hong Kong, including the reinstatement
4 of the Fulbright exchange program with regard to
5 Hong Kong at the earliest opportunity;

6 (11) to coordinate with allies, including the
7 United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the
8 Republic of Korea, to promote democracy and
9 human rights in Hong Kong; and

10 (12) to welcome and protect in the United
11 States residents of Hong Kong fleeing persecution or
12 otherwise seeking a safe haven from violations by
13 the Government of the PRC of the fundamental
14 rights of the people of Hong Kong.

15 (d) TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS FOR HONG
16 KONG RESIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES.—

17 (1) DESIGNATION.—

18 (A) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of section
19 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
20 U.S.C. 1254a), Hong Kong shall be treated as
21 if it had been designated under subsection
22 (b)(1)(C) of that section, subject to the provi-
23 sions of this section.

24 (B) PERIOD OF DESIGNATION.—The initial
25 period of the designation referred to in sub-

1 paragraph (A) shall be for the 18-month period
2 beginning on the date of enactment of this Act.

3 (2) ALIENS ELIGIBLE.—As a result of the des-
4 ignation made under subsection (a), an alien is
5 deemed to satisfy the requirements under paragraph
6 (1) of section 244(c) of the Immigration and Nation-
7 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)), subject to paragraph
8 (3) of such section, if the alien—

9 (A) was a permanent resident of Hong
10 Kong at the time such individual arrived into
11 the United States and is a national of the PRC
12 (or in the case of an individual having no na-
13 tionality, is a person who last habitually resided
14 in Hong Kong);

15 (B) has been continuously physically
16 present in the United States since the date of
17 the enactment of this Act;

18 (C) is admissible as an immigrant, except
19 as otherwise provided in paragraph (2)(A) of
20 such section, and is not ineligible for temporary
21 protected status under paragraph (2)(B) of
22 such section; and

23 (D) registers for temporary protected sta-
24 tus in a manner established by the Secretary of
25 Homeland Security.

1 (3) CONSENT TO TRAVEL ABROAD.—

2 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of
3 Homeland Security shall give prior consent to
4 travel abroad, in accordance with section
5 244(f)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality
6 Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(f)(3)), to an alien who is
7 granted temporary protected status pursuant to
8 the designation made under paragraph (1) if
9 the alien establishes to the satisfaction of the
10 Secretary of Homeland Security that emergency
11 and extenuating circumstances beyond the con-
12 trol of the alien require the alien to depart for
13 a brief, temporary trip abroad.

14 (B) TREATMENT UPON RETURN.—An alien
15 returning to the United States in accordance
16 with an authorization described in subpara-
17 graph (A) shall be treated as any other return-
18 ing alien provided temporary protected status
19 under section 244 of the Immigration and Na-
20 tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a).

21 (4) FEE.—

22 (A) IN GENERAL.—In addition to any
23 other fee authorized by law, the Secretary of
24 Homeland Security is authorized to charge and
25 collect a fee of \$360 for each application for

1 temporary protected status under section 244
2 of the Immigration and Nationality Act by a
3 person who is only eligible for such status by
4 reason of paragraph (1).

5 (B) WAIVER.—The Secretary of Homeland
6 Security shall permit aliens to apply for a waiv-
7 er of any fees associated with filing an applica-
8 tion referred to in subparagraph (A).

9 (e) TREATMENT OF HONG KONG RESIDENTS FOR
10 IMMIGRATION PURPOSES.—Notwithstanding any other
11 provision of law, during the 5 fiscal year period beginning
12 on the first day of the first full fiscal year after the date
13 of enactment of this Act, Hong Kong shall continue to
14 be considered a foreign state separate and apart from the
15 PRC as mandated under section 103 of the Immigration
16 and Nationality Act of 1990 (Public Law 101–649) for
17 purposes of the numerical limitations on immigrant visas
18 under sections 201, 202, and 203 of the Immigration and
19 Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, and 1153).

20 (f) VERIFICATION OF PRIORITY HONG KONG RESI-
21 DENTS.—

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
23 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
24 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
25 Homeland Security, shall publish in the Federal

1 Register, an interim final rule establishing proce-
2 dures for designation of Priority Hong Kong Resi-
3 dents. Notwithstanding section 553 of title 5, United
4 States Code, the rule shall be effective, on an in-
5 terim basis, immediately upon publication, but may
6 be subject to change and revision after public notice
7 and opportunity for comment. The Secretary of
8 State shall finalize such rule not later than 1 year
9 after the date of the enactment of this Act. Such
10 rule shall establish procedures—

11 (A) for individuals to register with any
12 United States embassy or consulate outside of
13 the United States, or with the Department of
14 Homeland Security in the United States, and
15 request designation as a Priority Hong Kong
16 Resident; and

17 (B) for the appropriate Secretary to verify
18 the residency of registered individuals and des-
19 ignate those who qualify as Priority Hong Kong
20 Residents.

21 (2) DOCUMENTATION.—The procedures de-
22 scribed in paragraph (1) shall include the collection
23 of—

24 (A) biometric data;

1 (B) copies of birth certificates, residency
2 cards, and other documentation establishing
3 residency; and

4 (C) other personal information, data, and
5 records deemed appropriate by the Secretary.

6 (3) GUIDANCE.—Not later than 90 days after
7 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
8 of State shall issue guidance outlining actions to en-
9 hance the ability of the Secretary to efficiently send
10 and receive information to and from the United
11 Kingdom and other like-minded allies and partners
12 for purposes of rapid verification of permanent resi-
13 dency in Hong Kong and designation of individuals
14 as Priority Hong Kong Residents.

15 (4) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the
16 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
17 State shall submit a report to the House Committees
18 on Foreign Affairs and the Judiciary and the Senate
19 Committees on Foreign Relations and the Judiciary
20 detailing plans to implement the requirements de-
21 scribed in this subsection.

22 (5) PROTECTION FOR REFUGEES.—Nothing in
23 this section shall be construed to prevent a Priority
24 Hong Kong Resident from seeking refugee status
25 under section 207 of the Immigration and Nation-

1 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or requesting asylum
2 under section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158).

3 (g) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—On an annual basis, the Sec-
5 retary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
6 rity, in consultation with other Federal agencies, as
7 appropriate, shall submit a report to the appropriate
8 congressional committees, detailing for the previous
9 fiscal year—

10 (A) the number of Hong Kong SAR resi-
11 dents who have applied for U.S. visas or immi-
12 gration benefits, disaggregated by visa type or
13 immigration benefit, including asylum, refugee
14 status, temporary protected status, and lawful
15 permanent residence;

16 (B) the number of approvals, denials, or
17 rejections of applicants for visas or immigration
18 benefits described in subparagraph (A),
19 disaggregated by visa type or immigration ben-
20 efit and basis for denial;

21 (C) the number of pending refugee and
22 asylum applications for Hong Kong SAR resi-
23 dents, and the length of time and reason for
24 which such applications have been pending; and

1 (D) other matters deemed relevant by the
2 Secretaries relating to efforts to protect and fa-
3 cilitate the resettlement of refugees and victims
4 of persecution in Hong Kong.

5 (2) FORM.—Each report under paragraph (1)
6 shall be submitted in unclassified form and pub-
7 lished on a text-searchable, publicly available website
8 of the Department of State and the Department of
9 Homeland Security.

10 (h) STRATEGY FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
11 ON HONG KONG.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—It is the policy of the United
13 States—

14 (A) to support the people of Hong Kong by
15 providing safe haven to Hong Kong SAR resi-
16 dents who are nationals of the PRC following
17 the enactment of the Hong Kong National Se-
18 curity Law that places certain Hong Kong per-
19 sons at risk of persecution; and

20 (B) to encourage like-minded nations to
21 make similar accommodations for Hong Kong
22 people fleeing persecution by the Government of
23 the PRC.

24 (2) PLAN.—The Secretary of State, in consulta-
25 tion with the heads of other Federal agencies, as ap-

1 appropriate, shall develop a plan to engage with other
2 nations, including the United Kingdom, on coopera-
3 tive efforts to—

4 (A) provide refugee and asylum protections
5 for victims of, and individuals with a fear of,
6 persecution in Hong Kong, either by Hong
7 Kong authorities or other authorities acting on
8 behalf of the PRC;

9 (B) enhance protocols to facilitate the re-
10 settlement of refugees and displaced persons
11 from Hong Kong;

12 (C) identify and prevent the exploitation of
13 immigration and visa policies and procedures by
14 corrupt officials; and

15 (D) expedite the sharing of information, as
16 appropriate, related to the refusal of individual
17 applications for visas or other travel documents
18 submitted by residents of the Hong Kong SAR
19 based on—

20 (i) national security or related
21 grounds under section 212(a)(3) of the Im-
22 migration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
23 1182(a)(3)); or

24 (ii) fraud or misrepresentation under
25 section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Immigration

1 and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
2 1182(a)(6)(C)).

3 (3) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the
4 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
5 State, in consultation with the heads of other Fed-
6 eral agencies, as appropriate, shall submit a report
7 on the plan described in paragraph (2) to the appro-
8 priate congressional committees.

9 (i) REFUGEE STATUS FOR CERTAIN RESIDENTS OF
10 HONG KONG.—

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—Aliens described in para-
12 graph (2) may establish, for purposes of admission
13 as a refugee under sections 207 of the Immigration
14 and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or asylum
15 under section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158), that
16 such alien has a well-founded fear of persecution on
17 account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
18 a particular social group, or political opinion by as-
19 serting such a fear and a credible basis for concern
20 about the possibility of such persecution.

21 (2) ALIENS DESCRIBED.—

22 (A) IN GENERAL.—An alien is described in
23 this subsection if such alien—

24 (i) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident
25 and—

1 (I) had a significant role in a
2 civil society organization supportive of
3 the protests in 2019 and 2020 related
4 to the Hong Kong National Security
5 Law and the encroachment on the au-
6 tonomy of Hong Kong by the PRC;

7 (II) was arrested, charged, de-
8 tained, or convicted of an offense aris-
9 ing from their participation in an ac-
10 tion as described in section 206(b)(2)
11 of the United States-Hong Kong Pol-
12 icy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C.
13 5726(b)(2)) that was not violent in
14 nature; or

15 (III) has had their citizenship,
16 nationality, or residency revoked for
17 having submitted to any United
18 States Government agency a nonfrivo-
19 lous application for refugee status,
20 asylum, or any other immigration ben-
21 efit under the immigration laws (as
22 defined in section 101(a) of that Act
23 (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)));

1 (ii) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident
2 spouse or child of an alien described in
3 clause (i); or

4 (iii) is the parent of an alien described
5 in clause (i), if such parent is a citizen of
6 the PRC and no other foreign state.

7 (B) OTHER CATEGORIES.—The Secretary
8 of Homeland Security, in consultation with the
9 Secretary of State, may designate other cat-
10 egories of aliens for purposes of establishing a
11 well-founded fear of persecution under para-
12 graph (1) if such aliens share common charac-
13 teristics that identify them as targets of perse-
14 cution in the PRC on account of race, religion,
15 nationality, membership in a particular social
16 group, or political opinion.

17 (C) SIGNIFICANT ROLE.—For purposes of
18 subclause (I) of paragraph (2)(A)(i), a signifi-
19 cant role shall include, with respect to the pro-
20 tests described in such clause—

21 (i) an organizing role;

22 (ii) a first aid responder;

23 (iii) a journalist or member of the
24 media covering or offering public com-
25 mentary;

1 (iv) a provider of legal services to one
2 or more individuals arrested for partici-
3 pating in such protests; or

4 (v) a participant who during the pe-
5 riod beginning on June 9, 2019, and end-
6 ing on June 30, 2020, was arrested,
7 charged, detained, or convicted as a result
8 of such participation.

9 (3) AGE OUT PROTECTIONS.—For purposes of
10 this subsection, a determination of whether an alien
11 is a child shall be made using the age of the alien
12 on the date an application for refugee or asylum sta-
13 tus in which the alien is a named beneficiary is filed
14 with the Secretary of Homeland Security.

15 (4) EXCLUSION FROM NUMERICAL LIMITA-
16 TIONS.—Aliens provided refugee status under this
17 subsection shall not be counted against the numer-
18 ical limitation on refugees established in accordance
19 with the procedures described in section 207 of the
20 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157).

21 (5) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—

22 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days
23 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
24 every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of State
25 and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall

1 submit a report on the matters described in
2 subparagraph (B) to—

3 (i) the Committee on the Judiciary
4 and the Committee on Foreign Relations
5 of the Senate; and

6 (ii) the Committee on the Judiciary
7 and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
8 the House of Representatives.

9 (B) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each
10 report required by subparagraph (A) shall in-
11 clude, with respect to applications submitted
12 under this section—

13 (i) the total number of refugee and
14 asylum applications that are pending at
15 the end of the reporting period;

16 (ii) the average wait-times for all ap-
17 plicants for refugee status or asylum pend-
18 ing—

19 (I) a prescreening interview with
20 a resettlement support center;

21 (II) an interview with U.S. Citi-
22 zenship and Immigration Services;
23 and

24 (III) the completion of security
25 checks;

1 (iii) the number of approvals, referrals
2 including the source of the referral, denials
3 of applications for refugee status or asy-
4 lum, disaggregated by the reason for each
5 such denial; and

6 (iv) the number of refugee circuit
7 rides to interview populations that would
8 include Hong Kong SAR completed in the
9 last 90 days, and the number planned for
10 the subsequent 90-day period.

11 (C) FORM.—Each report required by sub-
12 paragraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassi-
13 fied form, but may include a classified annex.

14 (D) PUBLIC REPORTS.—The Secretary of
15 State shall make each report submitted under
16 this paragraph available to the public on the
17 internet website of the Department of State.

18 (j) ADMISSION FOR CERTAIN HIGHLY SKILLED
19 HONG KONG RESIDENTS.—

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subsection (c),
21 the Secretary of Homeland Security, or, notwith-
22 standing any other provision of law, the Secretary of
23 State in consultation with the Secretary of Home-
24 land Security, may provide an alien described in sub-
25 section (b) with the status of a special immigrant

1 under section 101(a)(27) of the Immigration and
2 Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)), if the
3 alien—

4 (A) or an agent acting on behalf of the
5 alien, submits a petition for classification under
6 section 203(b)(4) of such Act (8 U.S.C.
7 1153(b)(4));

8 (B) is otherwise eligible to receive an im-
9 migrant visa;

10 (C) is otherwise admissible to the United
11 States for permanent residence (excluding the
12 grounds for inadmissibility specified in section
13 212(a)(4) of such Act (8 U.S.C. (a)(4)); and

14 (D) clears a background check and appro-
15 priate screening, as determined by the Sec-
16 retary of Homeland Security.

17 (2) ALIENS DESCRIBED.—

18 (A) PRINCIPAL ALIENS.—An alien is de-
19 scribed in this subsection if—

20 (i) the alien—

21 (I) is a Priority Hong Kong Resi-
22 dent; and

23 (II) has earned a bachelor's or
24 higher degree from an institution of
25 higher education; and

1 (ii) the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
2 rity determines that such alien's relocation
3 to the United States would provide a sig-
4 nificant benefit to the United States.

5 (B) SPOUSES AND CHILDREN.—An alien is
6 described in this subsection if the alien is the
7 spouse or child of a principal alien described in
8 paragraph (1).

9 (3) NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS.—

10 (A) IN GENERAL.—The total number of
11 principal aliens who may be provided special
12 immigrant status under this section may not
13 exceed 5,000 per year for each of the 5 fiscal
14 years beginning after the date of the enactment
15 of this Act. The Secretary of Homeland Secu-
16 rity may, in consultation with the Secretary of
17 State, prioritize the issuance of visas to individ-
18 uals with a bachelor's or higher degree in
19 science, technology, engineering, mathematics,
20 medicine, or health care.

21 (B) EXCLUSION FROM NUMERICAL LIMITA-
22 TIONS.—Aliens provided immigrant status
23 under this section shall not be counted against
24 any numerical limitation under section 201,
25 202, 203, or 207 of the Immigration and Na-

1 tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, 1153, and
2 1157).

3 (4) ELIGIBILITY FOR ADMISSION UNDER OTHER
4 CLASSIFICATION.—No alien shall be denied the op-
5 portunity to apply for admission under this section
6 solely because such alien qualifies as an immediate
7 relative or is eligible for any other immigrant classi-
8 fication.

9 (5) TIMELINE FOR PROCESSING APPLICA-
10 TIONS.—

11 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State
12 and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
13 ensure that all steps under the control of the
14 United States Government incidental to the ap-
15 proval of such applications, including required
16 screenings and background checks, are com-
17 pleted not later than 1 year after the date on
18 which an eligible applicant submits an applica-
19 tion under subsection (a).

20 (B) EXCEPTION.—Notwithstanding para-
21 graph (1), the relevant Federal agencies may
22 take additional time to process applications de-
23 scribed in paragraph (1) if satisfaction of na-
24 tional security concerns requires such additional
25 time, provided that the Secretary of Homeland

1 Security, or the designee of the Secretary, has
2 determined that the applicant meets the re-
3 quirements for status as a special immigrant
4 under this section and has so notified the appli-
5 cant.

6 (k) TERMINATION.—Except as provided in section 6
7 of this Act, this Act shall cease to have effect on the date
8 that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this
9 Act.

10 **SEC. 304. EXPORT PROHIBITION OF MUNITIONS ITEMS TO**
11 **THE HONG KONG POLICE FORCE.**

12 Section 3 of the Act entitled “An Act to prohibit the
13 commercial export of covered munitions items to the Hong
14 Kong Police Force”, approved November 27, 2019 (Public
15 Law 116–77; 133 Stat. 1173), is amended by striking “on
16 December 31, 2021.” and inserting the following: “on the
17 date on which the President certifies to the appropriate
18 congressional committees that—

19 “(1) the Secretary of State has, on or after the
20 date of the enactment of this paragraph, certified
21 under section 205 of the United States-Hong Kong
22 Policy Act of 1992 that Hong Kong warrants treat-
23 ment under United States law in the same manner
24 as United States laws were applied to Hong Kong
25 before July 1, 1997;

1 “(2) the Hong Kong Police have not engaged in
2 gross violations of human rights during the 1-year
3 period ending on the date of such certification; and

4 “(3) there has been an independent examina-
5 tion of human rights concerns related to the crowd
6 control tactics of the Hong Kong Police and the
7 Government of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
8 tive Region has adequately addressed those con-
9 cerns.”.

10 **SEC. 305. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING THE ONGO-**
11 **ING GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HU-**
12 **MANITY AGAINST UYGHURS AND OTHER MI-**
13 **NORITY GROUPS.**

14 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

15 (1) On December 9, 1948, the United Nations
16 General Assembly unanimously adopted the Conven-
17 tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
18 of Genocide (the Genocide Convention) signifying a
19 commitment in response to the Holocaust and other
20 crimes against humanity committed in the first half
21 of the twentieth century.

22 (2) The Genocide Convention entered into force
23 on January 12, 1951, and declares that all state
24 parties “confirm that genocide, whether committed
25 in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under

1 international law which they undertake to prevent
2 and to punish”.

3 (3) The Genocide Convention defines genocide
4 as “any of the following acts committed with intent
5 to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
6 racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing mem-
7 bers of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or
8 mental harm to members of the group; (c) Delib-
9 erately inflicting on the group conditions of life cal-
10 culated to bring about its physical destruction in
11 whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to
12 prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly trans-
13 ferring children of the group to another group”.

14 (4) The United States ratified the Genocide
15 Convention with the understanding that the commis-
16 sion of genocide requires “the specific intent to de-
17 stroy, in whole or in substantial part, a [protected]
18 group as such”.

19 (5) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a
20 state party to the Genocide Convention.

21 (6) Since 2017, the PRC Government, under
22 the direction and control of the Chinese Communist
23 Party (CCP), has detained and sought to indoctri-
24 nate more than one million Uyghurs and members
25 of other ethnic and religious minority groups.

1 (7) Recent data indicate a significant drop in
2 birth rates among Uyghurs due to enforced steriliza-
3 tion, enforced abortion, and more onerous birth
4 quotas for Uyghurs compared to Han.

5 (8) There are credible reports of PRC Govern-
6 ment campaigns to promote marriages between
7 Uyghurs and Han and to reduce birth rates among
8 Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims.

9 (9) Many Uyghurs reportedly have been as-
10 signed to factory employment under conditions that
11 indicate forced labor, and some former detainees
12 have reported food deprivation, beatings, suppression
13 of religious practices, family separation, and sexual
14 abuse.

15 (10) This is indicative of a systematic effort to
16 eradicate the ethnic and cultural identity and reli-
17 gious beliefs, and prevent the births of, Uyghurs,
18 ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, and members of reli-
19 gious minority groups.

20 (11) The birth rate in the Xinjiang region fell
21 by 24 percent in 2019 compared to a 4.2 percent de-
22 cline nationwide.

23 (12) On January 19, 2021, the Department of
24 State determined the PRC Government, under the
25 direction and control of the CCP, has committed

1 crimes against humanity and genocide against
2 Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority
3 groups in Xinjiang.

4 (13) Secretary of State Antony Blinken and
5 Former Secretary of State Michael Pompeo have
6 both stated that what has taken place in Xinjiang is
7 genocide and constitutes crimes against humanity.

8 (14) Article VIII of the Genocide Convention
9 provides, “Any Contracting Party may call upon the
10 competent organs of the United Nations to take
11 such action under the Charter of the United Nations
12 as they consider appropriate for the prevention and
13 suppression of acts of genocide”.

14 (15) The International Court of Justice has
15 stated that it is the obligation of all state parties to
16 the Genocide Convention to “employ all means rea-
17 sonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide
18 so far as possible”.

19 (16) The United States is a Permanent Mem-
20 ber of the United Nations Security Council.

21 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
22 gress that Congress—

23 (1) finds that the ongoing abuses against
24 Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious
25 minority groups constitute genocide as defined in the

1 Genocide Convention and crimes against humanity
2 as understood under customary international law;

3 (2) attributes these atrocity crimes against
4 Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious
5 minority groups to the People's Republic of China,
6 under the direction and control of the Chinese Com-
7 munist Party;

8 (3) condemns this genocide and these crimes
9 against humanity in the strongest terms; and

10 (4) calls upon the President to direct the
11 United States Permanent Representative to the
12 United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence
13 of the United States to—

14 (A) refer the People's Republic of China's
15 genocide and crimes against humanity against
16 Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and reli-
17 gious minority groups to the competent organs
18 of the United Nations for investigation;

19 (B) seize the United Nations Security
20 Council of the circumstances of this genocide
21 and crimes against humanity and lead efforts to
22 invoke multilateral sanctions in response to
23 these ongoing atrocities; and

24 (C) take all possible actions to bring this
25 genocide and these crimes against humanity to

1 an end and hold the perpetrators of these atroc-
2 ities accountable under international law.

3 **SEC. 306. PREVENTION OF UYGHUR FORCED LABOR.**

4 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
5 United States—

6 (1) to prohibit the import of all goods, wares,
7 articles, or merchandise mined, produced, or manu-
8 factured, wholly or in part, by forced labor from the
9 People’s Republic of China and particularly any such
10 goods, wares, articles, or merchandise produced in
11 the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China;

12 (2) to encourage the international community
13 to reduce the import of any goods made with forced
14 labor from the People’s Republic of China, particu-
15 larly those goods mined, manufactured, or produced
16 in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region;

17 (3) to coordinate with Mexico and Canada to ef-
18 fectively implement Article 23.6 of the United
19 States-Mexico-Canada Agreement to prohibit the im-
20 portation of goods produced in whole or in part by
21 forced or compulsory labor, which includes goods
22 produced in whole or in part by forced or compul-
23 sory labor in the People’s Republic of China;

24 (4) to actively work to prevent, publicly de-
25 nounce, and end human trafficking as a horrific as-

1 sault on human dignity and to restore the lives of
2 those affected by human trafficking, a modern form
3 of slavery;

4 (5) to regard the prevention of atrocities as in
5 its national interest, including efforts to prevent tor-
6 ture, enforced disappearances, severe deprivation of
7 liberty, including mass internment, arbitrary deten-
8 tion, and widespread and systematic use of forced
9 labor, and persecution targeting any identifiable eth-
10 nic or religious group; and

11 (6) to address gross violations of human rights
12 in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region through
13 bilateral diplomatic channels and multilateral insti-
14 tutions where both the United States and the Peo-
15 ple's Republic of China are members and with all
16 the authorities available to the United States Gov-
17 ernment, including visa and financial sanctions, ex-
18 port restrictions, and import controls.

19 (b) PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION OF GOODS MADE
20 IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.—

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in para-
22 graph (2), all goods, wares, articles, and merchan-
23 dise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in
24 part in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of
25 China, or by persons working with the Xinjiang

1 Uyghur Autonomous Region government for pur-
2 poses of the “poverty alleviation” program or the
3 “pairing-assistance” program which subsidizes the
4 establishment of manufacturing facilities in the
5 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, shall be
6 deemed to be goods, wares, articles, and merchan-
7 dise described in section 307 of the Tariff Act of
8 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307) and shall not be entitled to
9 entry at any of the ports of the United States.

10 (2) EXCEPTION.—The prohibition described in
11 paragraph (1) shall not apply if the Commissioner of
12 U.S. Customs and Border Protection—

13 (A) determines, by clear and convincing
14 evidence, that any specific goods, wares, arti-
15 cles, or merchandise described in paragraph (1)
16 were not produced wholly or in part by convict
17 labor, forced labor, or indentured labor under
18 penal sanctions; and

19 (B) submits to the appropriate congres-
20 sional committees and makes available to the
21 public a report that contains such determina-
22 tion.

23 (3) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall take
24 effect on the date that is 120 days after the date of
25 the enactment of this Act.

1 (c) ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY TO ADDRESS FORCED
2 LABOR IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS RE-
3 GION.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days
5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
6 Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force, established
7 under section 741 of the United States-Mexico-Can-
8 ada Agreement Implementation Act (19 U.S.C.
9 4681), shall submit to the appropriate congressional
10 committees a report that contains an enforcement
11 strategy to effectively address forced labor in the
12 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China or
13 products made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibet-
14 ans, or members of other persecuted groups through
15 forced labor in any other part of the People’s Repub-
16 lic of China. The enforcement strategy shall describe
17 the specific enforcement plans of the United States
18 Government regarding—

19 (A) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise
20 described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported
21 into the United States directly from the
22 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or made
23 by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or
24 members of other persecuted groups in any
25 other part of the People’s Republic of China;

1 (B) goods, wares, articles, and merchan-
2 dise described in subsection (b)(1) that are im-
3 ported into the United States from the People’s
4 Republic of China and are mined, produced, or
5 manufactured in part in the Xinjiang Uyghur
6 Autonomous Region or by persons working with
7 the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region gov-
8 ernment or the Xinjiang Production and Con-
9 struction Corps for purposes of the “poverty al-
10 leviation” program or the “pairing-assistance”
11 program; and

12 (C) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise
13 described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported
14 into the United States from third countries and
15 are mined, produced, or manufactured in part
16 in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or
17 by persons working with the Xinjiang Uyghur
18 Autonomous Region government or the
19 Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
20 for purposes of the “poverty alleviation” pro-
21 gram or the “pairing-assistance” program.

22 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy
23 required by paragraph (1) shall include the fol-
24 lowing:

1 (A) A description of the actions taken by
2 the United States Government to address
3 forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autono-
4 mous Region under section 307 of the Tariff
5 Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307), including a de-
6 scription of all Withhold Release Orders issued,
7 goods detained, and fines issued.

8 (B) A list of products made wholly or in
9 part by forced or involuntary labor in the
10 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or made
11 by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or
12 members of other persecuted groups in any
13 other part of the People's Republic of China,
14 and a list of businesses that sold products in
15 the United States made wholly or in part by
16 forced or involuntary labor in the Xinjiang
17 Uyghur Autonomous Region or made by
18 Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or mem-
19 bers of other persecuted groups in any other
20 part of the People's Republic of China.

21 (C) A list of facilities and entities, includ-
22 ing the Xinjiang Production and Construction
23 Corps, that source material from the Xinjiang
24 Uyghur Autonomous Region or by persons
25 working with the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous

1 Region government or the Xinjiang Production
2 and Construction Corps for purposes of the
3 “poverty alleviation” program or the “pairing-
4 assistance” program, a plan for identifying ad-
5 ditional such facilities and entities, and facility-
6 and entity-specific enforcement plans, including
7 issuing specific Withhold Release Orders to sup-
8 port enforcement of subsection (b), with regard
9 to each listed facility or entity.

10 (D) A list of high-priority sectors for en-
11 forcement, which shall include cotton, tomatoes,
12 polysilicon, and a sector-specific enforcement
13 plan for each high-priority sector.

14 (E) A description of the additional re-
15 sources necessary for U.S. Customs and Border
16 Protection to effectively implement the enforce-
17 ment strategy.

18 (F) A plan to coordinate and collaborate
19 with appropriate nongovernmental organizations
20 and private sector entities to discuss the en-
21 forcement strategy for products made in the
22 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

23 (3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph
24 (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
25 include a classified annex, if necessary.

1 (4) UPDATES.—The Forced Labor Enforcement
2 Task Force shall provide briefings to the appropriate
3 congressional committees on a quarterly basis and,
4 as applicable, on any updates to the strategy re-
5 quired by paragraph (1) or any additional actions
6 taken to address forced labor in the Xinjiang
7 Uyghur Autonomous Region, including actions de-
8 scribed in this Act.

9 (5) SUNSET.—This section shall cease to have
10 effect on the earlier of—

11 (A) the date that is 8 years after the date
12 of the enactment of this Act; or

13 (B) the date on which the President sub-
14 mits to the appropriate congressional commit-
15 tees a determination that the Government of
16 the People’s Republic of China has ended mass
17 internment, forced labor, and any other gross
18 violations of human rights experienced by
19 Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of
20 other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang
21 Uyghur Autonomous Region.

22 (d) DETERMINATION RELATING TO CRIMES AGAINST
23 HUMANITY OR GENOCIDE IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AU-
24 TONOMOUS REGION.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
2 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
3 of State shall—

4 (A) determine if the practice of forced
5 labor or other crimes against Uyghurs,
6 Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Mus-
7 lim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur
8 Autonomous Region of China can be considered
9 systematic and widespread and therefore con-
10 stitutes crimes against humanity or constitutes
11 genocide as defined in subsection (a) of section
12 1091 of title 18, United States Code; and

13 (B) submit to the appropriate congress-
14 sional committees and make available to the
15 public a report that contains such determina-
16 tion.

17 (2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph
18 (1)—

19 (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form
20 but may include a classified annex, if necessary;
21 and

22 (B) may be included in the report required
23 by subsection (e).

1 (e) DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY TO ADDRESS FORCED
2 LABOR IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS RE-
3 GION.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
5 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
6 of State, in coordination with the heads of other ap-
7 propriate Federal departments and agencies, shall
8 submit to the appropriate congressional committees
9 a report that contains a United States strategy to
10 promote initiatives to enhance international aware-
11 ness of and to address forced labor in the Xinjiang
12 Uyghur Autonomous Region of China.

13 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy
14 required by paragraph (1) shall include—

15 (A) a plan to enhance bilateral and multi-
16 lateral coordination, including sustained en-
17 gagement with the governments of United
18 States partners and allies, to end forced labor
19 of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of
20 other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang
21 Uyghur Autonomous Region;

22 (B) public affairs, public diplomacy, and
23 counter-messaging efforts to promote awareness
24 of the human rights situation, including forced

1 labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re-
2 gion; and

3 (C) opportunities to coordinate and col-
4 laborate with appropriate nongovernmental or-
5 ganizations and private sector entities to raise
6 awareness about forced labor made products
7 from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
8 and to provide assistance to Uyghurs, Kazakhs,
9 Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority
10 groups, including those formerly detained in
11 mass internment camps in the region.

12 (3) ADDITIONAL MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—
13 The report required by paragraph (1) shall also in-
14 clude—

15 (A) to the extent practicable, a list of—

16 (i) entities in the People’s Republic of
17 China or affiliates of such entities that di-
18 rectly or indirectly use forced or involun-
19 tary labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autono-
20 mous Region; and

21 (ii) Foreign persons that acted as
22 agents of the entities or affiliates of enti-
23 ties described in clause (i) to import goods
24 into the United States; and

1 (B) a description of actions taken by the
2 United States Government to address forced
3 labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re-
4 gion under existing authorities, including—

5 (i) the Trafficking Victims Protection
6 Act of 2000 (Public Law 106–386; 22
7 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.);

8 (ii) the Elie Wiesel Genocide and
9 Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public
10 Law 115–441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note); and

11 (iii) the Global Magnitsky Human
12 Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656
13 note).

14 (4) FORM.—The report required by paragraph
15 (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
16 include a classified annex, if necessary.

17 (5) UPDATES.—The Secretary of State shall in-
18 clude any updates to the strategy required by para-
19 graph (1) in the annual Trafficking in Persons re-
20 port required by section 110(b) of the Trafficking
21 Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107(b)).

22 (6) SUNSET.—This section shall cease to have
23 effect the earlier of—

24 (A) the date that is 8 years after the date
25 of the enactment of this Act; or

1 (B) the date on which the President sub-
2 mits to the appropriate congressional commit-
3 tees a determination that the Government of
4 the People's Republic of China has ended mass
5 internment, forced labor, and any other gross
6 violations of human rights experienced by
7 Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of
8 other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang
9 Uyghur Autonomous Region.

10 (f) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO
11 FORCED LABOR IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS
12 REGION.—

13 (1) REPORT REQUIRED.—

14 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180
15 days after the date of the enactment of this
16 Act, and not less frequently than annually
17 thereafter, the President shall submit to the ap-
18 propriate congressional committees a report
19 that identifies each foreign person, including
20 any official of the Government of the People's
21 Republic of China, that the President deter-
22 mines—

23 (i) knowingly engages in, is respon-
24 sible for, or facilitates the forced labor of
25 Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members

1 of other Muslim minority groups in the
2 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of
3 China; and

4 (ii) knowingly engages in, contributes
5 to, assists, or provides financial, material
6 or technological support for efforts to con-
7 travene United States law regarding the
8 importation of forced labor goods from the
9 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

10 (B) FORM.—The report required under
11 subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclas-
12 sified form, but may contain a classified annex.

13 (2) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—The President
14 shall impose the sanctions described in paragraph
15 (3) with respect to each foreign person identified in
16 the report required under paragraph (1)(A).

17 (3) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions de-
18 scribed in this subsection are the following:

19 (A) ASSET BLOCKING.—The President
20 shall exercise all of the powers granted to the
21 President under the International Emergency
22 Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)
23 to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all
24 transactions in property and interests in prop-
25 erty of a foreign person identified in the report

1 required under paragraph (1)(A) if such prop-
2 erty and interests in property—

3 (i) are in the United States;

4 (ii) come within the United States; or

5 (iii) come within the possession or
6 control of a United States person.

7 (B) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION,
8 OR PAROLE.—

9 (i) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—

10 An alien described in paragraph (1)(A)
11 is—

12 (I) inadmissible to the United
13 States;

14 (II) ineligible to receive a visa or
15 other documentation to enter the
16 United States; and

17 (III) otherwise ineligible to be
18 admitted or paroled into the United
19 States or to receive any other benefit
20 under the Immigration and Nation-
21 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

22 (ii) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

23 (I) IN GENERAL.—An alien de-
24 scribed in paragraph (1)(A) is subject
25 to revocation of any visa or other

1 entry documentation regardless of
2 when the visa or other entry docu-
3 mentation is or was issued.

4 (II) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A rev-
5 ocation under subclause (I) shall—

6 (aa) take effect immediately;

7 and

8 (bb) automatically cancel
9 any other valid visa or entry doc-
10 umentation that is in the alien's
11 possession.

12 (4) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

13 (A) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President
14 may exercise all authorities provided under sec-
15 tions 203 and 205 of the International Emer-
16 gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702
17 and 1704) to carry out this section.

18 (B) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided
19 for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of
20 the International Emergency Economic Powers
21 Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a foreign
22 person that violates, attempts to violate, con-
23 spires to violate, or causes a violation of para-
24 graph (1) to the same extent that such pen-
25 alties apply to a person that commits an unlaw-

1 ful act described in subsection (a) of such sec-
2 tion 206.

3 (5) WAIVER.—The President may waive the ap-
4 plication of sanctions under this section with respect
5 to a foreign person identified in the report required
6 under paragraph (1)(A) if the President determines
7 and certifies to the appropriate congressional com-
8 mittees that such a waiver is in the national interest
9 of the United States.

10 (6) EXCEPTIONS.—

11 (A) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE AC-
12 TIVITIES.—Sanctions under this section shall
13 not apply to any activity subject to the report-
14 ing requirements under title V of the National
15 Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.)
16 or any authorized intelligence activities of the
17 United States.

18 (B) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTER-
19 NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND FOR LAW EN-
20 FORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under
21 paragraph (3)(B) shall not apply with respect
22 to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien
23 into the United States is necessary—

24 (i) to permit the United States to
25 comply with the Agreement regarding the

1 Headquarters of the United Nations,
2 signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947,
3 and entered into force November 21, 1947,
4 between the United Nations and the
5 United States, or other applicable inter-
6 national obligations; or

7 (ii) to carry out or assist law enforce-
8 ment activity in the United States.

9 (7) TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.—The Presi-
10 dent may terminate the application of sanctions
11 under this section with respect to a foreign person
12 if the President determines and reports to the ap-
13 propriate congressional committees not less than 15
14 days before the termination takes effect that—

15 (A) information exists that the person did
16 not engage in the activity for which sanctions
17 were imposed;

18 (B) the person has been prosecuted appro-
19 priately for the activity for which sanctions
20 were imposed;

21 (C) the person has credibly demonstrated a
22 significant change in behavior, has paid an ap-
23 propriate consequence for the activity for which
24 sanctions were imposed, and has credibly com-

1 mitted to not engage in an activity described in
2 paragraph (1)(A) in the future; or

3 (D) the termination of the sanctions is in
4 the national security interests of the United
5 States.

6 (8) SUNSET.—This section, and any sanctions
7 imposed under this section, shall terminate on the
8 date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment
9 of this Act.

10 (9) DEFINITIONS OF ADMISSION; ADMITTED;
11 ALIEN.—In this section, the terms “admission”,
12 “admitted”, and “alien” have the meanings given
13 those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and
14 Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

15 (g) DISCLOSURES TO THE SECURITIES AND EX-
16 CHANGE COMMISSION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATED
17 TO THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.—

18 (1) POLICY STATEMENT.—It is the policy of the
19 United States to protect American investors,
20 through stronger disclosure requirements, alerting
21 them to the presence of Chinese and other compa-
22 nies complicit in gross violations of human rights in
23 United States capital markets, including American
24 and foreign companies listed on United States ex-
25 changes that enable the mass internment and popu-

1 lation surveillance of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz,
2 and other Muslim minorities and source products
3 made with forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Au-
4 tonomous Region of China. Such involvements rep-
5 resent clear, material risks to the share values and
6 corporate reputations of certain of these companies
7 and hence to prospective American investors, par-
8 ticularly given that the United States Government
9 has employed sanctions and export restrictions to
10 target individuals and entities contributing to human
11 rights abuses in the People’s Republic of China.

12 (2) DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RE-
13 LATING TO THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS
14 REGION.—

15 (A) IN GENERAL.—Section 13 of the Secu-
16 rities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m)
17 is amended by adding at the end the following
18 new subsection:

19 “(s) DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELAT-
20 ING TO THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.—

21 “(1) IN GENERAL.—Each issuer required to file
22 an annual or quarterly report under subsection (a)
23 shall disclose in that report the information required
24 by paragraph (2) if, during the period covered by
25 the report, the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer—

1 “(A) knowingly engaged in an activity with
2 an entity or the affiliate of an entity engaged
3 in creating or providing technology or other as-
4 sistance to create mass population surveillance
5 systems in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
6 Region of China, including any entity included
7 on the Department of Commerce’s ‘Entity List’
8 in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region;

9 “(B) knowingly engaged in an activity with
10 an entity or an affiliate of an entity building
11 and running detention facilities for Uyghurs,
12 Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other members of Mus-
13 lim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur
14 Autonomous Region;

15 “(C) knowingly engaged in an activity with
16 an entity or an affiliate of an entity described
17 in section 7(c)(1) of the Uyghur Forced Labor
18 Prevention Act, including—

19 “(i) any entity engaged in the ‘pair-
20 ing-assistance’ program which subsidizes
21 the establishment of manufacturing facili-
22 ties in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
23 Region; or

24 “(ii) any entity for which the Depart-
25 ment of Homeland Security has issued a

1 ‘Withhold Release Order’ under section
2 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C.
3 1307); or

4 “(D) knowingly conducted any transaction
5 or had dealings with—

6 “(i) any person the property and in-
7 terests in property of which were sanc-
8 tioned by the Secretary of State for the de-
9 tention or abuse of Uyghurs, Kazakhs,
10 Kyrgyz, or other members of Muslim mi-
11 nority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Au-
12 tonomous Region;

13 “(ii) any person the property and in-
14 terests in property of which are sanctioned
15 pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human
16 Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656
17 note); or

18 “(iii) any person or entity responsible
19 for, or complicit in, committing atrocities
20 in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re-
21 gion.

22 “(2) INFORMATION REQUIRED.—

23 “(A) IN GENERAL.—If an issuer described
24 under paragraph (1) or an affiliate of the issuer
25 has engaged in any activity described in para-

1 graph (1), the information required by this
2 paragraph is a detailed description of each such
3 activity, including—

4 “(i) the nature and extent of the ac-
5 tivity;

6 “(ii) the gross revenues and net prof-
7 its, if any, attributable to the activity; and

8 “(iii) whether the issuer or the affil-
9 iate of the issuer (as the case may be) in-
10 tends to continue the activity.

11 “(B) EXCEPTION.—The requirement to
12 disclose information under this paragraph shall
13 not include information on activities of the
14 issuer or any affiliate of the issuer activities re-
15 lating to—

16 “(i) the import of manufactured
17 goods, including electronics, food products,
18 textiles, shoes, and teas, that originated in
19 the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region;
20 or

21 “(ii) manufactured goods containing
22 materials that originated or are sourced in
23 the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

24 “(3) NOTICE OF DISCLOSURES.—If an issuer
25 reports under paragraph (1) that the issuer or an

1 affiliate of the issuer has knowingly engaged in any
2 activity described in that paragraph, the issuer shall
3 separately file with the Commission, concurrently
4 with the annual or quarterly report under subsection
5 (a), a notice that the disclosure of that activity has
6 been included in that annual or quarterly report that
7 identifies the issuer and contains the information re-
8 quired by paragraph (2).

9 “(4) PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.—

10 Upon receiving a notice under paragraph (3) that an
11 annual or quarterly report includes a disclosure of
12 an activity described in paragraph (1), the Commis-
13 sion shall promptly—

14 “(A) transmit the report to—

15 “(i) the President;

16 “(ii) the Committee on Foreign Af-
17 fairs and the Committee on Financial
18 Services of the House of Representatives;
19 and

20 “(iii) the Committee on Foreign Rela-
21 tions and the Committee on Banking,
22 Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;
23 and

24 “(B) make the information provided in the
25 disclosure and the notice available to the public

1 by posting the information on the Internet
2 website of the Commission.

3 “(5) INVESTIGATIONS.—Upon receiving a re-
4 port under paragraph (4) that includes a disclosure
5 of an activity described in paragraph (1), the Presi-
6 dent shall—

7 “(A) make a determination with respect to
8 whether any investigation is needed into the
9 possible imposition of sanctions under the Glob-
10 al Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
11 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) or section 8 of the
12 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act or wheth-
13 er criminal investigations are warranted under
14 statutes intended to hold accountable individ-
15 uals or entities involved in the importation of
16 goods produced by forced labor, including under
17 section 545, 1589, or 1761 of title 18, United
18 States Code; and

19 “(B) not later than 180 days after initi-
20 ating any such investigation, make a determina-
21 tion with respect to whether a sanction should
22 be imposed or criminal investigations initiated
23 with respect to the issuer or the affiliate of the
24 issuer (as the case may be).

1 “(6) ATROCITIES DEFINED.—In this subsection,
2 the term ‘atrocities’ has the meaning given the term
3 in section 6(2) of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and
4 Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–
5 441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).”.

6 (3) SUNSET.—Section 13(s) of the Securities
7 Exchange Act of 1934, as added by paragraph (2),
8 is repealed on the earlier of—

9 (A) the date that is 8 years after the date
10 of the enactment of this Act; or

11 (B) the date on which the President sub-
12 mits to the appropriate congressional commit-
13 tees a determination that the Government of
14 the People’s Republic of China has ended mass
15 internment, forced labor, and any other gross
16 violations of human rights experienced by
17 Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of
18 other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang
19 Uyghur Autonomous Region.

20 (4) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made
21 by paragraph (2) shall take effect with respect to re-
22 ports required to be filed with the Securities and Ex-
23 change Commission after the date that is 180 days
24 after the date of the enactment of this Act.

25 (h) DEFINITIONS.—In this Act:

1 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
2 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
3 mittees” means—

4 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
5 Committee on Financial Services, and the Com-
6 mittee on Ways and Means of the House of
7 Representatives; and

8 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
9 the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
10 Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Finance
11 of the Senate.

12 (2) ATROCITIES.—The term “atrocities” has
13 the meaning given the term in section 6(2) of the
14 Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act
15 of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 22 U.S.C. 2656
16 note).

17 (3) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.—The term
18 “crimes against humanity” includes, when com-
19 mitted as part of a widespread or systematic attack
20 directed against any civilian population, with knowl-
21 edge of the attack—

22 (A) murder;

23 (B) deportation or forcible transfer of pop-
24 ulation;

25 (C) torture;

1 (D) extermination;

2 (E) enslavement;

3 (F) rape, sexual slavery, or any other form
4 of sexual violence of comparable severity;

5 (G) persecution against any identifiable
6 group or collectivity on political, racial, na-
7 tional, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or
8 other grounds that are universally recognized as
9 impermissible under international law; and

10 (H) enforced disappearance of persons.

11 (4) FORCED LABOR.—The term “forced labor”
12 has the meaning given the term in section 307 of the
13 Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307).

14 (5) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign per-
15 son” means a person that is not a United States
16 person.

17 (6) PERSON.—The term “person” means an in-
18 dividual or entity.

19 (7) MASS POPULATION SURVEILLANCE SYS-
20 TEM.—The term “mass population surveillance sys-
21 tem” means installation and integration of facial
22 recognition cameras, biometric data collection, cell
23 phone surveillance, and artificial intelligence tech-
24 nology with the “Sharp Eyes” and “Integrated Joint
25 Operations Platform” or other technologies that are

1 used by Chinese security forces for surveillance and
2 big-data predictive policing.

3 (8) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
4 “United States person” means—

5 (A) a United States citizen or an alien law-
6 fully admitted for permanent residence to the
7 United States; or

8 (B) an entity organized under the laws of
9 the United States or any jurisdiction within the
10 United States, including a foreign branch of
11 such an entity.

12 **SEC. 307. UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION.**

13 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the
14 “Uyghur Human Rights Protection Act”.

15 (b) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
16 ings:

17 (1) The Government of the People’s Republic of
18 China (PRC) has a long history of repressing Turkic
19 Muslims and other Muslim minority groups, particu-
20 larly Uyghurs, in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re-
21 gion (“Xinjiang” or “XUAR”), also known as East
22 Turkestan. Central and regional PRC government
23 policies have systematically discriminated against
24 these minority groups by denying them a range of
25 civil and political rights, particularly freedom of reli-

1 gion. Senior Chinese Communist Party officials bear
2 direct responsibility for these gross human rights
3 violations.

4 (2) PRC government abuses include the arbi-
5 trary detention of more than 1,000,000 Uyghurs,
6 ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Mus-
7 lim minority groups, separation of working age
8 adults from their children and elderly parents, and
9 the integration of forced labor into supply chains.
10 Those held in detention facilities and internment
11 camps in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
12 have described forced political indoctrination, tor-
13 ture, beatings, food deprivation, sexual assault, co-
14 ordinated campaigns to reduce birth rates among
15 Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims through forced
16 sterilization, and denial of religious, cultural, and
17 linguistic freedoms. Recent media reports indicate
18 that since 2019, the PRC government has newly
19 constructed, expanded, or fortified at least 60 deten-
20 tion facilities with higher security or prison-like fea-
21 tures in Xinjiang.

22 (3) The Government of the People's Republic of
23 China's actions against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs,
24 Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority

1 groups in Xinjiang violate international human
2 rights laws and norms, including—

3 (A) the International Convention on the
4 Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
5 tion, to which the People’s Republic of China
6 has acceded;

7 (B) the Convention against Torture and
8 Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
9 or Punishment, which the People’s Republic of
10 China has signed and ratified;

11 (C) The Convention on the Prevention and
12 Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which
13 the People’s Republic of China has signed and
14 ratified;

15 (D) the International Covenant on Civil
16 and Political Rights, which the People’s Repub-
17 lic of China has signed; and

18 (E) the Universal Declaration of Human
19 Rights and the International Labor Organiza-
20 tion’s Force Labor Convention (no. 29) and the
21 Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (no.
22 105).

23 (c) REFUGEE PROTECTIONS FOR CERTAIN RESI-
24 DENTS OF THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS RE-
25 GION.—

1 (1) POPULATIONS OF SPECIAL HUMANITARIAN
2 CONCERN.—The Secretary of State, in consultation
3 with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall des-
4 ignate, as Priority 2 refugees of special humani-
5 tarian concern—

6 (A) aliens who were nationals of the Peo-
7 ple’s Republic of China and residents of the
8 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on Janu-
9 ary 1, 2021;

10 (B) aliens who fled the Xinjiang Uyghur
11 Autonomous Region after June 30, 2009, and
12 reside in other provinces of China or in a third
13 country where such alien is not firmly resettled;
14 and

15 (C) the spouses, children, and parents (as
16 such terms are defined in subsections (a) and
17 (b) of section 101 of the Immigration and Na-
18 tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)) of individuals de-
19 scribed in subparagraphs (A) and (B), except
20 that a child shall be an unmarried person under
21 27 years of age.

22 (2) PROCESSING OF XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTON-
23 OMOUS REGION REFUGEES.—The processing of indi-
24 viduals described in paragraph (1) for classification
25 as refugees may occur in China or a third country.

1 (3) ELIGIBILITY FOR ADMISSION AS A REF-
2 UGEE.—

3 (A) IN GENERAL.—Aliens described in sub-
4 paragraph (B) may establish, for purposes of
5 admission as a refugee under section 207 of the
6 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
7 1157) or asylum under section 208 of such Act
8 (8 U.S.C. 1158), that such alien has a well-
9 founded fear of persecution on account of race,
10 religion, nationality, membership in a particular
11 social group, or political opinion by asserting
12 such a fear and asserting a credible basis for
13 concern about the possibility of such persecu-
14 tion.

15 (B) ALIENS DESCRIBED.—An alien is de-
16 scribed in this subsection if such alien has been
17 identified as a person of special humanitarian
18 concern pursuant to paragraph (1) and—

19 (i) has experienced persecution in the
20 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region by
21 the Government of the People’s Republic of
22 China including—

23 (I) forced and arbitrary detention
24 including in an internment or re-edu-
25 cation camp;

1 (II) forced political indoctrina-
2 tion, torture, beatings, food depriva-
3 tion, and denial of religious, cultural,
4 and linguistic freedoms;
5 (III) forced labor;
6 (IV) forced separation from fam-
7 ily members;
8 (V) other forms of systemic
9 threats, harassment, and gross human
10 rights violations; or
11 (VI) has been formally charged,
12 detained, or convicted on account of
13 their peaceful actions as described in
14 the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act
15 of 2020 (Public Law 116–145); and
16 (ii) is currently a national of the Peo-
17 ple’s Republic of China whose residency in
18 the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,
19 or any other area within the jurisdiction of
20 the People’s Republic of China, was re-
21 voked for having submitted to any United
22 States Government agency a nonfrivolous
23 application for refugee status, asylum, or
24 any other immigration benefit under
25 United States law.

1 (C) ELIGIBILITY FOR ADMISSION UNDER
2 OTHER CLASSIFICATION.—An alien may not be
3 denied the opportunity to apply for admission
4 as a refugee or asylum under this section solely
5 because such alien qualifies as an immediate
6 relative of a national of the United States or is
7 eligible for admission to the United States
8 under any other immigrant classification.

9 (4) PRIORITY.—The Secretary of State shall
10 prioritize bilateral diplomacy with third countries
11 hosting former residents of the Xinjiang Uyghur Au-
12 tonomous Region and who face significant diplo-
13 matic pressures from the Government of the Peo-
14 ple’s Republic of China.

15 (5) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—

16 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180
17 days after the date of the enactment of this
18 Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary
19 of State and the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
20 rity shall submit a report on the matters de-
21 scribed in subparagraph (B) to—

22 (i) the Committee on the Judiciary
23 and the Committee on Foreign Relations
24 of the Senate; and

1 (ii) the Committee on the Judiciary
2 and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
3 the House of Representatives.

4 (B) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each
5 report required by subparagraph (A) shall in-
6 clude, with respect to applications submitted
7 under this section—

8 (i) the total number of applications
9 that are pending at the end of the report-
10 ing period;

11 (ii) the average wait-times and num-
12 ber of applicants who are currently pend-
13 ing—

14 (I) a pre-screening interview with
15 a resettlement support center;

16 (II) an interview with U.S. Citi-
17 zenship and Immigration Services;

18 (III) the completion of security
19 checks; and

20 (IV) receipt of a final decision
21 after completion of an interview with
22 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
23 Services; and

1 (iii) the number of denials of applica-
2 tions for refugee status, disaggregated by
3 the reason for each such denial.

4 (C) FORM.—Each report required by para-
5 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified
6 form, but may include a classified annex.

7 (D) PUBLIC REPORTS.—The Secretary of
8 State shall make each report submitted under
9 this subsection available to the public on the
10 internet website of the Department of State.

11 (d) STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ENCOURAGING AL-
12 LIES AND PARTNERS TO MAKE SIMILAR ACCOMMODA-
13 TIONS.—It is the policy of the United States to encourage
14 allies and partners of the United States to make accom-
15 modations similar to the accommodations made in this Act
16 for residents of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
17 who are fleeing oppression by the Government of the Peo-
18 ple’s Republic of China.

19 (e) TERMINATION.—This Act, and the amendments
20 made by this Act, shall cease to have effect on the date
21 that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this
22 Act.

1 **SEC. 308. REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS**
2 **HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL THAT COMMIT**
3 **HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.**

4 The President shall direct the Permanent Represent-
5 ative of the United States to the United Nations to use
6 the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to—

7 (1) reform the process for removing members of
8 the United Nations Human Rights Council that
9 commit gross and systemic violations of human
10 rights, including—

11 (A) lowering the threshold vote at the
12 United Nations General Assembly for removal
13 to a simple majority;

14 (B) ensuring information detailing the
15 member country's human rights record is pub-
16 licly available before the vote on removal; and

17 (C) making the vote of each country on the
18 removal from the United Nations Human
19 Rights Council publicly available;

20 (2) reform the rules on electing members to the
21 United Nations Human Rights Council to ensure
22 United Nations members that have committed gross
23 and systemic violations of human rights are not
24 elected to the Human Rights Council; and

25 (3) oppose the election to the Human Rights
26 Council of any United Nations member—

1 (A) currently designated as a country en-
2 gaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations
3 of internationally recognized human rights pur-
4 suant to section 116 or section 502B of the
5 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
6 2151n, 2304);

7 (B) currently designated as a state sponsor
8 of terrorism;

9 (C) currently designated as a Tier 3 coun-
10 try under the Trafficking Victims Protection
11 Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.);

12 (D) the government of which is identified
13 on the list published by the Secretary of State
14 pursuant to section 404(b) of the Child Soldiers
15 Prevention Act of 2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c–1(b))
16 as a government that recruits and uses child
17 soldiers; or

18 (E) the government of which the United
19 States determines to have committed genocide
20 or crimes against humanity.

21 **SEC. 309. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TIBET.**

22 (a) RANK OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL COORDI-
23 NATOR FOR TIBETAN ISSUES.—Section 621 of the Ti-
24 betan Policy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amend-
25 ed—

1 (1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), and
2 (d), as subsections (c), (d), and (e), respectively; and

3 (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the fol-
4 lowing:

5 “(b) RANK.—The Special Coordinator shall either be
6 appointed by the President, with the advice and consent
7 of the Senate, or shall be an individual holding the rank
8 of Under Secretary of State or higher.”.

9 (b) TIBET UNIT AT UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN
10 BEIJING.—

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall
12 establish a Tibet Unit in the Political Section of the
13 United States Embassy in Beijing, People’s Republic
14 of China.

15 (2) OPERATION.—The Tibet Unit established
16 under paragraph (1) shall operate until such time as
17 the Government of the People’s Republic of China
18 permits—

19 (A) the United States Consulate General
20 in Chengdu, People’s Republic of China, to re-
21 open; or

22 (B) a United States Consulate General in
23 Lhasa, Tibet, to open.

24 (3) STAFF.—

25 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall—

1 (i) assign not fewer than 2 United
2 States direct-hire personnel to the Tibet
3 Unit established under paragraph (1); and

4 (ii) hire not fewer than 1 locally en-
5 gaged staff member for such unit.

6 (B) LANGUAGE TRAINING.—The Secretary
7 shall make Tibetan language training available
8 to the personnel assigned under subparagraph
9 (A), consistent with the Tibetan Policy Act of
10 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note).

11 **SEC. 310. UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL EN-**
12 **GAGEMENT ON THE SUCCESSION OR REIN-**
13 **CARNATION OF THE DALAI LAMA AND RELI-**
14 **GIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.**

15 (a) REAFFIRMATION OF POLICY.—It is the policy of
16 the United States, as provided under section 342(b) of di-
17 vision FF of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021
18 (Public Law 116–260), that any “interference by the Gov-
19 ernment of the People’s Republic of China or any other
20 government in the process of recognizing a successor or
21 reincarnation of the 14th Dalai Lama and any future
22 Dalai Lamas would represent a clear abuse of the right
23 to religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists and the Tibetan
24 people”.

1 (b) INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT RELI-
2 GIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.—The Sec-
3 retary of State should engage with United States allies
4 and partners to—

5 (1) support Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders'
6 sole religious authority to identify and install the
7 15th Dalai Lama;

8 (2) oppose claims by the Government of the
9 People's Republic of China that the PRC has the
10 authority to decide for Tibetan Buddhists the 15th
11 Dalai Lama; and

12 (3) reject interference by the Government of the
13 People's Republic of China in the religious freedom
14 of Tibetan Buddhists.

15 **SEC. 311. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNET**
16 **FREEDOM AND GREAT FIREWALL CIR-**
17 **CUMVENTION TOOLS FOR THE PEOPLE OF**
18 **HONG KONG.**

19 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
20 ings:

21 (1) The People's Republic of China has repeat-
22 edly violated its obligations under the Joint Declara-
23 tion by suppressing the basic rights and freedoms of
24 Hong Kongers.

1 (2) On June 30, 2020, the National People’s
2 Congress passed a “National Security Law” that
3 further erodes Hong Kong’s autonomy and enables
4 authorities to suppress dissent.

5 (3) The Government of the People’s Republic of
6 China continues to utilize the National Security Law
7 to undermine the fundamental rights of the Hong
8 Kong people through suppression of the freedom of
9 speech, assembly, religion, and the press.

10 (4) Article 9 of the National Security Law au-
11 thorizes unprecedented regulation and supervision of
12 internet activity in Hong Kong, including expanded
13 police powers to force internet service providers to
14 censor content, hand over user information, and
15 block access to platforms.

16 (5) On January 13, 2021, the Hong Kong
17 Broadband Network blocked public access to HK
18 Chronicles, a website promoting pro-democracy view-
19 points, under the authorities of the National Secu-
20 rity Law.

21 (6) On February 12, 2021, internet service pro-
22 viders blocked access to the Taiwan Transitional
23 Justice Commission website in Hong Kong.

24 (7) Major tech companies including Facebook,
25 Twitter, WhatsApp and Google have stopped review-

1 ing requests for user data from Hong Kong authori-
2 ties.

3 (8) On February 28, 2021, 47 pro-democracy
4 activists in Hong Kong were arrested and charged
5 under the National Security Law on the charge of
6 “conspiracy to commit subversion”.

7 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
8 gress that the United States should—

9 (1) support the ability of the people of Hong
10 Kong to maintain their freedom to access informa-
11 tion online; and

12 (2) focus on investments in technologies that
13 facilitate the unhindered exchange of information in
14 Hong Kong in advance of any future efforts by the
15 Chinese Communist Party—

16 (A) to suppress internet access;

17 (B) to increase online censorship; or

18 (C) to inhibit online communication and
19 content-sharing by the people of Hong Kong.

20 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

21 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON-
22 GRESS.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
23 mittees” means—

24 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
25 the Senate;

1 (B) the Committee on Appropriations of
2 the Senate;

3 (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of
4 the Senate;

5 (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
6 the House of Representatives;

7 (E) the Committee on Appropriations of
8 the House of Representatives; and

9 (F) the Permanent Select Committee on
10 Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

11 (2) WORKING GROUP.—The term “working
12 group” means—

13 (A) the Under Secretary of State for Civil-
14 ian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights;

15 (B) the Assistant Secretary of State for
16 East Asian and Pacific Affairs;

17 (C) the Chief Executive Officer of the
18 United States Agency for Global Media and the
19 President of the Open Technology Fund; and

20 (D) the Administrator of the United States
21 Agency for International Development.

22 (3) JOINT DECLARATION.—The term “Joint
23 Declaration” means the Joint Declaration of the
24 Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
25 and Northern Ireland and the Government of the

1 People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong
2 Kong, done at Beijing on December 19, 1984.

3 (d) HONG KONG INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAM.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is
5 authorized to establish a working group to develop
6 a strategy to bolster internet resiliency and online
7 access in Hong Kong. The Secretary shall establish
8 a Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program in the Bu-
9 reau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at
10 the Department of State. Additionally, the President
11 of the Technology Fund is authorized to establish a
12 Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program. These pro-
13 grams shall operate independently, but in strategic
14 coordination with other entities in the working
15 group. The Open Technology Fund shall remain
16 independent from Department of State direction in
17 its implementation of this, and any other Internet
18 Freedom Programs.

19 (2) INDEPENDENCE.—During the period begin-
20 ning on the date of the enactment of this Act and
21 ending on September 30, 2023, the Program shall
22 be carried out independent from the mainland China
23 internet freedom portfolios in order to focus on sup-
24 porting liberties presently enjoyed by the people of
25 Hong Kong.

1 (3) CONSOLIDATION OF DEPARTMENT OF
2 STATE PROGRAM.—Beginning on October 1, 2023,
3 the Secretary of State may—

4 (A) consolidate the Program with the
5 mainland China initiatives in the Bureau of De-
6 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor; or

7 (B) continue to carry out the Program in
8 accordance with paragraph (2).

9 (4) CONSOLIDATION OF OPEN TECHNOLOGY
10 FUND PROGRAM.—Beginning on October 1, 2023,
11 the President of the Open Technology Fund may—

12 (A) consolidate the Program with the
13 mainland China initiatives in the Open Tech-
14 nology Fund; or

15 (B) continue to carry out the Program in
16 accordance with paragraph (2).

17 (e) SUPPORT FOR INTERNET FREEDOM TECH-
18 NOLOGY PROGRAMS.—

19 (1) GRANTS AUTHORIZED.—

20 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State,
21 working through the Bureau of Democracy,
22 Human Rights, and Labor, and the Open Tech-
23 nology Fund, separately and independently
24 from the Secretary of State, are authorized to
25 award grants and contracts to private organiza-

1 tions to support and develop programs in Hong
2 Kong that promote or expand—

3 (i) open, interoperable, reliable and
4 secure internet; and

5 (ii) the online exercise of human
6 rights and fundamental freedoms of indi-
7 vidual citizens, activists, human rights de-
8 fenders, independent journalists, civil soci-
9 ety organizations, and marginalized popu-
10 lations in Hong Kong.

11 (B) GOALS.—The goals of the programs
12 developed with grants authorized under sub-
13 paragraph (A) should be—

14 (i) to make the internet available in
15 Hong Kong;

16 (ii) to increase the number of the
17 tools in the technology portfolio;

18 (iii) to promote the availability of such
19 technologies and tools in Hong Kong;

20 (iv) to encourage the adoption of such
21 technologies and tools by the people of
22 Hong Kong;

23 (v) to scale up the distribution of such
24 technologies and tools throughout Hong
25 Kong;

1 (vi) to prioritize the development of
2 tools, components, code, and technologies
3 that are fully open-source, to the extent
4 practicable;

5 (vii) to conduct research on repressive
6 tactics that undermine internet freedom in
7 Hong Kong;

8 (viii) to ensure digital safety guidance
9 and support is available to repressed indi-
10 vidual citizens, human rights defenders,
11 independent journalists, civil society orga-
12 nizations and marginalized populations in
13 Hong Kong; and

14 (ix) to engage American private indus-
15 try, including e-commerce firms and social
16 networking companies, on the importance
17 of preserving internet access in Hong
18 Kong.

19 (C) GRANT RECIPIENTS.—Grants author-
20 ized under this paragraph shall be distributed
21 to multiple vendors and suppliers through an
22 open, fair, competitive, and evidence-based deci-
23 sion process—

24 (i) to diversify the technical base; and

1 (ii) to reduce the risk of misuse by
2 bad actors.

3 (D) SECURITY AUDITS.—New technologies
4 developed using grants from this paragraph
5 shall undergo comprehensive security audits to
6 ensure that such technologies are secure and
7 have not been compromised in a manner detri-
8 mental to the interests of the United States or
9 to individuals or organizations benefitting from
10 programs supported by the Open Technology
11 Fund.

12 (2) FUNDING SOURCE.—The Secretary of State
13 is authorized to expend funds from the Human
14 Rights and Democracy Fund of the Bureau of De-
15 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Depart-
16 ment of State during fiscal year 2020 for grants au-
17 thorized under paragraph (1) at any entity in the
18 working group.

19 (3) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

20 (A) OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND.—In addi-
21 tion to the funds authorized to be expended
22 pursuant to paragraph (2), there are authorized
23 to be appropriated to the Open Technology
24 Fund \$5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022
25 and 2023 to carry out this subsection. This

1 funding is in addition to the funds authorized
2 for the Open Technology Fund through the Na-
3 tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
4 Year 2021 (Public Law 116–92).

5 (B) BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN
6 RIGHTS, AND LABOR.—In addition to the funds
7 authorized to be expended pursuant to para-
8 graph (2), there are authorized to be appro-
9 priated to the Office of Internet Freedom Pro-
10 grams in the Bureau of Democracy, Human
11 Rights, and Labor of the Department of State
12 \$10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and
13 2023 to carry out this section.

14 (C) AVAILABILITY.—Amounts appro-
15 priated pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (B)
16 shall remain available until expended.

17 (f) STRATEGIC PLANNING REPORT.—Not later than
18 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
19 Secretary of State and the working group shall submit a
20 classified report to the appropriate committees of Con-
21 gress that—

22 (1) describes the Federal Government’s plan to
23 bolster and increase the availability of Great Fire-
24 wall circumvention and internet freedom technology
25 in Hong Kong during fiscal year 2022;

1 (2) outlines a plan for—

2 (A) supporting the preservation of an
3 open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet
4 in Hong Kong;

5 (B) increasing the supply of the technology
6 referred to in paragraph (1);

7 (C) accelerating the dissemination of such
8 technology;

9 (D) promoting the availability of internet
10 freedom in Hong Kong;

11 (E) utilizing presently-available tools in the
12 existing relevant portfolios for further use in
13 the unique context of Hong Kong;

14 (F) expanding the portfolio of tools in
15 order to diversify and strengthen the effective-
16 ness and resiliency of the circumvention efforts;

17 (G) providing training for high-risk groups
18 and individuals in Hong Kong; and

19 (H) detecting analyzing, and responding to
20 new and evolving censorship threats;

21 (3) includes a detailed description of the tech-
22 nical and fiscal steps necessary to safely implement
23 the plans referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2), in-
24 cluding an analysis of the market conditions in
25 Hong Kong;

1 (4) describes the Federal Government’s plans
2 for awarding grants to private organizations for the
3 purposes described in subsection (e)(1)(A);

4 (5) outlines the working group’s consultations
5 regarding the implementation of this section to en-
6 sure that all Federal efforts are aligned and well co-
7 ordinated; and

8 (6) outlines the Department of State’s strategy
9 to influence global internet legal standards at inter-
10 national organizations and multilateral fora.

11 **SEC. 312. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PRO-**
12 **TECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE’S**
13 **REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Amounts authorized to be appro-
15 priated or otherwise made available to carry out section
16 409 of the Asia Reassurance Initiative (Public Law 115–
17 409) include programs that prioritize the protection and
18 advancement of the freedoms of association, assembly, re-
19 ligious, and expression for women, human rights activists,
20 and ethnic and religious minorities in the People’s Repub-
21 lic of China.

22 (b) USE OF FUNDS.—Amounts appropriated pursu-
23 ant to subsection (a) may be used to fund nongovern-
24 mental agencies within the Indo-Pacific region that are fo-
25 cused on the issues described in subsection (a).

1 (c) CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT.—In carrying out
2 this section, the Assistant Secretary of Democracy,
3 Human Rights and Labor shall consult with the appro-
4 priate congressional committees and representatives of
5 civil society regarding—

6 (1) strengthening the capacity of the organiza-
7 tions referred to in subsection (b);

8 (2) protecting members of the groups referred
9 to in subsection (a) who have been targeted for ar-
10 rest, harassment, forced sterilizations, coercive abor-
11 tions, forced labor, or intimidation, including mem-
12 bers residing outside of the People’s Republic of
13 China; and

14 (3) messaging efforts to reach the broadest pos-
15 sible audiences within the People’s Republic of
16 China about United States Government efforts to
17 protect freedom of association, expression, assembly,
18 and the rights of ethnic minorities.

19 **SEC. 313. REPEAL OF SUNSET APPLICABLE TO AUTHORITY**
20 **UNDER GLOBAL MAGNITSKY HUMAN RIGHTS**
21 **ACCOUNTABILITY ACT.**

22 Section 1265 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
23 Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law
24 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is repealed.

1 **SEC. 314. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN**
2 **RACISM AND DISCRIMINATION.**

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
4 ings:

5 (1) Since the onset of the COVID–19 pan-
6 demic, crimes and discrimination against Asians and
7 those of Asian descent have risen dramatically
8 worldwide. In May 2020, United Nations Secretary-
9 General Antonio Guterres said “the pandemic con-
10 tinues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia,
11 scapegoating and scare-mongering” and urged gov-
12 ernments to “act now to strengthen the immunity of
13 our societies against the virus of hate”.

14 (2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI)
15 workers make up a large portion of the essential
16 workers on the frontlines of the COVID–19 pan-
17 demic, making up 8.5 percent of all essential
18 healthcare workers in the United States. AAPI
19 workers also make up a large share—between 6 per-
20 cent and 12 percent based on sector—of the bio-
21 medical field.

22 (3) The United States Census notes that Amer-
23 icans of Asian descent alone made up nearly 5.9 per-
24 cent of the United States population in 2019, and
25 that Asian Americans are the fastest-growing racial

1 group in the United States, projected to represent
2 14 percent of the United States population by 2065.

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that—

5 (1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian
6 descent and concerning increase in anti-Asian senti-
7 ment and racism in the United States and around
8 the world have no place in a peaceful, civilized, and
9 tolerant world;

10 (2) the United States is a diverse nation with
11 a proud tradition of immigration, and the strength
12 and vibrancy of the United States is enhanced by
13 the diverse ethnic backgrounds and tolerance of its
14 citizens, including Asian Americans and Pacific Is-
15 landers;

16 (3) the United States Government should en-
17 courage other foreign governments to use the official
18 and scientific names for the COVID–19 pandemic,
19 as recommended by the World Health Organization
20 and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
21 and

22 (4) the United States Government and other
23 governments around the world must actively oppose
24 racism and intolerance, and use all available and ap-

1 appropriate tools to combat the spread of anti-Asian
2 racism and discrimination.

3 **SEC. 315. ANNUAL REPORTING ON CENSORSHIP OF FREE**
4 **SPEECH WITH RESPECT TO INTERNATIONAL**
5 **ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS.**

6 Section 116(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act (227
7 U.S.C. 2151n(d)) is amended—

8 (1) in paragraph (11)(C), by striking “and” at
9 the end;

10 (2) in paragraph (12)(C)(ii), by striking the pe-
11 riod at the end and inserting a semicolon; and

12 (3) by adding at the end the following:

13 “(13) wherever applicable, instances in which
14 the government of each country has attempted to
15 extraterritorially intimidate or pressure a company
16 or entity to censor or self-censor the speech of its
17 employees, contractors, customers, or associated
18 staff with regards to the abuse of human rights in
19 such country, or sought retaliation against such em-
20 ployees or contractors for the same, including any
21 instance in which the government of China has
22 sought to extraterritorially censor or punish speech
23 that is otherwise legal in the United States on the
24 topics of—

1 “(A) repression and violation of funda-
2 mental freedoms in Hong Kong;

3 “(B) repression and persecution of reli-
4 gious and ethnic minorities in China, including
5 in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
6 and the Tibet Autonomous Region;

7 “(C) efforts to proliferate and use surveil-
8 lance technologies to surveil activists, journal-
9 ists, opposition politicians, or to profile persons
10 of different ethnicities; and

11 “(D) other gross violations of human
12 rights; and

13 “(14) wherever applicable, instances which a
14 company or entity located in or based in a third
15 country has censored or self-censored the speech of
16 its employees, contractors, customers, or associated
17 staff on the topic of abuse of human rights in each
18 country or sought to retaliate against such employ-
19 ees for the same, due to intimidation or pressure
20 from or the fear of intimidation by the foreign gov-
21 ernment.”.

1 **TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR**
2 **ECONOMIC STATECRAFT**

3 **SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PRC'S IN-**
4 **DUSTRIAL POLICY.**

5 It is the sense of Congress that—

6 (1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket
7 economy like the PRC's economy, which has cap-
8 tured such a large share of global economic ex-
9 change, are in many ways unprecedented and re-
10 quire sufficiently elevated and sustained long-term
11 focus and engagement;

12 (2) in order to truly address the most detri-
13 mental aspects of CCP-directed mercantilist eco-
14 nomic strategy, the United States must adopt poli-
15 cies that—

16 (A) expose the full scope and scale of intel-
17 lectual property theft and mass subsidization of
18 Chinese firms, and the resulting harm to the
19 United States, foreign markets, and the global
20 economy;

21 (B) ensure that PRC companies face costs
22 and consequences for anticompetitive behavior;

23 (C) provide options for affected United
24 States persons to address and respond to un-

1 reasonable and discriminatory CCP-directed in-
2 dustrial policies; and

3 (D) strengthen the protection of critical
4 technology and sensitive data, while still fos-
5 tering an environment that provides incentives
6 for secure but open investment, innovation, and
7 competition;

8 (3) the United States must work with its allies
9 and partners and multilateral venues and fora—

10 (A) to reinforce long-standing generally ac-
11 cepted principles of fair competition and market
12 behavior and address the PRC's anticompetitive
13 economic and industrial policies that undermine
14 decades of global growth and innovation;

15 (B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted
16 the same treatment as that of a free-market
17 economy until it ceases the implementation of
18 laws, regulations, policies, and practices that
19 provide unfair advantage to PRC firms in fur-
20 therance of national objectives and impose un-
21 reasonable, discriminatory, and illegal burdens
22 on market-based international commerce; and

23 (C) to align policies with respect to curbing
24 state-directed subsidization of the private sec-
25 tor, such as advocating for global rules related

1 to transparency and adherence to notification
2 requirements, including through the efforts cur-
3 rently being advanced by the United States,
4 Japan, and the European Union;

5 (4) the United States and its allies and part-
6 ners must collaborate to provide incentives to their
7 respective companies to cooperate in areas such as—

8 (5) the United States should develop policies
9 that—

10 (A) insulate United States entities from
11 PRC pressure against complying with United
12 States laws;

13 (B) together with the work of allies and
14 partners and multilateral institutions, counter
15 the potential impact of the blocking regime of
16 the PRC established by the Ministry of Com-
17 merce of the PRC on January 9, 2021, when
18 it issued Order No. 1 of 2021, entitled “Rules
19 on Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial
20 Application of Foreign Legislation and other
21 Measures”; and

22 (C) plan for future actions that the Gov-
23 ernment of the PRC may take to undermine the
24 lawful application of United States legal au-

1 thorities, including with respect to the use of
2 sanctions.

3 **SEC. 402. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE TEAMS.**

4 (a) PILOT PROGRAM.—Not later than 180 days after
5 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall
6 develop and implement a pilot program for the creation
7 of deployable economic defense response teams to help
8 provide emergency technical assistance and support to a
9 country subjected to the threat or use of coercive economic
10 measures and to play a liaison role between the legitimate
11 government of that country and the United States Govern-
12 ment. Such assistance and support may include the fol-
13 lowing activities:

14 (1) Reducing the partner country’s vulnerability
15 to coercive economic measures.

16 (2) Minimizing the damage that such measures
17 by an adversary could cause to that country.

18 (3) Implementing any bilateral or multilateral
19 contingency plans that may exist for responding to
20 the threat or use of such measures.

21 (4) In coordination with the partner country,
22 developing or improving plans and strategies by the
23 country for reducing vulnerabilities and improving
24 responses to such measures in the future.

1 (5) Assisting the partner country in dealing
2 with foreign sovereign investment in infrastructure
3 or related projects that may undermine the partner
4 country's sovereignty.

5 (6) Assisting the partner country in responding
6 to specific efforts from an adversary attempting to
7 employ economic coercion that undermines the part-
8 ner country's sovereignty, including efforts in the
9 cyber domain, such as efforts that undermine cyber-
10 security or digital security of the partner country or
11 initiatives that introduce digital technologies in a
12 manner that undermines freedom, security, and sov-
13 ereignty of the partner country.

14 (7) Otherwise providing direct and relevant
15 short-to-medium term economic or other assistance
16 from the United States and marshalling other re-
17 sources in support of effective responses to such
18 measures.

19 (b) REPORTS REQUIRED.—

20 (1) REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT.—Upon estab-
21 lishment of the pilot program required by subsection
22 (a), the Secretary of State shall provide the appro-
23 priate committees of Congress with a detailed report
24 and briefing describing the pilot program, the major
25 elements of the program, the personnel and institu-

1 tions involved, and the degree to which the program
2 incorporates the elements described in subsection
3 (a).

4 (2) FOLLOW-UP REPORT.—Not later than one
5 year after the report required by paragraph (1), the
6 Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate com-
7 mittees of Congress with a detailed report and brief-
8 ing describing the operations over the previous year
9 of the pilot program established pursuant to sub-
10 section (a), as well as the Secretary’s assessment of
11 its performance and suitability for becoming a per-
12 manent program.

13 (3) FORM.—Each report required under this
14 subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form,
15 but may include a classified annex.

16 (c) DECLARATION OF AN ECONOMIC CRISIS RE-
17 QUIRED.—

18 (1) NOTIFICATION.—The President may acti-
19 vate an economic defense response team for a period
20 of 180 days under the authorities of this section to
21 assist a partner country in responding to an unusual
22 and extraordinary economic coercive threat by an
23 adversary of the United States upon the declaration
24 of a coercive economic emergency, together with no-
25 tification to the Committee on Foreign Relations of

1 the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
2 the House of Representatives.

3 (2) EXTENSION AUTHORITY.—The President
4 may activate the response team for an additional
5 180 days upon the submission of a detailed analysis
6 to the committees described in paragraph (1) justi-
7 fying why the continued deployment of the economic
8 defense response team in response to the economic
9 emergency is in the national security interest of the
10 United States.

11 (d) SUNSET.—The authorities provided under this
12 section shall expire on December 31, 2026.

13 (e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Neither the authority
14 to declare an economic crisis provided for in subsection
15 (d), nor the declaration of an economic crisis pursuant to
16 subsection (d), shall confer or be construed to confer any
17 authority, power, duty, or responsibility to the President
18 other than the authority to activate an economic defense
19 response team as described in this section.

20 (f) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
21 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
22 tees of Congress” means—

23 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
24 Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
25 fairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and

1 Transportation, the Committee on Energy and Nat-
2 ural Resources, the Committee on Agriculture, Nu-
3 trition, and Forestry, and the Committee on Finance
4 of the Senate; and

5 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
6 Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on
7 Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Agri-
8 culture, and the Committee on Ways and Means of
9 the House of Representatives.

10 **SEC. 403. COUNTERING OVERSEAS KLEPTOCRACY.**

11 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

12 (1) Authoritarian leaders in foreign countries
13 abuse their power to steal assets from state institu-
14 tions, enrich themselves at the expense of their coun-
15 tries' economic development, and use corruption as
16 a strategic tool both to solidify their grip on power
17 and to undermine democratic institutions abroad.

18 (2) Global corruption harms the competitiveness
19 of United States businesses, weakens democratic
20 governance, feeds terrorist recruitment and
21 transnational organized crime, enables drug smug-
22 gling and human trafficking, and stymies economic
23 growth.

24 (3) Illicit financial flows often penetrate coun-
25 tries through what appear to be legitimate financial

1 transactions, as kleptocrats launder money, use shell
2 companies, amass offshore wealth, and participate in
3 a global shadow economy.

4 (4) The Government of the Russian Federation
5 is a leading model of this type of kleptocratic sys-
6 tem, using state-sanctioned corruption to both erode
7 democratic governance from within and discredit de-
8 mocracy abroad, thereby strengthening the authori-
9 tarian rule of Vladimir Putin.

10 (5) Corrupt individuals and entities in the Rus-
11 sian Federation, often with the backing and encour-
12 agement of political leadership, use stolen money—

13 (A) to purchase key assets in other coun-
14 tries, often with a goal of attaining monopolistic
15 control of a sector;

16 (B) to gain access to and influence the
17 policies of other countries; and

18 (C) to advance Russian interests in other
19 countries, particularly those that undermine
20 confidence and trust in democratic systems.

21 (6) Systemic corruption in the People’s Repub-
22 lic of China, often tied to, directed by, or backed by
23 the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and
24 the Chinese Government is used—

1 (A) to provide unfair advantage to certain
2 People's Republic of China economic entities;

3 (B) to increase other countries' economic
4 dependence on the People's Republic of China
5 to secure greater deference to the People's Re-
6 public of China's diplomatic and strategic goals;
7 and

8 (C) to exploit corruption in foreign govern-
9 ments and among other political elites to enable
10 People's Republic of China state-backed firms
11 to pursue predatory and exploitative economic
12 practices.

13 (7) Thwarting these tactics by Russian, Chi-
14 nese, and other kleptocratic actors requires the
15 international community to strengthen democratic
16 governance and the rule of law. International co-
17 operation in combating corruption and illicit finance
18 is vital to such efforts, especially by empowering re-
19 formers in foreign countries during historic political
20 openings for the establishment of the rule of law in
21 those countries.

22 (8) Technical assistance programs that combat
23 corruption and strengthen the rule of law, including
24 through assistance provided by the Department of
25 State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law

1 Enforcement Affairs and the United States Agency
2 for International Development, and through pro-
3 grams like the Department of Justice’s Office of
4 Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and
5 Training and the International Criminal Investiga-
6 tive Training Assistance Program, can have lasting
7 and significant impacts for both foreign and United
8 States interests.

9 (9) There currently exist numerous inter-
10 national instruments to combat corruption,
11 kleptocracy, and illicit finance, including—

12 (A) the Inter-American Convention against
13 Corruption of the Organization of American
14 States, done at Caracas March 29, 1996;

15 (B) the Convention on Combating Bribery
16 of Foreign Public Officials in International
17 Business Transactions of the Organisation of
18 Economic Co-operation and Development, done
19 at Paris December 21, 1997 (commonly re-
20 ferred to as the “Anti-Bribery Convention”);

21 (C) the United Nations Convention against
22 Transnational Organized Crime, done at New
23 York November 15, 2000;

1 (D) the United Nations Convention against
2 Corruption, done at New York October 31,
3 2003;

4 (E) Recommendation of the Council for
5 Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
6 Officials in International Business Trans-
7 actions, adopted November 26, 2009; and

8 (F) recommendations of the Financial Ac-
9 tion Task Force comprising the International
10 Standards on Combating Money Laundering
11 and the Financing of Terrorism and Prolifera-
12 tion.

13 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

14 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
15 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
16 mittees” means—

17 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
18 the Senate;

19 (B) the Committee on Banking, Housing,
20 and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

21 (C) the Committee on Finance of the Sen-
22 ate;

23 (D) the Committee on the Judiciary of the
24 Senate;

1 (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
2 the House of Representatives;

3 (F) the Committee on Financial Services
4 of the House of Representatives;

5 (G) the Committee on Ways and Means of
6 the House of Representatives; and

7 (H) the Committee on the Judiciary of the
8 House of Representatives.

9 (2) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—The term “foreign
10 assistance” means foreign assistance authorized
11 under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
12 U.S.C. 2251 et seq.).

13 (3) FOREIGN STATE.—The term “foreign state”
14 has the meaning given such term in section 1603(a)
15 of title 28, United States Code.

16 (4) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term
17 “intelligence community” has the meaning given
18 such term in section 3(4) of the National Security
19 Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

20 (5) PUBLIC CORRUPTION.—The term “public
21 corruption” includes the unlawful exercise of en-
22 trusted public power for private gain, such as
23 through bribery, nepotism, fraud, extortion, or em-
24 bezzlement.

1 (6) RULE OF LAW.—The term “rule of law”
2 means the principle of governance in which all per-
3 sons, institutions, and entities, whether public or
4 private, including the state, are accountable to laws
5 that are—

6 (A) publicly promulgated;

7 (B) equally enforced;

8 (C) independently adjudicated; and

9 (D) consistent with international human
10 rights norms and standards.

11 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
12 United States—

13 (1) to leverage United States diplomatic en-
14 gagement and foreign assistance to promote the rule
15 of law;

16 (2)(A) to promote international instruments to
17 combat corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance,
18 including instruments referred to in subsection
19 (a)(9), and other relevant international standards
20 and best practices, as such standards and practices
21 develop; and

22 (B) to promote the adoption and implementa-
23 tion of such laws, standards, and practices by for-
24 eign states;

1 (3) to support foreign states in promoting good
2 governance and combating public corruption;

3 (4) to encourage and assist foreign partner
4 countries to identify and close loopholes in their
5 legal and financial architecture, including the misuse
6 of anonymous shell companies, free trade zones, and
7 other legal structures, that are enabling illicit fi-
8 nance to penetrate their financial systems;

9 (5) to help foreign partner countries to inves-
10 tigate, prosecute, adjudicate, and more generally
11 combat the use of corruption by malign actors, in-
12 cluding authoritarian governments, particularly the
13 Government of the Russian Federation and the Gov-
14 ernment of the People's Republic of China, as a tool
15 of malign influence worldwide;

16 (6) to assist in the recovery of kleptocracy-re-
17 lated stolen assets for victims, including through the
18 use of appropriate bilateral arrangements and inter-
19 national agreements, such as the United Nations
20 Convention against Corruption, done at New York
21 October 31, 2003, and the United Nations Conven-
22 tion against Transnational Organized Crime, done at
23 New York November 15, 2000;

24 (7) to use sanctions authorities, such as the
25 Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act

1 (subtitle F of title XII of the National Defense Au-
2 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law
3 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note)) and section
4 7031(e) of the Department of State, Foreign Oper-
5 ations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
6 2020 (division G of Public Law 116–94), to identify
7 and take action against corrupt foreign actors;

8 (8) to ensure coordination between relevant
9 Federal departments and agencies with jurisdiction
10 over the advancement of good governance in foreign
11 states; and

12 (9) to lead the creation of a formal grouping of
13 like-minded states—

14 (A) to coordinate efforts to counter corrup-
15 tion, kleptocracy, and illicit finance; and

16 (B) to strengthen collective financial de-
17 fense.

18 (d) ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION FUND.—

19 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in
20 the United States Treasury a fund, to be known as
21 the “Anti-Corruption Action Fund”, only for the
22 purposes of—

23 (A) strengthening the capacity of foreign
24 states to prevent and fight public corruption;

1 (B) assisting foreign states to develop rule
2 of law-based governance structures, including
3 accountable civilian police, prosecutorial, and
4 judicial institutions;

5 (C) supporting foreign states to strengthen
6 domestic legal and regulatory frameworks to
7 combat public corruption, including the adop-
8 tion of best practices under international law;
9 and

10 (D) supplementing existing foreign assist-
11 ance and diplomacy with respect to efforts de-
12 scribed in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C).

13 (2) FUNDING.—

14 (A) TRANSFERS.—Beginning on or after
15 the date of the enactment of this Act, if total
16 criminal fines and penalties in excess of
17 \$50,000,000 are imposed against a person
18 under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
19 1977 (Public Law 95–213) or section 13, 30A,
20 or 32 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
21 (15 U.S.C. 78m, 78dd–1, and 78ff), whether
22 pursuant to a criminal prosecution, enforcement
23 proceeding, deferred prosecution agreement,
24 nonprosecution agreement, a declination to
25 prosecute or enforce, or any other resolution,

1 the court (in the case of a conviction) or the At-
2 torney General shall impose an additional pre-
3 vention payment equal to \$5,000,000 against
4 such person, which shall be deposited in the
5 Anti-Corruption Action Fund established under
6 paragraph (1).

7 (B) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Amounts
8 deposited into the Anti-Corruption Action Fund
9 pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be available
10 to the Secretary of State only for the purposes
11 described in paragraph (1), without fiscal year
12 limitation or need for subsequent appropriation.

13 (C) LIMITATION.—None of the amounts
14 made available to the Secretary of State from
15 the Anti-Corruption Action Fund may be used
16 inside the United States, except for administra-
17 tive costs related to overseas program imple-
18 mentation pursuant to paragraph (1).

19 (3) SUPPORT.—The Anti-Corruption Action
20 Fund—

21 (A) may support governmental and non-
22 governmental parties in advancing the purposes
23 described in paragraph (1); and

24 (B) shall be allocated in a manner com-
25 plementary to existing United States foreign as-

1 sistance, diplomacy, and anti-corruption activi-
2 ties.

3 (4) ALLOCATION AND PRIORITIZATION.—In
4 programming foreign assistance made available
5 through the Anti-Corruption Action Fund, the Sec-
6 retary of State, in coordination with the Attorney
7 General, shall prioritize projects that—

8 (A) assist countries that are undergoing
9 historic opportunities for democratic transition,
10 combating corruption, and the establishment of
11 the rule of law; and

12 (B) are important to United States na-
13 tional interests.

14 (5) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDERS.—For
15 any technical assistance to a foreign governmental
16 party under this section, the Secretary of State, in
17 coordination with the Attorney General, shall
18 prioritize United States Government technical assist-
19 ance providers as implementers, in particular the Of-
20 fice of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assist-
21 ance and Training and the International Criminal
22 Investigative Training Assistance Program at the
23 Department of Justice.

24 (6) PUBLIC DIPLOMACY.—The Secretary of
25 State shall announce that funds deposited in the

1 Anti-Corruption Action Fund are derived from ac-
2 tions brought under the Foreign Corrupt Practices
3 Act to demonstrate that the use of such funds are—

4 (A) contributing to international anti-cor-
5 ruption work; and

6 (B) reducing the pressure that United
7 States businesses face to pay bribes overseas,
8 thereby contributing to greater competitiveness
9 of United States companies.

10 (7) REPORTING.—Not later than 1 year after
11 the date of the enactment of this Act and not less
12 frequently than annually thereafter, the Secretary of
13 State shall submit a report to the appropriate con-
14 gressional committees that contains—

15 (A) the balance of the funding remaining
16 in the Anti-Corruption Action Fund;

17 (B) the amount of funds that have been
18 deposited into the Anti-Corruption Action
19 Fund; and

20 (C) a summary of the obligation and ex-
21 penditure of such funds.

22 (8) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.—None of
23 the amounts made available to the Secretary of
24 State from the Anti-Corruption Action Fund pursu-
25 ant to this section shall be available for obligation,

1 or for transfer to other departments, agencies, or en-
2 tities, unless the Secretary of State notifies the
3 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the
4 Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the
5 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
6 resentatives, and the Committee on Appropriations
7 of the House of Representatives, not later than 15
8 days in advance of such obligation or transfer.

9 (e) INTERAGENCY ANTI-CORRUPTION TASK
10 FORCE.—

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in
12 cooperation with the Interagency Anti-Corruption
13 Task Force established pursuant to paragraph (2),
14 shall manage a whole-of-government effort to im-
15 prove coordination among Federal departments and
16 agencies and donor organizations with a role in—

17 (A) promoting good governance in foreign
18 states; and

19 (B) enhancing the ability of foreign states
20 to combat public corruption.

21 (2) INTERAGENCY ANTI-CORRUPTION TASK
22 FORCE.—Not later than 180 days after the date of
23 the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
24 shall establish and convene the Interagency Anti-
25 Corruption Task Force (referred to in this section as

1 the “Task Force”), which shall be composed of rep-
2 resentatives appointed by the President from appro-
3 priate departments and agencies, including the De-
4 partment of State, the United States Agency for
5 International Development, the Department of Jus-
6 tice, the Department of the Treasury, the Depart-
7 ment of Homeland Security, the Department of De-
8 fense, the Department of Commerce, the Millennium
9 Challenge Corporation, and the intelligence commu-
10 nity.

11 (3) ADDITIONAL MEETINGS.—The Task Force
12 shall meet not less frequently than twice per year.

13 (4) DUTIES.—The Task Force shall—

14 (A) evaluate, on a general basis, the effec-
15 tiveness of existing foreign assistance programs,
16 including programs funded by the Anti-Corrup-
17 tion Action Fund, that have an impact on—

18 (i) promoting good governance in for-
19 eign states; and

20 (ii) enhancing the ability of foreign
21 states to combat public corruption;

22 (B) assist the Secretary of State in man-
23 aging the whole-of-government effort described
24 in paragraph (1);

1 (C) identify general areas in which such
2 whole-of-government effort could be enhanced;
3 and

4 (D) recommend specific programs for for-
5 eign states that may be used to enhance such
6 whole-of-government effort.

7 (5) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than
8 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act
9 and not less frequently than annually thereafter
10 through the end of fiscal year 2026, the Secretary
11 of State shall provide a briefing to the appropriate
12 congressional committees regarding the ongoing
13 work of the Task Force. Each briefing shall include
14 the participation of a representative of each of the
15 departments and agencies described in paragraph
16 (2), to the extent feasible.

17 (f) DESIGNATION OF EMBASSY ANTI-CORRUPTION
18 POINTS OF CONTACT.—

19 (1) EMBASSY ANTI-CORRUPTION POINT OF CON-
20 TACT.—The chief of mission of each United States
21 embassy shall designate an anti-corruption point of
22 contact for each such embassy.

23 (2) DUTIES.—The designated anti-corruption
24 points of contact designated pursuant to paragraph
25 (1) shall—

1 (A) coordinate, in accordance with guid-
2 ance from the Interagency Anti-Corruption
3 Task Force established pursuant to subsection
4 (e)(2), an interagency approach within United
5 States embassies to combat public corruption in
6 the foreign states in which such embassies are
7 located that is tailored to the needs of such for-
8 eign states, including all relevant Federal de-
9 partments and agencies with a presence in such
10 foreign states, such as the Department of State,
11 the United States Agency for International De-
12 velopment, the Department of Justice, the De-
13 partment of the Treasury, the Department of
14 Homeland Security, the Department of De-
15 fense, the Millennium Challenge Corporation,
16 and the intelligence community;

17 (B) make recommendations regarding the
18 use of the Anti-Corruption Action Fund and
19 other foreign assistance funding related to anti-
20 corruption efforts in their respective countries
21 of responsibility that aligns with United States
22 diplomatic engagement; and

23 (C) ensure that anti-corruption activities
24 carried out within their respective countries of
25 responsibility are included in regular reporting

1 to the Secretary of State and the Interagency
2 Anti-Corruption Task Force, including United
3 States embassy strategic planning documents
4 and foreign assistance-related reporting, as ap-
5 propriate.

6 (3) TRAINING.—The Secretary of State shall
7 develop and implement appropriate training for the
8 designated anti-corruption points of contact.

9 (g) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—

10 (1) REPORT OR BRIEFING ON PROGRESS TO-
11 WARD IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 180 days
12 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
13 nually thereafter for the following 3 years, the Sec-
14 retary of State, in consultation with the Adminis-
15 trator of the United States Agency for International
16 Development, the Attorney General, and the Sec-
17 retary of the Treasury, shall submit a report or pro-
18 vide a briefing to the appropriate congressional com-
19 mittees that summarizes progress made in com-
20 bating public corruption and in implementing this
21 Act, including—

22 (A) identifying opportunities and priorities
23 for outreach with respect to promoting the
24 adoption and implementation of relevant inter-

1 national law and standards in combating public
2 corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance;

3 (B) describing—

4 (i) the bureaucratic structure of the
5 offices within the Department of State and
6 the United States Agency for International
7 Development that are engaged in activities
8 to combat public corruption, kleptocracy,
9 and illicit finance; and

10 (ii) how such offices coordinate their
11 efforts with each other and with other rel-
12 evant Federal departments and agencies;

13 (C) providing a description of how the pro-
14 visions under paragraphs (4) and (5) of sub-
15 section (d) have been applied to each project
16 funded by the Anti-Corruption Action Fund;

17 (D) providing an explanation as to why a
18 United States Government technical assistance
19 provider was not used if technical assistance to
20 a foreign governmental entity is not imple-
21 mented by a United States Government tech-
22 nical assistance provider;

23 (E) describing the activities of the Inter-
24 agency Anti-Corruption Task Force established
25 pursuant to subsection (e)(2);

1 (F) identifying—

2 (i) the designated anti-corruption
3 points of contact for foreign states; and

4 (ii) any training provided to such
5 points of contact; and

6 (G) recommending additional measures
7 that would enhance the ability of the United
8 States Government to combat public corruption,
9 kleptocracy, and illicit finance overseas.

10 (2) ONLINE PLATFORM.—The Secretary of
11 State, in conjunction with the Administrator of the
12 United States Agency for International Develop-
13 ment, should consolidate existing reports with anti-
14 corruption components into a single online, public
15 platform that includes—

16 (A) the Annual Country Reports on
17 Human Rights Practices required under section
18 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
19 U.S.C. 2151n);

20 (B) the Fiscal Transparency Report re-
21 quired under section 7031(b) of the Depart-
22 ment of State, Foreign Operations and Related
23 Programs Appropriations Act, 2019 (division F
24 of Public Law 116–6);

1 (C) the Investment Climate Statement re-
2 ports;

3 (D) the International Narcotics Control
4 Strategy Report;

5 (E) any other relevant public reports; and

6 (F) links to third-party indicators and
7 compliance mechanisms used by the United
8 States Government to inform policy and pro-
9 gramming, as appropriate, such as—

10 (i) the International Finance Corpora-
11 tion's Doing Business surveys;

12 (ii) the International Budget Partner-
13 ship's Open Budget Index; and

14 (iii) multilateral peer review anti-cor-
15 ruption compliance mechanisms, such as—

16 (I) the Organisation for Eco-
17 nomic Co-operation and Develop-
18 ment's Working Group on Bribery in
19 International Business Transactions;

20 (II) the Follow-Up Mechanism
21 for the Inter-American Convention
22 Against Corruption; and

23 (III) the United Nations Conven-
24 tion Against Corruption, done at New
25 York October 31, 2003.

1 **TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC**
2 **SECURITY**

3 **SEC. 501. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIA-**
4 **LOGUE.**

5 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
6 United States—

7 (1) to pursue, in coordination with United
8 States allies, arms control negotiations and sus-
9 tained and regular engagement with the PRC—

10 (A) to enhance understanding of each oth-
11 er’s respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and ca-
12 pabilities;

13 (B) to improve transparency; and

14 (C) to help manage the risks of miscalcula-
15 tion and misperception;

16 (2) to formulate a strategy to engage the Gov-
17 ernment of the People’s Republic of China on rel-
18 evant issues that lays the groundwork for a con-
19 structive arms control framework, including—

20 (A) fostering dialogue on arms control
21 leading to the convening of strategic security
22 talks;

23 (B) negotiating norms for outer space;

1 (C) developing pre-launch notification re-
2 gimes aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation;
3 and

4 (D) expanding lines of communication be-
5 tween both governments for the purposes of re-
6 ducing the risks of conventional war and in-
7 creasing transparency;

8 (3) to pursue relevant negotiations in coordina-
9 tion with our allies and partners to ensure the secu-
10 rity of United States and allied interests to slow the
11 PRC's military modernization and expansion, includ-
12 ing on—

13 (A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic
14 missiles;

15 (B) integrated air and missile defense;

16 (C) hypersonic missiles;

17 (D) intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
18 naissance;

19 (E) space-based capabilities;

20 (F) cyber capabilities; and

21 (G) command, control, and communica-
22 tions; and

23 (4) to ensure that the United States policy con-
24 tinues to reassure allies.

1 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
2 gress that—

3 (1) it is in the interest of both nations to co-
4 operate in reducing risks of conventional and nuclear
5 escalation;

6 (2) a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other
7 PLA attack on United States early warning sat-
8 ellites, other portions of the nuclear command and
9 control enterprise, or critical infrastructure poses a
10 high risk to inadvertent but rapid escalation;

11 (3) the United States and its allies should pro-
12 mote international norms on military operations in
13 space, the employment of cyber capabilities, and the
14 military use of artificial intelligence, as an element
15 of risk reduction regarding nuclear command and
16 control; and

17 (4) United States allies and partners should
18 share the burden of promoting and protecting norms
19 regarding the weaponization of space, highlighting
20 unsafe behavior that violates international norms,
21 such as in rendezvous and proximity operations, and
22 promoting responsible behavior in space and all
23 other domains.

1 **SEC. 502. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO EN-**
2 **GAGE THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON**
3 **NUCLEAR ISSUES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE**
4 **ISSUES.**

5 (a) REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES-
6 CHINA ARMS CONTROL.—Not later than 180 days after
7 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
8 State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and
9 the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate
10 committees of Congress a report, and if necessary a sepa-
11 rate classified annex, that outlines the approaches and
12 strategies they will pursue to engage the Government of
13 the People's Republic of China on arms control and risk
14 reduction, including—

15 (1) areas of potential dialogue between the Gov-
16 ernments of the United States and the People's Re-
17 public of China, including on ballistic, hypersonic
18 glide, and cruise missiles, conventional forces, nu-
19 clear, space, and cyberspace issues, as well as other
20 new strategic domains, which could reduce the likeli-
21 hood of war, limit escalation if a conflict were to
22 occur, and constrain a destabilizing arms race in the
23 Indo-Pacific;

24 (2) how the United States Government can en-
25 gage the Government of the People's Republic of
26 China in a constructive arms control dialogue;

1 (3) identifying strategic military capabilities of
2 the People’s Republic of China that the United
3 States Government is most concerned about and how
4 limiting these capabilities may benefit United States
5 and allied security interests;

6 (4) mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control
7 nuclear, conventional, and unconventional military
8 escalation between the United States and the Peo-
9 ple’s Republic of China;

10 (5) the personnel and expertise required to ef-
11 fectively engage the People’s Republic of China in
12 strategic stability and arms control dialogues; and

13 (6) opportunities and methods to encourage
14 transparency from the People’s Republic of China.

15 (b) REPORT ON ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH THE
16 PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.—Not later than 180
17 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
18 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of De-
19 fense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the
20 appropriate committees of Congress a report that de-
21 scribes—

22 (1) a concrete plan for arms control talks with
23 the People’s Republic of China;

24 (2) if a bilateral arms control dialogue does not
25 arise, what alternative plans the Department of

1 State envisages for ensuring the security of the
2 United States and its allies through international
3 arms control negotiations;

4 (3) effects on the credibility of United States
5 extended deterrence assurances to allies and part-
6 ners if arms control negotiations do not materialize
7 and the implications for regional security architec-
8 tures;

9 (4) efforts at engaging the People's Republic of
10 China to join arms control talks, whether on a bilat-
11 eral or international basis; and

12 (5) the interest level of the Government of
13 China in joining arms control talks, whether on a bi-
14 lateral or international basis, including through—

15 (A) a formal invitation to appropriate offi-
16 cials from the People's Republic of China, and
17 to each of the permanent members of the
18 United Nations Security Council, to observe a
19 United States-Russian Federation New START
20 Treaty on-site inspection to demonstrate the se-
21 curity benefits of transparency into strategic
22 nuclear forces;

23 (B) discussions on how to advance inter-
24 national negotiations on the fissile material cut-
25 off;

1 (C) an agreement with the People’s Repub-
2 lic of China that allows for advance notifica-
3 tions of ballistic missile launches, through the
4 Hague Code of Conduct or other data ex-
5 changes or doctrine discussions related to stra-
6 tegic nuclear forces;

7 (D) an agreement not to target or interfere
8 in nuclear command, control, and communica-
9 tions (commonly referred to as “NC3”) infra-
10 structure; or

11 (E) any other cooperative measure that
12 benefits United States-People’s Republic of
13 China strategic stability.

14 (c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
15 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
16 tees of Congress” means—

17 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
18 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee
19 on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate;
20 and

21 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
22 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee
23 on Energy and Commerce of the House of Rep-
24 resentatives.

1 **SEC. 503. COUNTERING CHINA'S PROLIFERATION OF BAL-**
2 **LISTIC MISSILES AND NUCLEAR TECH-**
3 **NOLOGY TO THE MIDDLE EAST.**

4 (a) MTCR TRANSFERS.—Not later than 30 days
5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
6 shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
7 a written determination, and any documentation to sup-
8 port that determination detailing—

9 (1) whether any foreign person in China know-
10 ingly exported, transferred, or engaged in trade of
11 any item designated under Category I of the MTCR
12 Annex to any foreign person in the previous three
13 fiscal years; and

14 (2) the sanctions the President has imposed or
15 intends to impose pursuant to section 11B(b) of the
16 Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C.
17 4612(b)) against any foreign person who knowingly
18 engaged in the export, transfer, or trade of that item
19 or items.

20 (b) CHINA'S NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE COOPERA-
21 TION.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enact-
22 ment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appro-
23 priate committees of Congress a report detailing—

24 (1) whether any foreign person in China en-
25 gaged in cooperation with any other foreign person
26 in the previous three fiscal years in the construction

1 of any nuclear-related fuel cycle facility or activity
2 that has not been notified to the IAEA and would
3 be subject to complementary access if an Additional
4 Protocol was in force; and

5 (2) the policy options required to prevent and
6 respond to any future effort by China to export to
7 any foreign person an item classified as “plants for
8 the separation of isotopes of uranium” or “plants
9 for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear reactor
10 fuel elements” under Part 110 of the Nuclear Regu-
11 latory Commission export licensing authority.

12 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The determination required
13 under subsection (b) and the report required under sub-
14 section (c) shall be unclassified with a classified annex.

15 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

16 (1) The term “appropriate committees of Con-
17 gress” means—

18 (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of
19 the Senate;

20 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
21 the Senate;

22 (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of
23 the House of Representatives; and

24 (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
25 the House of Representatives.

1 (2) FOREIGN PERSON; PERSON.—The terms
2 “foreign person” and “person” mean—

3 (A) a natural person that is an alien;

4 (B) a corporation, business association,
5 partnership, society, trust, or any other non-
6 governmental entity, organization, or group,
7 that is organized under the laws of a foreign
8 country or has its principal place of business in
9 a foreign country;

10 (C) any foreign governmental entity oper-
11 ating as a business enterprise; and

12 (D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary
13 of any entity described in subparagraph (B) or
14 (C).

15 **TITLE VI—INVESTING IN A** 16 **SUSTAINABLE FUTURE**

17 **SEC. 601. ENSURING NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC** 18 **PRIORITIES WITH CHINA AND OTHER COUN-** 19 **TRIES ACCOUNT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL** 20 **ISSUES AND CLIMATE CHANGE.**

21 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

22 (1) The Special Report: Global Warming of
23 1.5°C, published by the Intergovernmental Panel on
24 Climate Change on October 8, 2018, and the Fourth
25 National Climate Assessment, first published by the

1 United States Global Change Research Program in
2 2018, concluded that—

3 (A) the release of greenhouse gas emis-
4 sions, most notably the combustion of fossil
5 fuels and the degradation of natural resources
6 that absorb atmospheric carbon from human
7 activity, are the dominant causes of climate
8 change during the past century; and

9 (B) changes in the Earth's climate are—

10 (i) causing sea levels to rise;

11 (ii) increasing the global average tem-
12 perature of the Earth;

13 (iii) increasing the incidence and se-
14 verity of wildfires; and

15 (iv) intensifying the severity of ex-
16 treme weather, including hurricanes, cy-
17 clones, typhoons, flooding, droughts, and
18 other disasters that threaten human life,
19 healthy communities, and critical infra-
20 structure.

21 (2) An increase in the global average tempera-
22 ture of 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industri-
23 alized levels would cause—

24 (A) the displacement, and the forced inter-
25 nal migration, of an estimated 143,000,000

1 people in Latin America, South Asia, and Sub-
2 Saharan Africa by 2050 if insufficient action is
3 taken (according to the World Bank);

4 (B) the displacement of an average of
5 17,800,000 people worldwide by floods every
6 year (according to the Internal Displacement
7 Monitoring Centre) because of the exacerbating
8 effects of climate change;

9 (C) more than \$500,000,000,000 in lost
10 annual economic output in the United States (a
11 10 percent contraction from 2018 levels) by
12 2100 (according to the Fourth National Cli-
13 mate Assessment);

14 (D) an additional 100,000,000 people
15 worldwide to be driven into poverty by 2030
16 (according to the World Bank);

17 (E) greater food insecurity and decreased
18 agricultural production due to climate change's
19 effects on the increased frequency and intensity
20 of extreme weather events;

21 (F) the proliferation of agricultural pests
22 and crop diseases, loss of biodiversity, degrad-
23 ing ecosystems, and water scarcity; and

1 (G) more than 350,000,000 additional peo-
2 ple worldwide to be exposed to deadly heat
3 stress by 2050.

4 (3) According to the International Energy
5 Agency, the United States, China, India, and the
6 European Union (including the United Kingdom) ac-
7 count for more than 58 percent of global greenhouse
8 gas emissions. China, which is the world’s top green-
9 house gases emitter and has an outsized impact on
10 the United States core interest in climate stability—

11 (A) is likely to achieve its carbon emissions
12 mitigation pledge to the Paris Agreement, con-
13 tained in its 2015 nationally determined con-
14 tribution, to “peak” emissions around 2030
15 ahead of schedule;

16 (B) announced, on September 22, 2020,
17 and restated on April 22, 2021, a pledge to
18 achieve carbon neutrality by 2060;

19 (C) announced on April 22, 2021, its in-
20 tent to strictly control coal fired power genera-
21 tion projects, as well as strictly limit the in-
22 crease in coal consumption over the 14th five
23 year plan period and phase it down in the 15th
24 five year plan period; and

1 (D) however, remains uncommitted to
2 internationally recognized metrics for achieving
3 these goals.

4 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
5 gress that—

6 (1) to address the climate crisis, the United
7 States must leverage the full weight of its diplomatic
8 engagement and foreign assistance to promote our
9 national security and economic interests related to
10 climate change;

11 (2) in the absence of United States leadership
12 on global issues driving international climate-related
13 policymaking, it would lead to a substantial and
14 harmful decline in the Nation’s global competitive-
15 ness;

16 (3) promoting international instruments on cli-
17 mate action and other relevant international stand-
18 ards and best practices, as such standards and prac-
19 tices develop, serve the interests of the American
20 people and protect United States environmental re-
21 sources and the planet;

22 (4) promoting the adoption and implementation
23 of international climate-related agreements, stand-
24 ards, and practices by foreign states ensures a level

1 playing field for United States businesses and other
2 stakeholders;

3 (5) working with international allies and part-
4 ners to promote environmental justice and climate
5 justice serves the American people's interests;

6 (6) finding common ground with China on cli-
7 mate action where possible is important, but the
8 United States must also continue to hold China ac-
9 countable where its actions undermine the interests
10 of the United States, its allies, and partners; and

11 (7) in furtherance of the previous clauses, the
12 United States should—

13 (A) explore opportunities for constructive
14 cooperation on climate action initiatives with
15 China and other countries while ensuring the
16 United States maintains its competitive advan-
17 tage in climate-related fields of expertise and
18 industry, including—

19 (i) support for international coopera-
20 tive policies, measures, and technologies to
21 decarbonize industry and power, including
22 through circular economy, energy storage
23 and grid reliability, carbon capture, and
24 green hydrogen; and

- 1 (ii) increased deployment of clean en-
2 ergy, including renewable and advanced
3 nuclear power; green and climate resilient
4 agriculture; energy efficient buildings;
5 green, and low-carbon transportation;
- 6 (B) cooperate on addressing emissions of
7 methane and other non-CO₂ greenhouse gases;
- 8 (C) cooperate on addressing emissions
9 from international civil aviation and maritime
10 activities;
- 11 (D) reduce emissions from coal, oil, and
12 gas;
- 13 (E) implement the Paris Agreement that
14 significantly advances global climate ambition
15 on mitigation, adaptation, and support;
- 16 (F) coordinate among relevant federal,
17 state, and local departments and agencies on
18 climate action related initiatives;
- 19 (G) provide resources, authorities and sup-
20 port for enhancing United States ambition and
21 commitment to solving the climate crisis includ-
22 ing climate action specific assistance and multi-
23 lateral fund contributions; and
- 24 (H) integrate considerations for climate
25 change into broader United States foreign pol-

1 icy decision making and the United States na-
2 tional security apparatus.

3 (c) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this Act is to provide
4 authorities, resources, policies, and recommended adminis-
5 trative actions—

6 (1) to restore United States global leadership
7 on addressing the climate crisis and make United
8 States climate action and climate diplomacy a more
9 central tenet of United States foreign policy;

10 (2) to improve the United States commitment
11 to taking more ambitious action to help mitigate
12 global greenhouse gas emission and improve devel-
13 oping countries' resilience and adaptation capacities
14 to the effects of climate change;

15 (3) to ensure the United States maintains com-
16 petitive advantage over global strategic competitors
17 in diplomacy and new technological development;

18 (4) to encourage the pursuit of new bilateral co-
19 operation agreements with other world powers on
20 initiatives to advance global clean energy innovation
21 and other measures to mitigate global greenhouse
22 gas emissions and improve climate change adapta-
23 tion capacities;

24 (5) to ensure that the United States national
25 security apparatus integrates critically important

1 data on the compounding effects that climate change
2 is having on global security risks by enhancing our
3 understanding of how, where, and when such effects
4 are destabilizing countries and regions in ways that
5 may motivate conflict, displacement, and other driv-
6 ers of insecurity; and

7 (6) to authorize funding and programs to sup-
8 port a reaffirmation of the United States commit-
9 ments to international cooperation and support for
10 developing and vulnerable countries to take climate
11 action.

12 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this Act:

13 (1) CLEAN ENERGY.—The term “clean energy”
14 means—

15 (A) renewable energy and related systems;

16 (B) energy production processes that emit
17 zero greenhouse gas emissions, including nu-
18 clear power;

19 (C) systems and processes that capture
20 and permanently store greenhouse gas emis-
21 sions from fossil fuel production and electricity
22 generation units; and

23 (D) products, processes, facilities, or sys-
24 tems designed to retrofit and improve the en-
25 ergy efficiency and electricity generated from

1 electrical generation units, while using less fuel,
2 less or fewer power production resources, or less
3 feedstocks.

4 (2) CLIMATE ACTION.—The term “climate ac-
5 tion” means enhanced efforts to reduce greenhouse
6 gas emissions and strengthen resilience and adaptive
7 capacity to climate-induced impacts, including—

8 (A) climate-related hazards in all coun-
9 tries;

10 (B) integrating climate change measures
11 into national policies, strategies and planning;
12 and

13 (C) improving education, awareness-rais-
14 ing, and human and institutional capacity with
15 respect to climate change mitigation, adapta-
16 tion, impact reduction, and early warning.

17 (3) CLIMATE CRISIS.—The term “climate cri-
18 sis” means the social, economic, health, safety, and
19 security impacts on people, and the threats to bio-
20 diversity and natural ecosystem health, which are at-
21 tributable to the wide-variety of effects on global en-
22 vironmental and atmospheric conditions as a result
23 of disruptions to the Earth’s climate from anthropo-
24 genic activities that generate greenhouse gas emis-

1 sions or reduce natural resource capacities to absorb
2 and regulate atmospheric carbon.

3 (4) CLIMATE DIPLOMACY.—The term “climate
4 diplomacy” means methods of influencing the deci-
5 sions and behavior of foreign governments and peo-
6 ples through dialogue, negotiation, cooperation, and
7 other peaceful measures on or about issues related
8 to addressing global climate change, including—

9 (A) the mitigation of global greenhouse gas
10 emissions;

11 (B) discussion, analysis, and sharing of
12 scientific data and information on the cause
13 and effects of climate change;

14 (C) the security, social, economic, and po-
15 litical instability risks associated with the ef-
16 fects of climate change;

17 (D) economic cooperation efforts and trade
18 matters that are related to or associated with
19 climate change and greenhouse gas mitigation
20 from the global economy;

21 (E) building resilience capacities and
22 adapting to the effects of change;

23 (F) sustainable land use and natural re-
24 source conservation;

1 (G) accounting for loss and damage attrib-
2 uted to the effects of climate change;

3 (H) just transition of carbon intense
4 economies to low or zero carbon economies and
5 accounting for laborers within affected econo-
6 mies;

7 (I) technological innovations that reduce or
8 eliminate carbon emissions; and

9 (J) clean energy and energy systems.

10 (5) CLIMATE SECURITY.—The term “climate
11 security” means the effects of climate change on—

12 (A) United States national security con-
13 cerns and subnational, national, and regional
14 political stability; and

15 (B) overseas security and conflict situa-
16 tions that are potentially exacerbated by dy-
17 namic environmental factors and events, includ-
18 ing—

19 (i) the intensification and frequency of
20 droughts, floods, wildfires, tropical storms,
21 and other extreme weather events;

22 (ii) changes in historical severe weath-
23 er, drought, and wildfire patterns;

24 (iii) the expansion of geographical
25 ranges of droughts, floods, and wildfires

1 into regions that had not regularly experi-
2 enced such phenomena;

3 (iv) global sea level rise patterns and
4 the expansion of geographical ranges af-
5 fected by drought; and

6 (v) changes in marine environments
7 that effect critical geostrategic waterways,
8 such as the Arctic Ocean, the South China
9 Sea, the South Pacific Ocean, the Barents
10 Sea, and the Beaufort Sea.

11 (6) RESILIENCE.—The term “resilience” means
12 the ability of human made and natural systems (in-
13 cluding their component parts) to anticipate, absorb,
14 cope, accommodate, or recover from the effects of a
15 hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, in-
16 cluding through ensuring the preservation, restora-
17 tion, or improvement of its essential basic structures
18 and functions. It is not preparedness or response.

19 **SEC. 602. ENHANCING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR**
20 **GLOBAL CLIMATE DISRUPTIONS.**

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in con-
22 sultation with other relevant agencies, shall conduct bien-
23 nial comprehensive evaluations of present and ongoing dis-
24 ruptions to the global climate system, including—

1 (1) the intensity, frequency, and range of nat-
2 ural disasters;

3 (2) the scarcity of global natural resources, in-
4 cluding fresh water;

5 (3) global food, health, and energy insecurities;

6 (4) conditions that contribute to—

7 (A) intrastate and interstate conflicts;

8 (B) foreign political and economic insta-
9 bility;

10 (C) international migration of vulnerable
11 and underserved populations;

12 (D) the failure of national governments;

13 and

14 (E) gender-based violence; and

15 (5) United States and allied military readiness,
16 operations, and strategy.

17 (b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the evaluations con-
18 ducted under subsection (a) are—

19 (1) to support the practical application of sci-
20 entific data and research on climate change’s dy-
21 namic effects around the world to improve resilience,
22 adaptability, security, and stability despite growing
23 global environmental risks and changes;

24 (2) to ensure that the strategic planning and
25 mission execution of United States international de-

1 development and diplomatic missions adequately ac-
2 count for heightened and dynamic risks and chal-
3 lenges associated with the effects of climate change;

4 (3) to improve coordination between United
5 States science agencies conducting research and
6 forecasts on the causes and effects of climate change
7 and United States national security agencies;

8 (4) to better understand the disproportionate
9 effects of global climate disruptions on women, girls,
10 indigenous communities, and other historically
11 marginalized populations; and

12 (5) to inform the development of the climate se-
13 curity strategy described in subsection (d).

14 (c) SCOPE.—The evaluations conducted under sub-
15 section (a) shall—

16 (1) examine developing countries' vulnerabilities
17 and risks associated with global, regional, and local-
18 ized effects of climate change; and

19 (2) assess and make recommendations on nec-
20 essary measures to mitigate risks and reduce
21 vulnerabilities associated with effects, including—

22 (A) sea level rise;

23 (B) freshwater resource scarcity;

24 (C) wildfires; and

1 (D) increased intensity and frequency of
2 extreme weather conditions and events, such as
3 flooding, drought, and extreme storm events, in-
4 cluding tropical cyclones.

5 (d) CLIMATE SECURITY STRATEGY.—The Secretary
6 shall use the evaluations required under subsection (a)—

7 (1) to inform the development and implementa-
8 tion of a climate security strategy for the Bureau of
9 Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the Bureau of
10 Political-Military Affairs, embassies, consulates, re-
11 gional bureaus, and other offices and programs oper-
12 ating chief of mission authority, including those with
13 roles in conflict avoidance, prevention and security
14 assistance, or humanitarian disaster response, pre-
15 vention, and assistance; and

16 (2) in furtherance of such strategy, to assess,
17 develop, budget for, and (upon approval) implement
18 plans, policies, and actions—

19 (A) to account for the impacts of climate
20 change to global human health, safety, govern-
21 ance, oceans, food production, fresh water and
22 other critical natural resources, settlements, in-
23 frastructure, marginalized groups, and eco-
24 nomic activity;

1 (B) to evaluate the climate change vulner-
2 ability, security, susceptibility, and resiliency of
3 United States interests and non-defense assets
4 abroad;

5 (C) to coordinate the integration of climate
6 change risk and vulnerability assessments into
7 all foreign policy and security decision-making
8 processes, including awarding foreign assist-
9 ance;

10 (D) to evaluate specific risks to certain re-
11 gions and countries that are—

12 (i) vulnerable to the effects of climate
13 change; and

14 (ii) strategically significant to the
15 United States;

16 (E) to enhance the resilience capacities of
17 foreign countries to the effects of climate
18 change as a means of reducing the risks of con-
19 flict and instability;

20 (F) to advance principles of good govern-
21 ance by encouraging foreign governments, par-
22 ticularly nations that are least capable of cop-
23 ing with the effects of climate change—

24 (i) to conduct climate security evalua-
25 tions; and

1 (ii) to facilitate the development of cli-
2 mate security action plans to ensure sta-
3 bility and public safety in disaster situa-
4 tions in a humane and responsible fashion;

5 (G) to evaluate the vulnerability, security,
6 susceptibility, and resiliency of United States
7 interests and nondefense assets abroad;

8 (H) to build international institutional ca-
9 pacity to address climate security implications
10 and to advance United States interests, regional
11 stability, and global security; and

12 (I) other activities that advance—

13 (i) the utilization and integration of
14 climate science in national security plan-
15 ning; and

16 (ii) the clear understanding of how
17 the effects of climate change can exacer-
18 bate security risks and threats.

19 (e) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
20 of the enactment of this Act and every two years there-
21 after for the following 20 years, the Secretary of State,
22 in consultation with other departments and agencies shall
23 submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
24 Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Com-
25 mittee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appro-

1 priations of the House of Representatives an unclassified
2 report, with a classified annex if necessary, that in-
3 cludes—

4 (1) a review of the efforts, initiatives, and pro-
5 grams in support of the strategy in subsection (c),
6 as well as—

7 (A) an assessment of the funding expended
8 by relevant Federal departments and agencies
9 on emerging events exacerbated by climate
10 change and the legal, procedural, and resource
11 constraints faced by the Department of State
12 and the United States Agency for International
13 Development throughout respective budgeting,
14 strategic planning, and management cycles to
15 support the prevention of and response to
16 emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

17 (B) current annual global assessments of
18 emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

19 (C) recommendations to further strengthen
20 United States capabilities described in this sec-
21 tion; and

22 (D) consideration of analysis, reporting,
23 and policy recommendations by civil society,
24 academic, and nongovernmental organizations
25 and institutions, and partner countries to pre-

1 vent and respond to emerging events exacer-
2 bated by climate change;

3 (2) recommendations to ensure shared responsi-
4 bility by—

5 (A) enhancing multilateral mechanisms for
6 preventing, mitigating, and responding to
7 emerging events exacerbated by climate change;
8 and

9 (B) strengthening regional organizations;
10 and

11 (3) the implementation status of the rec-
12 ommendations included in the review under para-
13 graph (1).

14 (f) REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTEL-
15 LIGENCE.—The Director of National Intelligence is en-
16 couraged to include, in his or her annual (or more often
17 as appropriate) unclassified testimony, accompanied by a
18 classified annex, if necessary, to Congress on threats to
19 United States national security—

20 (1) a review of countries and regions at risk of
21 emerging events exacerbated by climate change; and

22 (2) whenever possible, specific identification of
23 countries and regions at immediate risk of emerging
24 events exacerbated by climate change.

1 **SEC. 603. BALANCING ACCOUNTABILITY AND COOPERA-**
2 **TION WITH CHINA.**

3 It is the sense of Congress that—

4 (1) successful mitigation of global greenhouse
5 gas emissions and changes to the environment re-
6 quire global cooperation and coordination of efforts,
7 as well as holding other countries like the People’s
8 Republic of China accountable for their actions and
9 commitments to ensure a level playing field with the
10 United States, its allies, and partners;

11 (2) other countries look towards the United
12 States and China, as the world’s largest emitters
13 and largest economies, for leadership by example to
14 effectively mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, de-
15 velop and deploy energy generation technologies, and
16 integrate sustainable adaptation solutions to the in-
17 evitable effects of climate change;

18 (3) given the volume of China’s greenhouse gas
19 emissions and the scientific imperative to swiftly re-
20 duce global greenhouse gas emissions to net-zero
21 emissions around 2050, China should—

22 (A) revise its long-term pledge;

23 (B) seek to immediately peak its emissions;

24 (C) begin reducing its greenhouse gas
25 emissions significantly to meet a more ambi-
26 tious long-term 2050 reductions target; and

1 (D) update its nationally determined con-
2 tribution along a trajectory that aligns with
3 achieving a more ambitious net-zero by 2050
4 emissions target;

5 (4) it is in the United States national interest
6 to emphasize the environment and climate change in
7 its bilateral engagement with China, as global cli-
8 mate risks cannot be mitigated without a significant
9 reduction in Chinese domestic and overseas emis-
10 sions;

11 (5) the United States and China, to the extent
12 practicable, should coordinate on making and deliv-
13 ering ambitious pledges to reduce greenhouse gas
14 emissions, with aspirations towards achieving net
15 zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050;

16 (6) the United States and its allies should work
17 together, using diplomatic and economic tools, to
18 hold China accountable for any failure by China—

19 (A) to increase ambition in its 2030 na-
20 tionally determined contribution, in line with
21 net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 be-
22 fore the 26th Conference of the Parties to the
23 UNFCCC scheduled for November 2021 and
24 meeting a more ambitious nationally determined
25 contribution;

1 (B) to work faithfully to uphold the prin-
2 ciples, goals, and rules of the Paris Agreement;

3 (C) to avoid and prohibit efforts to under-
4 mine or devolve the Paris Agreement’s rule or
5 underlying framework, particularly within areas
6 of accountability transparency, and shared re-
7 sponsibility among all parties;

8 (D) to eliminate greenhouse gas intensive
9 projects from China’s Belt and Road Initiative
10 and other overseas investments, including—

11 (i) working with allies and partners of
12 the United States to eliminate support for
13 coal power production projects in China’s
14 Belt and Road Initiative;

15 (ii) providing financing and project
16 support for cleaner and less risky alter-
17 natives; and

18 (iii) undertaking “parallel initiatives”
19 to enhance capacity building programs and
20 overseas sustainable investment criteria,
21 including in areas such as integrated en-
22 ergy planning, power sector reform, just
23 transition, distributed generation, procure-
24 ment, transparency, and standards to sup-

1 port low-emissions growth in developing
2 countries; and

3 (E) to phase out existing coal power plants
4 and reduce net coal power production;

5 (7) the United States should pursue confidence-
6 building opportunities for the United States and
7 China to undertake “parallel initiatives” on clean
8 energy research, development, finance, and deploy-
9 ment, including through economic and stimulus
10 measures with clear, mutually agreed upon rules and
11 policies to protect intellectual property, ensure equi-
12 table, nonpunitive provision of support, and verify
13 implementation, which would provide catalytic
14 progress towards delivering a global clean energy
15 transformation that benefits all people;

16 (8) the United States should pursue cooperative
17 initiatives to reduce global deforestation; and

18 (9) the United States should pursue appro-
19 priate scientific cooperative exchanges and research
20 that align with United States interests and those of
21 its international partners and allies, provide reci-
22 procity of access, protect intellectual property rights,
23 and preserve the values and human rights interests
24 of the American people.

1 **SEC. 604. PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT AL-**
2 **TERNATIVES TO THE BELT AND ROAD INITIA-**
3 **TIVE.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President should seek oppor-
5 tunities to partner with multilateral development finance
6 institutions to develop financing tools based on shared de-
7 velopment finance criteria and mechanisms to support in-
8 vestments in developing countries that—

9 (1) support low carbon economic development;

10 and

11 (2) promote resiliency and adaptation to envi-
12 ronmental changes and natural disasters.

13 (b) PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT.—The Chief Execu-
14 tive Officer of the United States International Develop-
15 ment Finance Corporation should seek to partner with
16 other multilateral development finance institutions and de-
17 velopment finance institutions to leverage the respective
18 available funds to support low carbon economic develop-
19 ment, which may include clean energy including renewable
20 and nuclear energy projects, environmental adaptation,
21 and resilience activities in countries.

22 (c) CO-FINANCING OF INFRASTRUCTURE
23 PROJECTS.—

24 (1) AUTHORIZATION.—Subject to paragraph

25 (2), the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the
26 United States Agency for International Development

1 and other relevant agency heads are authorized to
2 co-finance infrastructure, resilience, and environ-
3 mental adaptation projects that advance the develop-
4 ment objectives of the United States overseas and
5 provide viable alternatives to projects that would
6 otherwise be included within China's Belt and Road
7 Initiative.

8 (2) CONDITIONS.—Co-financing arrangements
9 authorized pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be
10 approved unless—

11 (A) the projects to be financed—

12 (i) promote the public good;

13 (ii) promote United States national
14 security or economic interests;

15 (iii) promote low carbon emissions, in-
16 cluding clean energy renewable and nuclear
17 energy projects; and

18 (iv) will have substantially lower envi-
19 ronmental impact than the proposed Belt
20 and Road Initiative alternative; and

21 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
22 the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af-
23 fairs of the House of Representatives are noti-
24 fied not later than 15 days in advance of enter-
25 ing into such co-financing arrangements.

1 **SEC. 605. USING CLIMATE DIPLOMACY TO BETTER SERVE**
2 **NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC INTER-**
3 **ESTS.**

4 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—The President and the Secretary
5 of State shall prioritize climate action and climate diplo-
6 macy in United States foreign policy by—

7 (1) ensuring diplomacy, support, and inter-
8 agency coordination for bilateral and multilateral ac-
9 tions to address the climate crisis; and

10 (2) improving coordination and integration of
11 climate action across all bureaus and United States
12 missions abroad.

13 (b) **CLIMATE ACTION INTEGRATION.**—The Secretary
14 of State, through the Under Secretary of State for Eco-
15 nomic Growth, Energy, and the Environment and any
16 other designees, shall—

17 (1) prioritize climate action and clean energy
18 within the bureaus and offices under the leadership
19 of the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, En-
20 ergy, and the Environment;

21 (2) ensure that such bureaus and offices are co-
22 ordinating with other bureaus of the Department of
23 State regarding the integration of climate action and
24 climate diplomacy as a cross-cutting imperative
25 across the Department of State;

26 (3) encourage all Under Secretaries of State—

1 (A) to assess how issues related to climate
2 change and United States climate action are in-
3 tegrated into their operations and programs;

4 (B) to coordinate crosscutting actions and
5 diplomatic efforts that relate to climate action;
6 and

7 (C) to make available the technical assist-
8 ance and resources of the bureaus and offices
9 with relevant expertise to provide technical as-
10 sistance and expert support to other bureaus
11 within the Department of State regarding cli-
12 mate action, clean energy development, and cli-
13 mate diplomacy;

14 (4) manage the integration of scientific data on
15 the current and anticipated effects of climate change
16 into applied strategies and diplomatic engagements
17 across programmatic and regional bureaus of the
18 Department of State and into the Department of
19 State's decision making processes;

20 (5) ensure that the relevant bureaus and offices
21 provide appropriate technical support and re-
22 sources—

23 (A) to the President, the Secretary of
24 State, and their respective designees charged

1 with addressing climate change and associated
2 issues;

3 (B) to United States diplomats advancing
4 United States foreign policy related to climate
5 action; and

6 (C) for the appropriate engagement and
7 integration of relevant domestic agencies in
8 international climate change affairs, including
9 United States participation in multilateral fora;
10 and

11 (6) carry out other activities, as directed by the
12 Secretary of State, that advance United States cli-
13 mate-related foreign policy objectives, including glob-
14 al greenhouse gas mitigation, climate change adapta-
15 tion activities, and global climate security.

16 (c) RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
17 OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS.—The Under Sec-
18 retary of State for Political Affairs shall ensure that all
19 foreign missions are—

20 (1) advancing United States bilateral climate
21 diplomacy;

22 (2) engaging strategically on opportunities for
23 bilateral climate action cooperation with foreign gov-
24 ernments; and

1 (3) utilizing the technical resources and coordi-
2 nating adequately with the bureaus reporting to the
3 Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, En-
4 ergy and the Environment.

5 (d) REPORT.—Not later than 200 days after the date
6 of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of State
7 for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, in
8 cooperation with the Under Secretary of State for Political
9 Affairs, shall submit a report to the appropriate congres-
10 sional committees that—

11 (1) assesses how climate action and United
12 States climate diplomacy is integrated across the
13 Bureaus of the Department of State; and

14 (2) includes recommendations on strategies to
15 improve cross bureau coordination and under-
16 standing of United States climate action and climate
17 diplomacy.

18 (e) EFFECT OF ELIMINATION OF POSITIONS.—If the
19 positions of Under Secretary of State for Economic
20 Growth, Energy, and the Environment and the Undersec-
21 retary of State for Political Affairs are eliminated or un-
22 dergo name changes, the responsibilities of such Under
23 Secretaries under this section shall be reassigned to other
24 Under Secretaries of State, as appropriate.

25 (f) CLIMATE CHANGE OFFICERS.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall
2 establish and staff Climate Change Officer positions.
3 Such Officers shall serve under the supervision of
4 the appropriate chief of mission or the Under Sec-
5 retary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Envi-
6 ronment of the Department of State, as the case
7 may be. The Secretary shall ensure each embassy,
8 consulate, and diplomatic mission to which such Of-
9 ficers are assigned pursuant to paragraph (2) has
10 sufficient additional and appropriate staff to support
11 such Officers.

12 (2) ASSIGNMENT.—Climate Change Officers
13 shall be assigned to the following posts:

14 (A) United States embassies, or, if appro-
15 priate, consulates.

16 (B) United States diplomatic missions to,
17 or liaisons with, regional and multilateral orga-
18 nizations, including the United States diplo-
19 matic missions to the European Union, African
20 Union, Organization of American States, Arctic
21 Council, and any other appropriate regional or-
22 ganization, and the United Nations and its rel-
23 evant specialized agencies.

24 (C) Other posts as designated by the Sec-
25 retary.

1 (3) RESPONSIBILITIES.—Each Climate Change
2 Officer shall—

3 (A) provide expertise on effective ap-
4 proaches to—

5 (i) mitigate the emission of gases
6 which contribute to global climate change
7 and formulate national and global plans
8 for reducing such gross and net emissions;
9 and

10 (ii) reduce the detrimental impacts at-
11 tributable to global climate change, and
12 adapt to such impacts;

13 (B) engage and convene, in a manner that
14 is equitable, inclusive, and just, with individuals
15 and organizations which represent a govern-
16 ment office, a nongovernmental organization, a
17 social or political movement, a private sector
18 entity, an educational or scientific institution,
19 or any other entity concerned with—

20 (i) global climate change; the emission
21 of gases which contribute to global climate
22 change; or

23 (ii) reducing the detrimental impacts
24 attributable to global climate change;

1 (C) facilitate engagement by United States
2 entities in bilateral and multilateral cooperation
3 on climate change; and

4 (D) carry out such other responsibilities as
5 the Secretary may assign.

6 (4) RESPONSIBILITIES OF UNDER SEC-
7 RETARY.—The Under Secretary for Economic
8 Growth, Energy, and the Environment of the De-
9 partment of State shall, including by acting through
10 the Bureau of Oceans and International Environ-
11 mental and Scientific Affairs of the Department of
12 State—

13 (A) provide policy guidance to Climate
14 Change Officers established under subsection
15 (a);

16 (B) develop relations with, consult with,
17 and provide assistance to relevant individuals
18 and organizations concerned with studying,
19 mitigating, and adapting to global climate
20 change, or reducing the emission of gases which
21 contribute to global climate change; and

22 (C) assist officers and employees of re-
23 gional bureaus of the Department of State to
24 develop strategies and programs to promote
25 studying, mitigating, and adapting to global cli-

1 mate change, or reducing the emission of gases
2 which contribute to global climate change.

3 (g) ACTIONS BY CHIEFS OF MISSION.—Each chief of
4 mission in a foreign country shall—

5 (1) develop, as part of annual joint strategic
6 plans or equivalent program and policy planning, a
7 strategy to promote actions to improve and increase
8 studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate
9 change, or reducing the emission of gases which con-
10 tribute to global climate change by—

11 (A) consulting and coordinating with and
12 providing support to relevant individuals and
13 organizations, including experts and other pro-
14 fessionals and stakeholders on issues related to
15 climate change; and

16 (B) holding periodic meetings with such
17 relevant individuals and organizations relating
18 to such strategy;

19 (2) hold ongoing discussions with the officials
20 and leaders of such country regarding progress to
21 improve and increase studying, mitigating, and
22 adapting to global climate change, or reducing the
23 emission of gases which contribute to global climate
24 change in a manner that is equitable, inclusive, and
25 just in such country; and

1 (3) certify annually to the Secretary of State
2 that to the maximum extent practicable, consider-
3 ations related to climate change adaptation and
4 mitigation, sustainability, and the environment were
5 incorporated in activities, management, and oper-
6 ations of the United States embassy or other diplo-
7 matic post under the direction of the chief of mission.

8 (h) TRAINING.—Not later than 180 days after the
9 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
10 shall establish curriculum at the Department of State's
11 Foreign Service Institute that supplements political and
12 economic reporting tradecraft courses in order to provide
13 employees of the Department with specialized training
14 with respect to studying, mitigating, and adapting to glob-
15 al climate change, or reducing the emission of gases which
16 contribute to global climate change. Such training shall
17 include the following:

18 (1) Awareness of the full range of national and
19 subnational agencies, offices, personnel, statutory
20 authorities, funds, and programs involved in the
21 international commitments of the United States re-
22 garding global climate change and the emission of
23 gases which contribute to global climate change, the
24 science of global climate change, and methods for
25 mitigating and adapting to global climate change.

1 (2) Awareness of methods for mitigating and
2 adapting to global climate change and reducing the
3 emission of gases which contribute to global climate
4 change that are equitable, inclusive, and just.

5 (3) Familiarity with United States agencies,
6 multilateral agencies, international financial institu-
7 tions, and the network of donors providing assist-
8 ance to mitigate and adapt to global climate change.

9 (4) Awareness of the most frequently an-
10 nounced goals and methods of the entities specified
11 in subsection (a)(3)(B).

12 (i) CONTRACTING.—Contracting and agreements offi-
13 cers of the Department of State, and other United States
14 embassy personnel responsible for contracts, grants, or ac-
15 quisitions, shall receive training on evaluating proposals,
16 solicitations, and bids, for considerations related to sus-
17 tainability and adapting to or mitigating impacts from cli-
18 mate change.

19 (j) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the
20 date of the enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter,
21 the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on
22 Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
23 Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report
24 that includes a detailed breakdown of posts at which staff
25 are assigned the role of Climate Change Officer, the re-

1 responsibilities to which they have been assigned, and the
2 strategies developed by the chief of mission, as applicable.

3 (k) CLIMATE CHANGE SUPPORT AND FINANCING.—

4 The Secretary of State shall facilitate the coordination
5 among the Department of State and other relevant depart-
6 ments and agencies toward contributing technical coopera-
7 tion, engagement, development finance, or foreign assist-
8 ance relevant to United States international climate action
9 and in support of United States climate diplomacy.

10 (l) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress
11 that climate diplomacy tools as described in this section
12 are critical for demonstrating the commitment to include
13 climate changes issues as core tenets of foreign policy pri-
14 orities, as well as preserving the United States role as a
15 global leader on climate change action.

16 **SEC. 606. DRIVING A GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESIL-**
17 **IENCE STRATEGY.**

18 (a) AMENDMENT.—Section 117 of the Foreign As-
19 sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151p) is amended—

20 (1) in subsection (b)—

21 (A) by inserting “(1)” after “(b)”; and

22 (B) by adding at the end the following:

23 “(2)(A) The President is authorized to furnish
24 assistance to programs and initiatives that—

1 “(i) promote resilience among communities
2 facing harmful impacts from climate change;
3 and

4 “(ii) reduce the vulnerability of persons af-
5 fected by climate change.

6 “(B) There shall be, in the Department of
7 State, a Coordinator of Climate Change Resilience.”;
8 and

9 (2) by adding at the end the following:

10 “(d)(1) The Secretary of State, in coordination with
11 the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
12 national Development, shall establish a comprehensive, in-
13 tegrated, 10-year strategy, which shall be referred to as
14 the ‘Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy’, to miti-
15 gate the impacts of climate change on displacement and
16 humanitarian emergencies.

17 “(2) The Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy
18 shall—

19 “(A) focus on addressing slow-onset and rapid-
20 onset effects of events caused by climate change,
21 consider the effects of events caused by climate
22 change, and describe the key features of successful
23 strategies to prevent such conditions;

1 “(B) include specific objectives and multisecc-
2 toral approaches to the effects of events caused by
3 climate change;

4 “(C) promote our national security and eco-
5 nomic interests while leading international climate-
6 related policymaking efforts, on which the absence of
7 United States leadership would lead to a substantial
8 and harmful decline in the nation’s global competi-
9 tiveness;

10 “(D) promote international instruments on cli-
11 mate action and other relevant international stand-
12 ards and best practices, as such standards and prac-
13 tices develop, that serve the interests of the Amer-
14 ican people and protect United States environmental
15 resources and the planet;

16 “(E) promote the adoption and implementation
17 of such international climate-related agreements,
18 standards, and practices by foreign states;

19 “(F) work with our allies and partners to en-
20 sure a level playing field exists when it comes to cli-
21 mate action; to encourage and assist foreign coun-
22 tries to make similar or even greater commitments
23 than the United States;

24 “(G) describe approaches that ensure national
25 leadership, as appropriate, and substantively engage

1 with civil society, local partners, and the affected
2 communities, including marginalized populations and
3 underserved populations, in the design, implementa-
4 tion, and monitoring of climate change programs to
5 best safeguard the future of those subject to dis-
6 placement;

7 “(H) assign roles for relevant Federal agencies
8 to avoid duplication of efforts, while ensuring that—

9 “(i) the Department of State is responsible
10 for—

11 “(I) leading the Global Climate
12 Change Resilience Strategy;

13 “(II) establishing United States for-
14 eign policy;

15 “(III) advancing diplomatic and polit-
16 ical efforts; and

17 “(IV) guiding security assistance and
18 related civilian security efforts to mitigate
19 climate change threats;

20 “(ii) the United States Agency for Inter-
21 national Development is—

22 “(I) responsible for overseeing pro-
23 grams to prevent the effects of events
24 caused by climate change;

1 “(II) the lead implementing agency
2 for development and related nonsecurity
3 program policy related to building resil-
4 ience and achieving recovery; and

5 “(III) responsible for providing over-
6 seas humanitarian assistance to respond to
7 international and internal displacement
8 caused by climate change and to coordi-
9 nate the pursuit of durable solutions for
10 climate-displaced persons; and

11 “(iii) other Federal agencies support the
12 activities of the Department of State and the
13 United States Agency for International Devel-
14 opment, as appropriate, with the concurrence of
15 the Secretary of State and the Administrator of
16 the United States Agency for International De-
17 velopment;

18 “(I) describe programs that agencies will under-
19 take to achieve the stated objectives, including de-
20 scriptions of existing programs and funding by fiscal
21 year and account;

22 “(J) identify mechanisms to improve coordina-
23 tion between the United States, foreign govern-
24 ments, and international organizations, including the

1 World Bank, the United Nations, regional organiza-
2 tions, and private sector organizations;

3 “(K) address efforts to expand public-private
4 partnerships and leverage private sector resources;

5 “(L) describe the criteria, metrics, and mecha-
6 nisms for monitoring and evaluation of programs
7 and objectives in the Global Climate Change Resil-
8 ience Strategy;

9 “(M) describe how the Global Climate Change
10 Resilience Strategy will ensure that programs are
11 country-led and context-specific;

12 “(N) establish a program to monitor climate
13 and social conditions to anticipate and prevent cli-
14 mate and environmental stressors from evolving into
15 national security risks;

16 “(O) include an assessment of climate risks in
17 the Department of State’s Quadrennial Diplomacy
18 and Development Review; and

19 “(P) prioritize foreign aid, to the extent prac-
20 ticable, for international climate resilience in support
21 of this Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy.

22 “(3) Not later than 270 days after the date of the
23 enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter, the
24 President shall submit a report to the Committee on For-
25 eign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on For-

1 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives, based in part
2 on the information collected pursuant to this section, that
3 details the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy.
4 The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
5 may include a classified annex, if necessary.

6 “(4) Not later than 180 days after the date of the
7 enactment of this subsection, the Secretary of State and
8 the Coordinator of Global Climate Change Resilience shall
9 brief the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
10 and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
11 Representatives regarding the progress made by the Fed-
12 eral Government in implementing the Global Climate
13 Change Resilience Strategy.

14 “(5)(A) Not later than 270 days after the date of
15 the enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter,
16 the Comptroller General of the United States, in coopera-
17 tion and consultation with the Secretary of State, shall
18 produce a report evaluating the progress that the Federal
19 Government has made toward incorporating climate
20 change into department and agency policies, including the
21 resources that have been allocated for such purpose.

22 “(B) The report required under subparagraph (A)
23 shall assess—

1 “(i) the degree to which the Department of
2 State and the United States Agency for Inter-
3 national Development (USAID) are—

4 “(I) developing climate change risk assess-
5 ments; and

6 “(II) providing guidance to missions on
7 how to include climate change risks in their in-
8 tegrated country strategies;

9 “(ii) whether the Department of State and
10 USAID have sufficient resources to fulfill the re-
11 quirements described in paragraph (2); and

12 “(iii) any areas in which the Department of
13 State and USAID may lack sufficient resources to
14 fulfill such requirements.”.

15 (b) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There
16 are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
17 necessary to carry out this Global Climate Change Resil-
18 ience Strategy.

19 **SEC. 607. ADDRESSING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE**
20 **MITIGATION, ADAPTATION, AND SECURITY.**

21 (a) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

22 (1) **CONVENTION.**—The term “Convention”
23 means the United Nations Framework Convention
24 on Climate Change, done at New York May 9, 1992,
25 and entered into force March 21, 1994.

1 (2) MOST VULNERABLE COMMUNITIES AND
2 POPULATIONS.—The term “most vulnerable commu-
3 nities and populations” means communities and pop-
4 ulations that are at risk of substantial adverse ef-
5 fects of climate change and have limited capacity to
6 respond to such effects, including women, impover-
7 ished communities, children, indigenous peoples, and
8 informal workers.

9 (3) MOST VULNERABLE DEVELOPING COUN-
10 TRIES.—The term “most vulnerable developing
11 countries” means, as determined by the Adminis-
12 trator of the United States Agency for International
13 Development, developing countries that are at risk
14 of substantial adverse effects of climate change and
15 have limited capacity to respond to such effects, con-
16 sidering the approaches included in any international
17 treaties and agreements.

18 (4) PROGRAM.—The term “Program” means
19 the International Climate Change Adaptation, Miti-
20 gation, and Security Program established pursuant
21 to subsection (c).

22 (b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this section is to pro-
23 vide authorities for additional, new, current, and ongoing
24 bilateral and regional international development assist-
25 ance, and, as appropriate, to leverage private resources,

1 in support of host country driven projects, planning, poli-
2 cies, and initiatives designed to improve the ability of host
3 countries—

4 (1) to primarily produce reliable renewable en-
5 ergy and reduce or mitigate carbon emissions from
6 the power sector while facilitating the transition in
7 key global markets from electricity generated from
8 fossil fuel power to low-cost clean energy sources, in
9 a manner that is equitable for workers and commu-
10 nities;

11 (2) to adapt and become more resilient to cur-
12 rent and forecasted effects of climate change; and

13 (3) to employ—

14 (A) sustainable land use practices that
15 mitigate desertification and reduce greenhouse
16 gas emissions from deforestation and forest
17 degradation; and

18 (B) agricultural production practices that
19 reduce poverty while improving soil health, pro-
20 tecting water quality, and increasing food secu-
21 rity and nutrition.

22 (c) ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM.—The Secretary
23 of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treas-
24 ury and the Administrator of the United States Agency
25 for International Development, shall establish a program,

1 to be known as the “International Climate Change Adap-
2 tation, Mitigation, and Security Program”, to provide bi-
3 lateral and regional assistance to developing countries for
4 programs, projects, and activities described in subsection
5 (e).

6 (d) SUPPLEMENT NOT SUPPLANT.—Assistance pro-
7 vided under this section shall be used to supplement, and
8 not to supplant, any other Federal, State, or local re-
9 sources available to carry out activities that fit the charac-
10 teristics of the Program.

11 (e) POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United
12 States to ensure that the Program provides resources to
13 developing countries, particularly the most vulnerable
14 communities and populations in such countries, to support
15 the development and implementation of programs,
16 projects, and activities that—

17 (1) reduce greenhouse gas emissions through
18 the integration and deployment of clean energy, in-
19 cluding transmission, distribution, and interconnec-
20 tions to renewable energy, while facilitating the tran-
21 sition from electricity generated from fossil fuel
22 power to low-cost renewable energy sources, in a
23 manner that is equitable for workers and commu-
24 nities;

1 (2) address financial or other barriers to the
2 widespread deployment of clean energy technologies
3 that reduce, sequester, or avoid greenhouse gas
4 emissions;

5 (3) improve the availability, viability, and acces-
6 sibility of zero emission vehicles, including support
7 for design and development of transportation net-
8 works and land use practices that mitigate carbon
9 emissions in the transportation sector;

10 (4) support building capacities that may in-
11 clude—

12 (A) developing and implementing meth-
13 odologies and programs for measuring green-
14 house gas emissions and verifying emissions
15 mitigation, including building capacities to con-
16 duct emissions inventories and meet reporting
17 requirements under the Paris Agreement;

18 (B) assessing, developing, and imple-
19 menting technology and policy options for
20 greenhouse gas emissions mitigation and avoid-
21 ance of future emissions, including sector-based
22 and cross-sector mitigation strategies;

23 (C) enhancing the technical capacity of
24 regulatory authorities, planning agencies, and
25 related institutions in developing countries to

1 improve the deployment of clean energy tech-
2 nologies and practices, including through in-
3 creased transparency;

4 (D) training and instruction regarding the
5 installation and maintenance of renewable en-
6 ergy technologies; and

7 (E) activities that support the development
8 and implementation of frameworks for intellec-
9 tual property rights in developing countries;

10 (5) improve resilience, sustainable economic
11 growth, and adaptation capacities in response to the
12 effects of climate change;

13 (6) promote appropriate job training and access
14 to new job opportunities in new economic sectors
15 and industries that emerge due to the transition
16 from fossil fuel energy to clean energy;

17 (7) reduce the vulnerability and increase the re-
18 siliance capacities of communities to the effects of
19 climate change, including effects on—

20 (A) water availability;

21 (B) agricultural productivity and food se-
22 curity;

23 (C) flood risk;

24 (D) coastal resources;

25 (E) biodiversity;

1 (F) economic livelihoods;

2 (G) health and diseases;

3 (H) housing and shelter; and

4 (I) human migration;

5 (8) help countries and communities adapt to
6 changes in the environment through enhanced com-
7 munity planning, preparedness, and growth strate-
8 gies that take into account current and forecasted
9 regional and localized effects of climate change;

10 (9) conserve and restore natural resources, eco-
11 systems, and biodiversity threatened by the effects of
12 climate change to ensure such resources, ecosystems,
13 and biodiversity are healthy and continue to provide
14 natural protections from the effects of climate
15 change such as extreme weather;

16 (10) provide resources, information, scientific
17 data and modeling, innovative best practices, and
18 technical assistance to support vulnerable developing
19 countries to adapt to the effects of climate change;

20 (11) promote sustainable and climate-resilient
21 societies, including through improvements to make
22 critical infrastructure less vulnerable to the effects
23 of climate change;

24 (12) encourage the adoption of policies and
25 measures, including sector-based and cross-sector

1 policies and measures, that substantially reduce, se-
2 quester, or avoid greenhouse gas emissions from the
3 domestic energy and transportation sectors of devel-
4 oping countries;

5 (13) reduce deforestation and land degradation
6 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and implement
7 sustainable forestry practices;

8 (14) promote sustainable land use activities, in-
9 cluding supporting development planning, design,
10 and construction with respect to transportation sys-
11 tems and land use;

12 (15) promote sustainable agricultural practices
13 that mitigate carbon emissions, conserve soil, and
14 improve food and water security of communities;

15 (16) foster partnerships with private sector en-
16 tities and nongovernmental international develop-
17 ment organizations to assist with developing solu-
18 tions and economic opportunities that support
19 projects, planning, policies, and initiatives described
20 in subsection (b);

21 (17) provide technical assistance and strengthen
22 capacities of developing countries to meet the goals
23 of the conditional nationally determined contribu-
24 tions of those countries;

1 (18) establish investment channels designed to
2 leverage private sector financing in—

3 (A) clean energy;

4 (B) sustainable agriculture and natural re-
5 source management; and

6 (C) the transportation sector as described
7 in paragraph (3); and

8 (19) provide technical assistance and support
9 for non-extractive activities that provide alternative
10 economic growth opportunities while preserving crit-
11 ical habitats and natural carbon sinks.

12 (f) PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator of the
14 United States Agency for International Develop-
15 ment, in consultation with other departments and
16 agencies, shall provide assistance under the Pro-
17 gram—

18 (A) in the form of bilateral assistance pur-
19 suant to the requirements under subsection (g);

20 (B) to multilateral funds or international
21 institutions with programs for climate mitiga-
22 tion or adaptation in developing countries con-
23 sistent with the policy described in subsection
24 (e); or

1 (C) through a combination of the mecha-
2 nisms specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B).

3 (2) LIMITATION.—

4 (A) CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION TO MUL-
5 TILATERAL FUNDS OR INTERNATIONAL INSTI-
6 TUTIONS.—In any fiscal year, the Adminis-
7 trator of the United States Agency for Inter-
8 national Development may provide up to 40
9 percent of the assistance available to carry out
10 the Program to 1 or more multilateral funds or
11 international institutions that meet the require-
12 ments of subparagraph (B).

13 (B) MULTILATERAL FUND OR INTER-
14 NATIONAL INSTITUTION ELIGIBILITY.—A multi-
15 lateral fund or international institution is eligi-
16 ble to receive assistance under subparagraph
17 (A)—

18 (i) if—

19 (I) such fund or institution is es-
20 tablished pursuant to—

21 (aa) the Convention; or

22 (bb) an agreement nego-
23 tiated under the Convention; or

24 (II) the assistance is directed to
25 1 or more multilateral funds or inter-

1 national development institutions,
2 pursuant to an agreement negotiated
3 under the Convention; and

4 (ii) if such fund or institution—

5 (I) specifies the terms and condi-
6 tions under which the United States is
7 to provide assistance to the fund or
8 institution, and under which the fund
9 or institution is to provide assistance
10 to recipient countries; and

11 (II) ensures that assistance from
12 the United States to the fund or insti-
13 tution and the principal and income of
14 the fund or institution are disbursed
15 only—

16 (aa) to support projects,
17 planning, policies, and initiatives
18 described in subsection (b);

19 (bb) consistent with the pol-
20 icy described in subsection (e);
21 and

22 (cc) in regular consultation
23 with relevant governing bodies of
24 the fund or institution that—

1 (AA) include represen-
2 tation from countries among
3 the most vulnerable devel-
4 oping countries; and
5 (BB) provide public ac-
6 cess.

7 (C) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—The
8 Secretary of State, the Administrator of the
9 United States Agency for International Devel-
10 opment, or the Secretary of the Treasury shall
11 notify the appropriate congressional committees
12 not later than 15 days before providing assist-
13 ance to a multilateral fund or international in-
14 stitution under this subsection.

15 (3) LOCAL CONSULTATIONS.—Programs,
16 projects, and activities supported by assistance pro-
17 vided under this subsection shall require consulta-
18 tions with local communities, particularly the most
19 vulnerable communities and populations in such
20 communities, and indigenous peoples in areas in
21 which any programs, projects, or activities are
22 planned to engage such communities and peoples
23 through adequate disclosure of information, public
24 participation, and consultation, including full consid-
25 eration of the interdependence of vulnerable commu-

1 nities and ecosystems to promote the resilience of
2 local communities.

3 (g) BILATERAL ASSISTANCE.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Except to the extent incon-
5 sistent with this subsection, the administrative au-
6 thorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
7 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) shall apply to the imple-
8 mentation of this subsection to the same extent and
9 in the same manner as such authorities apply to the
10 implementation of such Act in order to provide the
11 Administrator of the United States Agency for
12 International Development with the authority to pro-
13 vide assistance to countries, including the most vul-
14 nerable developing countries, for programs, projects,
15 and activities consistent with the purposes described
16 in subsection (b) and the policy described in sub-
17 section (e).

18 (2) CONSIDERATIONS.—In carrying out this
19 subsection, the Administrator shall ensure that—

20 (A) the environmental impact of proposed
21 programs, projects, and activities is considered
22 through adequate consultation, public participa-
23 tion, and public disclosure of relevant informa-
24 tion; and

1 (B) programs, projects, and activities
2 under this subsection—

3 (i) avoid environmental degradation,
4 to the maximum extent practicable; and

5 (ii) are aligned, to the maximum ex-
6 tent practicable, with broader development,
7 poverty alleviation, or natural resource
8 management objectives and initiatives in
9 the recipient country.

10 (3) COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT.—The Adminis-
11 trator shall seek to ensure that—

12 (A) local communities, particularly the
13 most vulnerable communities and populations in
14 areas in which any programs, projects, or ac-
15 tivities are carried out under this subsection,
16 are engaged in the design, implementation,
17 monitoring, and evaluation of such programs,
18 projects, and activities through disclosure of in-
19 formation, public participation, and consulta-
20 tion; and

21 (B) the needs and interests of the most
22 vulnerable communities and populations are ad-
23 dressed in national or regional climate change
24 adaptation plans developed with USAID sup-
25 port.

1 (4) CONSULTATION AND DISCLOSURE.—For
2 each country receiving assistance under this sub-
3 section, the Administrator shall establish a process
4 for consultation with, and disclosure of information
5 to, local, national, and international stakeholders re-
6 garding any programs, projects, or activities carried
7 out under this subsection.

8 (h) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
9 authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section
10 \$2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 and each fiscal year
11 thereafter.

12 **SEC. 608. REDUCING THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS FROM BLACK**
13 **CARBON, METHANE, AND HIGH-GWP**
14 **HYDROFLUOROCARBONS.**

15 (a) DEFINITION.—The term “high-GWP HFC”
16 means newly manufactured hydrofluorocarbons with a
17 global warming potential calculated over a 100-year period
18 of greater than 150, as described in the Fifth Assessment
19 Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
20 Change.

21 (b) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the
22 United States representatives to appropriate international
23 bodies and conferences to use the voice, vote, and influence
24 of the United States, consistent with the broad foreign pol-

1 icy goals of the United States, to advocate that each such
2 body or conference—

3 (1) commit to significantly increasing efforts to
4 reduce black carbon, methane, and high-GWP
5 hydrofluorocarbons;

6 (2) invest in and develop alternative energy
7 sources, industrial and agricultural processes, appli-
8 ances, and products to replace sources of black car-
9 bon, methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons;

10 (3) enhance coordination with the private sec-
11 tor—

12 (A) to increase production and distribution
13 of clean energy alternatives, industrial proc-
14 esses, and products that will replace sources of
15 black carbon, methane, and high-GWP
16 hydrofluorocarbons;

17 (B) to develop action plans to mitigate
18 black carbon, methane, and high-GWP
19 hydrofluorocarbons from various private sector
20 operations;

21 (C) to encourage best technology, methods,
22 and management practices for reducing black
23 carbon, methane, and high-GWP
24 hydrofluorocarbons;

1 (D) to craft specific financing mechanisms
2 for the incremental costs associated with miti-
3 gating short-live climate pollutants; and

4 (E) to grow economic opportunities and
5 develop markets, as appropriate, for reducing
6 black carbon, methane, tropospheric ozone, and
7 hydrofluorocarbons;

8 (4) provide technical assistance to foreign regu-
9 latory authorities and governments to remove unnec-
10 essary barriers to investment in short-lived climate
11 mitigation solutions, including—

12 (A) the use of safe and affordable clean
13 energy;

14 (B) the implementation of policies requir-
15 ing industrial and agricultural best practices for
16 capturing or mitigating the release of methane
17 from extractive, agricultural, and industrial
18 processes; and

19 (C) climate assessment, scientific research,
20 monitoring, and technological development ac-
21 tivities;

22 (5) develop and implement clear, accountable,
23 and metric-based targets to measure the effective-
24 ness of projects described in paragraph (4); and

1 (6) engage international partners in an existing
2 multilateral forum (or, if necessary, establish
3 through an international agreement a new multilat-
4 eral forum) to improve global cooperation for—

5 (A) creating tangible metrics for evaluating
6 efforts to reduce black carbon, methane, and
7 high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons;

8 (B) developing and implementing best
9 practices for phasing out sources of black car-
10 bon, methane, and high-GWP
11 hydrofluorocarbons, including expanding capac-
12 ity for innovative instruments to mitigate black
13 carbon, methane, and high-GWP
14 hydrofluorocarbons at the national and sub-
15 national levels of foreign countries, particularly
16 countries with little capacity to reduce green-
17 house gas emissions and deploy clean energy fa-
18 cilities, and countries that lack sufficient poli-
19 cies to advance such development;

20 (C) encouraging the development of stand-
21 ards and practices, and increasing transparency
22 and accountability efforts for the reduction of
23 black carbon, methane, and high-GWP
24 hydrofluorocarbons;

1 (D) integrating tracking and monitoring
2 systems into industrial processes;

3 (E) fostering research to improve scientific
4 understanding of—

5 (i) how high concentrations of black
6 carbon, methane, and high-GWP
7 hydrofluorocarbons affect human health,
8 safety, and our climate;

9 (ii) changes in the amount and re-
10 gional concentrations of black carbon and
11 methane emissions, based on scientific
12 modeling and forecasting;

13 (iii) effective means to sequester black
14 carbon, methane, and high-GWP
15 hydrofluorocarbons; and

16 (iv) other related areas of research the
17 United States representatives deem nec-
18 essary;

19 (F) encouraging the World Bank, the
20 International Monetary Fund, and other inter-
21 national finance organizations—

22 (i) to prioritize efforts to combat
23 black carbon, methane, and high-GWP
24 hydrofluorocarbons; and

1 (ii) to enhance transparency by pro-
2 viding sufficient and adequate information
3 to facilitate independent verification of
4 their climate finance reporting;

5 (G) encouraging observers of the Arctic
6 Council (including India and China) to adopt
7 mitigation plans consistent with the findings
8 and recommendations of the Arctic Council's
9 Framework for Action on Black Carbon and
10 Methane;

11 (H) collaborating on technological ad-
12 vances in short-lived climate pollutant mitiga-
13 tion, sequestration and reduction technologies;
14 and

15 (I) advising foreign countries, at both the
16 national and subnational levels, regarding the
17 development and execution of regulatory poli-
18 cies, services, and laws pertaining to reducing
19 the creation and the collection and safe man-
20 agement of black carbon, methane, and high-
21 GWP hydrofluorocarbons.

22 (c) ENHANCING INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND
23 PARTNERSHIP OF UNITED STATES AGENCIES INVOLVED
24 IN GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTIONS.—

1 (1) FINDING.—Congress recognizes the success
2 of the United States Climate Alliance and the green-
3 house gas reduction programs and strategies estab-
4 lished by the Environmental Protection Agency’s
5 Center for Corporate Climate Leadership.

6 (2) AUTHORIZATION OF EFFORTS TO BUILD
7 FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS.—The Secretary of State
8 shall work with the Administrator of the Environ-
9 mental Protection Agency to build partnerships, as
10 appropriate, with the governments of foreign coun-
11 tries and to support international efforts to reduce
12 black carbon, methane, and high-GWP
13 hydrofluorocarbons and combat climate change.

14 (d) NEGOTIATION OF NEW INTERNATIONAL AGREE-
15 MENTS AND REASSERTION OF TARGETS IN EXISTING
16 AGREEMENTS.—Not later than 1 year after the date of
17 the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall sub-
18 mit a report to Congress that—

19 (1) assesses the potential for negotiating new
20 international agreements, new targets within existing
21 international agreements or cooperative bodies, and
22 the creation of a new international forum to mitigate
23 globally black carbon, methane, and high-GWP
24 hydrofluorocarbons to support the efforts described
25 in subsection (b);

1 (2) describes the provisions that could be in-
2 cluded in such agreements;

3 (3) assesses potential parties to such agree-
4 ments;

5 (4) describes a process for reengaging with
6 Canada and Mexico regarding the methane targets
7 agreed to at the 2016 North American Leaders'
8 Summit; and

9 (5) describes a process for reengaging with the
10 countries of the Arctic Council regarding the meth-
11 ane and black carbon targets that were negotiated in
12 2015 through the Framework for Action.

13 (e) CONSIDERATION OF BLACK CARBON, METHANE,
14 AND HIGH-GWP HYDROFLUOROCARBONS IN NEGOTI-
15 ATING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.—In negotiating
16 any relevant international agreement with any country or
17 countries after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
18 President shall—

19 (1) consider the impact black carbon, methane,
20 and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons are having on the
21 increase in global average temperatures and the re-
22 sulting global climate change;

23 (2) consider the effects that climate change is
24 having on the environment; and

1 (3) ensure that the agreement strengthens ef-
2 forts to eliminate black carbon, methane, and high-
3 GWP hydrofluorocarbons from such country or
4 countries.

5 (f) PLAN TO REDUCE BLACK CARBON EMISSIONS
6 FROM SHIPS.—Consistent with strategies adopted by the
7 International Maritime Organization to reduce greenhouse
8 gas emissions from ships, the Secretary of State, in con-
9 sultation with the Secretary of Transportation, the Sec-
10 retary of Commerce, the Administrator, and the Com-
11 mandant of the Coast Guard, shall develop a comprehen-
12 sive plan to reduce black carbon emissions from ships
13 based on appropriate emissions data from oceangoing ves-
14 sels. The plan shall provide for such reduction through—

15 (1) a clean freight partnership;

16 (2) limits on black carbon emissions; and

17 (3) efforts that include protection of access to
18 critical fuel shipments and emergency needs of
19 coastal communities.

20 (g) ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERAGENCY WORKING
21 GROUP ON SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANT MITIGA-
22 TION.—

23 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 90 days
24 after the date of enactment of this Act, the Presi-
25 dent shall establish a task force, to be known as the

1 Interagency Working Group on Short-Lived Climate
2 Pollutant Mitigation.

3 (2) MEMBERSHIP.—The members of the Work-
4 ing Group shall include the head (or a designee
5 thereof) of each relevant Federal agency.

6 (3) DUTIES.—The Working Group shall—

7 (A) not later than 180 days after the date
8 of enactment of this Act, submit to the appro-
9 priate congressional committees a report that
10 includes specific plans of each relevant Federal
11 agency;

12 (B) look for opportunities with other coun-
13 tries to promote alternatives to high-GWP
14 HFC, and transition over time to equipment
15 that uses safer and more sustainable alter-
16 natives to high-GWP HFC;

17 (C) review the policy recommendations
18 made by—

19 (i) the Intergovernmental Panel on
20 Climate Change;

21 (ii) the United States Climate Alli-
22 ance;

23 (iii) the Interagency Strategy to Re-
24 duce Methane Emissions;

- 1 (iv) the Council on Climate Prepared-
2 ness and Resilience;
3 (v) the Clean Cooking Alliance;
4 (vi) the International Maritime Orga-
5 nization; and
6 (vii) other relevant organizations and
7 institutions; and
8 (D) develop an action plan to reduce black
9 carbon, methane, and high-GWP
10 hydrofluorocarbons that incorporates any ap-
11 propriate proposals or recommendations made
12 by the entities referred to in subparagraph (C).

13 **SEC. 609. BUILDING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC GROWTH**
14 **AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION**
15 **THROUGH THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND.**

16 (a) GREEN CLIMATE FUND.—

17 (1) Congress finds that—

18 (A) climate change most severely impacts
19 vulnerable and disadvantaged communities in
20 the United States and around the world;

21 (B) it is the responsibility of the United
22 States Government to work with and press
23 other countries to address environmental justice
24 and climate justice;

1 (C) the report of the United Nations Envi-
2 ronment Programme entitled “Climate Change
3 and the Cost of Capital in Developing Coun-
4 tries”, dated May 2018, found that, in the 10
5 years prior to the publication of the report, cli-
6 mate vulnerability has cost the 20 nations most
7 affected by catastrophes rooted in climate
8 change an additional \$62,000,000,000 in inter-
9 est payments alone;

10 (D) individuals and families, particularly
11 communities of color, indigenous communities,
12 and low-income communities, that are on the
13 frontlines of climate change across the globe are
14 often in close proximity to environmental
15 stressors or sources of pollution;

16 (E) the communities described in subpara-
17 graph (D)—

18 (i) are often the first exposed to the
19 causes and impacts of climate change; and

20 (ii) have the fewest resources with
21 which to mitigate those impacts or to relo-
22 cate;

23 (F) all efforts to adapt to and mitigate cli-
24 mate change must include specific protections
25 for and acknowledgment of the harm of climate

1 change to communities of color, indigenous peo-
2 ples, women, and other frontline communities
3 and marginalized peoples around the world;

4 (G) in Paris, on December 12, 2015, the
5 parties to the United Nations Framework Con-
6 vention on Climate Change adopted the Paris
7 Agreement, a benchmark agreement—

8 (i) to combat climate change;

9 (ii) to accelerate and intensify the ac-
10 tions and investments needed for a sus-
11 tainable low carbon future; and

12 (iii) that acknowledges, “Parties
13 should, when taking action to address cli-
14 mate change, respect, promote and con-
15 sider their respective obligations on human
16 rights, the right to health, the rights of in-
17 digenous peoples, local communities, mi-
18 grants, children, persons with disabilities
19 and people in vulnerable situations and the
20 right to development, as well as gender
21 equality, empowerment of women and in-
22 tergenerational equity”;

23 (H) the Paris Agreement—

1 (i) notes the importance of “climate
2 justice” when mitigating and adapting to
3 climate change; and

4 (ii) recognizes “the need for an effec-
5 tive and progressive response to the urgent
6 threat of climate change”;

7 (I) it is imperative for all countries to un-
8 dertake mitigation activities to rapidly meet the
9 goal of limiting global warming to not more
10 than 1.5 degrees Celsius;

11 (J) developed countries have the greatest
12 capacity to mitigate their greenhouse gas emis-
13 sions, while—

14 (i) developing countries have the least
15 capacity to engage in mitigation activities;
16 and

17 (ii) the capacity of developing coun-
18 tries to engage in mitigation activities is
19 less than the national mitigation potential
20 of those developing countries;

21 (K) the determination for the fair share of
22 mitigation and adaptation activities for each
23 country must take into account—

24 (i) the historic greenhouse gas emis-
25 sions of each country; and

1 (ii) the current capacity of each coun-
2 try to both mitigate greenhouse gas emis-
3 sions and adapt to climate impacts;

4 (L) developed countries that have histori-
5 cally emitted a disproportionately high share of
6 greenhouse gas emissions, and reaped the eco-
7 nomic benefits of those polluting activities, have
8 a corresponding disproportionately greater re-
9 sponsibility to engage in global mitigation and
10 adaptation activities, as compared to less indus-
11 trialized countries that have historically polluted
12 far less;

13 (M) the only realistic way for less industri-
14 alized countries to meet their full mitigation po-
15 tential is through international climate financ-
16 ing by more developed countries;

17 (N) in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, devel-
18 oped countries committed to jointly mobilize,
19 starting in 2020, \$100,000,000,000 per year in
20 public climate financing (as well as private in-
21 vestment and other alternative forms of fi-
22 nance), for developing countries, a commitment
23 reaffirmed in 2015 in Decision 1/CP.21 of the
24 United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
25 mate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement;

1 (O) the \$100,000,000,000 commitment de-
2 scribed in subparagraph (N) was a political
3 compromise that falls short of the actual fi-
4 nancing needs for climate action in developing
5 countries;

6 (P) Bloomberg New Energy Finance has
7 estimated that the transition to renewable en-
8 ergy sources in developing countries will require
9 hundreds of billions of dollars annually;

10 (Q) the United Nations Environment Pro-
11 gramme has estimated that adaptation needs
12 relating to climate change in developing coun-
13 tries may be as much as \$300,000,000,000 an-
14 nually by 2030;

15 (R) the Green Climate Fund was created
16 in 2010 by 194 countries to serve as a crucial
17 financing mechanism to help developing coun-
18 tries limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions
19 and adapt to climate change;

20 (S) in 2015, the United Nations Frame-
21 work Convention on Climate Change agreed
22 that the Green Climate Fund should serve the
23 goals of the Paris Agreement, which states that
24 “developed country Parties shall provide finan-
25 cial resources to assist developing country Par-

1 ties with respect to both mitigation and adapta-
2 tion in continuation of their existing obligations
3 under the Convention”;

4 (T) the Green Climate Fund is an essential
5 institution for climate financing, as the Green
6 Climate Fund ensures—

7 (i) balanced governance between de-
8 veloped and developing countries;

9 (ii) stakeholder engagement and dis-
10 course;

11 (iii) a balanced approach between
12 mitigation and adaptation;

13 (iv) fair and equal labor and working
14 conditions;

15 (v) conservation of biodiversity and
16 critical habitats; and

17 (vi) strong environmental, social, and
18 gender protections;

19 (U) the Green Climate Fund—

20 (i) promotes and protects human
21 rights and the rights of marginalized
22 groups, including indigenous peoples,
23 women, children, and people with disabil-
24 ities;

1 (ii) continues to take steps to
2 strengthen protection for marginalized
3 groups; and

4 (iii) the United States committed
5 \$3,000,000,000 of the first
6 \$10,000,000,000 raised for the initial re-
7 source mobilization period of the Green
8 Climate Fund, though only $\frac{1}{3}$ of this
9 pledge was fulfilled, leaving the United
10 States the only country to fall substantially
11 short of a commitment of a country to the
12 Green Climate Fund; and

13 (V) the Green Climate Fund is a fully
14 operational and proven institution supporting
15 well over 100 projects and programs in devel-
16 oping countries around the world.

17 (2) It is the policy of the United States to pro-
18 vide climate financing—

19 (A) as an essential part of the global effort
20 to combat climate change; and

21 (B) that—

22 (i) upholds the principles of environ-
23 mental justice and climate justice;

1 (ii) supports programs and projects
2 developed by recipient countries and com-
3 munities;

4 (iii) is designed and implemented with
5 the free, prior, and informed consent of in-
6 digenous peoples and other impacted com-
7 munities;

8 (iv) promotes gender equality as es-
9 sential in all of the projects and programs
10 supported by climate financing;

11 (v) includes best practices for environ-
12 mental and social safeguards to ensure
13 that projects and programs supported by
14 climate financing respect fundamental
15 human rights; and

16 (vi) addresses both mitigation and ad-
17 aptation as essential aspects of responding
18 to climate change.

19 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
20 are authorized to be appropriated for contributions to the
21 Green Climate Fund \$1,400,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;
22 \$2,600,000,000 for fiscal year 2023; and \$4,000,000,000
23 for fiscal year 2024.

24 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
25 gress that the climate financing needs to achieve the

1 greenhouse gas emissions reductions required to keep the
2 planet at or below 1.5 degrees Celsius of global warming
3 are significantly greater than the amount of funds author-
4 ized to be appropriated under subsection (a).

5 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this Act:

6 (1) CLIMATE FINANCING.—The term “climate
7 financing” means the transfer of new and additional
8 public funds from developed countries to developing
9 countries for projects and programs that—

10 (A) reduce or eliminate greenhouse gas
11 emissions;

12 (B) enhance and restore natural carbon se-
13 questration; and

14 (C) promote adaptation to climate change.

15 (2) GREEN CLIMATE FUND.—The term “Green
16 Climate Fund” means the independent, multilateral
17 fund—

18 (A) established by parties to the United
19 Nations Framework Convention on Climate
20 Change; and

21 (B) adopted by decision as part of the fi-
22 nancial mechanism of the United Nations
23 Framework Convention on Climate Change.

24 (3) PARIS AGREEMENT.—The term “Paris
25 Agreement” means the annex to Decision 1/CP.21

1 adopted by the 21st Conference of Parties of the
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
3 Change in Paris, France, on December 12, 2015.

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