THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA

HOUSE RESOLUTION

No. 58

Session of 2021

INTRODUCED BY RYAN, STAATS, KAUFFMAN, CAUSER, BROOKS, DIAMOND, METCALFE, TOPPER, ROWE, ZIMMERMAN, JOZWIAK, KEEFER, R. MACKENZIE, COOK, COX, JAMES, MOUL AND M. MACKENZIE, FEBRUARY 24, 2021

REFERRED TO COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, FEBRUARY 24, 2021

A RESOLUTION

- 1 Impeaching David N. Wecht, Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme 2 Court, for misbehavior in office.
- 3 BE IT RESOLVED, That David N. Wecht, a Justice of the Supreme
- 4 Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, be impeached for
- 5 misbehavior in office, and that the following Articles of
- 6 Impeachment be exhibited to the Senate:
- 7 ARTICLE I
- 8 As a candidate for Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
- 9 in 2015, Justice Wecht made multiple statements concerning the
- 10 constitutionality of Pennsylvania's existing Congressional
- 11 districting map which plainly showed his inability to sit as a
- 12 fair and impartial jurist.
- 13 Just two short years before the dispute was in front of the
- 14 Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Justice Wecht stated,
- 15 "Gerrymandering is an absolute abomination. It is a travesty. It
- 16 is deeply wrong. These [Congressional] districts have been drawn
- 17 to disenfranchise the majority of Pennsylvanians. And they have

- 1 been drawn by skilled political operatives, and it needs to
- 2 stop." Spring 2015 Judge Candidate Forum, Neighborhood Networks
- 3 and MoveOn Philly, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?
- 4 v=713tnbv55mU&feature=youtu.be.
- 5 One of the more damning statements made by Justice Wecht was
- 6 made at a candidate's forum held by the named party in League of
- 7 Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 177 A.3d 1000 (Pa.
- 8 Commonwealth 2017). At that forum, he stated, "Everybody in this
- 9 room should be angry about how gerrymandered we
- 10 are...Understand, sitting here in the city of Pittsburgh, your
- 11 vote is diluted. Your power is taken away from you." Eric
- 12 Holmberg, Forums Put Spotlight on PA Supreme Court Candidates,
- 13 PUBLICSOURCE (Oct. 22, 2015), at www.publicsource.org/forums-
- 14 put-spotlight-on-pa-supreme-court-candidates.
- Despite this glaringly obvious lack of objectivity and
- 16 impartiality, Justice Wecht participated in the deliberations of
- 17 the application for the Court to exercise its extraordinary
- 18 jurisdiction filed by League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania,
- 19 which implored the Court to remove the case using its King's
- 20 Bench authority. Justice Wecht sided with the Petitioners,
- 21 ordering fact finding and conclusions of law by the Commonwealth
- 22 Court to be presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on an
- 23 expedited basis. Justice Wecht participated in oral argument by
- 24 the parties before the Court. Finally, Justice Wecht
- 25 participated in the determination in granting the relief
- 26 requested by the Petitioners, manufacturing an extra-textual
- 27 series of constitutional requirements for Congressional
- 28 redistricting, and reserving for itself the drawing of
- 29 Congressional districts.
- 30 Rule 2.11(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct establishes a

- 1 straightforward mandate: Any judge-including a Justice of the
- 2 Supreme Court "shall disqualify himself or herself in any
- 3 proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
- 4 questioned." A judge's impartiality might reasonably be
- 5 questioned when "[t]he judge, while a judge or judicial
- 6 candidate, has made a public statement, other than in a court
- 7 proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that commits the
- 8 judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular way
- 9 in the proceeding or controversy." Rule 2.11(A)(5). This duty to
- 10 disqualify exists "...regardless of whether a motion to
- 11 disqualify is filed." Rule 2.11, Comment (2). Justice Wecht
- 12 failed in his obligation to disqualify himself from these
- 13 proceedings and failed to disclose that he had made these
- 14 statements to allow parties to determine whether petition for
- 15 his removal from the case. The Court granted extraordinary
- 16 relief to the Petitioners by a vote of four justices to three.
- 17 Had Justice Wecht conformed his behavior to the mandates in
- 18 Canon 1 in the Code of Judicial Conduct, that judges "uphold and
- 19 promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
- 20 judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
- 21 impropriety," the Court would have lacked a majority vote to
- 22 override the Commonwealth Court's stay; lacked a majority to
- 23 effectively re-write the Pennsylvania Constitution to impose
- 24 additional districting standards for the Congressional
- 25 redistricting process; and, would not have facilitated a
- 26 violation of Article II, Section 1 of the United States
- 27 Constitution by usurping the legislative authority to draw
- 28 congressional districts.
- 29 Justice Wecht failed to disclose this obvious conflict
- 30 despite having multiple opportunities to do so. When his

- 1 statements were discovered, and an application to disqualify him
- 2 from these proceedings was filed, Justice Wecht sat in judgment
- 3 of his own application for disqualification. Justice Wecht said
- 4 that the two weeks needed to fully investigate his biased
- 5 statements by a party was far too long to wait after counsel
- 6 suspected his bias. He went on to say that counsel should have
- 7 assumed that such bias existed and that they should have
- 8 conducted their research prior to the beginning of the case.
- 9 Finally, the Justice said he should not disqualify himself
- 10 because "the publicity surrounding this case and its
- 11 consequence, it is as or more likely that the reversal of such a
- 12 prominent case after a flurry of state and national media
- 13 coverage will call into question this Court's orderly
- 14 administration of justice..." League of Women Voters of
- 15 Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 645 Pa. 341, 361, 179 A.3d 1080,
- 16 1092 (2018).
- On February 5, 2018, Justice Wecht issued an opinion and
- 18 order which effectively manufactured a standard that
- 19 impermissible bias on the part of the judiciary has a threshold
- 20 "publicity" standard and parties are obligated to engage in pre-
- 21 trial investigations of whether their judge will be impartial.
- 22 By failing to recuse himself as he should have and
- 23 manufacturing new standards for disqualification of justices to
- 24 excuse his previously expressed, partisan political interests,
- 25 Justice Wecht deprived parties before the court of their rights
- 26 to Due Process of law quaranteed under the United States
- 27 Constitution and the Constitution of Pennsylvania and engaged in
- 28 misbehavior in office.
- 29 Wherefore, Justice David N. Wecht is quilty of an impeachable
- 30 offense warranting removal from office and disqualification to

- 1 hold any office of trust or profit under this Commonwealth.
- 2 ARTICLE II
- 3 On January 22, 2018, the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of
- 4 Pennsylvania issued a per curiam Order ("Order") in League of
- 5 Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, holding that the
- 6 Congressional Redistricting Act of 2011 ("Act") "clearly,
- 7 plainly and palpably violates the Constitution of the
- 8 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania" and, on this sole basis, struck it
- 9 down as unconstitutional. 644 Pa. 287, 289, 175 A.3d 282, 284
- 10 (2018). The Court further enjoined the future use of the Act in
- 11 elections for Pennsylvania seats in the United States House of
- 12 Representatives commencing with the upcoming May 15, 2018,
- 13 primary election.
- 14 The Court in its Order mandated that if the Pennsylvania
- 15 General Assembly chose "...to submit a congressional districting
- 16 plan that satisfies the requirements of the Pennsylvania
- 17 Constitution, it shall submit such plan for consideration by the
- 18 Governor on or before February 9, 2018." Id. at 290, 284. The
- 19 Court further held that "[i]f the Governor accepts the General
- 20 Assembly's congressional districting plan, it shall be submitted
- 21 to this Court on or before February 15, 2018." Id.
- 22 This Order overrode the express legislative and executive
- 23 authority, found in Article IV, Section 15 of the Pennsylvania
- 24 Constitution, concerning the Governor's veto authority and the
- 25 General Assembly's subsequent authority to override such veto.
- 26 Article IV, Section 15 clearly lays out the path a bill must
- 27 take to become law. That process begins in the General Assembly
- 28 and once a bill has passed both Houses of the General Assembly,
- 29 Article IV, Section 15 directs that it shall then be presented
- 30 to the Governor. If the Governor does not approve the bill, the

- 1 Constitution mandates that he shall return it with his
- 2 objections to the House in which it originated. At that point,
- 3 the originating House shall enter the objections at large upon
- 4 their journal and proceed to reconsider it. If after such
- 5 reconsideration, two-thirds of all the members elected to that
- 6 House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent with the
- 7 objections to the other House for reconsideration. If the bill
- 8 is then approved by two-thirds of all the members elected to
- 9 that House it shall become a law. Article IV, Section 15 further
- 10 states:
- If any bill shall not be returned by the Governor within
- ten days after it shall have been presented to him, the
- same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed
- it, unless the General Assembly, by their adjournment,
- prevent its return, in which case it shall be a law,
- unless he shall file the same, with his objections, in
- 17 the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, and give
- 18 notice thereof by public proclamation within 30 days
- 19 after such adjournment.
- The February 9th date by which the Court mandated the General
- 21 Assembly submit a redistricting plan to the Governor and the
- 22 February 15th date by which a redistricting plan must be
- 23 approved by the Governor and sent to the Court allows the
- 24 Governor only a six-day period within which to consider the plan
- 25 and provide his approval, rather than the number of days
- 26 provided for in the Constitution of Pennsylvania. Moreover, this
- 27 six-day period did not provide any time for the General Assembly
- 28 to exercise its constitutional override authority should the
- 29 Governor veto the redistricting plan.
- 30 This six-day period clearly, plainly and palpably violated

- 1 Article IV, Section 15 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania. By
- 2 its express terms, the Order ignored the constitutional time
- 3 frame set out for the Governor's consideration of a bill as well
- 4 as the constitutional authority of the General Assembly to
- 5 override a gubernatorial veto.
- 6 In signing this order that blatantly and clearly contradicts
- 7 the plain language of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Justice
- 8 David N. Wecht engaged in misbehavior in office.
- 9 Wherefore, Justice David N. Wecht is guilty of an impeachable
- 10 offense warranting removal from office and disqualification to
- 11 hold any office or trust or profit in this Commonwealth.
- 12 ARTICLE III
- 13 In its January 22, 2018 Order, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
- 14 further held that should the General Assembly not submit a
- 15 congressional districting plan on or before February 9, 2018, or
- 16 should the Governor not approve the General Assembly's plan on
- 17 or before February 15, 2018, the Court shall proceed to
- 18 expeditiously adopt a plan based on the evidentiary record
- 19 developed in the Commonwealth Court. This order by the
- 20 Pennsylvania Supreme Court completely disregards the tenets of
- 21 the United States Constitution.
- In a related Order of the Court dated February 7, 2018, a
- 23 fellow Justice on the Court recognized the gravity of the
- 24 Court's order in his concurring and dissenting opinion. He
- 25 stated, "the Court's remedy threatens the separation of powers
- 26 dictated by Article I, Section 4 of the United States
- 27 Constitution by failing to allow our sister branches sufficient
- 28 time to legislate a new congressional districting map,
- 29 potentially impinges upon the due process rights of the parties
- 30 at bar..." League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 645 Pa. 1,

- 1 136, 178 A.3d 737, 826 (2018). Article 1, Section 4 of the
- 2 United States Constitution gives authority regarding the "Times,
- 3 Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
- 4 Representatives" only to state legislatures and Congress. In
- 5 this unprecedented case, by issuing their January 22, 2018
- 6 Order, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has, in contravention to
- 7 the express grant of authority in the United States
- 8 Constitution, arrogated unto itself this legislative authority.
- 9 On February 19, 2018, the Court issued a Per Curiam opinion
- 10 and order, with Justice Wecht and three other Justices of the
- 11 Supreme Court arrogating to themselves the task of drawing
- 12 Congressional Districts. In his dissenting opinion, the Chief
- 13 Justice noted,"... the adoption of a judicially created
- 14 redistricting plan apparently upon advice from a political
- 15 scientist who has not submitted a report as of record nor
- 16 appeared as a witness in any court proceeding in this case; and
- 17 the absence of an adversarial hearing to resolve factual
- 18 controversies arising in the present remedial phase of this
- 19 litigation." League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v.
- 20 Commonwealth, 645 Pa. 576, 626, 181 A.3d 1083, 1121-22 (2018).
- 21 He said, "In these circumstances, the displacement to the
- 22 judiciary of the political responsibility for redistricting-
- 23 which is assigned to the General Assembly by the United States
- 24 Constitution-appears to me to be unprecedented." Id. at 1122.
- 25 In joining an Order of the Supreme Court that blatantly and
- 26 clearly contradicts the plain language of the United States
- 27 Constitution, Justice David N. Wecht engaged in misbehavior in
- 28 office.
- 29 Wherefore, Justice David N. Wecht is quilty of an impeachable
- 30 offense warranting removal from office and disqualification to

- 1 hold any office or trust or profit under this Commonwealth.
- 2 ARTICLE IV
- 3 In July of 2019, Justice Wecht authored the opinion in
- 4 Pennsylvania Restaurant and Lodging Association v. Pittsburgh,
- 5 re-writing provisions of the Commonwealth's Home Rule Charter
- 6 and Optional Plans Law and Disease Prevention and Control Law of
- 7 1955 to manufacture authority to compel employers within the
- 8 City of Pittsburgh to provide paid sick leave to their
- 9 employees. 211 A.3d 810 (Pa. 2019). In doing so, Justice Wecht
- 10 transgressed the Separation of Powers between the legislative
- 11 and judicial branches of State government.
- 12 The law, codified as 53 Pa.C.S. § 2962, provides for
- 13 limitations on ability of a municipality which adopts a home
- 14 rule charter in the regulation of businesses and employment. The
- 15 law states, in part, that home rule municipalities "shall not
- 16 determine duties, responsibilities or requirements placed upon
- 17 businesses, occupations and employers, including the duty to
- 18 withhold, remit or report taxes or penalties levied or imposed
- 19 upon them or upon persons in their employment, except as
- 20 expressly provided by statutes which are applicable in every
- 21 part of this Commonwealth or which are applicable to all
- 22 municipalities or to a class or classes of municipalities."
- Despite there being no authority "expressly provided by
- 24 statutes," Justice Wecht undertook a tortured and circuitous 46-
- 25 page analysis of existing State law and manufactured authority
- 26 from the words of the Disease Prevention and Control Law of
- 27 1955. This law imposes the responsibility for "the prevention
- 28 and control of communicable and non-communicable diseases" on
- 29 local boards of health and the Department of Health (in the
- 30 absence of a local board). Despite the command in the law that

- 1 such authority be "expressly provided" for such ordinances to be
- 2 within the municipality's legitimate authority, Justice Wecht
- 3 found authority which was at-best implied under the Disease
- 4 Prevention and Control Law of 1955 satisfied the "express"
- 5 requirements.
- 6 The Disease Prevention and Control Law of 1955 grants local
- 7 boards of health and the Department of Health authority over
- 8 individuals who are infected with a communicable or non-
- 9 communicable disease and who have been exposed to such
- 10 individuals and, grants authority to isolate, quarantine and
- 11 surveille only these two classes of individuals. Nowhere in the
- 12 Disease Prevention and Control Law of 1955, or elsewhere in
- 13 Pennsylvania law, is there an expressed grant of authority to
- 14 municipalities to compel private businesses to provide paid sick
- 15 leave.
- In re-writing the statute, by striking the word "expressly"
- 17 in the law and replacing it with "impliedly," Justice Wecht
- 18 exercised authority that is solely vested in the legislative
- 19 branch under Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution of
- 20 Pennsylvania. This transgression of the separation of powers
- 21 between co-equal branches of government evidences that Justice
- 22 David N. Wecht engaged in misbehavior in office.
- 23 Wherefore, Justice David N. Wecht is guilty of an impeachable
- 24 offense warranting removal from office and disqualification to
- 25 hold any office of trust or profit under this Commonwealth.
- 26 ARTICLE V
- 27 In July 2020, Justice Wecht authored the majority opinion
- 28 Wolf v. Scarnati, blatantly violating the separation of powers
- 29 between the legislative and judicial branches of government. 233
- 30 A.3d 679 (Pa. 2020).

- 1 The question in Wolf v. Scarnati was whether a concurrent
- 2 resolution seeking to compel the Governor to end a state of
- 3 emergency required presentment under Article III, Section 9 of
- 4 the Constitution of Pennsylvania. The statute at issue, codified
- 5 at 35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(c), provides that "[t]he General Assembly
- 6 by concurrent resolution may terminate a state of disaster
- 7 emergency at any time. Thereupon, the Governor shall issue an
- 8 executive order or proclamation ending the state of disaster
- 9 emergency." The statute, enacted in 1978, did not provide a
- 10 mechanism for presentment to the Governor. By the plain reading
- 11 of the words of the law, presentment to the Governor was not
- 12 envisioned by the General Assembly of 1978.
- 13 In holding the statute to be unconstitutional, Justice Wecht
- 14 re-wrote the statute to add a presentment provision to the law.
- 15 As articulated by a fellow Justice of the Court, Justice Wecht
- 16 amended the law as follows:
- 17 The General Assembly by concurrent resolution may
- 18 terminate a state of disaster emergency at any time. [The
- 19 Governor may then approve or veto the resolution. If the
- 20 resolution is approved by the Governor or his veto is
- 21 **overridden**, t]hereupon, the Governor shall issue an
- 22 executive order or proclamation ending the state of
- disaster emergency.
- 24 Wolf, 233 A.3d at 709.
- The plain language of the statute stands as a clear
- 26 expression of legislative intent by the General Assembly of 1978
- 27 to avoid presentment to the Governor. According to his fellow
- 28 Justice, Wecht's effort to re-write the statute or ignore its
- 29 plain language "is merely a means to the same end i.e.,
- 30 permitting the constitutional requirement of presentment to be

- 1 satisfied notwithstanding the fact that the statute explicitly
- 2 aims to avoid exactly that." Id. at 712
- 3 Justice Wecht's opinion in Wolf v. Scarnati is at tension
- 4 with long-standing jurisprudence on severability of
- 5 unconstitutional laws, including an opinion authored by Justice
- 6 Wecht himself.
- 7 In Protz v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, Justice Wecht
- 8 gave a strict reading of the Worker's Compensation Act on the
- 9 use of impairment ratings from the American Medical Association
- 10 in making determinations of the level of disability for workers'
- 11 compensation, and struck down the law. 639 Pa. 645, 161 A.3d 827
- 12 (2017). The law provided that physicians should make these
- 13 determinations "pursuant to the most recent edition of the
- 14 American Medical Association 'Guide to the Evaluation of
- 15 Permanent Impairment.'" At the time the law was enacted, the
- 16 Fourth Edition of the AMA Guides was being used. For the sake of
- 17 "constitutional avoidance," and the appearance of impartiality
- 18 and consistency, Justice Wecht could have simply struck the
- 19 words "most recent" and added the word "Fourth." He did not.
- 20 Strikingly, Justice Wecht found it constitutionally tenable
- 21 in Wolf v. Scarnati to add 22 words that the General Assembly
- 22 did not include in the law, while finding it constitutionally
- 23 untenable in Protz to replace two words with one.
- 24 By re-writing the statute under the auspices of
- 25 "constitutional avoidance," Justice Wecht frustrated the intent
- 26 of the General Assembly of 1978 and exercised authority that is
- 27 vested in the legislative branch under Article II, Section 1 of
- 28 the Constitution of Pennsylvania. This violation of his
- 29 obligation to uphold the Constitution of Pennsylvania evidences
- 30 that Justice David N. Wecht engaged in misbehavior in office.

- 1 Wherefore, Justice David N. Wecht is guilty of an impeachable
- 2 offense warranting removal from office and disqualification to
- 3 hold any office of trust or profit under this Commonwealth.
- 4 ARTICLE VI
- 5 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted Rule 2.11(A)(4) of the
- 6 Code of Judicial Conduct, which governs recusals and provides
- 7 that when "[t]he judge knows or learns that a party, a party's
- 8 lawyers, or the law firm of a party's lawyer has made a direct
- 9 or indirect contribution to the judge's campaign in "...an
- 10 amount that would raise a reasonable concern about the fairness
- 11 or impartiality of the judge's consideration of a case involving
- 12 the party..." judges shall disqualify themselves.
- 13 In September 2020, the Supreme Court issued its opinion and
- 14 order in Pennsylvania Democratic Party v. Boockvar. No. 133 MM
- 15 2020, 2020 WL 5554644 (Pa. Sept. 17, 2020). During his 2015
- 16 campaign for election to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Justice
- 17 Wecht received nearly \$3.1 million in campaign contributions
- 18 during the 2015 election cycle. Nearly 8%, or \$224,910.24, of
- 19 his reported campaign funds were contributed by the petitioners
- 20 in Pennsylvania Democratic Party v. Boockvar.
- 21 Rule 2.11(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct establishes
- 22 unequivocally that any judge, including a Justice of the Supreme
- 23 Court, "shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in
- 24 which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned."
- 25 A judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned-and a
- 26 judge must disqualify himself or herself-when "the judge, while
- 27 a judge or judicial candidate, has made a public statement,
- 28 other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion,
- 29 that commits the judge to reach a particular result or rule in a
- 30 particular way in the proceeding or controversy." Rule 2.11(A)

- 1 (5).
- 2 According to the commentaries on this Rule, there is no
- 3 amount specified that would require recusal or disqualification,
- 4 but rather "the nature of the inquiry is an objective one
- 5 involving the public perception of large contributions and their
- 6 effect on the judge's ability to be impartial... A contribution
- 7 of several thousand dollars will almost always require an
- 8 analysis of whether disqualification is warranted...[T]he effect
- 9 of contributions will generally dissipate over time. The larger
- 10 the contribution, the longer it will take to dissipate."
- 11 Statement of Policy Regarding Disqualification Based on Campaign
- 12 Contributions Under Rule 2.11(A)(4) published at 46 Pa.B. 6969
- 13 (November 5, 2016).
- Justice Wecht, writing for the majority in Commonwealth v.
- 15 Koehler (2020), addressed the issue of recusal. He stated that a
- 16 challenge to an appellate judge's bias may be heard under the
- 17 Post Conviction Relief Act because, "'[d]ue process demands the
- 18 absence of judicial bias.' And a litigant's due process rights
- 19 are violated if a biased appellate judge decides the fate of the
- 20 litigant's appeal." 229 A.3d 915, 931 (Pa. 2020) (citations
- 21 omitted). Donations of large sums of money to a Justice's
- 22 campaign by a party to litigation must be disclosed so that the
- 23 parties may weigh the efficacy of an application for
- 24 disqualification of that Justice.
- Justice Wecht had an obligation to disclose these
- 26 contributions to the parties under the Court's Rules of Judicial
- 27 Conduct. This failure to disclose evidences that Justice David
- 28 N. Wecht engaged in misbehavior in office.
- 29 Wherefore, Justice David N. Wecht is quilty of an impeachable
- 30 offense warranting removal from office and disqualification to

- 1 hold any office of trust or profit under this Commonwealth.
- 2 ARTICLE VII
- 3 Justice Wecht, who as a Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice
- 4 took an oath to support, obey and defend the Constitutions of
- 5 the United States and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and to
- 6 discharge the duties of his office with fidelity, and who is
- 7 bound to uphold the integrity of the judiciary, to avoid
- 8 impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, and to perform
- 9 the duties of his office impartially, did, through actions
- 10 including:
- 11 (1) failing to abide by the Pennsylvania Code of
- 12 Judicial Conduct and thereby depriving parties of their
- rights to Due Process guaranteed under the United States
- 14 Constitution and the Constitution of Pennsylvania in League
- of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth;
- 16 (2) violating Article IV, Section 15 of the Constitution
- of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in League of Women Voters
- of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth;
- 19 (3) violating Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution
- of the United States of America in League of Women Voters of
- 21 Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth;
- 22 (4) exercising authority that is solely vested in the
- legislative branch under Article II, Section 1 of the
- 24 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in
- 25 Pennsylvania Restaurant and Lodging Association v.
- 26 Pittsburgh;
- 27 (5) exercising authority that is solely vested in the
- legislative branch under Article II, Section 1 of the
- 29 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in Wolf v.
- 30 Scarnati;

- 1 (6) failing to abide by the Canons of Judicial Ethics
- 2 embodied in the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct to
- 3 disclose his potential bias to the parties in *Pennsylvania*
- 4 Democratic Party v. Boockvar;
- 5 undermine confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
- 6 judiciary and betray the trust of the people of the Commonwealth
- 7 of Pennsylvania, thereby bringing disrepute on the courts of the
- 8 Commonwealth, and rendering Justice Wecht unfit to continue to
- 9 serve as a Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
- 10 Wherefore, Justice David N. Wecht is guilty of an impeachable
- 11 offense warranting removal from office and disqualification to
- 12 hold any office of trust or profit under this Commonwealth.
- 13 The House of Representatives hereby reserves to itself the
- 14 right and ability to exhibit at any time hereafter further
- 15 Articles of Impeachment against Justice David N. Wecht, to reply
- 16 to any answers which Justice Wecht may make to any Articles of
- 17 Impeachment which are exhibited and to offer proof at trial in
- 18 the Senate in support of each and every Article of Impeachment
- 19 which shall be exhibited by them.