H. R. 2328

To require the Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to impose unilaterally position limits and margin requirements to eliminate excessive oil speculation, and to take other actions to ensure that the price of crude oil, gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, and heating oil accurately reflects the fundamentals of supply and demand, to remain in effect until the date on which the Commission establishes position limits to diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive speculation as required by title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

June 23, 2011

Mr. Hinchey (for himself, Mr. Welch, Mr. Defazio, Mr. Grijalva, Mr. Olver, and Mr. Stark) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture

A BILL

To require the Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to impose unilaterally position limits and margin requirements to eliminate excessive oil speculation, and to take other actions to ensure that the price of crude oil, gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, and heating oil accurately reflects the fundamentals of supply and demand, to remain in effect until the date on which the Commission establishes position limits to diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive speculation as required by title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and for other purposes.

1	Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2	tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3	SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4	This Act may be cited as the "End Excessive Oil
5	Speculation Now Act of 2011".
6	SEC. 2. ELIMINATION OF EXCESSIVE OIL SPECULATION.
7	(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—
8	(1) the national average retail price for a gallon
9	of gasoline was \$3.75 on June 8, 2011;
10	(2) increased gasoline prices are causing severe
11	economic pain to the American people;
12	(3) Congress has a responsibility—
13	(A) to ensure that gasoline prices at the
14	pump reflect the fundamentals of supply and
15	demand; and
16	(B) to bring needed relief to consumers
17	and businesses of the United States at the gas
18	pump;
19	(4) there is mounting evidence that the spike in
20	gasoline prices has—
21	(A) little to do with the fundamentals of
22	supply and demand; and
23	(B) more to do with Wall Street specu-
24	lators increasing oil and gas prices in the en-
25	ergy futures and swaps markets:

1	(5) as of May 27, 2011—
2	(A) the supply of gasoline in the United
3	States was higher than it was 2 years ago; and
4	(B) the demand for gasoline was lower
5	than it was 2 years ago when the national aver-
6	age for a gallon of regular unleaded gasoline
7	was \$2.44 a gallon;
8	(6) on May 12, 2011, Exxon Mobil Chairman
9	and Chief Executive Officer, Rex Tillerson, told the
10	Committee on Finance of the Senate that oil should
11	cost between \$60 and \$70 per barrel, if the price of
12	oil was based on supply and demand fundamentals;
13	(7) on March 21, 2011, Goldman Sachs warned
14	clients that speculators were boosting crude oil
15	prices by as much as \$27 a barrel;
16	(8) on March 25, 2011, Delta Airlines General
17	Counsel, Ben Hirst, said that the marginal cost of
18	oil production is between \$60 to \$70 a barrel;
19	(9) in the summer of 2008, when gas prices
20	rose to over \$4 a gallon, Saudi Arabian government
21	officials told the Federal Government that specu-
22	lators were responsible for increasing oil prices by
23	about \$40 a barrel;
24	(10) the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
25	sion has the authority to ensure that the price dis-

1	covery for oil and gasoline is based on the fun-
2	damentals of supply and demand, rather than exces-
3	sive speculation;
4	(11) title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
5	Reform and Consumer Protection Act (15 U.S.C.
6	8301 et seq.) (and amendments made by that Act)
7	requires the Commission to establish position limits
8	"to diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive specula-
9	tion" for trading in crude oil, gasoline, heating oil
10	and other physical commodity derivatives;
11	(12) as of the date of introduction of this Act,
12	the Commission has failed to impose position limits
13	to diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive oil and
14	gasoline speculation as required by law; and
15	(13) the proposed position limits for derivatives
16	that the Commission included in the notice of pro-
17	posed rulemaking entitled "Position Limits for De-
18	rivatives" (76 Fed. Reg. 4752 (January 26, 2011))
19	are not scheduled to go into effect until the first
20	quarter of 2012, which would—
21	(A) occur on a date that is later than the
22	statutory deadline for the regulations; and
23	(B) fail to diminish, eliminate, or prevent
24	excessive speculation as required by the Dodd-
25	Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-

1		tection Act (Public Law 111–203; 124 Stat.
2		1376).
3	(b)	ELIMINATION OF EXCESSIVE OIL SPECULA-
4	TION.—	
5		(1) Definitions.—In this Act:
6		(A) Bona-fide hedge trading; bona-
7		FIDE HEDGE TRANSACTION.—The terms "bona-
8		fide hedge trading" and "bona-fide hedge trans-
9		action" means a transaction or position that—
10		(i)(I) represents a substitute for a
11		transaction made or to be made, or a posi-
12		tion taken or to be taken, at a later time
13		in a physical marketing channel;
14		(II) is economically appropriate for
15		the reduction of risks in the conduct and
16		management of a commercial enterprise;
17		and
18		(III) arises from the potential change
19		in the value of—
20		(aa) assets that a person owns,
21		produces, manufactures, processes, or
22		merchandises or anticipates owning,
23		producing, manufacturing, processing,
24		or merchandising;

1	(bb) liabilities that a person has
2	incurred or anticipates incurring; or
3	(cc) services that a person pro-
4	vides, purchases, or anticipates pro-
5	viding or purchasing; or
6	(ii) reduces risks attendant to a posi-
7	tion resulting from a swap that—
8	(I) was executed opposite a
9	counterparty for which the transaction
10	would qualify as a bona-fide hedging
11	transaction; or
12	(II) meets the requirements of
13	clause (i).
14	(B) Commission.—The term "Commis-
15	sion" means the Commodity Futures Trading
16	Commission.
17	(2) Duty of Chairman of the commis-
18	SION.—Notwithstanding section 2 of the Commodity
19	Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 2) or any other provision of
20	law (including regulations), not later than 14 days
21	after the date of enactment of this Act, the Chair-
22	man of the Commission shall unilaterally—
23	(A) establish 1 or more speculative position
24	limits in any registered entity on or through
25	which crude oil, gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, or

heating oil futures or swaps are traded that are equal to the position accountability levels or position limits, as appropriate, established by the New York Mercantile Exchange;

- (B) establish 1 or more speculative position limits that are equal to the position accountability levels or position limits, as appropriate, established by the New York Mercantile Exchange on the aggregate number or amount of positions in contracts based upon the same underlying commodity that may be held by any person, including any group or class of traders, for each month across—
 - (i) contracts listed by designated contract markets;
 - (ii) with respect to an agreement, contract, or transaction that settles against any price (including the daily or final settlement price) of 1 or more contracts listed for trading on a registered entity, contracts traded on a foreign board of trade that provides members or other participants located in the United States with direct access to the electronic trading and

1	order matching system of the foreign board
2	of trade; and
3	(iii) swap contracts that perform or
4	affect a significant price discovery function
5	with respect to regulated entities;
6	(C) establish margin requirements of 12
7	percent for speculative swaps and futures trad-
8	ing in crude oil, gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel,
9	and heating oil;
10	(D) require that each bank holding com-
11	pany, investment bank, hedge fund, or swaps
12	dealer engaged in the trading of energy futures
13	or swaps for the benefit of the bank holding
14	company, investment bank, hedge fund, or
15	swaps dealer or on the behalf of, or as
16	counterparty to, an index fund, exchange traded
17	fund, or other noncommercial participant—
18	(i) register with the Commission as a
19	noncommercial participant; and
20	(ii) be subject to each position limit
21	and margin requirement under this sub-
22	section for each position in a manner by
23	which the position is considered to be a
24	speculative, proprietary position of the

- bank holding company, investment bank,
 hedge fund, or swaps dealer;
 - (E) take any other action that the Chairman of the Commission determines to be necessary to eliminate excessive speculation in the aggregate to ensure that the price of crude oil, gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, and heating oil accurately reflects the fundamentals of supply and demand; and
 - (F) ensure that each bank holding company, hedge fund, investment bank, and swaps dealer that is engaged in the trading of energy futures or swaps for the benefit of the bank holding company, hedge fund, investment bank, and swaps dealer, or on the behalf of, or as counterparty to, 1 or more noncommercial participants, abides by each position limit and margin requirement under this subsection.
 - (3) APPLICABILITY.—Each position limit and margin requirement under this subsection shall not apply to bona-fide hedge trading.
 - (4) Adjustments.—Notwithstanding section 2 of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 2) or any other provision of law (including regulations), the Chairman of the Commission may adjust any posi-

tion limit under this subsection to the extent that the position of all noncommercial participants or speculators (in the aggregate and measured on an annual basis) shall not equal an amount greater than 35 percent of the annual, aggregate position of all traders in such futures and swaps market or markets for crude oil, gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, and heating oil trading.

(5) Sunset.—

- (A) IN GENERAL.—This Act, and the authority provided under this Act, shall terminate on the date on which the Commission imposes position limits to diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive speculation as required by, and increased margin requirements as authorized in, title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 8301 et seq.) (and amendments made by that Act).
- (B) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of Congress that, if finalized, the proposed position limits for derivatives that the Commission included in the notice of proposed rulemaking entitled "Position Limits for Derivatives" (76 Fed. Reg. 4752 (January 26, 2011)) are not sufficient to fulfill the statutory requirements of

title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 8301
et seq.) (and amendments made by that Act) to
diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive speculation.

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