New Jersey-2024-A1007-Introduced

An Act concerning post-high school educational expenses, amending N.J.S.2A:34-23 and supplementing chapter 34 of Title 2A of the New Jersey Statutes.

Be It Enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:

1. N.J.S.2A:34-23 is amended to read as follows:

2A:34-23. Pending any matrimonial action or action for dissolution of a civil union brought in this State or elsewhere, or after judgment of divorce or dissolution or maintenance, whether obtained in this State or elsewhere, the court may make such order as to the alimony or maintenance of the parties, and also as to the care, custody, education and maintenance of the children, or any of them, as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just, and require reasonable security for the due observance of such orders, including, but not limited to, the creation of trusts or other security devices, to assure payment of reasonably foreseeable medical and educational expenses. Upon neglect or refusal to give such reasonable security, as shall be required, or upon default in complying with any such order, the court may award and issue process for the immediate sequestration of the personal estate, and the rents and profits of the real estate of the party so charged, and appoint a receiver thereof, and cause such personal estate and the rents and profits of such real estate, or so much thereof as shall be necessary, to be applied toward such alimony and maintenance as to the said court shall from time to time seem reasonable and just; or the performance of the said orders may be enforced by other ways according to the practice of the court. Orders so made may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require.

The court may order one party to pay a retainer on behalf of the other for expert and legal services when the respective financial circumstances of the parties make the award reasonable and just. In considering an application, the court shall review the financial capacity of each party to conduct the litigation and the criteria for award of counsel fees that are then pertinent as set forth by court rule. Whenever any other application is made to a court which includes an application for pendente lite or final award of counsel fees, the court shall determine the appropriate award for counsel fees, if any, at the same time that a decision is rendered on the other issue then before the court and shall consider the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party. The court may not order a retainer or counsel fee of a party convicted of an attempt or conspiracy to murder the other party to be paid by the party who was the intended victim of the attempt or conspiracy.

a. In determining the amount to be paid by a parent for support of the child and the period during which the duty of support is owed, the court in those cases not governed by court rule shall consider, but not be limited to, the following factors:

(1) Needs of the child;

(2) Standard of living and economic circumstances of each parent;

(3) All sources of income and assets of each parent;

(4) Earning ability of each parent, including educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, custodial responsibility for children including the cost of providing child care and the length of time and cost of each parent to obtain training or experience for appropriate employment;

(5) Need and capacity of the child for education, including, but not limited to, the factors concerning higher education enumerated in section 2 of P.L. c. (C. ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill);

(6) Age and health of the child and each parent;

(7) Income, assets and earning ability of the child;

(8) Responsibility of the parents for the court-ordered support of others;

(9) Reasonable debts and liabilities of each child and parent; and

(10) Any other factors the court may deem relevant.

The obligation to pay support for a child who has not been emancipated by the court shall not terminate solely on the basis of the child's age if the child suffers from a severe mental or physical incapacity that causes the child to be financially dependent on a parent. The obligation to pay support for that child shall continue until the court finds that the child is relieved of the incapacity or is no longer financially dependent on the parent. However, in assessing the financial obligation of the parent, the court shall consider, in addition to the factors enumerated in this section, the child's eligibility for public benefits and services for people with disabilities and may make such orders, including an order involving the creation of a trust, as are necessary to promote the well-being of the child.

As used in this section "severe mental or physical incapacity" shall not include a child's abuse of, or addiction to, alcohol or controlled substances.

b. In all actions brought for divorce, dissolution of a civil union, divorce from bed and board, legal separation from a partner in a civil union couple or nullity the court may award one or more of the following types of alimony: open durational alimony; rehabilitative alimony; limited duration alimony or reimbursement alimony to either party. In so doing the court shall consider, but not be limited to, the following factors:

(1) The actual need and ability of the parties to pay;

(2) The duration of the marriage or civil union;

(3) The age, physical and emotional health of the parties;

(4) The standard of living established in the marriage or civil union and the likelihood that each party can maintain a reasonably comparable standard of living, with neither party having a greater entitlement to that standard of living than the other;

(5) The earning capacities, educational levels, vocational skills, and employability of the parties;

(6) The length of absence from the job market of the party seeking maintenance;

(7) The parental responsibilities for the children;

(8) The time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment, the availability of the training and employment, and the opportunity for future acquisitions of capital assets and income;

(9) The history of the financial or non-financial contributions to the marriage or civil union by each party including contributions to the care and education of the children and interruption of personal careers or educational opportunities;

(10) The equitable distribution of property ordered and any payouts on equitable distribution, directly or indirectly, out of current income, to the extent this consideration is reasonable, just and fair;

(11) The income available to either party through investment of any assets held by that party;

(12) The tax treatment and consequences to both parties of any alimony award, including the designation of all or a portion of the payment as a non-taxable payment;

(13) The nature, amount, and length of pendente lite support paid, if any; and

(14) Any other factors which the court may deem relevant.

In each case where the court is asked to make an award of alimony, the court shall consider and assess evidence with respect to all relevant statutory factors. If the court determines that certain factors are more or less relevant than others, the court shall make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law on the reasons why the court reached that conclusion. No factor shall be elevated in importance over any other factor unless the court finds otherwise, in which case the court shall make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law in that regard.

When a share of a retirement benefit is treated as an asset for purposes of equitable distribution, the court shall not consider income generated thereafter by that share for purposes of determining alimony.

c. In any case in which there is a request for an award of alimony, the court shall consider and make specific findings on the evidence about all of the statutory factors set forth in subsection b. of this section.

For any marriage or civil union less than 20 years in duration, the total duration of alimony shall not, except in exceptional circumstances, exceed the length of the marriage or civil union. Determination of the length and amount of alimony shall be made by the court pursuant to consideration of all of the statutory factors set forth in subsection b. of this section. In addition to those factors, the court shall also consider the practical impact of the parties' need for separate residences and the attendant increase in living expenses on the ability of both parties to maintain a standard of living reasonably comparable to the standard of living established in the marriage or civil union, to which both parties are entitled, with neither party having a greater entitlement thereto.

Exceptional circumstances which may require an adjustment to the duration of alimony include:

(1) The ages of the parties at the time of the marriage or civil union and at the time of the alimony award;

(2) The degree and duration of the dependency of one party on the other party during the marriage or civil union;

(3) Whether a spouse or partner has a chronic illness or unusual health circumstance;

(4) Whether a spouse or partner has given up a career or a career opportunity or otherwise supported the career of the other spouse or partner;

(5) Whether a spouse or partner has received a disproportionate share of equitable distribution;

(6) The impact of the marriage or civil union on either party's ability to become self-supporting, including but not limited to either party's responsibility as primary caretaker of a child;

(7) Tax considerations of either party;

(8) Any other factors or circumstances that the court deems equitable, relevant and material.

An award of alimony for a limited duration may be modified based either upon changed circumstances, or upon the nonoccurrence of circumstances that the court found would occur at the time of the award. The court may modify the amount of such an award, but shall not modify the length of the term except in unusual circumstances.

In determining the length of the term, the court shall consider the length of time it would reasonably take for the recipient to improve his or her earning capacity to a level where limited duration alimony is no longer appropriate.

d. Rehabilitative alimony shall be awarded based upon a plan in which the payee shows the scope of rehabilitation, the steps to be taken, and the time frame, including a period of employment during which rehabilitation will occur. An award of rehabilitative alimony may be modified based either upon changed circumstances, or upon the nonoccurrence of circumstances that the court found would occur at the time of the rehabilitative award.

This section is not intended to preclude a court from modifying alimony awards based upon the law.

e. Reimbursement alimony may be awarded under circumstances in which one party supported the other through an advanced education, anticipating participation in the fruits of the earning capacity generated by that education. An award of reimbursement alimony shall not be modified for any reason.

f. Except as provided in subsection i., nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the court's authority to award open durational alimony, limited duration alimony, rehabilitative alimony or reimbursement alimony, separately or in any combination, as warranted by the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case.

g. In all actions for divorce or dissolution other than those where judgment is granted solely on the ground of separation the court may consider also the proofs made in establishing such ground in determining an amount of alimony or maintenance that is fit, reasonable and just. In all actions for divorce, dissolution of civil union, divorce from bed and board, or legal separation from a partner in a civil union couple where judgment is granted on the ground of institutionalization for mental illness the court may consider the possible burden upon the taxpayers of the State as well as the ability of the party to pay in determining an amount of maintenance to be awarded.

h. Except as provided in this subsection, in all actions where a judgment of divorce, dissolution of civil union, divorce from bed and board or legal separation from a partner in a civil union couple is entered the court may make such award or awards to the parties, in addition to alimony and maintenance, to effectuate an equitable distribution of the property, both real and personal, which was legally and beneficially acquired by them or either of them during the marriage or civil union. However, all such property, real, personal or otherwise, legally or beneficially acquired during the marriage or civil union by either party by way of gift, devise, or intestate succession shall not be subject to equitable distribution, except that interspousal gifts or gifts between partners in a civil union couple shall be subject to equitable distribution. The court may not make an award concerning the equitable distribution of property on behalf of a party convicted of an attempt or conspiracy to murder the other party.

i. No person convicted of Murder, N.J.S.2C:11-3; Manslaughter, N.J.S.2C:11-4; Criminal Homicide, N.J.S.2C:11-2; Aggravated Assault, under subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:12-1; or a substantially similar offense under the laws of another jurisdiction, may receive alimony if: (1) the crime results in death or serious bodily injury, as defined in subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:11-1, to a family member of a divorcing party; and (2) the crime was committed after the marriage or civil union. A person convicted of an attempt or conspiracy to commit murder may not receive alimony from the person who was the intended victim of the attempt or conspiracy. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit the authority of the court to deny alimony for other bad acts.

As used in this subsection:

"Family member" means a spouse, child, parent, sibling, aunt, uncle, niece, nephew, first cousin, grandparent, grandchild, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, stepparent, stepchild, stepbrother, stepsister, half brother, or half sister, whether the individual is related by blood, marriage or civil union, or adoption.

j. Alimony may be modified or terminated upon the prospective or actual retirement of the obligor.

(1) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that alimony shall terminate upon the obligor spouse or partner attaining full retirement age, except that any arrearages that have accrued prior to the termination date shall not be vacated or annulled. The court may set a different alimony termination date for good cause shown based on specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The rebuttable presumption may be overcome if, upon consideration of the following factors and for good cause shown, the court determines that alimony should continue:

(a) The ages of the parties at the time of the application for retirement;

(b) The ages of the parties at the time of the marriage or civil union and their ages at the time of entry of the alimony award;

(c) The degree and duration of the economic dependency of the recipient upon the payor during the marriage or civil union;

(d) Whether the recipient has foregone or relinquished or otherwise sacrificed claims, rights or property in exchange for a more substantial or longer alimony award;

(e) The duration or amount of alimony already paid;

(f) The health of the parties at the time of the retirement application;

(g) Assets of the parties at the time of the retirement application;

(h) Whether the recipient has reached full retirement age as defined in this section;

(i) Sources of income, both earned and unearned, of the parties;

(j) The ability of the recipient to have saved adequately for retirement; and

(k) Any other factors that the court may deem relevant.

If the court determines, for good cause shown based on specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law, that the presumption has been overcome, then the court shall apply the alimony factors as set forth in subsection b. of this section to the parties' current circumstances in order to determine whether modification or termination of alimony is appropriate. If the obligor intends to retire but has not yet retired, the court shall establish the conditions under which the modification or termination of alimony will be effective.

(2) Where the obligor seeks to retire prior to attaining the full retirement age as defined in this section, the obligor shall have the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the prospective or actual retirement is reasonable and made in good faith. Both the obligor's application to the court for modification or termination of alimony and the obligee's response to the application shall be accompanied by current Case Information Statements or other relevant documents as required by the Rules of Court, as well as the Case Information Statements or other documents from the date of entry of the original alimony award and from the date of any subsequent modification.

In order to determine whether the obligor has met the burden of demonstrating that the obligor's prospective or actual retirement is reasonable and made in good faith, the court shall consider the following factors:

(a) The age and health of the parties at the time of the application;

(b) The obligor's field of employment and the generally accepted age of retirement for those in that field;

(c) The age when the obligor becomes eligible for retirement at the obligor's place of employment, including mandatory retirement dates or the dates upon which continued employment would no longer increase retirement benefits;

(d) The obligor's motives in retiring, including any pressures to retire applied by the obligor's employer or incentive plans offered by the obligor's employer;

(e) The reasonable expectations of the parties regarding retirement during the marriage or civil union and at the time of the divorce or dissolution;

(f) The ability of the obligor to maintain support payments following retirement, including whether the obligor will continue to be employed part-time or work reduced hours;

(g) The obligee's level of financial independence and the financial impact of the obligor's retirement upon the obligee; and

(h) Any other relevant factors affecting the obligor's decision to retire and the parties' respective financial positions.

If the obligor intends to retire but has not yet retired, the court shall establish the conditions under which the modification or termination of alimony will be effective.

(3) When a retirement application is filed in cases in which there is an existing final alimony order or enforceable written agreement established prior to the effective date of this act, the obligor's reaching full retirement age as defined in this section shall be deemed a good faith retirement age. Upon application by the obligor to modify or terminate alimony, both the obligor's application to the court for modification or termination of alimony and the obligee's response to the application shall be accompanied by current Case Information Statements or other relevant documents as required by the Rules of Court, as well as the Case Information Statements or other documents from the date of entry of the original alimony award and from the date of any subsequent modification. In making its determination, the court shall consider the ability of the obligee to have saved adequately for retirement as well as the following factors in order to determine whether the obligor, by a preponderance of the evidence, has demonstrated that modification or termination of alimony is appropriate:

(a) The age and health of the parties at the time of the application;

(b) The obligor's field of employment and the generally accepted age of retirement for those in that field;

(d) The obligor's motives in retiring, including any pressures to retire applied by the obligor's employer or incentive plans offered by the obligor's employer;

(e) The reasonable expectations of the parties regarding retirement during the marriage or civil union and at the time of the divorce or dissolution;

(f) The ability of the obligor to maintain support payments following retirement, including whether the obligor will continue to be employed part-time or work reduced hours;

(g) The obligee's level of financial independence and the financial impact of the obligor's retirement upon the obligee; and

(h) Any other relevant factors affecting the parties' respective financial positions.

(4) The assets distributed between the parties at the time of the entry of a final order of divorce or dissolution of a civil union shall not be considered by the court for purposes of determining the obligor's ability to pay alimony following retirement.

k. When a non-self-employed party seeks modification of alimony, the court shall consider the following factors:

(1) The reasons for any loss of income;

(2) Under circumstances where there has been a loss of employment, the obligor's documented efforts to obtain replacement employment or to pursue an alternative occupation;

(3) Under circumstances where there has been a loss of employment, whether the obligor is making a good faith effort to find remunerative employment at any level and in any field;

(4) The income of the obligee; the obligee's circumstances; and the obligee's reasonable efforts to obtain employment in view of those circumstances and existing opportunities;

(5) The impact of the parties' health on their ability to obtain employment;

(6) Any severance compensation or award made in connection with any loss of employment;

(7) Any changes in the respective financial circumstances of the parties that have occurred since the date of the order from which modification is sought;

(8) The reasons for any change in either party's financial circumstances since the date of the order from which modification is sought, including, but not limited to, assessment of the extent to which either party's financial circumstances at the time of the application are attributable to enhanced earnings or financial benefits received from any source since the date of the order;

(9) Whether a temporary remedy should be fashioned to provide adjustment of the support award from which modification is sought, and the terms of any such adjustment, pending continuing employment investigations by the unemployed spouse or partner; and

(10) Any other factor the court deems relevant to fairly and equitably decide the application.

Under circumstances where the changed circumstances arise from the loss of employment, the length of time a party has been involuntarily unemployed or has had an involuntary reduction in income shall not be the only factor considered by the court when an application is filed by a non-self-employed party to reduce alimony because of involuntary loss of employment. The court shall determine the application based upon all of the enumerated factors, however, no application shall be filed until a party has been unemployed, or has not been able to return to or attain employment at prior income levels, or both, for a period of 90 days. The court shall have discretion to make any relief granted retroactive to the date of the loss of employment or reduction of income.

l. When a self-employed party seeks modification of alimony because of an involuntary reduction in income since the date of the order from which modification is sought, then that party's application for relief must include an analysis that sets forth the economic and non-economic benefits the party receives from the business, and which compares these economic and non-economic benefits to those that were in existence at the time of the entry of the order.

m. When assessing a temporary remedy, the court may temporarily suspend support, or reduce support on terms; direct that support be paid in some amount from assets pending further proceedings; direct a periodic review; or enter any other order the court finds appropriate to assure fairness and equity to both parties.

n. Alimony may be suspended or terminated if the payee cohabits with another person. Cohabitation involves a mutually supportive, intimate personal relationship in which a couple has undertaken duties and privileges that are commonly associated with marriage or civil union but does not necessarily maintain a single common household.

When assessing whether cohabitation is occurring, the court shall consider the following:

(1) Intertwined finances such as joint bank accounts and other joint holdings or liabilities;

(2) Sharing or joint responsibility for living expenses;

(3) Recognition of the relationship in the couple's social and family circle;

(4) Living together, the frequency of contact, the duration of the relationship, and other indicia of a mutually supportive intimate personal relationship;

(5) Sharing household chores;

(6) Whether the recipient of alimony has received an enforceable promise of support from another person within the meaning of subsection h. of R.S.25:1-5; and

(7) All other relevant evidence.

In evaluating whether cohabitation is occurring and whether alimony should be suspended or terminated, the court shall also consider the length of the relationship. A court may not find an absence of cohabitation solely on grounds that the couple does not live together on a full-time basis.

As used in this section:

"Full retirement age" shall mean the age at which a person is eligible to receive full retirement for full retirement benefits under section 216 of the federal Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. s.416).

(cf: P.L.2014, c.42)

2. (New section) a. Pursuant to any determination made by the court under subsection a. of N.J.S.2A:34-23, the court may make such order for the educational expenses of an unemancipated child, whether of minor or majority age. The court's authority to make such provision extends, but is not limited to, periods of undergraduate college education or professional or other training after a child's graduation from high school. The court's authority under this statute terminates when the child receives a bachelor's degree or a post-high school vocational certificate or similar certification confirming the child's completion of the course of study.

Educational expenses for which a court may make such order may include, but shall not be limited to, tuition, room, board, dues, transportation to and from school during scheduled school recesses, books, supplies, nondiscretionary fees, registration and application costs, lab costs, computer costs, medical expenses including medical insurance and living expenses during the school year, which sums may be ordered payable to the child, to either parent, or to the educational institution directly or through a special account or trust created for such purpose, at the discretion of the court. Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from requiring the child to contribute to his educational expenses in the form of scholarships, grants, work-study programs, use of assets held in the child's name, student loans or financial aid. The court shall have the authority to allocate the child's contribution between the parents and child, if warranted by the factors below.

When parents, regardless of their relationship or marital status, are in agreement on the issue of their responsibility, if any, regarding the payment of post high-school education expenses and child support on behalf of a child over the age of 18, the court shall not intervene on these issues unless the court determines that the parties' agreement would result in harm to the child.

In evaluating whether to make provision for the post-high school educational expenses of an unemancipated child as set forth herein, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to:

(1) Whether the parents, if still living with the child, would have contributed toward the child's educational expenses;

(2) The effect of the background, values, and goals of the parents on the reasonableness of the expectation of the child for contribution to his or her educational expenses;

(3) Any socioeconomic benefits that the child may gain from obtaining a post-high school education, including, but not limited to any benefits the child may obtain from being the first child in his or her family to obtain a post-high school education;

(4) The amount of the contribution sought for the child's educational expenses;

(5) The ability of the parents to pay the child's educational expenses, with the court having the discretion to impute an income to a parent who is underemployed without just cause for purposes of determining that parent's ability to pay;

(6) The relationship of the requested contribution to the kind of educational institution into which the child seeks entry or course of study sought by the child;

(7) The type of institution into which the child seeks to advance his or her education and the institution's graduation rate, employment placement rate, student debt rate, as well as all other relevant information regarding the institution;

(8) The availability of the course of study sought by the child at a New Jersey public institution;

(9) The financial resources of both parents;

(10) The commitment to and aptitude of the child for the requested education;

(11) The length of the course of study necessary to obtain the degree or certification sought by the child and the anticipated ability of the child to complete the course of study within that time period, with the court having the authority to limit the parent's contribution toward a child's undergraduate college expenses to four tuition years;

(12) The financial resources of the child as compared with the financial resources of both parents;

(13) The existence of custodial or trust funds for the benefit of the child, subject to the terms of the custodial account or trust, with the court having the authority to allocate the custodial or trust funds established by the parents during the marriage, or, in circumstances where the parties were unmarried, established during periods of cohabitation equally between the parents or otherwise, if warranted;

(14) The ability of the child to earn income during the school year or during school recesses;

(15) The availability of scholarships, grants, work-study programs, and or student loans, financial aid to the child, as well as the terms of repayment of any loans;

(16) The child's relationship to each parent, at the time the contribution is sought, as well as in the years preceding the time the contribution is sought, including mutual affection and shared goals, responsiveness to parental advice and guidance;

(17) The date on which the contribution was first requested and the date on which the parent was notified that contribution would be sought;

(18) Whether the parents have children that have obtained post-high school education and the amount the parents contributed toward those post-high school education costs;

(19) Whether the parent from whom contribution is sought has other children, their ages relative to the age of the child for whom contribution is sought, and, if known, the likelihood that the child or children will seek to obtain a post-high school education;

(20) Whether the parent is obligated by court order or agreement to contribute to the support and maintenance of a children other than the child for whom contribution is sought;

(21) The relationship of the education requested to any prior training and to the overall long-range goals of the child; and

(22) Any other factors which the court may deem relevant.

b. In each case where the court is asked to make provision for the educational expenses of an unemancipated child, the court shall consider and assess evidence with respect to all relevant statutory factors. If the court determines that certain factors are more or less relevant than others, the court shall make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the reasons why the court reached that conclusion. No factor shall be elevated in importance over any other factor unless the court finds otherwise, in which case the court shall make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law in that regard.

Upon an application by either parent, the court may modify a prior order directing that a parent contribute to the educational expenses of the child. The following reasons may serve as a basis for the modification, or termination, of a parent's obligation to contribute to an unemancipated child's post-high school educational expenses:

(1) The child's failure to enroll in a post-high school educational program within 120 days after the child has graduated from high school or completed a graduation equivalence degree program, barring illness or disability;

(2) The child's failure to maintain full-time status as determined by the institution at the post-high school educational program, barring illness or disability;

(3) The child's failure to maintain grades sufficient to reenroll at such institution, barring illness or disability;

(4) The child's failure to provide the contributing parent with a transcript or similar official document provided by the post-high school educational institution that includes: (a) the courses in which the child is enrolled, (b) the courses that the child completed for each term, (c) the grades and credits received for each such course, and (d) an official document from the institution listing the courses in which the child is enrolled for the upcoming term and the number of credits for each such course, unless the court finds that providing this information would cause harm to the child;

(5) The child's estrangement from a contributing parent, not due to documented abuse; or

(6) Any other reason that makes the modification of the prior order fit, reasonable, and just, given the parties' and child's circumstances.

If the court terminates the parent's obligation to contribute to the child's educational expenses for the reasons stated above, the termination shall be final with the parent's obligation not eligible for reinstatement.

c. A parent's obligation to pay child support and contribute to the educational expenses of a child who has been diagnosed with a developmental disability, or whose physical disability or diagnosed health problem limits the child's ability to maintain full-time enrollment in a post-high school educational institution shall remain open to review so long as the child is enrolled in and attending an institution for post-high school education and the child continues to meet the other requirements of this section.

As used in this section "post-high school education" means any postsecondary training or schooling for which the student is assessed a fee and attends classes regularly including but not limited to a community college, vocational school, technical school, undergraduate college, or undergraduate university.

d. The issue of the parent's contribution, if any, toward the educational expenses of a child shall be addressed with every final judgment for divorce that establishes child support, as well as any order establishing child support for a child who is older than 17 years of age, unless good cause is shown. Good cause includes (1) the presence of other relevant factors that may make the issue of parental contribution inapplicable and (2) the fact that an injustice would result from the issue being addressed. In all cases, the determination of good cause shall be within the sound discretion of the court. Should good cause exist, the judgment or order shall state the court's reasoning with specificity.

3. This act shall take effect immediately.

STATEMENT

This bill enumerates specific factors for the court to consider in evaluating whether to issue an order for a parent to pay educational expenses of an unemancipated child, whether of minor or majority age. The authority granted under the bill extends to undergraduate college education or professional or other training after graduation from high school.

The types of educational expenses for which a court may make provision include tuition, room, board, dues, transportation to and from school during scheduled school recesses, books, supplies, nondiscretionary fees, registration and application costs, lab costs, computer costs, medical expenses including medical insurance and living expenses during the school year, which sums may be ordered payable to the child, to either parent, or to the educational institution directly or through a special account or trust created for such purpose, at the discretion of the court. Nothing shall preclude the court from requiring the child to contribute to his or her educational expenses in the form of scholarships, grants, work-study programs, use of assets held in the child's name, student loans or financial aid. The court shall have the authority to allocate the child's contribution between the parents and child, if warranted by the enumerated factors.

The factors, many of which are currently used in decisional law, include: (1) Whether the parents, if still living with the child, would have contributed toward the child's educational expenses; (2) The effect of the background, values, and goals of the parents on the reasonableness of the expectation of the child for contribution to his or her educational expenses; (3) Any socioeconomic benefits that the child may gain from obtaining a post-high school education, including, but not limited to any benefits the child may obtain from being the first child in his or her family to obtain a post-high school education; (4) The amount of the contribution sought for the child's educational expenses; (5) The ability of the parents to pay the child's educational expenses, with the court having the discretion to impute an income to a parent who is underemployed without just cause for purposes of determining that parent's ability to pay; (6) The relationship of the requested contribution to the kind of educational institution into which the child seeks entry or course of study sought by the child; (7) The type of institution into which the child seeks to advance his or her education and the institution's graduation rate, employment placement rate, student debt rate, as well as all other relevant information regarding the institution; (8) The availability of the course of study sought by the child at a New Jersey public institution; (9) The financial resources of both parents; (10) The commitment to and aptitude of the child for the requested education; (11) The length of the course of study necessary to obtain the degree or certification sought by the child and the anticipated ability of the child to complete the course of study within that time period, with the court having the authority to limit the parent's contribution toward a child's undergraduate college expenses to four tuition years; (12) The financial resources of the child as compared with the financial resources of both parents; (13) The existence of custodial or trust funds for the benefit of the child, subject to the terms of the custodial account or trust, with the court having the authority to allocate the custodial or trust funds established by the parents during the marriage, or, in circumstances where the parties were unmarried, established during periods of cohabitation equally between the parents or otherwise, if warranted; (14) The ability of the child to earn income during the school year or during school recesses; (15) The availability of scholarships, grants, work-study programs, and or student loans, financial aid to the child, as well as the terms of repayment of any loans; (16) The child's relationship to each parent, at the time the contribution is sought, as well as in the years preceding the time the contribution is sought, including mutual affection and shared goals, responsiveness to parental advice and guidance; (17) The date on which the contribution was first requested and the date on which the parent was notified that contribution would be sought; (18) Whether the parents have children that have obtained post-high school education and the amount the parents contributed toward those post-high school education costs; (19) Whether the parent from whom contribution is sought has other children, their ages relative to the age of the child for whom contribution is sought. and, if known, the likelihood that the child or children will seek to obtain a post-high school education; (20) Whether the parent is obligated by court order or agreement to contribute to the support and maintenance of a children other than the child for whom contribution is sought; (21) The relationship of the education requested to any prior training and to the overall long-range goals of the child; and (22) Any other factors which the court may deem relevant. The bill provides that all the factors are relevant and no factor should be elevated in importance over any other factor unless the court finds otherwise. In that case the court is required to make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law in that regard.

Under the bill, when parents are in agreement on the issue of their responsibility, if any, regarding the payment of post-high school education expenses and child support on behalf of a child over the age of 18, the court shall not intervene on these issues unless the court determines that the parties' agreement would result in harm to the child.

The bill provides that upon an application by either parent, the court may modify a prior order directing that a parent contribute to the educational expenses of the child. The following reasons may serve as a basis for the modification or of a parent's obligation to contribute to an unemancipated child's educational expenses: (1) The child's failure to enroll in a post-high school educational program within 120 days after the child has graduated from high school or completed a graduation equivalence degree program, barring illness or disability; (2) The child's failure to maintain full-time status as determined by the institution at the post-high school education program, barring illness or disability; (3) The child's failure to maintain grades sufficient to reenroll at such institution, barring illness or disability; (4) The child's failure to provide the contributing parent with a transcript or similar official document provided by the post-high school institution that includes: (a) the courses in which the child is enrolled, (b) the courses that the child completed for each term, (c) the grades and credits received for each such course, and (d) an official document from the institution listing the courses in which the child is enrolled for the upcoming term and the number of credits for each such course, unless the court finds that providing this information would cause harm to the child; (5) The child's estrangement from a contributing parent, not due to documented abuse; or (6) Any other reason that makes the modification of the prior order fit, reasonable, and just, given the parties' and child's circumstances.

Under the bill, if the court terminates the parent's obligation to contribute to the child's educational expenses, the termination shall be final with the parent's obligation not eligible for reinstatement.

A parent's obligation to pay child support and contribute to the educational expenses of a child who has been diagnosed with a developmental disability, or whose physical disability or diagnosed health problem limits the child's ability to maintain full-time enrollment in a post-high school institution shall remain open to review so long as such child is enrolled in and attending an institution for post-high school education and the child continues to meet the other requirements of the bill.

As used in the bill, "post-high school education" means any postsecondary training or schooling for which the student is assessed a fee and attends classes regularly including but not limited to a community college, vocational school, technical school, undergraduate college, or undergraduate university.