Bill Text: TX HB3792 | 2021-2022 | 87th Legislature | Introduced
Bill Title: Relating to protecting the population of Texas, its environment, and its most vulnerable communities, promoting the resilience of the electric grid and certain municipalities.
Spectrum: Partisan Bill (Republican 3-0)
Status: (Introduced - Dead) 2021-03-22 - Referred to State Affairs [HB3792 Detail]
Download: Texas-2021-HB3792-Introduced.html
By: Shaheen | H.B. No. 3792 |
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relating to protecting the population of Texas, its environment, | ||
and its most vulnerable communities, promoting the resilience of | ||
the electric grid and certain municipalities. | ||
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: | ||
SECTION 1. The legislature finds that: | ||
(1) electric grid blackouts threaten the lives of the | ||
citizens of Texas and pose a disproportionally large risk to the | ||
elderly, vulnerable and underprivileged within our state and | ||
especially communities facing environmental justice issues such as | ||
disproportionate environmental health burdens and population | ||
vulnerabilities to facilities such as chemical plants and | ||
refineries that can become environmental disaster areas when taken | ||
offline due to loss of electricity. | ||
(2) all 16 critical infrastructures identified in | ||
President Barack Obama's Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21) | ||
including water and wastewater services; food and agriculture; | ||
communications systems; the energy sector including refineries and | ||
fuel distribution systems; chemical plants; the financial sector; | ||
hospitals and health care facilities; law enforcement and | ||
government facilities; nuclear reactors; and countless other | ||
critical functions depend on the state's electric grid, making the | ||
grid's protection vital to our economy and homeland security; | ||
(3) the February 2021 Texas Blackout caused death and | ||
suffering to the citizens of Texas, economic loss to the Texas | ||
economy, impacts to all critical infrastructures in Texas, the | ||
dispatch of generation units that likely exceeded Environmental | ||
Protection Agency (EPA) limits for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, | ||
mercury, and carbon monoxide emissions, as well as wastewater | ||
release limits, radically increased pricing of electricity that | ||
resulted in electric power bills unaffordable by many customers | ||
across the state, and exacerbated the COVID-19 pandemic risk by | ||
forcing many of the state's citizens to consolidate at warming | ||
centers and in other small spaces where warmth for survival | ||
superseded social distancing; | ||
(4) a previous large-scale blackout occurred in Texas | ||
in February 2011 during which 4.4 million customers were affected; | ||
(5) this state is uniquely positioned to prevent | ||
blackouts because it is a net exporter of energy and is the only | ||
state with an electric grid almost exclusively within its | ||
territorial boundaries; | ||
(6) the 2011 and 2021 blackouts call into question | ||
whether too much risk has been accepted regarding weatherization of | ||
electric generation infrastructure, whether the state lacks the | ||
internal distribution structure and control systems to manage | ||
rolling blackouts, and whether sufficient resources have been | ||
allocated toward overall grid resilience; | ||
(7) Governor Gregg Abbott has declared reform of the | ||
Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) as an emergency | ||
item for the 87th Texas Legislature; | ||
(8) public confidence in the resilience of the Texas | ||
electric grid is essential to ensuring environmental justice, | ||
economic prosperity, domestic tranquility, continuity of | ||
government, and life-sustaining systems; | ||
(9) a resilient Texas electric grid that offers | ||
businesses continuity of operations in the event of a natural or | ||
man-made disaster will be an unrivaled attraction for businesses to | ||
expand or move their operations to this state and for protecting | ||
what is important to Texas, ranging from its military installations | ||
to its environment; | ||
(10) insufficient market incentives or regulations | ||
exist for electric utilities to prioritize security and resilience, | ||
and to protect the grid against "all hazards;" | ||
(11) protection of the Texas electric grid against | ||
"all hazards" would assure businesses and the citizens of this | ||
state that the "lights will be back on first in Texas" in the event | ||
of a nationwide catastrophe affecting electric infrastructure, | ||
sparing catastrophic societal and environmental consequences for | ||
this state; | ||
(12) when this state begins implementation of the "all | ||
hazards resilience" plan to protect the state's electric grid, | ||
short-term and long-term economic benefit will far exceed even the | ||
most optimistic estimates of the conventional economic incentives | ||
provided by tax abatements to attract businesses to this state; | ||
SECTION 2. Subtitle B, Title 2, Utilities Code, is amended | ||
by adding Chapter 44 to read as follows: | ||
CHAPTER 44. GRID RESILIENCE | ||
Sec. 44.001. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter: | ||
1) "All hazards resilience" of the electric grid means | ||
protections against threats caused by: | ||
A. terrestrial weather including wind, hurricanes, | ||
tornadoes, flooding, ice storms, extended cold weather events, heat | ||
waves, or wildfires; | ||
B. seismic events including earthquakes or tsunamis; | ||
C. physical threats including terrorist attack with direct | ||
fire, drones, explosives or other methods of physical sabotage; | ||
D. cyberattacks including through malware or hacking of | ||
unprotected or compromised Information Technology (IT) networks, | ||
E. manipulation of Operational Technology (OT) devices | ||
including sensors, actuators, or drives; | ||
F. electromagnetic threats through man-made radio frequency | ||
(RF) weapons, high altitude nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP), or | ||
naturally occurring geomagnetic disturbances (GMD), | ||
G. electric generation supply chain vulnerabilities | ||
including insecure or inadequate fuel transportation, or storage; | ||
and | ||
H. "insider threats" caused by compromised or hostile | ||
personnel working within government and/or the utility industry. | ||
(2) "EMP Commission reports" means all reports | ||
released by the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States | ||
from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, including the July 2017 | ||
report titled "Recommended E3 HEMP Heave Electric Field Waveform | ||
for the Critical Infrastructures." | ||
(3) "Micro-grid" means a group of interconnected loads | ||
and distributed energy resources inside clearly defined electrical | ||
boundaries that act as a single controllable entity with respect to | ||
the grid. | ||
(4) "Security commission" means the Texas Grid | ||
Security Commission. | ||
Sec. 44.002. TEXAS GRID SECURITY COMMISSION. (a) The | ||
security commission shall report to the Chief of the Texas Division | ||
of Emergency Management (TDEM) and is composed of the following | ||
members: | ||
(1) a representative of the Texas Division of | ||
Emergency Management appointed by the chief of the division; | ||
(2) a representative of the State Office of Risk | ||
Management appointed by the risk management board; | ||
(3) a representative of the independent organization | ||
certified under Section 39.151 for the ERCOT region appointed by | ||
the chief executive officer of the organization; | ||
(4) a representative of the Texas Military Department | ||
appointed by the adjutant general of the department; | ||
(5) a representative of the Texas Military | ||
Preparedness Commission appointed by the military preparedness | ||
commission; | ||
(6) a representative of the Office of State-Federal | ||
Relations appointed by the director of the office; | ||
(7) a representative of the Department of Information | ||
Resources appointed by the executive director of the department; | ||
(8) a representative of power generation companies | ||
appointed by the chief of the Texas Division of Emergency | ||
Management; | ||
(9) two representatives of transmission and | ||
distribution utilities appointed by the chief of the Texas Division | ||
of Emergency Management; | ||
(10) three members of the public with expertise in | ||
critical infrastructure protection, to represent the public | ||
interest. | ||
(11) one representative appointed by the chief of the | ||
Texas Division of Emergency Management from each of the following | ||
essential services sectors: | ||
(A) law enforcement; | ||
(B) emergency services; | ||
(C) communications; | ||
(D) water and sewer services; | ||
(E) health care; | ||
(F) financial services; | ||
(G) food and agriculture; | ||
(H) transportation; and | ||
(I) energy. | ||
(12) an expert in the field of higher education | ||
appointed by the chief of the Texas Division of Emergency | ||
Management. | ||
(13) an expert in the field of electricity markets and | ||
regulations appointed by the chief of the Texas Division of | ||
Emergency Management. | ||
(b) The chief of the Texas Division of Emergency Management | ||
may invite members or former members of the United States Air | ||
Force's Electromagnetic Defense Task Force (EDTF) to the security | ||
commission. | ||
(c) The Texas Division of Emergency Management shall | ||
designate a member of the security commission to serve as presiding | ||
officer. | ||
(d) The security commission shall convene at the call of the | ||
presiding officer. | ||
(e) A vacancy on the security commission is filled by | ||
appointment for the unexpired term in the same manner as the | ||
original appointment. | ||
(f) Members of the security commission will primarily be | ||
residents of the state of Texas or bordering states within ERCOT's | ||
jurisdiction. However, the presiding officer or the chief of the | ||
Texas Division of Emergency Management may invite additional | ||
subject matter experts including, but not limited to, those | ||
recognized as experts in the fields of electricity markets, | ||
cybersecurity of grid control systems, EMP mitigation, terrestrial | ||
and solar weather, and micro-grids from outside Texas as needed. | ||
Sec. 44.003. GRID RESILIENCE INFORMATION. (a) Some | ||
information used in determining the vulnerabilities of the electric | ||
grid or that is related to measures to be taken to protect the grid | ||
may be confidential and not subject to Chapter 552, Government | ||
Code. | ||
(b) Information deemed confidential by Subsection (a) shall | ||
be stored and maintained by the independent organization certified | ||
under Section 39.151 for the ERCOT region. | ||
(c) The following members of the security commission will | ||
lead an information security working group and shall apply for a | ||
secret security clearance or an interim secret security clearance | ||
to be granted by the federal government: | ||
(1) the representative of the independent | ||
organization certified under Section 39.151 for the ERCOT region; | ||
(2) the representative of the Texas Division of | ||
Emergency Management; and | ||
(3) the representative of the State Office of Risk | ||
Management. | ||
(d) The information security working group will determine | ||
what information should be categorized as confidential information | ||
as described by Subsection (a), which particular members of the | ||
security commission may access various types of information, and | ||
which additional members should apply for a secret security | ||
clearance or interim clearance granted by the federal government. | ||
(e) With regard to confidential information as described by | ||
Subsection (a), a reasonable balance of public transparency shall | ||
be maintained. Nothing in this section abrogates any rights or | ||
remedies under Chapter 552, Government Code. | ||
Sec. 44.004. GRID RESILIENCE EVALUATION. (a) The security | ||
commission will evaluate all hazards to the ERCOT electric grid by | ||
utilizing all available information on past blackouts in the ERCOT | ||
system as well as threats which can cause future blackouts | ||
utilizing the definition of "all hazards resilience" in Sec. | ||
44.001(1). The commission may create sub-groups or teams to address | ||
each hazard as needed and must assess hazards both on the likelihood | ||
and the level of consequence of each hazard. | ||
(b) The security commission shall identify methods where | ||
the state can support an overall National Deterrence Policy as | ||
proposed by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission by: | ||
i) identifying how to ensure all hazards resilience for | ||
electric utilities supporting critical national security functions | ||
within the state; and | ||
ii) engaging the Texas National Guard to be trained as first | ||
responders to cybersecurity threats to the ERCOT grid and other | ||
critical infrastructures. | ||
(c) The security commission shall evaluate the state's | ||
nuclear generation sites and the all hazards resilience of the | ||
reactors as well as off-site power for critical safety systems that | ||
support the reactor and spent fuel. The commission has direct | ||
liaison authority to communicate with the Nuclear Regulatory | ||
Commission (NRC) to accomplish this evaluation. | ||
(d) The security commission shall evaluate current Critical | ||
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards established by the North | ||
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and the National | ||
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards to determine | ||
the most appropriate standards for protecting the state's grid | ||
infrastructure. | ||
(e) The security commission shall explore what local | ||
communities and other states have done to address grid resilience, | ||
The commission may request funding to conduct site visits to these | ||
locations as required. | ||
(f) The security commission shall identify Texas-based | ||
universities which can contribute with expertise in cybersecurity | ||
and other areas to mitigate all hazards. | ||
(g) The security commission shall solicit information from | ||
defense contractors with experience protecting defense systems | ||
from EMP, as well as electric utilities who have developed EMP | ||
protections for their grid assets. | ||
(h) The security commission shall solicit information from | ||
the United States Department of Homeland Security which has | ||
published Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Protection and Resilience | ||
Guidelines for Critical Infrastructure and Equipment that can be | ||
used to mitigate the effects of such a disaster. | ||
(i) The security commission will solicit information from | ||
the Congressional EMP Commission which assesses that protection | ||
against the worst threat, nuclear EMP attack, will mitigate lesser | ||
threats. | ||
Sec. 44.005. CONTRACTOR SUPPORT FOR CRITICAL SYSTEM AND | ||
COMPONENT RESILIENCE. (a) With the assistance of the security | ||
commission the State Office of Risk Management shall select | ||
contractors with proven expertise to identify critical systems and | ||
components of the ERCOT electric grid vulnerable to "all hazards," | ||
with a specific emphasis on the most dangerous cyber and | ||
electromagnetic threats. The contractors must have the | ||
demonstrated expertise to identify the critical components, | ||
including industrial control systems, before the expiration of six | ||
months after the date the contractors are engaged. | ||
(b) Not later than January 1, 2023, an entity that owns or | ||
operates a component identified by the contractor under Subsection | ||
(a) as critical shall upgrade the components as necessary for the | ||
components to meet the applicable standard proposed in the EMP | ||
Commission reports. | ||
(c) The State Office of Risk Management shall select | ||
contractors with demonstrated expertise to verify whether affected | ||
entities have identified potential affected systems and components | ||
and whether these entities have upgraded systems and components as | ||
required by Subsection (b). | ||
Sec. 44.006. PLAN FOR ALL HAZARDS RESILIENCE. (a) Not | ||
later than January 1, 2022, the security commission shall prepare | ||
and deliver to the legislature a plan for protecting the ERCOT grid | ||
from a catastrophic loss of power in the state. | ||
(b) The plan must include: | ||
(1) provisions for determining weatherizing | ||
requirements to prevent blackouts from extreme cold weather events, | ||
whether these requirements will induce cyber vulnerabilities, and | ||
the associated costs for these requirements not later than January | ||
1, 2022; | ||
(2) provisions for installing, replacing, or | ||
upgrading industrial control systems and associated networks (or | ||
the use of compensating controls/procedures) in critical | ||
facilities to address cyber vulnerabilities not later than January | ||
1, 2022; | ||
(3) provisions for installing, replacing, or | ||
upgrading extra high-voltage power transformers and supervisory | ||
control and data acquisition systems to withstand 100 | ||
kilovolts/meter E1 electromagnetic pulses and 85 volts/kilometer | ||
E3 electromagnetic pulses not later than January 1, 2026; | ||
(4) a timeline for upgrading remaining infrastructure | ||
to meet recommendations of the EMP Commission reports; | ||
(5) long-term resilience provisions for supporting | ||
industries including: | ||
(A) nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; | ||
(B) fuel supply; | ||
(C) health care; | ||
(D) communications; | ||
(E) water and sewer services; | ||
(F) food supply; and | ||
(G) transportation. | ||
(6) any additional provisions considered necessary by | ||
the security commission. | ||
(c) The security commission may consult with the Private | ||
Sector Advisory Council in developing the plan. | ||
(d) The Texas Division of Emergency Management shall | ||
incorporate the plan into the state emergency management plan and | ||
update the state emergency management plan as necessary to | ||
incorporate progressive resilience improvements. | ||
Sec. 44.007. ALTERNATIVE TIMELINE OR STANDARD. A panel | ||
composed of members of the security commission may approve a | ||
resilience standard or implementation timeline for an electric | ||
utility or other entity that differs from a resilience standard or | ||
implementation timeline adopted under Section 44.005. | ||
Sec. 44.008. RESILIENCE COST RECOVERY. A regulatory | ||
authority shall include in establishing the rates of an electric | ||
utility consideration of the costs incurred to install, replace, or | ||
upgrade facilities or equipment to meet a resilience standard | ||
established under this chapter. A regulatory authority shall | ||
presume that costs incurred to meet a resilience standard under | ||
this chapter are reasonable and necessary expenses. | ||
Sec. 44.009. MICRO-GRIDS. (a) The security commission | ||
shall establish resilience standards for micro-grids and certify a | ||
micro-grid that meets the standards. These standards must be | ||
developed for both alternating current (AC) and direct current (DC) | ||
micro-grids. | ||
(b) Except as provided by Subsection (c), a municipality or | ||
other political subdivision may not enact or enforce an ordinance | ||
or other measure that bans, limits, or otherwise regulates inside | ||
the boundaries or extraterritorial jurisdiction of the | ||
municipality or political subdivision a micro-grid that is | ||
certified by the security commission under this section. | ||
(c) The owner or operator of a micro-grid certified by the | ||
security commission is a power generation company and is required | ||
to register under Section 39.351(a). The owner or operator of the | ||
micro-grid is entitled to: | ||
(1) interconnect the micro-grid; | ||
(2) obtain transmission service for the micro-grid; | ||
and | ||
(3) use the micro-grid to sell electricity and | ||
ancillary services at wholesale in a manner consistent with the | ||
provisions of this title and commission rules applicable to a power | ||
generation company or an exempt wholesale generator. | ||
SECTION 3. Chapter 380, Local Government Code, is amended | ||
by adding Section 380.004 to read as follows: | ||
Sec. 380.004. FIVE STAR GOLD RESILIENT COMMUNITIES. (a) | ||
The Texas Grid Security Commission shall establish resilience | ||
standards for municipalities in the following essential service | ||
areas: | ||
(1) emergency services; | ||
(2) communications systems; | ||
(3) clean water and sewer services; | ||
(4) health care systems; | ||
(5) financial services; | ||
(6) energy systems; and | ||
(7) transportation systems. | ||
(b) Standards for energy systems under Subsection (a) must | ||
include provisions to ensure that energy, electric power, and fuel | ||
supplies are protected and available for recovery in the event of a | ||
catastrophic power outage. | ||
(c) On the application of a municipality for the | ||
designation, the Texas Grid Security Commission may designate a | ||
municipality that meets the resilience standards in the applicable | ||
service area as: | ||
(1) a Resilient Emergency Services Community; | ||
(2) a Resilient Communications Systems Community; | ||
(3) a Resilient Clean Water and Sewer Services | ||
Community; | ||
(4) a Resilient Health Care Systems Community; | ||
(5) a Resilient Financial Services Community; | ||
(6) a Resilient Energy Community; or | ||
(7) a Resilient Transportation Community. | ||
(d) The Texas Grid Security Commission may designate a | ||
municipality that meets the resilience standards in five of the | ||
seven service areas as a Five Star Gold Resilient Community. | ||
(e) A municipality may not use a resilient community | ||
designation in advertising, marketing, or economic development | ||
initiatives unless the Texas Grid Security Commission has awarded | ||
the municipality with the designation in the applicable service | ||
area or as a Five Star Gold Resilient Community. | ||
(f) A municipality that does not qualify in at least five of | ||
the seven areas as a resilient community may not offer economic | ||
incentives or tax abatements for any purposes for any entity to | ||
locate in the municipality. | ||
SECTION 4. Not later than January 1, 2023, the Texas Grid | ||
Security Commission shall prepare and deliver a report to the | ||
legislature on the progress of implementing resilience standards | ||
adopted under Sections 44.004 and 44.005, Utilities Code, as added | ||
by this Act. | ||
Section 5. Not later than January 1 of each year, the | ||
commission shall prepare and deliver a non-classified report to the | ||
legislature, the Governor and the Public Utility Commission of | ||
Texas assessing natural and man-made threats to the electric grid | ||
and efforts to mitigate the threats. Such report shall be prepared | ||
for public distribution The commission shall hold confidential or | ||
classified briefings with officials as necessary. | ||
SECTION 6. This Act takes effect immediately if it receives | ||
a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, as | ||
provided by Section 39, Article III, Texas Constitution. If this | ||
Act does not receive the vote necessary for immediate effect, this | ||
Act takes effect September 1, 2021. |